精神分析的不可能的艺术

THE IMPOSSIBLE ART OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

精神分析的不可能的艺术

Once the purity of the analyst’s desire had exploded at the end of Seminar
XI, Lacan started to investigate the analyst’s relation with the object a
(the cause of the analy sand’s desire), which the analyst was expected to
support in order to elicit (rather than mould or dampen down) the desire
of the analysand.

一旦精神分析家的欲望的纯粹性在第11研讨班的结束时爆发开来,拉康开始研究分析家跟小客体的关系 (分析者的欲望的原因)。分析家被期望要支持这个小客体,为了召唤(而不是塑造或淡化)分析者的欲望。

What could it possibly mean to be the support of object
a? Lacan rejected vigorously all the obvious solutions: analysts must try
to understand what the cause of the analysand’s desire is and convey
their understanding, analysts must interpret this cause, analysts must
incarnate it. As the only possible alternative, he eventually came up with
the idea that the analyst’s desire must be to ‘disbe’ the object a, i.e. to be
a semblance of the object a.

成为小客体的支持,可能是什么意思?拉康强烈地拒绝所有表面的解决:分析家必须尝试理解分析者的欲望的原因是什么,并且传递他们的理解;分析家必须解释这个原因,分析家必须具体表现这个原因。作为唯一可能的替代,拉康最后获得这个观念:分析家的欲望必须是要“剥除生命实存”,剥除小客体的生命实存。也就是说,分析家的欲望是要成为小客体的类似物。

In 1967, Lacan admitted that this is not exactly a tenable position
(Lacan 1968a[1967]:59). Yet he recalled that at the end of his career the
founder of psychoanalysis had described his invention as an impossible
profession too. For in ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’, Freud
had written:

在1967年,拉康承认,这并不是确实能自园其说的立场。可是,他提醒,在事业的结束时,精神分析的创办者曾经描述他的发明,作为也是不可能的专业。因为在“终止与没有终止的精神分析”一文,弗洛伊德写到:

[L]et us pause for a moment to assure the analyst that he has our
sincere sympathy in the very exacting demands he has to fulfil in
carrying out his activities. It almost looks as if analysis were the
third of those ‘impossible’ professions in which one can be sure
beforehand of achieving unsatisfying results. The other two, which
have been known much longer, are education and government.
(Freud 1937c:248)

让我们暂停一下,为了要让分析家确实,他获得我们诚恳的同情,对于他必须实践的这个严酷的要求,当他实现他的活动时。看起来好像是,精神分析是那些“不可能的”的专业的第三个。在这些“不可能”的专业里,我们能够预先确实获得的结果是不令人满意的。其他两个不可能的专业,大家知道的时间较长,那就是教育与政府。

This gloss on the three impossible professions should not be read as a
statement in which the notion of impossibility covers a specific
psychoanalytic meaning. For impossibility is not a Freudian concept.
Moreover, from Freud’s reference to the ‘impossible professions’ in his
preface to August Aichhorn’s Wayward Youth (Freud 1925f), it can be
inferred that the entire expression constituted some kind of German
commonplace rather than a Freudian invention in its own right. In this
preface Freud had conceded: ‘From an early period on, I have adopted
the joke of the three impossible professions—as there are: educating,
healing and governing —and I was also greatly preoccupied with the
means of these assignments’ (ibid.: 273).

这三个不可能的专业的虚饰外表不应该被阅读为这个陈述。在这个陈述里,不可能的这个观念掩盖明确的精神分析的意义。因为不可能并不是弗洛伊德的观念。而且,从弗洛伊德的提到’不可能的专业“,在他写的序文,给艾奇封的“迷失的青春”。我们可以推论,整个的表达构成某种的德国的公共场域,而不是弗洛伊德学派自己拥有的发明。在这篇序文,弗洛伊德承认:「从早期开始,我就採用“三个不可能的专业”的这个笑话。这三个专业就是教育,治疗,与统治。我也非常专注探讨这些行业的工具。

A comparison between this mention and the 1937 one reveals that
Freud at one stage substituted the analytic profession for the healing
profession while keeping the two other professions unaltered. This
substitution may be interpreted in at least two different ways. First, one
could argue that in 1937 Freud ultimately acknowledged that healing
and analysing are the same, that nobody is healed if not subjected to the
process of analysis, although both practices are fundamentally impossible.
Second, it could be said that Freud finally considered healing to be an
altogether possible achievement and therefore out of place within the
series of impossible professions, filling the empty space with
psychoanalysis. Contrary to the first interpretation, healing is here
essentially different from analysing, the former being possible and the
latter impossible.

