拉康:知识之爱与爱的标记

LOVE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE AGALMA
知识之爱与爱的标记

The intersubjective relationship between the analysand and the analyst,
and the analyst’s ineluctable involvement in the analysand’s transference
indicate that Lacan’s original outlook of transference singled out the
analytic situation as a constructive dialogue on the symbolic plane of
full speech or, better still, as an interaction between two subjective desires.

分析者与分析家之间的互为主体性关系,以及分析家的难以避免的牵涉分析者的移情,指示著,拉康对于移情的原初的观点,突显出精神分析的情境,作为是建设性的对话,在充分言说的象征的层面。或者,更好的是,作为两个主体的欲望之间的互动。

Many of Lacan’s glosses on transference from the 1950s could be
mustered to corroborate this picture and many of Lacan’s attacks on the
techniques of transference handling within ego-psychology could be read
as implicit arguments for the revival of psychoanalytic treatment as a
symbolic interaction between two subjects.36

从1950年开始,拉康对于移情的许多铨释能够被聚集来形成这个画面。拉康对于自我-心理学之内,处理移情的技术的许多攻击,能够被阅读作为是暗示的论点,赞同精神分析的治疗的复興,作为是象征的互动,处于两个主体之间。

Lacan’s post-1960 contributions cleared the way for a completely
different view. To see how radically his ideas on transference changed
over the course of a decade, it suffices to contrast a statement from his
1957 ‘The Agency of the Letter’ (1977g[1957]) with a passage from his
‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’
(1995b[1967]).

拉康在1960后的贡献,替一个完全不同的观点,清理途径。假如我们看见,拉康在十年的过程当中,他对于移情的观念如何强烈地改变。这就足够将一个陈述,从1957年的“信息的代理者”,跟1967年10月的建议,针对学院派的精神分析家的一个段落,作为对照。

Referring again to Freud’s explanation of transference
in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Lacan reported in the former
text that ‘transference…gave its name to the mainspring of the
intersubjective link between analyst and analysand’ (Lacan
1977g[1957]:170). Ten years later he shattered any remaining faith in
the value of this name, stating with undisguised disdain:
I am astounded that no-one has ever thought of objecting to me,
given certain of the terms of my doctrine, that the transference
alone is an objection to intersubjectivity. I even regret it, seeing
that nothing is more true: it refutes it, it is its stumbling block.
(Lacan 1995b[1967]:4)

拉康再次提的弗洛伊德对于移情的解释,在“梦的解析”里。拉康在先前的文本报导,移情给予它的名字,给分析家与分析者之间的互为主体的联接的动力。十年以后,他粉碎任何剩余的信仰,对于移情这个名字的价值。他带着毫不伪装的藐视陈述:「我大为吃惊,竟然从来没有人反对我。假如考虑到,我的信条的某些术语。光是移情就是互为主体间性的反对。我深知对它感到遗憾。因为没有一样东西比它更加真实,移情反驳互为主体间隙。移情是互为主体间性的绊脚石。」

Prepared in the course of his Seminar V (1998b[1957–58]:357–358) and
advanced more emphatically in ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ (1977i
[1958]:229–230) and the ‘Remark on the Report by Daniel Lagache’
(1966e[1960]:655–656), Lacan’s self-criticism of intersubjectivity had
reached a first peak in Seminar VIII, On Transference (1991b[1960–
61]), which initiated a less homogeneous, more conflict-ridden version
of the analytic relationship.37

拉康对于互为主体间性的批评,在第四研讨班的过程已经准备。然后在“治疗的方向”,以及“拉噶奇的报告的谈论”,更加强调地提出。在第八研讨班,“论移情”,拉康对于互为主体间性的自我批评首次达到颠峰。第八研讨班,“论移情”开启一个比较没有那么同质性,更加充满冲突的说法,对于精神分析的关系。

