爱的知识与客体

KNOWLEDGE OF LOVE AND THE OBJECT a
爱与客体的知识

Thus far I have only examined the role of the analysand as a lover within
the transference. But what about the position of the analyst as a loved
object? Elaborating Socrates’ response to Alcibiades’ declaration of love
in the Symposium, Lacan stressed in Seminar VIII (1991b[1960–61]:185)
that the analyst ought to avoid entering the metaphor of love. Like
Socrates the analyst is approached as a loved object, invested with the
supposed subject of knowing and the agalma, yet she is not meant to
return the analysand’s love if the psychoanalytic process is to continue.
Needless to say that this guideline is but a reformulation of Freud’s
warning in ‘Observations on Transference-Love’ (1915a[1914]:165–166)
that the analyst who considers entering a love relationship with the
analysand is inevitably drawn into something else than psychoanalysis.

迄今,我仅是解释分析及作为爱人的角色,在移情里面,。但是关于分析家作为被爱的客体的立场又如何?建构苏格拉底的回应阿西比底斯的宣告爱,在“会饮篇”里,在第八研讨,拉康强调,分析家应该避免进入爱的隐喻。就像苏格拉底,分析家被接近,作为是被爱的客体,被投注作为应该知道的主体,这位阿加马。可是,分析家并没有被用来回因分析者的爱,假如精神分析的过程想要继续。自不待言,这个引导仅是重新阐释弗洛伊德的警告,在“论移情与爱的观察”:分析家若是考虑跟分析者进入爱的关系,他无可避免地会被扯进并非是精神分析的其他东西。

Even more important than the analyst’s avoidance of the metaphor of
love is her refusal to identify with the supposed subject of knowing.
When handling the transference the analyst should again follow Socrates’
example inasmuch as he incessantly impressed on his acolytes that he
knew nothing at all, his only objective in life being the ongoing evaluation
of what they themselves purportedly knew.

比起避免爱的隐喻更加重要的事情,就是分析家拒绝认同作为是应该知道的主体。当分析家处理移情时,他应该再次遵循苏格拉底的榜样。因为他不断地给予他的侍从这个印象:他根本什么都不知道,他一生的唯一的目标,就是正在进行的评估,他们自己被认为知道的事情。

When Lacan claimed that
analysts are supposed subjects of knowing in the transference, it is
therefore crucial to understand that this may be representative of how
analysands perceive their analysts, but not of how analysts should present
themselves vis-a-vis their patients. On numerous occasions Lacan
declared that analysts should refrain from incarnating the supposed
subject of knowing.

当拉康宣称,分析家是被认为知道的主体,在移情里。因此这是很重要的,要理解,这可能的这个代表,分析者如何感知他们的分析家,但是并不是代表分析家应该如何呈现他们自己,跟病人面对时。在无数的场合,拉康宣称:分析家应该自我节制,不要具体表现作为被认为是知道的主体。

As such, he warned in Seminar IX: ‘We need to
learn how to rid ourselves of this supposed subject of knowing at every
moment. We can never have recourse to it; that is excluded’ (Lacan 1961–
62: session of 22 November 1961). Six years later, in Seminar XIV, he
contended that analysts ought to know that they are not subjects endowed
with knowledge, and that one of the analyst’s main tasks consists in the
rectification of the effects of the analysand’s supposition (Lacan 1966–
67: session of 21 June 1967).

作为一位应该知道的主体,拉康在第九研讨班提出警告:「我们需要学习如何替我们自己摆脱这个随时被认为是知道的主体。我们永远无法诉诸于它。那是被排除的。」六年以后,在第14研讨班,拉康主张,分析家应该知道,他们并不是被禀赋具有知识的主体。分析家的主要工作之余,就是矫正分析者的假设的影响。

Taking this precept one step further, one could say that the analyst’s
identification with the supposed subject of knowing is as much a recipe
for the termination of psychoanalytic treatment as engaging in the metaphor
of love, with the caveat that in this case the relation between the analyst
and the analysand will be governed by objectification, suggestion and the
therapeutic abuse of power rather than the mutual sharing of losses and
gains. Not offering themselves as reservoirs of knowledge and not satisfying
the analysand’s demands—a venture in which they engage automatically
when they identify with the supposed subject of knowing— analysts are
expected to bring about a psychic transformation from demand to desire
in the analysand (Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:430; 1977i[1958]:269). In
Seminar XI Lacan put it as follows:

当我们讲这个教导更加深入探讨,我们能够说,分析的认同是应该知道的主体,同样是一个食谱,对于精神分析治疗的终止,作为是参与爱的隐喻。带着这个旦书:在这个情况,分析家与分析者之间的关系将会受到客体化,暗示,与治疗的濫用权力的统辖。而不是互相的分享损失与获益。分析家并没有提供他们自己,作为是知识的贮存所,也没有满足分析者的要求—分析者自动地参与这样的事业,当他们认同应该知道的主体。分析家被期望导致心灵的转变,从要求转变成为分析者身上的欲望。在第11研讨班,拉康表达它如下:

In so far as the analyst is supposed to know [according to the
analysand], he is also supposed [according to the ethics of
psychoanalysis] to set out in search of unconscious desire. This is
why I say …that desire is the axis, the pivot, the handle, the hammer,
by which is applied the force-element to the inertia that lies behind
what is formulated at first, in the discourse of the patient, as demand,
namely the transference.
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:235, translation modified)53

因为分析家应该知道,(依照分析者的想法),也被认为应该出发寻找无意识的欲望(依照精神分析伦理学)。这就是我说的东西。欲望是轴心,枢纽,手把,铁锤。凭借它们,力量的元素比运用到惯性,隐藏在起初被阐释背后的惯性,在病人的辞说里,作为要求,换句话说,作为移情。
At the end of Seminar XI he reconstructed this mandatory analytic
transition from demand to desire—the only way out of the clinical impasse
of transference—in the so-called ‘schema of the interior eight’ (ibid.:
271):

在第11研讨班的结尾,拉康重新建构这个义务的精神分析的转移,从要求转移到欲望—这是唯一的方式脱离移情的临床的僵局。这个所谓的“内部的8字形的基模”。

Figure 2 The interior eight
Source: J.Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1994, p. 271.