比较一下这次的提到跟1937年的提到,我们发现,弗洛伊德在一个阶段,用精神分析的专业,来替换治疗的专业。另一方面,他又保持这两个其他的专业原封不动。这样的替换可能被解释,用至少是两个不同的方式。首先,我们能够争论,在1937年,弗洛伊德最后承认,治疗与精神分析是相同的。没有人被治疗好,假如他没有被承受过精神分析的过程。虽然两个行业的实践基本上都是不可能的。其次,我们能够说,弗洛伊德最后认为治疗是一个完全可能的成就,因此并不适合被归纳到不可能的专业的系列之内,作为是填补精神分析的空虚的空间。跟第一个解释恰恰相反,治疗在此基本上是不同于精神分析,治疗是可能的,而精神分析则是不可能。

Proceeding from Lacan’s conclusion concerning the untenable position
of the analyst and his formalization of the analyst’s discourse during the
late 1960s, I shall argue in favour of yet a third interpretation, saying
that healing and analysing are both impossible, but that the impossibility
is not the same due to a different position of the agencies. It will appear
then that the impossibility of psychoanalysis is highly specific and more
related to the position of the analyst than to the analytic process as such.
Impossibility gained momentum in Lacan’s works from the mid-1960s
onwards.

从拉康的结论继续前进,关于精神分析家的这个难以自圆其说的立场,以及精神分析家的辞说的的正式化,在1960年代期间。我将主张,赞同还有第三种的解释,并且说:治疗与精神分析两者都是不可能的。但是,这个不可能并不相同,由于代理者的不同的立场。因此,看起来,精神分析的不可能是非常明确的,而且跟分析家的立场更加息息相关,而不是由于精神分析的过程的本身。在拉康的著作里,从1960年代开始,不可能就获得强调的力量。

After its initial alignment with the real in Seminar XI (1977b
[1964]:167) the impossible gradually achieved currency as a central
Lacanian concept, defined in Seminar XX as ‘what does not stop not
being written’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:59, 94). Although the notion had
figured in Freud’s ‘joke’ of the three professions, Lacan did not revive
‘impossibility’ through the centralization of a marginal Freudian term,
as he had done previously with the notion of foreclosure (Verwerfung),
but by introducing the categories of modal logic into psychoanalytic
theory.66

经过最初的认同实在界,在第11研讨班,这个不可能逐渐获得流通,作为是中央的拉康派的观念。在第20研讨班,这个不可能被定义为“不停止不被书写的东西”。虽然这个观念已经包含在弗洛伊德的三个专业的笑话里,拉康重新主张“不可能”的观念,并不是经由将边缘的弗洛伊德的术语,拿来作为中心,如同拉康先前曾经做过的,对于“除权弃绝”的观念。相反地,拉康是重新主张不可能,是凭借将模态逻辑的范畴,介绍进入精神分析理论。

One of the seminal texts in which Lacan defined psychoanalytic
practice on the basis of an impossibility is the transcript of the opening
session of Seminar XIII, The Object of Psychoanalysis (1965–66), which
was published separately as ‘Science and Truth’ (1989b[1965]). Here
Lacan readdressed the vexed issue with which he had opened and closed
his Seminar XI in 1964: ‘Is psychoanalysis a science?’ (Lacan 1977b
[1964]:7, 264).

在其中一个研讨班的文本,拉康定义精神分析的实践,根据不可能作为基础。那就是第13研讨班,“精神分析的目标”的开始的几堂的录音稿。这个研讨班分开被出版,标题是“科学与真理”。在此,拉康重新处理这个感到懊恼的问题。他用这个问题来开始与结束他在1964年的第11研讨班:精神分析是一门科学吗?

In ‘Science and Truth’, his answer to this question was
not only much more elaborate than in Seminar XI, it also left little doubt
as to the exact position of psychoanalysis vis-a-vis science. Whereas in
Seminar XI Lacan had drawn attention to the ‘ambiguity that persists in
the question as to what in psychoanalysis is or is not reducible to science’
(ibid.: 265), in ‘Science and Truth’ he distinguished sharply between
psychoanalysis and science on the basis of their differential relation to
the function of truth as cause. Finding support, once again, in the second
book of Aristotle’s Physics (1996:38–42), Lacan argued that science is
predicated upon truth as a formal cause, whereas psychoanalysis
encompasses truth as a material cause.67

在“科学与真理”,拉康对于这个问题的回答,不但更加地复制,比起第11研讨班。这个回答也留下几乎无可置疑,关于精神分析家的确实的立场,跟科学面对面。在第11研讨班,拉康已经注意到“关于在精神分析什么可化简,什么不可化简成为科学的这个问题,其间持续存在的模糊嗳昧”。在“科学与真理”,拉康锐利地区别精神分析与科学,根据它们的差异的关系,跟真理的功能,作为原因。拉康再次找到支持,在“亚里斯多德的物理学”的第二册。拉康主张,科学并不是以真理的述语,作为是正式的原因。而精神分析则是涵盖真理,作为物质的原因。

In science, Lacan intimated, the nature of a process and its various
components is represented in a formal law, such as E=mc2 , which is
itself the result of extensive empirical research or experimental testing.
Scientists use these formulas to explain why certain things happen the
way they do, which tallies with Aristotle’s description of a formal cause:
A second way in which the word [cause] is used is for the form or
pattern (i.e. the formula for what a thing is, both specifically and
generically, and the terms which play a part in the formula). For
example, the ratio 2:1, and number in general, cause the octave.
(Aristotle 1996:39)

拉康主张,在科学,过程的特性与过程的各种不同的成分被代表,作为是正式的法则,譬如,爱因斯坦的能源公式E=mc2,跟亚里斯多德的描述正式的原因不谋而合。第二个方式,真理(原因)被使用的方式,是为了形式或模式之用。(譬如,作为某件东西存在的内容的公式,不论述明确地或一般地。还有,在公式里扮演角色的术语)。譬如,2 :1 的比例,与一般的数字,会引起程式语言。

Lacan proclaimed that in science truth functions as a formal cause because
truth is the quality assigned to properly developed scientific laws (Lacan
1989b[1965]:22). Scientific formulas stemming from controlled
observations or carefully conducted experiments are believed to be true
(generally or under specific circumstances), and their truth value indicates
the extent to which they can be used to explain certain events. Put
differently, the extent to which a formula explains (causes) a certain
phenomenon provides an indication of the formula’s truth.

