从重复到诉诸行动

FROM REPETITION TO ENACTMENT
从重复到诉诸行动

In 1954–55 Lacan devoted a substantial part of his Seminar II to a
theoretical analysis of Freud’s concept of the compulsion to repeat
(Wiederholungszwang). As he explained on at least two occasions
during this Seminar (1988c[1954–55]:118, 123), this was a logical
step to take after having dissected the phenomenology of transference,
taking account of the amalgamation of transference and repetition in
Freud’s works.28 It was also an occasion for Lacan to address a
Freudian dilemma Lagache had rehashed in his numerous
contributions to the topic of transference: does transference conform
to the repetition of a need, or to a need for repetition? (Lagache
1952:94–95; 1953[1951]:4–5; 1993[1954]:137).

在1954-55年,拉康专注他的第二研讨班上很充实的部分,探讨弗洛伊德的强迫的观念的理论的分析,为了要重复。他在这个研讨班期间,至少在两个场合,他继续解释。这是一个必要採取的逻辑的步骤,当他已经解剖移情的现象学,描述移情与重复的合并,在弗洛伊德的著作里。那也是一个场合,让拉康能够处理弗洛伊德的困境。拉佳奇曾经在他许多的贡献,探讨移情的主题,曾经复述弗洛伊德的困境:移情符合需求的重复吗?或是符合重复的需求?

In presenting this
dilemma, Lagache had opposed Freud’s description of transference
as the repetition of an unfulfilled need for love (Freud 1912b:100),
following the pleasure principle, to his subsequent account of
transference as a derivative of the compulsion to repeat, and thus of
what functions beyond the pleasure principle (Freud 1920g:20–21).
Hence, the apparently futile question raised by Lagache opened up
onto a cardinal issue: does transference operate in keeping with the
pleasure principle, or does it work against it?29

当拉佳奇呈现这个困境时,他将弗洛伊德对于移情的描述,跟没有被满足的爱的需求的重复,相提并论。他遵循快乐原则,到弗洛伊德随后的描述移情,作为是重复的强迫的衍生物。因此,是超越快乐原则的功能的东西的衍生物。因此,拉佳奇提出的这个表面上说徒劳的问题,展开进入一个主要的议题:移情的运作,符合快乐原则吗?或者抵触快乐原则吗?

Lacan’s trajectory in Seminar II sparked a new interpretation of
‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (Freud 1920g), in which Freud had
conceptualized the repetition compulsion as an infernal cycle compelling
people to re-experience unpleasurable events time and again. By analogy
with the notion of resistance, Lacan dubbed the repetition compulsion
an insistence, linking its compulsive nature to the continuous return of
the signifiers within the symbolic order.

拉康在第二研讨班的探讨引发对于“超越快乐原则”的新的铨释。在” 超越快乐原则“的文章,弗洛伊德曾经建构重复的强迫的观念,作为是内部的迴圈,强迫人们一再地重新经验令人不愉快的事件。拉康则是将它跟抗拒的观念类比,称重复的强迫是一种抗拒。拉康将重复强迫的特性,跟象征秩序内部,能指的继续回落联接一块。

Again minimizing the explanatory
value of the Zeigarnik effect, he attributed the repetition compulsion to
the incessant intrusion of the symbolic machinery which governs all
human life forms, similar to the ongoing exchange of messages within
an isolated, closed circuit (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:87–90). Hence, if
transference follows the repetition compulsion and the latter equals the
insistence of the signifiers within the symbolic order, then transference
must be characterized by that same symbolic insistence and not, for that
matter, by the power of resistance.