Seminar VIII was strewn with references to the insuperable inequity
which the transference instates between the analysand and the analyst.
Sometimes Lacan designated this inequity as a ‘subjective disparity’
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:11, 233), at other times he qualified it as a
fundamental discordance or dissymmetry (ibid.: 53, 68). As I have pointed
out in the previous chapter (pp. 72–73), Lacan’s self-criticism had grown
out of the observation that intersubjectivity does not exclude the perils
of a reciprocal, imaginary ‘therapeutic alliance’ between the analysand
and the analyst.38

第八研讨班的内容散布著无法克服的不平等,移情安置的不平等,在分析者与分析家之间。有时,拉康指明这个不平等,作为是“主体性的差异”。还有些时刻,他将这个不平等赋予基本的不协调或不均称的特质。如同我曾经指出,在先前的章节,拉康的自我-批评是产生于这个观察:互为主体性并没有排除互惠的,想像的联盟的危险,在分析者与分析家之间。

In Seminar VIII he argued that intersubjectivity is an
altogether erroneous description of what takes place within the analytic
setting, quite simply because this setting is governed by transference,
which is in turn pervaded by love. To demonstrate that transference runs
counter to intersubjectivity Lacan thus rejuvenated his Freudian
equivalence of transference and love, initially adumbrated in Seminar I
(1988b[1953–54]:90), now showing that love entails everything but a
harmonious interaction between two complementary subjects.

在第八研讨班,拉康主张,互为主体性是一个完全错误的描述,对于发生在分析家的背景内部。这完全是因为这个背景受到移情的统辖,然后移情被爱所弥漫。为了证明,移情跟互为主体性并行不悖,拉康因此重新提醒他对弗洛伊德将移情与爱相提并论。在第一研讨班,首次被描绘轮廓。他现在则是显示,爱涵盖每样东西,除了在两个互补的主体之间的和谐的互动。

The conflict-ridden undertow of the psychoanalytic process also emboldened
him to criticize mainstream descriptions of the treatment as an analytic
‘situation’, a term which he preferred to replace by ‘pseudo-situation’
because ‘the position of the two subjects present is by no means
equivalent’ (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:11, 233).39

精神分析过程的充满冲突的暗流,也让拉康大胆地批评治疗的主流的描述,作为是精神分析的“情境”。他比较喜欢用“人为-情境”来取代“情境”这个术语。因为“两个主体的立场绝非是相等的。”

Taking his lead from the Symposium (Plato 1951), which he presented
as the minutes of a series of psychoanalytic sessions (Lacan 1991b [1960–
61]:38), Lacan identified the analysand with the lover, the analyst with
the beloved, and the resulting strategies of transference with the dynamics
of love. What characterizes the lover is an immanent feeling of lack.40
Although the lover is hardly aware of this lack, much less of its exact
nature, he none the less believes that the loved object possesses the means
to neutralize it, thus restoring a sense of completeness.41

拉康从探讨柏拉图的“会饮篇”作为开始,他呈现“会饮篇”的探讨,作为精神分析节数的系列的细节。拉康将分析者认同为情人,分析家认同是被爱者。移情的造成结果的策略,具有爱的动力结构。表现情人的特征的东西是欠缺的内在感觉。虽然情人自己几乎不知道这个欠缺,更不用说是欠缺的确实的特性。他仍然相信,这个爱的客体拥有这个工具,让这个欠缺保持中立,因此恢复一种完整的感觉。

To Lacan, the
fact that the lover lacks knowledge about the existence and the status of
this lack was sufficient proof to claim that the lack is unconscious.42
When the beloved recognizes the other’s love, the beloved reckons that
she must have something which provokes the other’s interest, yet she
does not have a clue as to what it is (ibid.: 52–53). Hence both the lover
and the beloved are in a position of partial ignorance, but their ignorance
is not the same.