拉康宣称,在科学,真理发挥功能,作为是正式的原因,因为真理作为特质,是被指定给合适发展的科学的法则。科学的公式,起源于被控制的观察,或仔细主导的实验。这些公式被相信是真实的(一般性或在明确的环境之下)。它们的真理的价值指示著这个程度。它们被使用来解释某些事件的程度。换句话说,一个公式解释(或引起)某个现象的程度,提供公式的真理的一个指示。

In psychoanalysis, however, truth functions as a material cause and
the materiality is conditioned by the signifier (ibid.: 22–23). To understand
Lacan’s point, one should note that for Aristotle the material cause was
an answer to the question ‘What is this thing made of?’ rather than ‘Why
and how has this thing come about?’. In claiming that psychoanalytic
truth functions as a material cause by means of the signifier, Lacan thus
argued that in psychoanalysis the truth of an event (say, a symptom) is
always embedded in the symbolic order; it is made of signifiers, so to
speak.

可是,在精神分析,真理发挥功能,作为是材料的原因。这个材料受到能指的制约。为了理解拉康的要点,我们应该注意到,对于亚里斯多德,材料真理并没有解答这个问题:「这个东西由什么组成?」而是要解答这个问题:「这个东西为什么发生,如何发生?“当拉康宣称,精神分析的真理发挥功能,作为凭据能指的材料的原因。拉康因此主张,在精神分析,事件的真理(譬如,症状),总是被镶嵌在象征的秩序里。也就是说,它由能指组成。

As he had already tried to demonstrate via the rhetorical figure of
a prosopopea (‘I, truth, will speak’) to a bemused audience of Viennese
psychoanalysts in 1955 (Lacan 1977f[1955]:121–123), Lacan contended
that psychoanalysts could only proceed from the idea that the truth is
something which speaks internally and not, as scientists claim, something
‘out there’ which is silent and simply waiting to be laid down in formal
knowledge.68 Yet assuming that the truth speaks implies that it is
impossible to develop a knowledge which represents this truth fully and
adequately, for knowledge also takes root in language and there is no
language through which the truth does not speak.69

如同在1955年,针对维也纳的精神分析家的感的困惑的听众,拉康已经尝试过证明,凭借作为客观的第三者的修词的人物,(我,真理,将言说)。拉康主张,精神分析的前进,仅能从这个观念:真理是某件从内部言说的东西。真理并不是某件“外在于那里“的东西,如同科学家所宣称的。这个”外在于那里“的东西沉默,而且仅是等待着被正式的知识宣告出来。可是,假定真理会言说,暗示着,要发展充分而且充足地代表这个真理的知识是不可能。因为知识也生根于语言。然而,却没有一种语言,这个真理不经由它来言说。

Hence the first and foremost impossibility in psychoanalysis: it is
impossible to cover truth by relying on knowledge, whether the
knowledge is that incorporated and acted on by the analyst or that
produced by the analysand. In yet another piece of bravado, Lacan
summarized his thesis as follows in the opening paragraph of Television:
I always speak the truth. Not the whole truth, because there’s no
way, to say it all. Saying it all is literally impossible: words fail. Yet
it’s through this very impossibility that the truth holds onto the real.
(Lacan 1990d[1973]:3)

因此,在精神分析最初与最重要的不可能是:要依靠知识来涵盖真理是不可能。无论这个知识是被分析家融合或诉诸行动的知识,或是被分析者产生的知识。在另外一篇虚张声势的文章,在“电视“访谈的开头的段落,拉康总结他的主题如下:

我总是言说真理。不是完整的真理。因为要说出全部真理是不可能的。全部说出真理实质上是不可能的:因为话语做不到。可是,就是要通过话语失败的方式,真理才掌握到实在界。

Due to this epistemological impossibility, psychoanalysis is more akin
to art than science. Freud would have been quite reluctant to accept such
a designation, because in his view psychoanalysis had to be based on
truthfulness and the eradication of semblance and deceit—art only
generating illusions.70 Lacan however had favoured a conception of
‘psychoanalysis as art’ from the very start of his teachings. For instance,
in the 1953 lecture ‘The Neurotic’s Individual Myth’, he prepared his
audience of philosophers for his new interpretation of the Rat Man by
broaching the contentious issue as to whether psychoanalysis is a science.
His answer could not have been more categorical:

由于认识论的不可能,精神分析更加类似于艺术,而不是科学。弗洛伊德本来会相当不愿意接受这样的指称。因为在他的观的,精神分析的基础必须是真理,与抹除类似物与欺骗。艺术仅是产生幻觉。可是,拉康则是赞同“精神分析作为艺术“的观念,从他的教学的开始。譬如,在1953年的演讲”神经症者的个人神话“,他让他的哲学家们的听众,准备接纳他对于”鼠人“的新的解释。他装饰这个具有争议的议题,关于精神分析是否是一门科学。他的回答当时完全是范畴的观念。

It is often said that psychoanalysis is not, strictly speaking, a science,
which seems to imply by contrast that it is quite simply an art.
That is erroneous if one takes it to mean that psychoanalysis is
only a technique, an operational method, an aggregate to formulas.
But it is not erroneous if you use this word art in the sense in
which it was used in the Middle Ages to speak of the liberal arts—
that series going from astronomy to dialectic by way of arithmetic,
geometry, music, and grammar.
(Lacan 1979[1953]:406)

经常有人说,精神分析严格来说并不是一门科学。这似乎对照地暗示着:精神分析仅仅是一门艺术。那是错误的观念,假如我们将它意思解释为:精神分析仅是一门技术,一个运作的方法,各种公式的聚集处。但是,这样的解释不算是错误,假如你们使用“艺术“这个字词,如同它在中世纪所使用的意义,当提到liberal arts (通识技艺)。那个系列包含天文学,到辩证法,经由算术,几何,音乐,与文法。

Lacan claimed that the medieval ‘liberal arts’ distinguish themselves
from the sciences due to their ‘fundamental relation to human proportion’,
a relation which is ‘implied pre-eminently in the use of speech’ (ibid.:
406). His ensuing assertion on the singular status of psychoanalysis as a
fundamental art clearly foreshadowed his formulation on psychoanalytic
truth as a material cause in ‘Science and Truth’:

拉康宣称,中世纪的“通识技艺“区别它们自己跟理科的科学的不同,是由于它们跟人类的属性具有基本的关系。这个关系被暗示出了,特别是在对于言说的使用。拉康随后的主张,针对精神分析的独特的地位,作为是一门基本的艺术,由他对于精神分析的真理的阐述清楚地看出端倪,作为是”科学与真理“的研讨班的材料的原因。

It is in this respect that analytic experience is not definitively
objectifiable. It always implies within itself the emergence of a
truth that cannot be said, since what constitutes truth is speech,
and then you would have in some way to say speech itself which is
exactly what cannot be said in its function as speech.
(ibid.: 406)

在这方面,精神分析的经验并没有明确地可以被形成客体。它总是暗示着,在精神分析经验的内部,会有无法被说出的真理的出现。因为那是组成真理作为言说的东西。然后,你们将必须用某个方式说出言说的本身。那确实是无法被说出的东西,在它作为言说的功能。

With the concept of the impossible established, Lacan returned to Freud’s
three impossible professions, in order to situate them with regard to his
theory of the four discourses. In 1970 Lacan was interviewed on the
topic of his theoretical contributions to psychoanalysis by the academic
Robert Georgin, whom he described contemptuously as ‘a funny Belgian
who has asked me some questions’ (Lacan 1991a[1969–70]:213).71 Part
of the interview was first broadcasted by the French-speaking official
Belgian radio station and afterwards also by the official French station.
‘Radiophonie’ (1970), the text of Lacan’s carefully prepared answers,
constitutes one of his most important later works.72 Lacan’s answer to
Georgin’s seventh question, which was never on the air, is of particular
significance here. The question ran as follows:

随着这个不可能的观念被建立,拉康回到弗洛伊德的三个不可能的专业,为了定位它们,关于他的“四个辞说“的理论。在1970年,拉康接受学院派的罗伯 乔金的访谈,针对这个议题:他对于精神分析的理论的贡献。拉康藐视地描绘罗伯 乔金,作为1”滑稽的比利时人,他询问我一下问题“。访谈的部分内容首先被播放,由说法语的官方的比利时的无线电台,随后,由官方的法语电台”Radiophnie“。拉康这次的仔细准备的回答的文本,构成他晚期的最重要的著作之一。拉康对于乔金的第七个问题的回答,从来没有播放过,在此具有特殊的意义。这个问题内容如下:

Governing, educating and psychoanalysing are three untenable
challenges. None the less, it is necessary for the psychoanalyst to
commit himself to this perpetual dispute of every discourse,
especially his own. The psychoanalyst clings to a knowledge—the
analytic knowledge—which he disputes by definition. How do you
solve—or not—this contradiction? Status of the impossible? The
impossible, is it the real?
(ibid.: 96)

统治,教育,与精神分析是三个无法自园其说的挑战。可人,精神分析家仍然有必要奉献他自己,对于日常辞说的这个永久的争论,特别是他自己的辞说.精神分析紧捉住一门知识—精神分析的知识。他用定义来争论的精神分析的知识。你如何解决,或不解决这个悖论?不可能的状态的悖论?不可能界,那是实在界吗?