再次,当拉康淡化哲噶米克的解释的价值,他将重复的强迫归属于象征的机器的不断的闯入。这个象征的机器统辖所有的人类的生命的形式。类似于正在进行的讯息的交换,在一个孤立的,封闭的迴圈里。因此,假如移情遵循重复的强迫,而重复的强迫相等于是能指的坚持,在象征的秩序里,那么,移情必然是有相同的象征的坚持表现特征。就那件事情而言,移情并不是由抗拒的力量表现特征。

This conclusion urged Lacan to decide
in favour of the analysand’s transference as an unconscious, symbolic
need for repetition functioning beyond the pleasure principle, and it
bolstered his critique of clinicians advocating the analysis of the
transference as a resistance.30 This is not to say that Lacan completely
rejected the resistance side of transference, but he considered it an
unproductive, deceitful departure from its bona fide repetition side—a
deterioration for whose emergence the analyst is as much responsible as
for that of the symbolic insistence.

这个结论催促拉康作决定赞同分析者的移情,作为是无意识,象征的需求重复,发挥功能,超越快乐原则。这个结论支撑临床医生的批判。这些临床医生主张移情的精神分析,作为抗拒。这并不是说,拉康完全排斥移情具有抗拒的一面。代替的,他认为移情是一个没有生产的欺骗的出发,从它的真诚的重复的那一面出发—这是一种恶化。对于这个恶化,分析家同样要负责,如同负责象征的坚持的出现。

Armed with this new distinction between transference insistence
(symbolic repetition) and transference resistance (imaginary projection),
Lacan returned to the case-studies of Dora and the young homosexual
woman, putting Freud’s technical errors into a different light. Following
a juxtaposition of the two cases in Seminar IV, he argued that whereas in
the Dora case Freud had radically ignored the imaginary element of deceit
within Dora’s transference, in the case of the young homosexual woman
he had made exactly the opposite mistake, concentrating exclusively on
the deceitfulness of her dream (to be a happily married woman) without
acknowledging its truthful symbolic articulation (Lacan 1994[1956–57]:
135–136).

拉康装备著这个新的区别,处于移情的坚持(象征的重复),与移情的抗拒(想像的投射)之间的区别,他回转到朵拉与这位年轻同性恋的女人的个案研究,他将弗洛伊德的技术的错误,从不同的观点观看。拉康在第四研讨班,将这两个个案相提并论。他主张说,在朵拉的个案,弗洛伊德强烈地忽略欺骗的想像的元素,在朵拉的移情的内部。而在年轻的同性恋的女人,弗洛伊德犯了确实是相反的错误,他专注地集中于梦的欺骗性(成为婚姻快乐的女人),而没有承认欺骗性是真实的象征的表达。

In his treatment of Dora Freud was led astray by his
unshakeable belief that his patient was unconsciously, yet honestly
reliving her love for Mr K in her relationship with her analyst, whilst in
his analysis of the young homosexual girl he was mistaken in excluding
the possibility that her dream of a happily married life transpired a deeply
felt, though unconscious wish.

在他治疗朵拉时,弗洛伊德的导致迷失,是由于他的没有动摇的信念:他的病人无意识地,可是有诚实地重新经历她对K先生的爱,在她跟她的分析家的关系。弗洛伊德对这位年轻的同性恋者从事精神分析时,他犯错误地排除这个可能性:她对于快乐婚姻的生活的梦想散发出一股深深被感觉,虽然是无意识的愿望。

At the end of the 1950s, with Seminar VII (1992[1959–60]), a radical
shift of perspective took place. Although the entire seminar was intended
as a revaluation of the aims and objectives of psychoanalytic treatment,
Lacan entered into a digression concerning the relation between the
pleasure and reality principles in Freud’s oeuvre to redefine the status of
the signifier.

在1950年代的结束,在第七研讨班,拉康的观点发生强烈的改变。虽然整个的研讨班被意图充当重新评估精神分析治疗的目标与目的。拉康从事离题讨论,关于弗洛伊德的著作里,快乐原则与现实原则之间的关系的离题讨论。为了重新定义能指的地位。

Contrary to what he had proffered in previous seminars, he
now located the signifier, or what Freud had called Vorstellung
(representation), firmly within the realm of the pleasure principle (ibid.:
134). Relying on Freud’s ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’
(1950a[1895]), Lacan intimated that the pleasure principle, the primary
unconscious process regulating the distribution of libidinal energy
between representations, cannot operate without these representations.
Rather than being an agency functioning beyond the pleasure principle,
the signifier thus became part and parcel of the primary process.