对于拉康,情人欠缺这个知识,关于这个欠缺的存在与地位,就是充分的证据用来宣称,这个欠缺是无意识的欠缺。当被爱的人体认筹他者的爱,被爱的人认为,她一定拥有某件东西,引起他者的興趣。可是,她并没有线索,关于那是什么。因此,情人与被爱的人都处于部分无知的立场。但是他们的无知并不相等。

The lover does not know much about the immanent lack,
but does know the beloved can annihilate it; the beloved does not know
what he has, yet does know the lover wants it. The lover’s ignorance is
more related to an absence (what the lover misses), whereas the beloved’s
ignorance is more associated with a presence (what the beloved owns).
Relying on Ancient Greek mythology, Lacan stated that love reaches
its highest degree of expression when the beloved becomes a lover in
turn and starts returning the lover’s love. When this occurs the positions
within the relationship are no longer distributed according to who lacks
(the lover) and who possesses something (the beloved), since each partner
wants something from the other and also has something to offer.

情人对于这个内在性的欠缺,所知不多。但是,她确实知道这位被爱的人能够毁灭这个欠缺。被爱的人并不知道他拥有什么。可是他确实知道情人想要它。情人的无知,跟一个缺席(情人所错过的东西)更加息息相关。而被爱的人的无知则是跟一个存在(被爱的人拥有的东西),更加地联想一块。依靠古代的希腊文化,拉康陈述:爱到达它的最高的表达,当轮到被爱的人成为情人,然后开始回报情人的爱。当这样的事情发生,在关系之内的立场不再被分配,依照谁欠钱(情人),与谁拥有某件东西(被爱的人)。因为每一个伴侣都想要某件东西,从他者那里,并且也拥有某件给予东西。

Lacan designated the moment when the beloved becomes a lover as ‘the
metaphor of love’, and in accordance with his own definition of metaphor
he drew attention to its potential for revealing a new signification, notably
the genuine, true signification of love (ibid.: 49–64).43

拉康指明这个时刻,被爱的人成为爱人的时刻,作为是“爱的隐喻”。为了符合他自己对隐喻的定义,他提醒注意隐喻的潜力,作为显示新的意义。特别是真诚,真实的爱的意义。

For all its ostensible rosiness, the portrait of love Lacan painted in Seminar
VIII was of course predicated upon a tragic misunderstanding between the
partners. What the lover discovers in the beloved is no more no less than the
object of the lover’s own fantasy, and has nothing to do with what the beloved
really has to offer. Conversely, what the beloved believes she possesses as an
object for the lover, without knowing for sure what it is, equally relates to
the beloved’s fantasy and has no bearing whatsoever on what the lover really
lacks. Each of the partners mistakes fantasy for reality, adding error to error
when entering the metaphor of love.

拉康在第八研讨班描绘的爱的肖像,尽管过于绚丽灿烂,当然对于它的描绘是依靠一个悲剧的误解,在伴侣之间。爱人在被爱的人身上发现的东西,实实在在就是爱人自己的幻想的客体。跟被爱的人确实必须提供的东西,没有丝毫关系。相反地,被爱的人相信她拥有的东西,作为是爱的的客体,而没有确实知道那是什么东西,那同样是跟被爱的人的幻想息息相关。跟爱人确实欠缺的东西,根本没有丝毫关系。每一位伴侣都将幻见误认为是现实,将错误增加到错误,当他进入爱的隐喻。

Applying this picture to the analytic ‘pseudo-situation’, Lacan
compared the analysand to a lover because analysands generally expect
their analysts to possess the key to their difficulties—inhibitions,
symptoms and anxieties which they cannot understand, let alone solve.

拉康将这个画面运用到精神分析的”人为的情境“,并将分析者比喻为分析家,因为分析者通透期望她们的分析家拥有解决他们的困难的解答—压抑,症状,与焦虑的的困难的解答。那是分析者无法理解的,遑论解答。

In Seminar VIII Lacan described this key, as seen through the eyes of the
analysand, in two different ways. In the opening stages of the Seminar,
he cut the analyst’s key from the substance of knowledge:
The psychoanalyst is a human being one comes to see in order to
find the knowledge [science] of what is most intimate to oneself—
this is the state of mind in which one usually approaches him—
and thus of what we must assume to be initially most alien to him.
None-the-less, this is what we encounter at the start of
psychoanalysis; this knowledge [science] is what he is supposed
to have.
(ibid.: 81–82)