Endorsing the equivalence of the impossible and the real, Lacan
emphasized that it is rather premature to state that the three Freudian
challenges are impossible and therefore real. Instead of defining the
practices of government, education and psychoanalysis as equally and
indistinctively impossible, Lacan posited that they each comprise a
specific impossibility, based on a specific impotence, as illustrated in his
formulas of the four discourses.73

拉康替不可能界等于是实在界背书,并且强调说这是为时过早,假如我们还不能陈述:三个弗洛伊德的挑战都是不可能,因此都是实在界。拉康并没有定义政府,教育与精神分析的实践,作为是同样而且模糊地不可能。拉康假设,它们每一个都包含一个明确的不可能性。以明确的无能为力作为基础。如同他的四个辞说的公式所说明。

To substantiate these differing impossibilities, he pointed out that the
discourse of the analyst transforms the impossibility of the discourse of
the master into impotence (impuissance), and its impotence into
impossibility. This transformation becomes clear when comparing the
formulas of the discourse of the master and the discourse of the analyst,
which Lacan introduced in the first session of Seminar XVII (1991 a
[1969–70]:9–27).

为了将这些不同的不可能性具体表现,拉康指出,精神分析家的辞说转化主人辞说的不可能性,转化成为无能为力。并且将主人辞说的无能为力,转化成为不可能性。这种转化变得清楚,当他比较主人辞说的公式,与精神分析家的辞说。

In Lacan’s formulas of discourse, impossibility always directs the
relationship between the two upper terms (represented by an arrow),
whereas impotence is characteristic for the relationship between the two
lower terms (represented by a double slash). As such, it can be verified
that the impossibility between S1 and S2 in the master’s discourse becomes
an impotence in the analyst’s discourse, whereas the impotence between
a and becomes an impossibility. In this way, the discourse of the master
reveals itself as the opposite of the discourse of the analyst, or, in other
words, governing is the reverse of psychoanalysing.74

在拉康的辞说的公司,不可能总是引的这两个上方的术语之间的关系(由箭头代表)。无能为力力的特征则是这两个下方的术语之间的关系(由双重的划杠代表)。作为这样的公式,我们可以验证:在主人辞说里,在S1 与 S2 之间的不可能,在分析家的辞说里,变得无能为力。在小客体与被阉割的主体之间的无能为力,则是变成不可能。用这个方式,主人辞说显示它自己,作为是精神分析辞说的对立。或者,换句话说,统治就是精神分析的相反。

But how are impossibility and impotence to be interpreted here? What
does it mean for the impossibility of the master’s discourse to be
transformed in impotence in the analyst’s discourse, and vice versa? In
‘Radiophonie’ Lacan divulged that in the master’s discourse, the
impossibility signifies the failure of the agency

但是,不可能与无能为力在此如何能够被解释?那是什么意思,让主人辞说的不可能,被转化成为精神分析辞说的无能为力?反过来说,也是一样?在“电台广播访谈”,拉康详述:在主人辞说理,这个不可能意味着代理者能指S的无法命令主体S的知识。

Whether a socially identified ruler or the psychic mastery of each and every individual, no matter how hard a master (S) tries to govern and control knowledge (S), the latter will always partially escape.

无论他说一位被社会认同的统治者,或们每个个人的心灵的掌控者,无论一位主人多么努力尝试要统治与控制主体的知识,后者将总是部分地逃避。

The reason for this lack of control is to be found in the impotence which
characterizes the relationship between the two lower terms of the formula.
Governing produces a result (the object a), but this result is powerless in
relation to the truth of the whole process. The truth of the master’s
discourse is that knowledge is partly unconscious and that this
unconscious part does not comprise a subject ().

控制的这个欠缺的理由能够被找到,在这个无能为力里。因为无能为力的特征就是公式的两个下方的术语之间的关系。统治产生一个结果(小客体a),但是这个结果是无能为力,当它与整个过程的真理的关系。主人的辞说的真理是,知识部分是无意识的,而且这个无意识的部分,并没有组成一个被阉割的主体S。

Unconscious knowledge
is not known by a particular agency; the only thing that can be said about
this knowledge is that it works and that it knows itself. Unconscious
knowledge is strictly self-contained and organizes the life of human
beings without they themselves knowing it. At the level of unconscious
knowledge there is a lack of agency, which is just another way of saying
that in the realm of unconscious knowledge the subject is barred (). The
product of the master’s discourse is not capable of reducing this lack,
for this product, which Lacan calls object a, is but a substitute stopgap—
not at all adequate for annihilating the lack () and for producing
some kind of jouissance. Therefore it is impossible to command
knowledge. Whatever the result of governing, the lack remains, due to
the barrier of jouissance on the level of impotence.

无意识的知识并没有根据一个特殊的代理者来认识。关于这个知识,唯一能够被说的事情是,它运转,它知道它自己。无意识的知识是严格地自我包容,并且组织人类的生命,但是他们自己却不知道它。在无意识的知识的层面,有一个代理者的欠缺。这是另外一种方式来说:在无意识的知识的领域里,主体是被划杠。主人辞说的产物并不能化减这个欠缺。因为这个产物,拉康称为是小客体a,仅是一个替代的替身—它根本就不足够来消灭这个欠缺,也不足够来产生某种的欢爽。因此,这是不可能,要命令知识。无论统治的结果是什么,这个欠缺始终存在。由于在无能为力的层面,欢爽的受到阻碍。

In the analyst’s discourse, the impossibility between S and S
2
of the master’s discourse becomes itself an impotence. This implies that the
discourse is based on the powerlessness of a signifier (S1) to control an existing frame of knowledge. The master signifier (S 1) is unable to organize the body of signifiers (S
2 ) for once and for all, and to reveal the definitive
signification of knowledge. In terms of what I have explained above (see
p. 87) within the context of the analyst’s task to dissolve coagulated centres
of signification in light of the analysand’s avowal of desire, the impotence
of the analyst’s discourse rests upon the unavoidable production of new
master signifiers, new loci of control whose power does not extend beyond
the reorganization of the symbolic order.