跟在前几个研讨班,他提供的东西恰恰相反,拉康现在定位这个能指,或弗洛伊德所谓的“再现表象”,牢固地定位在快乐原则的领域内部。拉康依靠弗洛伊德的“科学心理学的计划”主张说:快乐原则是最初的无意识的过程,规范力比多的精力的分配,在再现表象之间。假如没有这些再现表象,快乐原则无法运作。能指并非是超越快乐原则发挥功能的代理者,能指因此变成是原初的过程的部分与领域。

This new conception of the signifier evidently challenged the
connection between transference and repetition. Initially, Lacan had
correlated transference with the repetition compulsion and the latter with
the insistence of the signifier beyond the pleasure principle. Now, with
the new alliance between the signifier and the pleasure principle,
transference could no longer be associated with the repetition compulsion,
unless the symbolic mechanism of transference itself was entirely revised.
In addition, the proposed congruence of transference, the signifier and
the pleasure principle seemed to topple Lacan’s original take on Lagache’s
polarization (need for repetition vs. repetition of need) into the opposite
direction, transference appearing quite conspicuously as the repetition
of a need.

能指的这个新的观念明显地挑战移情与重复之间的连接。最初,拉康曾经将移情跟重复的强迫连接一块,将重复的强迫跟能指的坚持超越快乐原则连接一块。现在,随着这个新的联盟,处于能指与快乐之家的新的联盟,移情不再能够跟重复的强迫连想一块。除非移情本身的象征的机制完全被修订。除外,移情,能指与快乐原则的被建议的调和似乎坍塌拉康的原先的接纳拉噶奇的两极化(重复的需求,对抗需求的重复),坍塌成为相反的方向,移情相当显著地出现,作为是需求的重复。

Avoiding this inconsistency in Seminar VII, Lacan devoted his next
seminar entirely to the topic of transference, which incited him to ponder
the two sides of Lagache’s opposition again and to offer the following
provisional solution:

拉康避免在第七研讨班的这个不一贯,他专注他的下一个研讨班,专注探讨移情的主题。移情的主题激发他再次沉思拉噶奇的对立的两面,并且提供以下的暂时的解决:

[I]t seems impossible to me to eliminate from the phenomenon of
transference the fact that it manifests itself in relation to somebody
spoken to. This is a constitutive fact. It constitutes a frontier and it
simultaneously indicates to us that we should not drown the
phenomenon of transference in the general possibility of repetition
constituted by the existence of the unconscious. In analysis, there
are of course repetitions linked to the constancy of the signifying
chain in the subject. These repetitions need to be distinguished
strictly from what we call transference, even when in some cases
they may have homologous effects.
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:208)

我似乎不可能从移情的现象里,减少这个事实:移情展示它自己,相关于某个被对谈的人。这是一个具有形成本质的事实。它形成一个边界,它同时跟我们指示,我们不应该将移情的这个现象,淹没于重复的一般可能里,无意识的存在形成的重复的可能里。在精神分析,当然会有重复跟主体里的成为能指的锁链的固定常数连接一块。这些重复需要严格地被区别,跟我们所谓的移情,即使当在某些的情况,他们可能会有同质性的影响。

It would be erroneous to infer from this passage that Lacan took issue
with his own previous equivalence of transference and the need for
repetition, now realigning the occurrence of transference with the
repetition of a need. As a matter of fact, he was making a rudimentary
case for the radical separation of transference and repetition on the basis
of an evaluation of the inherently creative dimension in the transference
phenomenon.

这将是错误的,假如我们从这个段落推论,拉康争议他自己先前将移情与重复的需求的相等。现在则是将移情的发生,跟需求的重复重新等同。事实上,拉康正在建构一个基本的个案,朝向将移情跟重复强烈地分开,基础是评估移情的现象的本质上创造的维度。

On the one hand, Freud’s definition of transference as the
analysand’s reproduction in acts of a repressed historical event within
the presence of the analytic situation (Freud 1914g:150) encouraged
Lacan to loosen the knot between transference and the compulsion to
repeat.