在第八研讨班,拉康描述这个解答,通过分析者的眼光可以看出,用两个不同的方式。在研讨班的开始的阶段,,拉康将分析家的解答,从知识的物质切割下来。我们逐渐将精神分析家看着是一个人,为了找到这个知识,跟我们自己最亲密的东西的知识。那就是心灵的状态,我们通常接近他的心灵的状态。因此,也是我们必须假定是对于他是最异化的的东西的状态。尽管如此,这就是我们遭遇的东西,在精神分析的开始。这个知识就是他被认为拥有的东西。

Lacan’s observation that analysands commonly regard their analysts as
experts of the human psyche whose specialized knowledge will dissolve
the symptoms ultimately crystallized into his concept of the ‘supposed
subject of knowing’, which continued to undergird his ideas on
transference until the end of his career.44

拉康观察到,分析者通常将他的分析家视为是人类心灵的专家。这位心灵的专家精通的知识将会化解症状。拉康的观察最后具体成为他的观念:“被认为是知道的主体“。这个观念继续作为他探讨移情的观念的的支撑,直到拉康的事业的结束。

Yet as his work progressed he underscored that this function of the
‘supposed subject of knowing’, the constitutive element of the
transference, does not imply that the analysand automatically perceives
the analyst as somebody who knows (Lacan 1977b[1964]:233; 1967–
68: session of 22 November 1967; 1971–72: session of 2 December 1971).
In his ‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’
he even went so far as to state:

可是,随着他的研究的进展,拉康强调,“被认为是知道的主体“的这个功能,移情的形成的元素,并没有暗示,分析者自动地感知这位分析家,作为是知道的某个人。在他的”1967年11月的建议“,针对学院派的精神分析家,拉康甚至过分地陈述:

We shall have to see what qualifies the psychoanalyst to respond
to this situation [of the supposed subject of knowing] which one
can see does not envelop his person. Not only is the supposed
subject of knowing not real in effect, but it is in no way necessary
that the subject who is active in the conjuncture, the
psychoanalysand (the only one who speaks initially), impose it
upon him. Not only is it not necessary, it is not usually true: which
is demonstrated in the initial stages of the discourse by a way of
assuring oneself that the suit does not fit the psychoanalyst—an
assurance against the fear that he will put, if I may say so, his
creases in it too soon.

(Lacan 1995b[1967]:5, translation modified)
我们将必须看出,为了回应这个情境,“被认为是知道的主体“的这个情境,我们能够看出,这个情境并没有涵盖精神分析家这个人的人格,他的特质。被认为是知道的主体不但实际上并非真实,而且活跃于这个关键联接的主体,也就是最初作为言说的唯一的人,分析者,根本也没有这个必要,将它赋加在他身上。这非但并非必要,它通常也并非是真实:在辞说的最初的阶段,被证明的东西,凭借让自己确信,这套西装并不适合精神分析家。他用这种确实来对抗这个恐惧:很快地,他将会让这套西装起皱纹,容我这样说。

Without devaluing the importance of the supposed subject of knowing
for the transference, Lacan relativized its impact as a truthful and honest
expectation with which most analysands approach their analysts, considering
the spurious relationship they have with knowledge professed by somebody
else. As I have explained in Chapter 1, it is not because people do not know
what is wrong with them, and, following their wish to know the truth, urge
professionals to tell them what they know, that they will be willing to accept
the professionals’ knowledge.

拉康并没有贬低被认为是知道的主体对于移情的重要性,他将它的影响相对化,作为忠实而诚实的期望。大部分的分析者都带着这个期望,接近他们的分析家,认为分析家具有跟某个人其他的人宣称的知识的似是而非的关系。如同我在第一章解释过程,这并不是因为人们不知道他们的问题出在哪里,当他们遵循他们的愿望要知道真理时,他们要求专业人员告诉他们他们所知道的事情,他们将会愿意接受专业人员的知识。

An analysand’s investment of her analyst with
the supposed subject of knowing is always relative: on the one hand she
wants her analyst to be wildly knowledgeable, whereas on the other she
already knows in advance that from the moment he will start professing his
knowledge, it will prove fatally flawed. Or, if the analysand has been
sufficiently hystericized, he will simultaneously expect his analyst to be
knowledgeable, to convey this knowledge, to admit it is inadequate, to seek
more knowledge, to allow him to find knowledge elsewhere, etc.45
None the less Lacan remained convinced that the supposed subject of
knowing constitutes ‘the pivot on which everything to do with the
transference is hinged’ (ibid.: 5).