在精神分析家的辞说,能指1与能指2之间的不可能本身就变成无能为力。这暗示著,这个辞说的基础上能指1的无能为力,无法控制知识的现存的架构。主人能指(S1)没有能力一劳永逸地组织能指们(S2)的身体,也无法显示知识的明确的意义。用我以上刚刚解释的术语,在分析家的工作的内文里,要溶解意义的被凝固的中心,从分析者的宣称欲望的观点,分析家的辞说的无能为力,依靠无可避免的新的主人的能指的产生,新的控制的轨迹,它的力量并没有延伸超越象征的秩序的重新组织。

This specific impotence of the
analyst’s discourse is responsible for a specific impossibility, which I wish
to designate here as the impossibility to analyse what is merely a lack. If
the process of analysis were to enable the analysand to make sense of all
(conscious and unconscious) knowledge, the analysand would become
the material agent of his condition and ‘complete analysis’ would be
possible.

精神分析家的辞说的明确的无能为力,要替明确的不可能负责。我但愿能够在此将这个明确的不可能,指明是不可能分析仅是属于欠缺的东西。假如精神分析的过程要是让分析者能够理解所有的知识(无论是意识或是无意识的知识)。分析者将会变成是他的条件的物质代理者。那时,“完整”的精神分析将是可能的。

But as it happens, the patient remains a barred subject and the
only thing that can ever follow is her acceptance of this position. Rather
than effects of signification, the analyst’s discourse has effects of nonsense,
in so far as meaning is always fleeting, elusive.75 This seems to me
the reason why Lacan said in Seminar XXII that ‘The effect of meaning
required of the analytic discourse is not imaginary. It is neither symbolic.
It has to be real.’ (Lacan 1975c[1974–75]:4/96).

但是,偶然地,病人始终是一个被划杠阉割的主体。唯一可能跟随而来的东西,是病人接受这个立场。分析家的辞说并不是意义的效果,而是拥用无意识作为效果。因为意义总是瞬间消失,闪烁不定。我觉得这似乎就是这个理由,为什么拉康在第22研讨班会说:对于精神分析辞说所要求的意义的效果,并不是想像界。它也不是象征界。它必须是实在界。

The critical importance of Lacan’s point of view cannot be overrated,
especially when compared to what many psychoanalysts have done and
some continue to do. Instead of acknowledging the barrier their discourse
imposes on the process of ‘sense-making’, they radically eliminate it.
Many analysts indeed only try to make sense of other people’s lives and
of a whole range of sociocultural phenomena. The analyst’s job allegedly
consists in making sense where all others have failed; if nobody is capable
of making sense of what happens, there is still the analyst who can. Here,
the analyst is convinced that the master signifiers of his discourse do
control knowledge and he is obviously enjoying it.

拉康的观点具有关键的重要性,无论如何高估也不为过。特别是当我们比较他的观点,跟许多精神分析家已经做过,还有一些分析家继续在做的事情比较起来。他们非常没有承认他们的辞说赋加的阻碍,给予“理解意义”的过程。他们反而强烈地减少它。许多精神分析家确实仅是尝试理解别人的生活,以及仅是理解社会与文化的现象的整个范围。精神分析家的工作被宣称就是在于理解所有的其他分析家失败的地方。即使没有人能够理解所发生的事情,依旧还有分析家能够理解。分析家相信:他的辞说的主人能指,确实控制知识,他显而易见地正在享受知识。

Alongside the aforementioned situation (see p. 78) of analysts advocating a discourse
of the right to jouissance, this could be a second instance of a surreptitious
lapse of the analyst’s discourse into the realm of perversion.
When the analyst’s discourse is supported by the enjoyment of making
sense it cannot possibly be analytic anymore, because in Lacan’s
representation of the analyst’s discourse, the barrier between S
1 and S 2 is insuperable. The whole Lacanian dynamics of the analyst’s discourse
can thus be reduced to a single formula, which could serve as a rewording
of the ‘paradox of the position of the analyst’: one cannot enjoy being an
analyst and continue to be one.