In this figure the outer line symbolizes the demands (D) verbalized by the
analysand during the initial stages of the analytic process. Through these
demands the analysand inevitably arrives at a point of transference (T),
notably when he bears witness to a belief in the supposed subject of
knowing. If this moment does not prompt the analysand to withdraw from
the treatment, it constitutes a nodal point where the trajectory of demand
bifurcates, continuing either via the line of identification or via desire.
On the one hand analysts can take advantage of their analysands’
transference to present themselves as ego ideals, proving to their patients
that they honestly care about them (thus fulfilling their demands), cultivating
a mutual working alliance, and facilitating processes of social and
behavioural modelling.

在这个图形里,外面的那条线象征要求(D),由分析者文词表达的要求,在精神分析的过程的最初的阶段。通过这些要求,分析者无可避免地到达移情的点(T).特别是当他见证一个信仰:分析家作为是应该知道的主体。假如这个时刻并没有激发分析者从治疗撤退,它会形成一个节点。在那里,要求的投射分叉出去,要就是经由认同的脉络,要不就是经由欲望的脉络。一方面,分析家能够利用他们的分析者的移情,来呈现他们自己,作为自我理想,对他们的病人证明:他们诚实地关心他们(因此,实践他们的要求),培养互相的工作的联盟,并且让社会与行为的模拟过程更加方便。

This is the approach Lacan situated on the
intersecting line of identification, and which he had designated earlier as
the hallmark of suggestion and the analytic abuse of power (Lacan
1998b[1957–58]:423–438; 1977i[1958]:270).54 When analysts opt for this
strategy of transference handling, analysands identify with their analysts
and enter an endless cycle of identical demands.55

拉康将这个方法定位在移情的脉络的互相交会。他早先曾经指明这个方法,作为是暗示与精神分析的滥用权力的标记。当分析家选择处理移情的策略,分析者认同他们的分析家,并且进入认同的要求的无穷尽的迴圈。

On the other hand,
however, the analyst can also halt before the pathway of identification and
direct the analysand towards the realm of desire (d), which Lacan depicted
as an interrupted line piercing the plane of demand at the point of
transference, thus circumventing the line of identification before rejoining
that of demand.56 To open this sequence, the analyst should neither satisfy
nor frustrate the analysand’s demands (Lacan 1977i[1958]:255), but use
them as launch pads for eliciting a series of questions in the analysand:
‘What do you (analyst) want (from me)?’, ‘What do others want (from
me)?’, ‘What is it that I want (others to want from me)?’, and ‘How is
what I want influenced by what others want (from me)?’.

可是,在另一方面,分析家也能够停止,在认同的途径面前,并且引导分析者朝向欲望(d)的领域。拉康描述欲望的领域,作为是被中断的线,贯穿要求的层面,在移情的点,因此绕过认同的线,在重新加入要求的线之前。为了打开这个系列,分析家既不应该满足,也不应该挫败分析者的要求。而是要使用分析者的要求,作为发达的垫板,召唤分析者的一系列的问题:「你作为分析家想要从我这里获得什么?」,「别人想要从我这里获得什么?」,「我想要别人从我这里获得什么?」,「我想要的东西,如何受到别人从我这里想要的东西的影响?」

Again the analyst
is not supposed to answer these questions, because that would only imply
his renewed identification with the supposed subject of knowing. Rather
he is expected to enable analysands to voice their own answers, which
normally leads to the (re)construction of their fantasies and, eventually, to
their realization that it is impossible to know for once and for all what it is
they want since they are human beings endowed with an unconscious. For
analysts the linchpin of this entire procedure is their constant refusal to
identify with the supposed subject of knowing.

而且,分析家并不认为应该回答这些问题。因为那将仅是暗示他的重新的认同作为应该知道的主体。相反地,分析家被期望让分析者能够表达他们自己的回答。分析者自己的回答正常来说,会导致他们的幻见的重新建构。最后,会导致他们的体会:这个不可能的,要一劳永逸地知道他们想要什么,因为他们是禀赋著无意识的人类。对于分析家,这整个过程的支撑就是他们固定地拒绝认同作为是应该知道的主体。

Does this mean that Lacanian analysts are entitled to ensconce
themselves in their comfortable seats without bothering too much about
the acquisition of psychoanalytic knowledge? Not at all. In his ‘Proposition
of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’, Lacan proclaimed:
‘It is clear that of the supposed knowledge he [the analyst] knows nothing
…This in no way authorises the psychoanalyst to be satisfied in the
knowledge that he knows nothing, for what is at issue is what he has to
come to know’ (Lacan 1995b[1967]:6).

这难道意味著,分析家有资格牢固他自己,于他们的舒适的座位,不必太过费心于精神分析知识的获得?绝非如此。在他的1967年的“建议”,论学院派的精神分析家,拉康宣称:「显而易见,关于这个被认为的知识,分析家一无所知。这让分析家根本就没有被授权,要满意于知识。分析家一无所知。因为受到争议的东西,是分析家必须逐渐知道。」

And in a contemporaneous
intervention on the relation between psychoanalysis and reality he declared:
‘Psychoanalysts are the wiseacres of a knowledge about which they cannot
converse with each other. This is something else than the mystagogy of
non-knowledge’ (Lacan 1968a[1967]:59). But what is this functional
knowledge analysts are asked to acquire and which is seemingly powerful
enough to guarantee their ignoring what they know?