分析者对于她的分析家投注被认为是知道的主体。这种投注总是相对的:一方面,她想要她的分析家成为知识广博。另一方面,她已经事先知道,从那个时刻开始,他将会开始宣称他的知识。那个知识将会证明致命地具有瑕疵。或者,假如分析者已经充分地成为癔症者,他将会同时期望他的分析家成为知识广博。传达这个知识,承认这个知识是不足够的,寻求更多的知识,让他能够在别的地方找到知识,等等。尽管如此,拉康始终相信,被认为是知道的主体形成“ 这个枢纽,依靠这个枢纽里,每件事情都跟移情有关联。

Even when analysands refuse to accept
their analysts as paragons of absolute knowledge, the supposed subject
of knowing (and transference) will continue to operate if only the
analysands believe that one day they will become masters in their own
house. In this sense Lacan’s supposed subject of knowing conveys nothing
more than the analysand’s opinion that all knowledge can be endowed
with a subject, i.e. that there is no such thing as a knowledge which has
to remain fundamentally subject-less. In more psychological terms, the
supposed subject of knowing refers to the individual’s belief that it is
possible to attain the climax of full self-realization, a status characterized
by the definitive cancellation of all nonsense, the complete understanding
of oneself and the discovery of the true signification of life.46

即使当分析者拒绝接受他们的分析家,作为是绝对知识的典范,被认为是知道的主体(与移情),将继续运转,只要分析者相信,有一天,他们将会成为大师,在他们自己的房屋里。从这个意义而言,拉康的被认为的知道的主体,传达的东西,仅仅是分析者的意见:所有的知识都能够被禀赋一个主体。譬如,并不存在着这种知识的东西,必须始终基本上是没有主体的知识。用更加是心理学的术语,被认为是知道的主体,提到个人的信仰:获得充分的自性的实现的高潮是可能的。这一种状态的特征是明确地取消一切的无稽之谈,完全理解自己,并且发现生命的真实的意义。

The supposed subject of knowing is evidently at odds with the divided subject
() of the unconscious, because it glorifies the transparency of all
knowledge and aims for the restoration of a psychic economy without
loss. The supposed subject of knowing ‘is the postulate of which it is the
case that it abolishes the unconscious’ (Lacan 1968c[1967]:46).
In his 1967 ‘Proposition’, Lacan formalized the installation of the
supposed subject of knowing in a new algorithm of transference (Lacan

1995b[1967]:5):被认为是知道的主体,跟无意识的分裂的主体,显而易见是互相抵触。因为它推崇所有的知识的透明化,并且目标朝着恢复心灵的活力,没有任何损失。被认为是知道的主体,就是这个假设,就在这个假设的情况里,它废除无意识。在他的1967年的“建议”,拉康正式将被认为是知道的主体,安置在移情的新的轨迹里。

The sequence under the bar represents the analysand’s assumption of an
agency controlling the signification of all knowledge (the undivided
subject of the unconscious, the thinker behind the unconscious thoughts),
whereby 5 stands for (undivided, present) subject and (S1, S2,…Sn) for
the unconscious thoughts (the symbolic network of signifiers). The S
above the bar is the so-called ‘transference-signifier’ (signifiant du
transfert) which, in its relation to any old signifier (Sa), makes the
supposition possible. The link between S and Sa is the connection between
two signifiers without which the supposed subject of knowing would
remain without signification for the analysand.47 Indeed the assumption
that all knowledge can be subjectified only becomes significant for the
analysand because he has ‘transferred’ one of the signifiers (ideas,
representations) in his psyche to a particular signifier belonging to another
subject, the analyst for that matter.48