一方面,弗洛伊德的定义移情,作为是分析者的复制,在被压抑的历史的事件的行动里,在分析的情况的存在里面。这鼓励拉康松开这个环结,处于移情于重复的强迫之间的环结。

The element of acting and the incessant implication of the present
within the transference prompted him to approach transference as
something more than the emergence of the compulsion to repeat. On the
other hand, he questioned the view of transference as the repetition of an
ancient unfulfilled need from the vantage point that the analysand never
simply succumbs to this need, but always recreates it within the novel
context of the analytic experience (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:206–207).

在移情内部,行动的元素与目前的不断的暗示,激发拉康探讨移情,作为是某件不仅是重复的强迫的出现。在另一方面,他质问移情的观点,作为旧时没有被满足的需求的重复,从分析者从来没有仅是屈从这个需求的观看点。而是总是重新创造这个需要,在精神分析经验的新奇的内文里。

The vexed issue of the relationship between transference and repetition
was reopened in 1962–63, when Lacan spent a whole year investigating
the topic of anxiety. Broaching yet again the conjunction of transference
and the compulsion to repeat, he underscored that transference cannot
be reduced to the reproduction of an anterior, unresolved conflict. If the
analysand’s transference is marked by love, this affect is always already
related to an object in the present, which Lacan (1991b[1960–61]: 179–
195) illustrated with Socrates’ interpretation of Alcibiades’ love in Plato’s
Symposium (Plato 1951).31

移情与重复之间的关系的恼人的问题重新被展开,当拉康花费一整年的时间,研究焦虑的议题。拉康再次将移情与重复的强迫分开,他强调,移情无法被化简成为前期,没有被解救的冲突的复制。假如分析者的移情被标记著爱,这个情感总是已经恩目前的客体相关。拉康举例说明目前这个客体,用苏格拉底的解释阿西比底斯的爱,这柏拉图的“会饮篇”里。

Concurrently, he insisted that the reduction
of transference to repetition obfuscates the importance of the analyst’s
own part in the entire affair. For if the transference always integrates an
object in the present, analysts cannot escape their being made into the
object of their analy sands’ transference, through which they not only
elicit but also crucially shape their patients’ reactions. Down-playing
the repetitive component of transference and upgrading the analyst’s
creative part in it, Lacan also replaced his previous definition of
countertransference as the sum of the analyst’s prejudices, insufficient
information, passions and difficulties, by the analyst’s essential
implication in the analysand’s transference, whose cautious management
must proceed from the purified desire of the analyst (Lacan 1991b[1960–
61]: 221; 1962–63: session of 27 February 1963).32

同时,拉康坚持,移情化简成为重复,抹除分析家扮演的角色的重要性,在整个的情事里。因此,假如移情总是合并目前的客体,分析家无法逃避他们的存在,被填加到他们的分析者的移情的客体里。通过分析者的移情,他们不但召唤,而且关键地塑造他们的病人的反应。贬抑移情的重复的成分,并且提升分析者在移情的重复里扮演创造性的角色,拉康也更换他的先前的反-移情的定义,作为是分析家的各种偏见,不充分的资讯,激情与困难的总和。由于分析家的基本的暗示,在分析者的移情里。对于分析者的谨慎的管理必须前进,从分析家的被纯净化的欲望里。

Lacan’s most distinguished view on the nature of transference
appeared in Seminar XI (1977b[1964]), in which he designated
transference and repetition as two distinct fundamental concepts of
psychoanalysis.33 Disregarding his own previous assertions and criticizing
Freud for presenting a confused account, Lacan proclaimed that repetition
has nothing in common with transference (ibid.: 33, 69).