在精神分析与现实之间的关系的当代的介入,拉康宣称:「精神分析师知识的嘲讽者。关于这个知识,他们彼此无法对谈。这是某件其他的东西,并非是非-知识的神秘学。」但是,分析家被要求去获得这个功能性的知识是什么?表面上似乎拥有足够力量保证他们忽略他们所知道的东西?

During the early 1950s
Lacan believed it was sufficient for analysts to know that their knowledge
is but a symptom of their ignorance, and that the success of their
interventions crucially depends on their ability to ignore what they know
(Lacan 1966b[1955]:349, 358). Yet from Seminar VIII he underscored
that analysts succeed in ‘knowing that they have to ignore what they know’
only if they know something about love (Lacan 1991b [1960–61]:135).

在1950年代的早期,拉康相信,这样是足够的,精神分析家只要知道,他们的知识仅是他们的无知的症状。他们的介入的成功主要依靠他们的能力,忽略他们所知道的东西。可是,从第八研讨班,拉康强调,精神分析家成功于“知道他们必须忽略他们所知道的东西”。只要他们知道有关爱的某件东西。

In
other words, knowing something about transference is a prerequisite for
suspending the knowledge one has accumulated from training sessions,
books and previous experience.

换句话说,知道关于移情的某件东西,是悬置这个知识的先决条件。我们曾开;累积这个知识,从训练的节数,书籍与先前的经验。

Once again Lacan referred to Socrates who, in spite of his incessant
confession of ignorance, did admit that he knew something about love.
Of course, when Socrates transmitted his knowledge about love he did
not speak in his own name, but through the mouth of a mysterious woman
named Diotima. Lacan interpreted this singularity of the Socratic
discourse as a move necessitated by the antagonism between Socrates’
dialectical method of inquiry and the epistemological status of the
knowledge in question.

再一次,拉康提到苏格拉底。尽管苏格拉底经常坦诚他的无知,他确实承认,他知道某件东西,关于爱。当然,当苏格拉底将他的关于爱的知识传递时,他并没有用他自己的名字谈论。而是通过一位名叫狄奥提玛的神秘的女人。拉康解释苏格拉底的辞说的独异性,作为是这个敌意必然需要的动作,苏格拉底的研究的辩证法,与受到置疑的知识的认识论的地位之间的敌意。

To Lacan knowledge of love escaped Socrates’
dialectical method, forcing him to rely on what he had learnt from the
common-sense opinions of Diotima (ibid.: 142–148). Socrates’
knowledge of love did not belong to the established realm of episteme, a
series of hard and fast scientific facts, but merely to the ethereal sphere
of doxa, the shared ideas of popular wisdom.

对于拉康,爱的知识是苏格拉底的辩证方法无法理解的。爱的这个知识强迫苏格拉底依靠他从狄奥提玛的常识的意见里学习来的东西。苏格拉底的爱的知识并没有属于认识论的已经建立的领域,那一系列的艰涩与快速的科学的事实。代替地,爱的知识仅是属于“共享观念”的空中的领域,那是通俗智慧的共享观念。

Analysts need to possess knowledge of love to be capable of ignoring
what they know and to ensure the maintenance of analytic standards, but
the knowledge of love itself constitutes a limit. This is the problem Lacan
set out to investigate in Seminar XX (1998a[1972–73]), not so much
with the brief of enhancing our understanding of love, but more with the
aim of clarifying the rationale behind this limit of love and knowledge.
From the start of the seminar he informed his audience: ‘[W]hat I say of
love is assuredly that one cannot speak about it…I spoke of the love
letter, of the declaration of love—not the same thing as the word of love’
(ibid.: 12). Operating beyond the signifier, Lacan defined love as a sign,
and more specifically as a sign that one changes reason or discourse.

分析家需要拥有爱的知识,这样他才能够忽略他们所知道的东西,并且保证维持精神分析的标准。但是爱的这个知识本身形成一个限制。这就是拉康出发要研究的难题,在第20研讨班。他并没有带著强化我们对爱的理解的主题,而是目的在于澄清爱与知识的这个限制的背后的理性。从研讨班一开始,他告诉他的听众:「我所谈论的关于爱,确实就是,我们无法谈论它的东西。我谈论爱的信息,爱的宣告—这跟爱的话语,并不相同。拉康超越这个能指运作,他定义爱作为是一个讯息。更加明确底,作为我们改变理性或辞说的信息。

Unlike the signifier, love is unequivocal to the extent that it can always
be taken as indicating a transition from one discourse to another (ibid.:
16). However, love is at once the most awkward sign to recognize: neither
the jouissance of the Other, the sexual characters appearing on the surface
of the partner’s body, nor the receipt of love letters, nor the awareness
that the Other knows you so well that he can predict your whereabouts
offer reliable criteria for ascertaining the Other’s love.57 Lacan’s entire
Seminar XX hovered around an amazing paradox: love always constitutes
a sign, but nothing ever constitutes a sign of love. When love takes over,
it inevitably alters the course of human action, yet testimonies of love
are impossible to confirm by established facts.