在这个横杠底下的系列代表分析者的假设一个代理,控制一切知识的意义的代理(无意识的没有被分裂的主体,无意识的思想背后的思想家),S代表(没有被分裂,存在的)主体。(S1,、、、Sn)代表无意识的思想 (能指的象征的网络)。横杠以上的这个S 就是所谓的“移情-能指”。由于它跟任何旧的能指(Sa)的关系,这个“移情-能指”让这个假设成为可能。在S与Sa 之间的联接,就是两个能指之间的联接。假如没有这两个能指,被认为是知道的主体将始终保持是咩有意义,对于分析者。的确,所有的知识能够被形成主体,这个假设变得重要,对于分析者。因为他已经转移他的心灵里的其中一个能指(观念,再现表象),转移到一个特殊的能指,属于另外一个主体的能指,就这件事情而言,那就是分析家。

In Seminar XX Lacan translated this craving for complete knowledge
within the transference in the terminology of love, proclaiming that ‘love
is the desire to be One’, and that love proceeds from the belief ‘we are
but One’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:6, 47).49 Love (and transference) equals
believing that the other is not an Other affected by an irreducible lack,
but the incarnation of the perfect One, and it cherishes the hope that this
One will spill over onto one-self. Since the entrapment of love is part
and parcel of the neurotic’s psychic economy, it is by no means restricted
to the psychoanalytic setting, which again explains why transference
can easily exist outside the walls of the psychoanalytic cabinet.

在第20研讨班,拉康翻译对于完整知识的渴望,在移情之内,用爱的术语。拉康宣称,“爱是想要成为”一“的欲望。爱继续前进,凭借这个信仰:我们仅是“一”。爱(与移情)等于是相信:他者并不是受的无法还原的欠缺的影响的大他者,而是完美的“一”的具体化身。爱怀抱这个希望:这个“一”将会分撒在“作为自性的一”。因为爱的陷阱是神经症的心灵的活力的部分与包裹。爱绝非是被限制在精神分析的背景里。这再次解释为什么移情很容易存在于精神分析的咨商室的墙壁之外。

If the unconscious is a knowledge without a knowing agency (a
headless body so to speak) and the supposed subject of knowing correlates
with the complete mastery over knowledge, it is clear why Lacan
contended in Seminar XI (1977b[1964]:130–133) that transference
involves a closure of the unconscious. In its striving for unity love favours
the redemption of the absent subject of the unconscious or, to use Lacan’s
terms in Encore, it aims at being, to be understood here as self-fulfilment
(Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:40). Once again this point repeated a feature
Freud had noted in his paper on transference-love and which he had
attributed to the influence of resistance:

假如无意识是没有知道的代理者的知识(也就是,没有头的身体),被认为是知道的主体,跟完整的掌控知识息息相关。显而易见地,拉康为什么在第11研讨班主张,移情牵涉到无意识的封闭。当无意识奋斗获得统一时,爱偏爱无意识的欠缺的主体的救赎。或者,用拉康在“再来”研讨班的术语说,爱的目标是生命实存,在此应该被理解为实践-自性。再次,这一点重复弗洛伊德没有注意到的一个特征,当他探讨移情与爱。弗洛伊德将这个特征归属于坚持的影响。

At a first glance it certainly does not look as if the patient’s falling
in love in the transference could result in any advantage to the
treatment. No matter how amenable she has been up till then, she
suddenly loses all understanding of the treatment and all interest
in it, and will not speak or hear about anything but her love, which
she demands to have returned. She gives up her symptoms or pays
no attention to them; indeed, she declares that she is well.
(Freud 1915a[1914]:162)

乍然一瞥,移情与爱看起来确实不像是:在移情里恋爱的病人能够造成任何的利益,对于治疗。无论她直到那时是多么的可被修正,她突然丧失所有的理解,对于治疗与治疗里的所有的興趣。她所言说,或所停到的事情,无非就是她的爱。她要求回到她的爱。她放弃她的症状,或并没有注意那些症状。的确,她宣称,她是健康的。

Alienated to the transference-signifier, analysands deceive themselves and
their analysts when supposing the subject of knowing, not only in their
sudden extirpation of the debilitating effects of the symptoms, but also in
the special demands they put upon their analysts. In the former case the
analyst runs the risk of losing his patient because she declares herself healthy
and cannot think of any good reason to continue the treatment.