拉康探讨移情的特性的最明显的观点,出现在第11研讨班。在那里,他指明移情与重复,作为精神分析的两个不同的基本的观念。拉康忽视他自己先前的主张,并且批评弗洛伊德,因为呈现一个感到困惑的描述。拉康宣称,重复跟移情根本没有任何共通的地方。

Whereas
repetition occurs when a missed, traumatic encounter (beyond the
pleasure principle) is integrated within the network of signifiers (following
the pleasure principle), transference ‘is the enactment of the reality of
the unconscious’ (ibid.: 146, 149).34 Gradually disclosing the meaning
of this new, highly aphoristic description of transference, Lacan specified
that the reality of the unconscious is always sexual and that this
unconscious sexual reality underpins all the analysand’s demands within
the transference.

重复发生,当一个被错过的,创伤的遭遇(超越快乐原则)被合并到能指的网络内部(遵循快乐原则),移情就是“无意识的现实的诉诸行动”。拉康逐渐揭露这个新的,高度警语的描述移情的意义。他并且指明,无意识的现实总是性化,这个无意识的性的现实,作为是所有分析者在移情内部的要求。

For example, if an analysand demands that the analyst
say something because she has the impression that the latter does not
seem to be interested in her associations, this demand represents an avatar
of the analysand’s unconscious sexual reality, notably that she derives
excitement from awakening people’s interest and that she cannot tolerate
the idea that somebody might not be attracted to her.

譬如,假如分析者要求:分析家应该说出某件东西。因为她拥有这个印象,分析家似乎对她的联想,没有感到興趣。这个要求代表分析者的无意识的性的现实的具体表现,特别是,分析者获得興奋,从唤醒人们的興趣,她无法容忍这个观念:某个人没有被她吸引。

If the analyst remains
mute, the analysand is bound to interpret his silence as an indication of
the analyst’s lack of interest or, more commonly, as evidence of his lack
of professionalism, and she is likely to employ this interpretation as an
explanation for her own lack of analytic progress. More specifically, she
will attribute the fact that the analyst is not giving her enough (nice
interpretations, kind words, love) to his being a bad practitioner, and she
will try to change his habits by intermittently threatening him with her
imminent departure.

假如分析家始终沉默不语,分析者一定要解释他的沉默,作为是指示分析家的欠缺興趣,或是,更加普遍地,作为证明分析家欠缺专业精神。分析者很可能运用这个解释,作为解释她自己的欠缺精神分析的进步。更加明确地,分析者将个事实:分析家并没有给予她充分的(解释,仁慈的话语,爱),归咎于分析家是差劲的执业者。她将尝试改变分析家的态度,凭借间歇地威胁他,用她的快要来临的离去。

Conversely, when an analysand requests that the
analyst remain silent so that he can devote himself fully to the exploration
of his thoughts, this demand too harbours an unconscious sexual reality,
inasmuch as the analysand might enjoy destroying whatever interest
people may show in him so that he can devote himself quietly to the
narcissistic enjoyment of his own isolated condition.

相反地,当分析者要求:分析家应该始终保持沉默,这样,他才能够充分地专注他自己,探索他的思想。这个要求也怀抱著一个无意识的性的现实。因为分析者可能喜欢恢灭任何让人们在他身上显示的任何興趣。这样,他才会安静地专注他自己,于他自己的孤立的情况的自恋的享受。

Substantiating earlier statements on the analyst’s responsibility,
Lacan added that this enactment of the sexual reality of the unconscious
should not be understood as a mere effect of the analysand’s psychic
structure:

拉康将他早期对于分析家的责任的陈述具体表现,然后补充说,无意识里的性的现实的这个诉诸行动,不应该被理解,作为仅是分析者的心灵的结构的结果。

The transference is a phenomenon in which subject and
psychoanalyst are both included. To divide it in terms of
transference and countertransference—however bold, however
confident what is said on this theme may be—is never more than a
way of avoiding the essence of the matter.
(ibid.: 231)

移情是主体与精神分析家两种都包含在内的现象。用移情与反移情来区分,从来就是逃避问题的本质的方式。无论针对这个主题所说出的话语是多么勇敢,多么自信。

Apropos of the aforementioned examples, this means that the analysand
in the first case will not regard the analyst as a passive figure who lacks
all interest and commitment, expressly formulating the demand that he
start working and acting as a proper analyst, if the latter did not cultivate
an attitude of prolonged silence. Mutatis mutandis, the analysand in the
second case will not vilify the analyst for intervening, impressing on
him the idea that good analysts are supposed to listen and not talk, if the
analyst himself did not engage regularly in asking questions and launching
interpretations.