不像能指,爱并非模棱两可,甚至爱总是能够被认为啥指示一个传递,从一个辞说传递到另一个辞说。可是,爱既是最笨拙的信息,要体认出来:爱既非是大他者的欢爽,性爱的人物出现在伴侣的身体的表面,也非是爱的信息的接收者,也非是这个知道:大他者对你甚为熟稔,以致他能够预测你的下落,提供可靠的标准,作为确的大他者的爱。拉康的整个的第20研讨班,萦绕一个令人惊奇的悖论:爱总是形成一个信息,但是没有任何东西,形成爱的一个信息。当爱接管时,爱一成不变地改变人类行动的途径,可1,爱的测试基石是不可能证实,凭借已经建立的事实。

A woman might be
convinced of her own love and the ravages it provokes, without ever
being able to prove her love to her partner and without ever being
successful in ratifying his own love for her. The crucial implication for
the analyst is that she must never take ostensible signs of love
(transference) in the analysand at face value, whilst acknowledging that
love dramatically changes the analytic picture. In addition, analysts ought
to realize that knowing everything about love is an illusion, and that
what knowledge they have must be subject to continuous revision.

女人可能相信她自己的爱与爱引起的破坏,但是女人从来就不能够证明她的爱,对她的伴侣,女人从来没没有成功地批准他对于她的爱。对于分析家的重要的暗示是,女人一定不要按照分析者身上的表面价值,接受爱的夸张的信息时。另一方面,女人必须承认,爱戏剧性地改变精神分析的画面。除外,分析家应该体会:知道有关爱的一切是一种幻觉。分析家所拥有的知识必须隶属于继续的修正。

Not complying with the metaphor of love and ignoring what he knows
on the basis of a (necessarily limited) knowledge of love, the analyst’s
task also consists in dismantling the ideals which the analysand has
conferred onto him. Whilst supporting the functions of the supposed subject
of knowing and the agalma in order to elicit the analysand’s fantasy, the
analyst needs to ensure that the transference can be analysed. Indeed, for
all his scepticism about the so-called ‘liquidation’ of the transference—
one of the pillars of mainstream French psychoanalysis during the 1950s—
Lacan never disputed the analyst’s duty of bringing about the fall (chute)
or the reduction (reduction) of the analysand’s transference (Lacan 1967–
68: session of 10 January 1968).58

分析家的工作并不是同意爱的隐喻,然后忽略他知道的东西,以爱的必然是有限的知识作基础。分析家的工作也是在于拆解这些理想,分析者给予他的这些理想。分析家一方面支持被认为是应该知道的主体与阿加马的功能,为了召唤分析者的幻见。另一方面,分析家也需要保证,这个移情能够被分析。的确,尽管分析家的怀疑主义,关于移情的所谓的“终止”–在1950年代期间,主流的法国精神分析的支柱之一。拉康从来没有争议分析家的责任,关于分析者的移情的化简的掉落。

Inducing the fall of the supposed subject
of knowing means that the analyst ought to lay bare its illusory character
after having exploited (but not identified with) its value for the construction
of the analysand’s fantasy. An elimination of the deceptive aspect of the
transference is the only meaning Lacan was willing to grant to the practice
of transference-liquidation (Lacan 1977b[1964]: 267). As such, the
Lacanian clinic does not dislodge the transference, the analyst cannot
prevent the unconscious from being re-enacted or closing up, yet the
analytic process does contribute to dissolving the dissimulation which the
supposed subject of knowing sustains.

化简被认为是应该知道的主体的掉落,意味着,分析家应该揭露这种化简具有幻见的特性,当它已经利用(但并不是认同)它的价值,对于建设分析者的幻见。移情的欺骗的层面的减少,是拉康愿意给予的唯一的意义,给移情-终止的实践。作为这样的实践,拉康派的琳床并没有移除移情,分析家无法阻止无意识,不要被重新扮演,或封闭。可是,精神分析的过程确实促成这个欺骗,被认为应该知道的主体维持的欺骗。

In Lacan’s conception of the treatment, working towards the destabilization
of deceit equalled progressing towards the realization of truth. By contrast
with the established schools of psychoanalysis he did not flaunt the essential
replacement of (the analysand’s) transference with (the analyst’s) reality, even
less the slow maturation of the transference to the level of genital objectrelations,
defending instead the gradual substitution of truth for knowledge.59

用拉康的治疗的观念,朝向将欺骗的除掉稳定的工作,相等于是朝向体现真理的进展。跟精神分析的现存的学派对照起来,拉康并没有炫耀用基本上是分析家的现实,取代分析者的移情。甚至没有炫耀移情的缓慢地成熟到性器官的客体化的层次。代替的,拉康防卫真理逐渐被知识替换。

Saying that the analyst should act in the name of truth (Lacan 1966–67: session
of 21 June 1967) or that his feigning the position of supposed subject of knowing
is the only access to truth (Lacan 1967–68: session of 22 November 1967)
seemed even more conceited and presumptuous than proposing a
transformation of the ‘hysterical misery into common unhappiness’ (Freud
and Breuer 1895d:305) or staging a confrontation between the analysands’
pleasurable fantasies and the standard requirements of reality. Although
supported by Freud’s professed love of truth (Wahrhaftigkeit, Wahrheitsliebe)
(1915a[1914]:164; 1937c: 248), Lacan was vilified for his uncompromising
espousal of veracity as the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis, the more so after
launching statements such as ‘I, the truth, am speaking’ (Lacan
1977f[1955]:120–123; 1989b[1965]:15) and ‘I always speak the truth’ (Lacan
1990d[1973]:3).