当分析者针对移情的能指,表现异化时,分析者欺骗他们自己与分析家。当他们认为知道的主体,不但在他们的突然的移除症状的令人衰弱的影响,而且在他们对于分析家提出的特别的要求。在前者的情况,分析家冒着丧失他的分析者的危险。因为她宣称她自己是健康,并且无法想出任何好的理由,来继续这个治疗。

In the latter
case, a patient may consider breaking off the treatment because he feels
that the analyst is not paying enough attention to him, does not give enough
of her time, tends to run shorter sessions with him than with other
analysands, does not appreciate the (financial) effort he has put into the
whole enterprise, in short does not love him enough. Of course, the analyst
needs to ensure that the analysis does not come to a halt because the
analysand’s transference makes him feel ‘cured by magic’ or ‘just treated
like everybody else’. To solve this clinical problem, Lacan advised that
the analyst overturn the dead weight of the analysand’s demands within
the transference with the lever of desire, a recommendation to which I will
return in the following section of this chapter.

在后者的情况,病人可能考虑中断治疗,因为他觉得,分析家并没有给予他充分的注意,没有给予她充分的时间。分析家倾向于将她的咨商时数减短,比起他给予其他的分析者。分析家并没有赏识他付出的财政的努力,付给整个的企业。总之,分析家并没有充分地爱他。当然,分析家需要保证,精神分析并没有中止,因为分析者的移情让他感觉“被魔法治疗”。或“仅是像每一位其他的人一样被治疗”。为了解决这个临床的难题,拉康劝告,分析家应该推翻分析者的要求的僵化的重量,在移情之内,用欲望的杠杆。在这个章节的以下部分,我将回头谈论这一个建议。

As mentioned earlier, the analysand’s perception of the analyst as a
character equipped with knowledge of his most intimate experiences is
not the only factor Lacan distinguished in Seminar VIII to explain the
eruption of love. After having cut the analyst’s key to the analysand’s
problems, as seen through the latter’s own eyes, from the material of
knowledge, Lacan used the sparring match between Socrates and
Alcibiades at the end of the Symposium to delineate the function of the
agalma within the transference (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:163–195).

如同早先提到,分析者对于分析家的感觉,作为是装备他最亲近的经验的知识的人物。分析家的感觉并不是唯一的因素,拉康在第八研讨班区别出来。为了解释爱的发作。当拉康将分析家对于分析者的解答,跟知识的材料切割开始,依照从分析家自己的眼光来观看。拉康使用苏格拉底与阿西比底斯之间的拳击表演赛,在“会饮篇”的结尾,为了描述阿加马的功能,在移情之内。

Agalma is the term Alcibiades used to grasp the hidden, yet fascinating
object he believed to be enclosed in the depths of Socrates’ hideous body.
A mysterious gem whose preciousness he had savoured as a young man
during a privileged moment of revelation, the agalma had sparked
Alcibiades’ infatuation with Socrates and served to justify his eulogy of
Socrates’ attractiveness.

阿加马是阿西比底斯使用的术语,用来理解这个隐藏,可是令人著迷的客体。他相信这个客体被封闭在苏格拉底的令人厌憎的身体的深处。阿加马是一个神秘的珍宝,他年轻时曾经喜爱的珍宝的珍贵。当他处于接受启蒙的特权的时期,这个阿加马珍宝激发阿西底比斯对于苏格拉底的著迷。阿加马珍宝充当是对于苏格拉底的迷人的颂扬的理由。

In Seminar VIII Lacan surmised that the part played by the agalma in
the emergence of transference must be at least as important as that of the
supposed knowledge, yet his subsequent invocations of the topic were
rather disappointing. Apart from a small, yet valuable gloss in his
‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’ (1995b
[1967]:7), references were often limited to simple mentions of the term. It
is tempting to argue that Lacan gradually replaced the agalma with his
own concept of the object a, so that each passage on the function of the
object a in the transference would contain an implicit reference to the
agalma.