除了精神分析家的以上提到解决,他们主张拥有欢爽的权利。还可能有第二个例子,精神分析家的辞实秘密地掉入倒错症的领域。当精神分析家的辞说受的理解的欢爽的支持,它就不再可能是精神分析。因为在拉康对于精神分析辞说的再现,在能指1与能指2之间的阻碍是无法克服的。整个的拉康的精神分析辞说的动力学,因此能够被化简成为单一个公式。这个公式可以充当是重新描述“精神分析家的立场的悖论”。我们无法享受成为一位分析家,又继续成为一位分析家。

The corollary of this paradox should not come as a surprise anymore.
After excluding the jouissance of the analyst, Lacan re-emphasized the
desire of the analyst. In relation to the formula of the analyst’s discourse
this desire comprises two aspects. First, it is a desire to put knowledge in
the place of truth. Indeed, in the analyst’s discourse knowledge (S
2) is situated in the lower left-hand corner, which Lacan defined as the place
of truth (Lacan 1991a[1969–70]:106).

这个悖论的必然结局不应该再引人惊奇。拉康将分析家的欢爽排除在外后,他重新强调,分析家的欲望,跟分析家的辞说的公式息息相关。这个欲望包含两个层面。首先,那是一个欲望,要将知识取代真理。的确,在精神分析家的辞说,知识(S2)被定位在下方的左手边的角落。拉康定义它,作为真理的位置。

On first sight, this could be seen
as contradicting the impossibility between knowledge and truth. Yet Lacan
argued that knowledge functioning on the place of truth has nothing to
do with knowledge being used as unquestionable truth. When analysts
are expected to use their knowledge as a manifestation of truth, they
should let their knowledge speak within everything they say, whilst
realizing that its base does not contain all the answers to the analysand’s
problems.

乍然一看,这可以被视为是反驳这个不可能,知识与真理之间的不可能。可是,拉康主张,在真理的位置发挥功能的知识,跟被使用作为无可置疑的真理的知识,并没有丝毫关系。当分析家被期待要使用他们的知识,作为真理的证明。他们不应该让他们的知识言说,在他们所说的一切事情之内。另一方面,他们体认到,知识的基地并没有包含所有的答案,针对分析者的难题的答案。

This point is similar to what I have discussed above (see p.
75) apropos of the analyst’s ignorance and the paradox of stupidity.76
Second, the desire of the analyst is evidently related to ‘disbeing’, to
making oneself appear as the cause of the desire of the analysand, even
to making the analysand believe that the analyst is the cause of her desire.

这一点类似我以上讨论的东西,关于精神分析家的无知与愚蠢的悖论。其次,精神分析家的欲望显而易见地跟“没有生命实存”息息相关,跟让自己出现,作为是分析者的欲望的客体的原因息息相关,甚至跟让分析者相信,分析家说她的欲望的原因。

This entails a second impossibility, although it is essentially the same as
the one described above (see p. 95) as ‘the impossibility to analyse what
is merely a lack’. It is impossible for the analyst to cause the desire of
the other through being the object a, because the object a is not something
a human being can identify with, and in so far as the analyst would try to
confront the analysand directly with the cause of his desire the analysand
is likely to experience anxiety.77

这涵盖第二个不可能,虽然它基本上是相同的,跟以上被描述的这个不可能,作为是不可能分析仅是属于欠缺的东西。精神分析家不可能引起他者的欲望,凭借充当小客体a。因为小客体a并不是某件人类能够认同的东西。因为精神分析家将会尝试让分析者直接面对欲望的原因,分析者很可能经验到焦虑。

Hence, the desire of the analysand can
only be invoked if it is sustained by an object which the analysand assigns
to the analyst, but of which the analyst knows nothing about. In Seminar
XVII, Lacan described the ensuing impossibility in the following terms:

因此,分析家的欲望能够被召唤的条件,仅是当它受到客体的维持,分析者指定给分析家的客体。但是,对于这个客体,分析家一无所知。在第17研讨班,拉康描述随之而来的不可能,用以下的术语:

‘what is at stake in the position of the analyst [is] this seduction of truth
he presents, insofar as he would know something about what he
principally represents. Do I emphasize enough the relief of the
impossibility of his position?’ (ibid.: 205). So, if the enjoyment of the
analyst is excluded, it appears that the desire of the analyst harbours a
double impossibility: an impossibility between truth and knowledge and
an impossibility to cause the desire of the analysand. The counterpart of
the above formula on the enjoyment of the analyst could therefore read:
one cannot adopt the desire of the analyst and also analyse.

「分析家的立场岌岌可危的地方,就是他呈现的真理的诱拐。因为他将会知道某件东西,关于他主要代表的东西。我充分强调过分析家的立场的不可能的这个解除吗?假如分析家的欢爽被排除,似乎,分析家怀抱著双重的不可能:一是真理与知识之间的不可能。另外一个不可能是要引起分析者的欲望。分析家的欢爽的的以上的公式的对应物,因此能够被阅读成为:我们无法採用分析家的欲望,也还能够分析。

In Lacanian theory, psychoanalysis is not simply an art; it is a real art.
This implies that it is an impossible art, but also that it is unrealized.

用拉康的理论,精神分析不但是一门艺术,它而且是实在界的艺术。这暗示着,精神分析是不可能的艺术,而是是无法被实现的艺术。

Psychoanalytic organizations tend to transform the practice of
psychoanalysis into a respectful profession, but in this way, the ontological
impossibilities of psychoanalysis are remodelled into the various
necessities of science: knowledge has to be true, the position of the
researcher-agent has to be well defined, results have to be validated,
intentions have to be clarified, the whole process has to be (quality)
controlled.