关于前面所述的例子,这意味着,在第一个个案里的分析者,将不会视分析家,作为一个被动的人物。他欠缺所有的興趣与奉献。他生动地阐述这个要求:他应该开始工作与形动,作为一位恰如分的分析家。假如后者并没有培养延长的沉默的态度。比照起来,在第二个个案的分析者将不会抨击分析家,因为介入,让他接受这个观念:好的分析家被认为是倾听,而不是谈话。假如分析家自己并没有规律地参与询问问题,并发动解释。

The analyst’s conduct in these two cases is crucial for
the emergence of the analysand’s transference as the enactment of the
sexual reality of the unconscious and it simultaneously gives form to it.

在这两个个案里,分析家的行为是重要的,对于分析者的移情的出现,作为是无意识的性的现实的诉诸行动。分析家的行为同时也给予它形式。

Needless to say that the analyst’s conduct in these matters reflects a
particular desire and rests upon an appreciation of the psychic structure of
the analysand before and during analytic sessions. In the first case, the
analyst’s sustained silence will normally proceed from a diagnosis of the
analysand as a hysteric, whereas in the second case the analyst’s nagging
interventions will be based on a diagnosis of obsessional neurosis. Since
hysteria revolves around an ardent desire to elicit the desire of the Other,
the analyst’s silence encompasses a refusal to enter the hysterical dynamics
and is well suited to trigger the hysteric’s fantasy within the transference.

自不待言的是,分析家的行为,在这些事情里,反映出特殊的欲望,并依靠分析者的心灵的结构的赏识,在精神分析节数之前与期间。在第一个个案,分析家的持续的沉默,正常地前进,从诊断分析者,作为癔症。在第二个个案,分析家的唠叨的介入,将会以妄想症的神经症作为基础。因为癔症环绕热切的欲望旋转,为了召唤大他者的欲望。分析家的沉默涵盖拒绝进入癔症的动力结构,并且非常合适地触发癔症的幻见,在移情的内部。

In ‘Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectics of Desire’ Lacan wrote:
[A] calculated vacillation of the analyst’s ‘neutrality’ may be more
valuable for a hysteric than any amount of interpretation, despite
the frenzy which may result from it. That is to say, so that this
frenzy does not entail a rupture and the sequel convinces the subject
that the desire of the analyst was by no means involved.
(Lacan 1977k[1960]:321–322, translation modified)

在“主体的颠覆与欲望的辩证法”,拉康书写到:「比起任何数量的解释,分析家保持“中立”的审慎评估的摇摆,可能更加有价值。尽管从这个摇摆可能造成的狂热。换句话说,这个狂热并没有涵盖中断。这个过程让主体相信,分析家的欲望根本就没有被牵涉在内。

Vice versa, since obsessional neurosis hinges on a desire to neutralize
the desire of the Other, the analyst’s interventions confront the analysand
with a living presence by which the analyst guards himself against the
tentacles of the obsessional apparatus and conjures up the obsessional
fantasy.35 In these two cases, the analyst’s attitude is complementary, yet
in each case it is based on what Lacan called the desire of the analyst, i.e.
a desire that analysands reach the point where they avow their own desire.
Strategies of transference 123

反过来说,因为妄想症的神经症依靠大他者的欲望的保持中立。分析家的介入,让分析者面临一个活生生的存在。凭借这个活生的存在,分析家警戒他自己,对抗妄想症的工具的碰触,并且召唤妄想症者的幻想。在这两个个案里,分析家的态度是互补的。可是,在每个个案,它的基础上是拉康所谓的分析家的欲望。譬如,分析者的欲望到达这一点,在那里,他们宣称他们自己的欲望。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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