说分析家应该行动,以真理之名,或是说,分析家伪装具有被认为是应该知道的主体,是接近真理的唯一的途径。这种说法是更加地自负与冒昧,比起建议将癔症的悲惨,转化成为共同的不快乐。或是展示一种冲突,在分析者的令人快乐的幻想,与现实的标准的要求之间。虽然受到弗洛伊德的宣称的真理之爱的支持,拉康被抨击,因为他毫不妥协地主张真理,作为是精神分析的最终的目标。他更加受的抨击,当他发动这些陈述,诸如,“我,作为真理,正在言说”,“我总是言说真理”。

But against the expectations Lacan’s notion of truth did not
signal the perfect match between reason and reality, the scientific
‘correspondence criterion’ of truth embedded in the medieval adage of
adaequatio rei et intellectus (an intellect that is in line with the thing).60 Neither
did it advance the traditional psychoanalytic goal of the analysand’s discovery
of a repressed unconscious representation, and its reintegration into a conscious
series of thoughts. The Lacanian truth emblematized no more no less than the
very absence of definitive truths within human existence, owing to the fact
that not all knowledge can be subjectified, that the enjoyment of fullness is
forever excluded, that the symbolic law of castration compels (neurotic) subjects
to desire until the end of their days.

但是对抗这些期望,拉康的真理的观念并没有指示理性与现实的完美的匹配。真理的科学的对应的标准,被镶嵌于中世纪的箴言:跟物象若合一契的知识。拉康的真理的观念也没有提升传统的精神分析的目标:分析者的发现被压抑的无意识的再现表象,以及这个被压抑的无意识的再现表象,被融化进入意识的思想的系列。拉康派的真理的具体标志,实实在在就是在人类的存在内部,明确的真理的欠缺。由于这个事实:并非所有的知识都能够被成为主体,充实的享受,。永远地被排除。阉割的象征的法则逼迫神经症的主体去欲望,直到他们的有生之年的结束。

In ‘Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire’ Lacan
decanted this truth (of an irreducible absence or lack) into the aphorism
‘There is no Other of the Other’, and its algebraical equivalent S(O),
carefully delineating its implications for analytic practice:
The lack referred to here is indeed that which I have already
formulated: that there is no Other of the Other.

在“主体的颠覆与欲望的辩证法1”,拉康倾注“无可化简的缺席或欠缺”的这个真理,成为这个警语:“没有大他者的大他者“。这句警语用代数公式等于:S(O) 。拉康仔细地描述这个警语对于精神分析的实践的重要性。在此被提到的欠缺确实就是我已经阐释的东西:大他者没有大他者。

But is this mark
made by the Unbeliever of the truth really the last word that is
worth giving in reply to the question, ‘What does the Other want
of me?’, when we, the analysts, are its mouthpiece? Surely not,
and precisely because there is nothing doctrinal about our office.
We are answerable to no ultimate truth; we are neither for nor
against any particular religion.
(Lacan 1977k[1960]:316)

但是真理的不信仰者发表的这句谈论,难道确实就是最后的断言,它值得给予这个回答吗?针对这个问题:“大他者想要我什么?”。当我们作为分析家,就是真理的代言人?当然不是,确实是因为关于我们提供的服务,并没有任何信条的东西。我们并不对任何最终的真理负责。我们既不赞同,也不反对任何特殊的宗教。

The impossibility to unearth the final truth about oneself should not
embolden the analyst to answer the analysand’s question—once the
fantasy has been constructed—of ‘What does the Other want from me?’
with stock expressions such as ‘You will never know’ or ‘This is
impossible to find out’. For these statements are as much tributary to a
definitive truth as their vexed counterparts (‘This is what the Other wants’,
‘I possess the solution to your problem’). Pontificating that it is impossible
to know for once and for all what the Other wants becomes a definitive
truth in its own right, which contradicts the principle that there is no
such thing as a final truth. It is therefore sufficient for analysands to
relativize their own time-honoured answers to what the Other wants from
them, that is to say to question the trust they had put in their fantasies.

不可能挖掘关于自己的最后的真理, 不应该因此让分析家大胆地回答分析者的问题: “大他者想要从我这里获得什么?”,一旦这个幻见已经被建构, 带着现存的表达,譬如, “你永远不会知道”, 或”这是不可能发现的” . 因为这些陈述同样都是归属于明确的真理,作为他们的感到懊恼的类同之物.(“这就是大他者所想要的是东西”, “ 我拥有你的难题的解答”) .武断地说, 我们不可能一劳永逸地知道大他者想要的东西, 这句话本身就形成一个明确的真理 .这句话抵触这个原则: 没有最后的真理的这样的东西存在 . 因此,分析者有充分理由将他们自己的自古以来的回答, 作为相对的价值, 回答大他者想要从他们获得什么.换句话说, 要质疑他们给予他们的幻见的信任.

Analysts should not (and cannot) prevent analysands from formulating
new answers and creating new fantasies, their only hope being that the
distrust they have developed towards the old ones affects their attitudes
towards the new versions. In his 1967 ‘Proposition’ Lacan described
this process, which coincides with the end of the transference relation,
as a subjective destitution (destitution subjective), issuing it as the
analysand’s entry ticket to the analytic profession (Lacan 1995b[1967]:8).