精神分析的组织倾向于将精神分析的实践,转化成为令人尊敬的行业。但是,用这个方式,精神分析的本体的不可能,被重新修改成为是科学的各色各样的需要:知识必须是真实,研究员-代理者的立场必须被清楚定义,结果必须是能够被验证,意图必须明朗,整个的过程必须被品质管控。

Lacan’s itinerary contains an implicit argument against the
professionalization of psychoanalysis, if professionalization means that
those who practice psychoanalysis can become authorized clinicians when
they are able to prove that the effects they produce are valuable to their
analysands and to society in general.78 However, Lacan also constructed
an argument substantiating psychoanalysis as an impossible profession,
not reading Freud’s joke as a demand to overcome a deplorable social
condition, but as an accurate assessment of a complicated practice which
must be maintained as such.79

拉康的旅行路线包含一个暗含的论点,反对精神分析变成专门职业。假如专门职业的意思是,那些作为精神分析的执业者,能够成为是被授权的临床医生,当他们能够证明,他们产生的效果是有价值的,对于他们的分析者,以及对于一般的社会。可是,拉康也建构一个论点:他让精神分析实质表现,作为是不可能的专业。他阅读弗洛伊德的笑话,不是作为要求克服令人哀叹的社会的情况,而是作为正确的评估复杂的执业实践,它必须被维持作为这样一个令人哀叹的情况。
But if psychoanalysis is a real art and as such twice as impossible,
and if it should remain that way, what can stop us from abolishing it
altogether? If there is only psychoanalytic impossibility and an argument
in favour of its necessity is not psychoanalytic, where does psychoanalysis
derive its raison d’etre from? To these questions, there is only one possible
answer: because of contingency, or what Lacan dubbed ‘what stops not
being written’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:94).

但是,假如精神分析是实在界的艺术,作为这样的艺术,精神分析成为双倍的不可能。假如精神分析始终保持是那个方式,有什么能够阻止我们,不去完全地废除它?假如存在的仅是精神分析的不可能,赞同这种不可能的必要性的论点,并不是精神分析。那精神分析要从哪里获得它的“存在的理由“?针对这些问题,仅有一个可能的解答:因为偶然性,或拉康所谓的”没有停止被书些的东西“。

As Freud himself advocated
in his metaphor of archaeological sleuthing, psychoanalysis is geared
towards making discoveries, towards the creation of wonder and surprise
at the revelation of the unexpected, in short towards the crystallization
of new signifiers that reduce the painful necessity of repetition and are
therefore able to change the analysand’s life. In this sense, the Lacanian
practice of psychoanalysis is a genuine labour of love—not a love which
turns the contingency of an encounter into the necessity of a relationship,
but a love which cherishes both the marvel and the uncertainty of the
first accidental meeting (ibid.: 145).

如同弗洛伊德他自己主张,在他的考古学的技艺的隐喻,精神分析被发动,朝向要从事发现,朝向创造惊奇与神奇,在意料之外的启蒙处,总之,朝向新的能指的具体成形。这些新的能止减少重复的令人痛苦的必要,并且因此能够改变分析者的一生。就这个意义而言,拉康派的精神分析的执业实践,是真诚的爱的劳苦。这个爱的劳苦,并不是将遭遇的偶然性转变成为关系的必然性。而是珍惜首次的偶然的邂逅的惊奇与不确定。

Since Lacan conceived his practice
as radically Freudian, the inspiration for this idea had evidently come
from the founder. ‘Essentially, one might say, the cure is effected by
love’, Freud had written to Jung in December 1906 (McGuire 1974:12–
13), repeating his phrase to a group of followers in January 1907 as ‘Our
cures are cures of love’ (Nunberg and Federn 1962:101).

因为拉康构想他的执业实践,作为是强烈的弗洛伊德学派,作为这个观念的启发显而易见是来自创办者。「基本上,我们可以说,治疗是由爱所造成的。」弗洛伊德曾经写信给荣格,在1906年的12月。在1907年,他重复他的词语,对于一群的跟随者,作为是“我们的治疗是爱的治疗)。

In a sense, what Freud defined as love in these passages concerned
the analysand’s transference more than the analyst’s clinical intentions.
This evidently stirs the question as to how analysts, inasmuch as their
practice is inhabited by love, should deal with the transference-love on
the side of their patients. Freud formulated a tentative, quite unsatisfactory
answer in his ‘Observations on Transference-Love’ (1915a[1914]),
whereas Lacan explored the issue in his year-long Seminar VIII on
transference (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]). It is to these clinical vicissitudes
of transference that I will direct my attention in the following chapter.

从某个意义来说,弗洛伊德定义作为爱的东西,在这些段落里,跟分析者的移情的关联,远胜过跟分析家的临床的意图的关联。这显而易见地触动这个问题,关于分析家应该如何处理移情与爱,在病人的这边,既然他们的执业实践就是被爱所驻居。弗洛伊德阐述一个尝试性,相当不令人满意的回答,在他的“针对移情与爱的观察”。拉康则是探索这个问题,在他长达一年的第八研讨班,“论移情”。在以下的章节,我将引导我的注意力,朝向移情在临床的起伏变化。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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