在第八研讨班,拉康推测,在移情出现时,阿加马的珍宝扮演的角色,至少是同样地重要,跟被认为的知识的出现扮演的角色。可是,拉康随后召唤的议题相当令人失望。除了将他在1967年,针对学院派的精神分析家的“建议”,稍作修改装饰外,拉康的指称经常被限制在简单地提到那个术语。我们忍不住地要争辩:拉康逐渐用他自己的小客体a的观念,取代阿加马。所以,在移情里的小客体a的功能的每个段落,都包含含暗示地提到阿加马。


I wish to challenge this idea, not so much because it is difficult to
entertain on the basis of Lacan’s own works, but mainly because the
equation of the agalma and the object a makes it extremely difficult to
comprehend some of Lacan’s later statements on the position of the analyst
in the treatment.50 For example, when Lacan argued in Encore that analysts
are ‘in the best position to do what should rightfully be done, namely to
investigate the status of the truth as knowledge’, when they put the object
a in the place of semblance, does this mean that the analyst is supposed to
sustain the analysand’s love in order to realize the analytic goals? For if
agalma (as the mysterious object triggering love) equals the object a and
the analyst is held to occupy the position of object a in the analytic discourse,
how can the transference ever be analysed?

我希望交换这个观念,倒不是因为很困难根据拉康自己的著作来怀抱这个观念。而是因为将阿加马跟小客体a相等,让某些拉康晚期的陈述的理解成为极端困难,当他探讨治疗时的分析家的立场。譬如,当拉康在“再来”研讨班主张,分析家“处于最佳立场,去做有权利应该被做的事情,也就是说,去研究真理作为知识的位置”,当他将小客体a 取代类似物。这难道是意味著:分析家应该维持分析者的爱,为了实践精神分析的目标?因为假如阿加马(作为触动爱的神秘的客体),相等于是小客体a,而分析家被认为是占据小客体a的位置,在精神分析的辞说里,移情如何能够被分析?

The conflation of the agalma and the object a also gives rise to a
confusion of love and desire in Lacan’s work, since the object a is
traditionally defined as the object cause of desire. Lacan himself to some
degree contributed to this confusion by using love and desire as
interchangeable terms in Seminar VIII, and by elucidating the metaphor
of love in his two subsequent Seminars as a substitution of the desiring
(le desirant) for the desirable (le desire).51 However, from the mid-1960s
he charted love and desire as two separate experiences on whose
distinction the entire progress of psychoanalytic treatment depends.

阿加马与小客体a的混合,也产生爱与欲望的混淆,在拉康的著作里。因为小客体a传统上被定义为欲望的客体的原因。拉康他自己有某个程度促成这种混淆。在第八研讨班,拉康使用爱与欲望,作为是可以交换的术语。他阐述爱的隐喻,在他随后的研讨班,作为是欲望者的替换被欲望者。可是,从1960的中叶开始,他描绘爱与欲望,作为两个分开的经验。精神分析的治疗的整个的进展,就依靠这个区别。

The
promotion of desire as the analyst’s lever to overturn the analysand’s
love in Seminar XI (1977b[1964]:235) can exemplify this. Hence the
agalma of love does not equal the object a of desire, because like the
supposed subject of knowing the agalma relates to the analysand’s
perception of the Other as a perfect being, containing the precious jewels
of happiness and salvation, whereas the object a is strictly situated within
the dimension of semblance. Whereas the agalma represents the ideal
stone of wisdom, the object a is but a partial, replaceable commodity.52

欲望的提倡,作为分析家的杠杆,推翻分析者的爱,在第11研讨班,能够作为这个的典范。 因此,爱的阿加马并没有相等于欲望的小客体a,因为就像被认为是知道的主体,这个阿加马跟分析者对于大他者作为是完美的人的感觉息息相关。它包含快乐与救赎的这个珍贵的珠宝。而小客体a 则是严格地被定位在类似物的维度里面。虽然阿加马代表理想的智慧的宝石,小客体a 仅是部分,无法取代的货物。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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