分析不应该(与不能够)阻止分析者不宜阐释新的回答与创造新的幻见。他们仅有希望,他们发展的不信任,朝向旧的答案的不信任,会影响他们朝向新的版本的态度。在他的1957年的“建议”,拉康描述这个过程,巧合于移情的关系的结束。作为是主体的匮乏,发表它,作为是分析者进入精神分析的专业的入场门票。

Lacan was adamant that the fall of the supposed subject of knowing
and its concurrent effect of subjective destitution on the side of the analysand
cannot be realized through an array of transference-interpretations, that is
to say interpretations whose object is the nature of transference itself. As
he had explained in Seminar V (1998b[1957–58]:428) and ‘The Direction
of the Treatment’ (1977i[1958]:231), the analyst cannot construct a ‘neutral’
platform outside the analysand’s transference from which to operate on
this transference. If the analysand accepts the analyst’s interpretation of
the transference, this acceptance needs to be interpreted in its own right
because the analysand is bound to hear the interpretation as coming from
the supposed subject of knowing and thus from within the transference.
Giving meta-interpretations after the transference has been interpreted does
not make a difference, since these metainterpretations would also require
interpretation, ad infinitum. As Lacan put it in his 1969 summary of Seminar
XV: ‘

拉康坚决主张,被认为是应该知道的主体的掉落,与分析者这边的主体的匮乏的同时对影响,无法通过移情与独立的安排来体会。换句话说,解释的目标就是移情的特性本身。依照他在第四研讨班解释的,分析家无法建构一个“中立”的平台,。在分析者的移情的外面,来运转这个移情。假如分析者接受分析家的解释移情,这个接受需要在它自身之内被解释。因为分析者一定会听见这个解释,作为来自被认为是应该知道的主体。因此是来自移情。在移情被解释之后,给予形上的解释,并没有什么差别。因为这些形上的解释也要求解释,直到永远。如同拉康在他的1969年的“第14研讨班”的总结这样表达;

There is no transference of the transference’ (Lacan 1984[1969]:25).
Lacan’s solution to this deadlock lay in the deployment of a tactics of
interpretation which points towards the analysand’s desire rather than
the demands (for love) within the transference. The analyst makes clear
that she knows nothing about the analysand, that whatever knowledge
the analysand has assembled is futile, and that additional knowledge
(whether practical know-how or deep wisdom) is not what the analysand
can expect from the experience. On the contrary, if knowledge is at all
involved at the end of the psychoanalytic process it will appear as an
acknowledgement of the limit of the imperative to ‘Know Thyself!’
(Lacan 1967–68: session of 13 March 1968).

拉康对于这个僵局的解答在于运用解释的策略。这个解释的策略指向分析者的欲望,而不是移情之内的对爱的要求。分析家澄清,她对于分析者一无所知。无论分析者装配怎样的知识,都是徒劳的。那个额外的知识(无论是实践的技术手册,或深刻的智慧),都不是分析者能够从精神分析所期望的。相反地,假如知识在精神分析过程的结束时被牵涉进入,它将看起来像是承认“认识你自己”的命令的极限。

This tactics of interpretation
evidently challenges the meaning of analytic interpretation as such,
because the analyst neither explains the analysand’ s symptoms, nor
makes sense of what the analysand says, nor translates the analysand’s
actions into new significant units, etc. Vacillating between silence, the
punctuation of the analysand’s discourse and the formulation of oracular
sentences, the analyst cultivates the atopia of the Socratic position (Lacan
1991b [1960–61]:126–127). I will discuss the underlying principles of
these Lacanian tactics of interpretation at length in the following chapter
of this book.

解释的策略明显地挑战精神分析解释作为这种极限的意义。因为分析家既不解释分析者的症状,也没有理解分析者说的内容,也不是翻译分析者的行动,成为新的重要的单位,等等。分析家摇摆于沉默,分析者的辞说的标点,与侃侃而谈的阐述之间,分析家培养苏格拉底的立场的无边界国土。我将在这本书的下一个章节,详细讨论这些拉康学派的解释的策略的基本原则。

From the mid-1960s Lacan associated the fall of the supposed subject
of knowing with the analyst’s functioning as an object a, his disbeing
(desetre) the analysand’s cause of desire. For example, in Seminar XV
he stated:

从1969年代代中业,拉康将被认为应该知道的主体的掉落,跟分析家作为小客体a的功能,这个“非存在物”是分析者的欲望的原因。譬如,在第14研讨班,拉康陈述:

The end of analysis consists in the fall of the supposed subject of
knowing and its reduction to the accession of this object a, the
cause of the division of the subject, which replaces it. The only
thing the analyst, who fantasmatically plays the game with the
analysand as regards the supposed subject of knowing, supports at
the end of analysis is this rest of the known thing which is called
the object a.
(Lacan 1967–68: session of 10 January 1967)

精神分析的目的,在于被认为应该知道的主体的掉落,以及它被化减到这个小客体a的让位,主体的分裂的原因。这个小客体a取代了主体。分析家幻见地跟分析者扮演这个游戏,关于被认为是应该知道的主体,分析家支持的唯一的东西,在精神分析的结束,就是这个已知之物的其余部分,被称为小客体a。

To understand the meaning of this proposition it suffices to look back at
what Lacan concluded at the end of Seminar VIII:

为了理解这个建议的意义,我们回顾一下,就足够理解拉康作为结论的东西,在第八研讨班的结束:

What Socrates knows, and what the analyst at least has to see, is
that on the level of the small a [the object a], the issue is completely
different from that of the access to an ideal. Love can only grasp
the field of being. And the analyst can only think that any object
can fulfil it. This is where we analysts are brought to balance, on
this limit where the question is raised of the value of any object
that enters the field of desire.
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:459–460)

苏格拉底知道的东西,分析家至少必须看见的东西,就是,在小客体a的层次,这个问题并没有完全不同于接近理想的问题。爱仅能理解生命实存的领域。分析家仅能够认为,任何客体都能够满足它。这就是我们作为分析家被迫要平衡的东西,在这个限制。在那里,问题被提出,针对任何客体的价值,在进入欲望的领域时。

Disbeing the object a involves encouraging analysands to realize that
the supposed subject of knowing and the agalma, whose brilliance once
reassured them in their love, are but replaceable objects a, semblances
of being whose power does not outmatch that of other potential objects
and whose promise of enjoyment is doomed to remain inadequate.61 The
result of this operation, which the analyst effectuates by reducing himself
to nothing but a gaze or a voice (Lacan 1995b[1967]:10; 1967–68: session
of 7 February 1968), is that the analysand can undertake a ‘crossing’
(traversee) (Lacan 1977b[1964]:273) or succeeds in dropping out (decoir)
(Lacan 1995b[1967]:8) of his fantasy.62 Again, this result correlates with
a moment of subjective destitution which, as mentioned on p. 136, Lacan
promoted as the precondition for entering the practice of psychoanalysis.

“非存在”这个小客体a,牵涉到鼓楼分析者体会到,被认为应该知道的主体与阿加马,他们的辉煌曾有一度让他们相信他们的爱。现在仅剩可被替换的小客体a,生命实存的类似物。它的力量并没有击败其他的潜在的客体的力量。它对于欢爽的许诺,注定始终不足够。这个运作的结果,分析家让它实现,凭借将他自己化减成为仅是凝视或声音。这个运作的结果是,分析者能够理解一个“跨越”,或是成功地抛掉他的幻见。而且,这个结果跟主体的匮乏的时刻息息相关。拉康
将它提升为进入精神分析的先决条件。

As I have indicated at the end of the previous chapter, during the early
1970s Lacan opened yet another new perspective on the goal of
psychoanalytic treatment, combining Freud’s idea that psychoanalysis
operates via the pathways of love (McGuire 1974:12–13) and his own
assertion that love is always a sign of changing discourses (Lacan
1998a[1972–73]: 16).

如同我曾经指示,在早先的章节的结束,在1970年代,拉康打开另外一个观点,针对精神分析治疗的目标。他将弗洛伊德的观念:精神分析经由爱的途径运作,跟他自己的主张:爱总是正在改变的辞说的讯号。

The theoretical framework for this new perspective
can be derived from a juxtaposition of two of Lacan’s numerous aphorisms
in Seminar XX and Television, statements produced in 1973 with an interval
of a mere six months. In the final pages of Seminar XX Lacan posited:
I incarnated contingency in the expression ‘stops not being written.’
For here there is nothing but encounter…

对于这个新观点的理论的架构,能够被获得,从拉康的无数的警语的其中两个警语的并列,在第20研讨班与“电视访谈“,在1973年产生的陈述,中间区隔仅六个月,在第20研讨班的最后几页,拉康提出:「我具体表现偶然性,在这个表达”停止不被书写“。因为在此,仅是存在着遭遇。

The displacement of the
negation from the ‘stops not being written’ to the ‘doesn’t stop
being written’, in other words, from contingency to necessity—
there lies the point of suspension to which all love is attached. All
love, subsisting only on the basis of the ‘stops not being written’,
tends to make the negation shift to the ‘doesn’t stop being
written’…Such is the substitute that…constitutes the destiny as
well as the drama of love.
(ibid.: 145)

从“听止不被书写“的否定,更换到”不要停止被书写“,换句话说,从偶然性替换到必然性—那里存在着悬置的点,所有的爱被连系到那个悬置的点。所有的爱,维持的基础仅是”停止不被书写“,它倾向于让这个否定转移到”不要停止被书写“。形成命运与爱的戏剧的替换就是如此。

This fragment loses much of its mysterious character if one exchanges
the notion of love for that of transference. For then it becomes clear that
Lacan hinted at the inauspicious transference situation Freud had held
responsible, in the letter to Flies from April 1900 quoted on p. 107, for
‘the apparent endlessness’ and the ‘asymptotic conclusion of the
treatment’ (Masson 1985:409): an accidental encounter (contingency)
which develops into an indispensable compulsive relationship (necessity).
The tenor of Lacan’s words at the end of Seminar XX chimed with his
oration on love in Television, although the latter concerned itself more
explicitly with the analyst’s coordination of its labours.

这个碎片丧失许多它的神秘的特性,假如我们交换爱的观念,跟移情的观念。因为那时,显而易见地,拉康暗示这个不吉祥的移情的情境,弗洛伊德要负责的移情的情境。在他写给弗利斯的信件,从1900年四月,“因为明显的没有终止“与”治疗的非症状的结论“:一个意外的遭遇(偶然性)发展成为无可免除的强迫的关系(必然性)。拉康的话语的主调,在第20研讨班的结束,跟他在”电视访谈“的侃侃而谈爱,互相共鸣。虽然后者更加明确地关注到分析家对于爱的劳苦的调和。

After having
expounded that the analytic discourse promises to introduce something
new within the field of love (Lacan 1990d[1973]:28), an arena marked
by the impasse (closure) of the unconscious, he contended that this novelty
requires only that somewhere the sexual relation stops not being
written, that contingency be established (what it comes down to),
so as to make headway on that which will later be completed by
demonstrating such a relation to be impossible, that is by instituting
it in the real.
(ibid.: 39, translation modified)

拉康解释,精神分析辞说承诺要介绍某件新的东西,在爱的领域里面。这一个斗技场被标识是无意识的僵局(封闭)。拉康主张,这个新奇仅是要求,某个地方,性的关系停止不被书写,偶然性应该被建立(它的总结),为了向前推进,后来将会被完成对东西,凭借证明这样的关系是不可能。也就是,凭借在实在界建立它。

This sentence contains first of all an argument to bring the necessity of the
analysand’s transference back to its underlying contingency. Chosen in an
unexpected, yet fortunate encounter and gradually transformed into a
standard feature of the analysand’ s life, the analyst tries to re-establish
her original position as an accidental, replaceable find. This restoration of
contingency is a prerequisite for the analysand’s discovery that everything
will fall short of the ‘perfect match’ or, to use Lacan’s words in the second
part of the above sentence, that the sexual relation is impossible.

这个句子首先包含一个论点:要将分析者的移情的必要性,带回到它作为基础的偶然性。当分析家被选中,在出乎意外,可是有幸运的遭遇里,然后逐渐被转化成为分析者的生活的标准的特征,分析家尝试重新建立她的原初的立场,作为是偶然,可被替换的发现。偶然性的恢复是分析者的发现的先决条件:每件事情都无法符合“完美的匹配“,或是,用拉康的话语说,在以上的句子的第二部分:性的关系是不可能的。

If the analyst moves from contingency to necessity and back, then the
same could be said of the entire analytic process. Lacan’s words in
Television could indeed be read as also comprising an argument for
calibrating psychoanalytic practice around surprise, revelation, sudden
discovery, etc. Conceiving psychoanalytic treatment as a discipline of
contingencies could also solve the question as to how the discourse of
the analyst can subsist if it is predicated upon love and if love is the sign
of changing discourses.

假如分析家从偶然性移动到必然性,然后回转,然后相同的道路,对于完整的精神分析的过程而言,也是真实的。拉康在“电视访谈“的话语,确实能够被阅读为,也是包含一个论点,作为订定精神分析实践的标准,环绕着惊奇,启示,突然发现,等等。将精神分析的治疗构想为偶然性的专业,也能够解决这个问题,关于分析家的辞说如何能够存在,假如它是以爱作为陈述,假如爱是正在改变的辞说的讯息。

As I have mentioned before (see p. 134), Lacan
stipulated at the beginning of Seminar XX that the sign of love strikes
whenever a subject is moving from one discourse to another. But if
psychoanalysis is indeed effected by love, how is it possible to
institutionalize a discourse that is no more no less than the transition
from one discourse to another? One answer could be that the entire period
between the analysand’s entry into and departure from analysis represents
a transition from one discourse, say a deeply ingrained life-style, to
another. A second answer could be that the transition from one discourse
to another takes place every time an analysand has a session with the
analyst.

如同我以前曾经提到,拉康在第20研讨班的开始提出但书:爱的讯息打击,每当主体正在移动,从一个辞说到另外一个辞说。但是,假如精神分析确实是由爱造成结果,这如何是可能的?要将辞说形成体制?这个辞说实实在在就是从一个辞说转移到另外一个辞说?其中一个答案可能是:整个时期,在分析家的进入,与从精神分析的出发之间的整个的时期,代表从一个辞说的转移,譬如,根深蒂固的生活-形态,转移到另外一个辞说。第二个答案可能是:从一个辞说转移到另外一个辞说会发生,每当分析者跟分析家进行咨商时。

Each of these answers is valid only if one forgets that analysands do
not immediately change their ways when entering psychoanalysis, neither
during individual nor over consecutive sessions. Despite the rule of free
association, analysands commonly fall back on their usual, current
discourse. Some analysands even believe that the day they will be able
to engage in free association will also constitute the end of their analysis.

这些回答的每一个都是正确的,只要我们忘记,分析者并没有立即改变他们的方式,当他们进入精神分析时,既不是在个人的咨商,也不是在连续性的咨商。尽管自由联想到规则,分析者通常依靠他们的寻常的目前的辞说。有些分析者甚至相信,他们将会从事自由联想到那一天,将也是形成精神分析结束。

My answer to the above problem is that the transition from one discourse
to another takes place at irregular moments, both during the course of
psychoanalytic treatment and outside a psychoanalytic setting. The only
difference between the emergence of these transitions is that within the
treatment they are consciously provoked by the analyst, whereas outside
they occur more or less haphazardly. When Lacan stated in Television
that conceiving something new requires contingency (what stops not
being written), this applies directly to how the analytic discourse affects
the analysand who is subjugated to the necessities of other discourses:
not the regular pattern of analytic sessions, but the unexpected appearance
of a new signifier governs the process of change.

针对以上的难题,我的回答是:从一个辞说转换到另外一个辞说发生在不规律的时刻。两者都在精神分析的治疗的过程,与外在于精神分析的背景。唯一的差异,在这些转换的出现之间的唯一的差异是,在治疗内部,他们意识方面受到分析家的激发。而在外面,他们相当偶然地发生。 当拉康在“电视访谈”陈述:构想某件新的东西,要求偶然性(停止不被书写的东西),这直接运用到精神分析的辞说如何影响分析者,隶属于其他的辞说的必然性的分析者:这并不是精神分析咨商的规律模式,而是新的能指的意外的出现,统辖改变的过程。

Since the destiny and drama of love hinges on a shift from contingency
to necessity, as Lacan put it in Seminar XX, the ultimate psychoanalytic
effect can only involve a reduction of the established necessity of the
analytic effects themselves to the status of simple contingency. This
process requires an analysis of the analytic experience, in which the
analysand can come to realize that it was no more than an accident on
his particular journey through life. The ultimate analytic effect thus
coincides with the termination of psychoanalysis, after which the
analysand will hopefully understand, at least if the treatment was
Lacanian, not the true signification but the nonsensicality of the entire
experience, not the necessity but the impossibility of finding definitive
answers to the questions of life.

既然命运与爱的戏剧都依附从偶然性的转变成为必然性。如同拉康在第20研讨班表达它。最后的精神分析的影响仅会牵涉到将精神分析的影响本身的已经建立的必要性,化减成为单纯的偶然性的地位。在那里,分析者能够逐渐体会到,那仅是一件意外,在他经历的人生的特殊的旅途。最后的精神分析的影响,因此巧合于精神分析的终止。在精神分析终止之后,分析家将会希望地了解,至少假如治疗是拉康学派的话,不是了解这个必然性,而是了解这个不可能:提人生的问题找到明确的答案的不可能。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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