逻辑时间机器

LACAN’S LOGICAL TIME MACHINE
拉康的逻辑时间机器

At this stage, it is necessary to return to the Freudian goals of
psychoanalysis and their associated deadlock, in order to show how Lacan
reformulated these goals following his own changing perspectives on
the position of the analyst.

在这个阶段,我们有必要回到弗洛伊德的精神分析的目标,与目标息息相关的僵局。为了显示拉康重新阐释这些目标,遵循他自己的逐渐改变的观的,针对分析家的立场。

In the third session of Seminar XI, within the context of an inquiry
into the ontological status of the unconscious, Lacan revealed what he
believed to be a contradiction in Freud’s description of the unconscious
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:31–32).

在第11研讨班的第三堂,在探讨无意识的本体的地位的内文里,拉康显示他相信的一种悖论,在弗洛伊德的描述无意识。

On the one hand, Freud had stressed on
various occasions (Freud 1912b:108; 1915e:187; 1920g:28) that
unconscious processes are not structured according to a temporal order
(Zeitlosigkeit), whereas on the other hand he had noted that repressed
unconscious impulses do not change over time (Freud 1920g:28;
1933a[1932]:73–74).

在另一方面,弗洛伊德曾经在各个场合强调:无意识的过程并不是依照时间的秩序来建立架构。在另一方面,弗洛伊德已经注意到,被压抑的无意识的冲动,并没有随着时间而改变。

To Lacan, Freud’s second statement implied that a
repressed unconscious impulse, which he dubbed ‘desire’, does function
according to a particular temporal order, notably the order of unvarying
duration, which evidently contradicts the first claim on the absence of
time in the unconscious. To solve this problem, Lacan proposed a
distinction between two kinds of temporal processes: a modality
according to which objects are characterized by duration—a short or
prolonged existence over time—and a logical modality, in which the
existence of an object can only be established with hindsight, as an
inference from the logical succession of two moments (Lacan
1977b[1964]:32).

对于拉康,弗洛伊德的第二个陈述暗示着:被压抑的无意识的冲动,他命名为“欲望”,确实是依照特殊的时间的秩序发挥功能。特别是依照一成不变的期间的秩序。这个一成不变的时间显然互相抵触最初的宣称:在无意识里,时间的缺席。为了解决这个难题,拉康建议区别两种的时间的过程:依照其中一个模式,客体由期间来表现特征,随着时间的简短或延长的存在。另外一个模式则1逻辑的模式。在那里,客体的存在仅能靠着后见之明来建立。作为是从两个时空的逻辑的连续来推论。

To illustrate how this modality of logical time functions, Lacan referred
to a puzzle he had analysed in an article of 1945 (1988a[1945]). The
story runs as follows. A prison governor explains to three prisoners that
he wants to set one of them free without taking responsibility for who it
shall be. He shows the inmates three white and two black disks, telling
them that he will pin one of these five disks between their shoulders, so
that each will be able to see the colour of the disk on the back of the two
others, but not the colour of his own. He also emphasizes that they are
not allowed to mirror themselves nor to engage in conversation, the latter
activity running counter to their own interest. The first prisoner who
thinks he has figured out the nature of his colour and who can explain
how he has arrived at the conclusion will be released.54

为了解释逻辑时间的这个模式如何运作,拉康提到他曾经分析过的一个谜团,在1945年的一篇文章。故事的内容如下:一位监狱的典狱长对三位囚犯解释,他想要释放他们其中的一位,但是他不负责决定是哪一位。他给这些犯人观看三个白色与两个黑色的园盘。他告诉他们,他将这些园盘的每一个挂在他们的肩膀背后。这样,每一位都将会看见前面两位其他犯人的背后的园盘的颜色。但是看不见他自己的背后的园盘的颜色。他也强调,他们不被容许反映他们自己,也不许参与谈话。后者的行动跟他们自己的利益相违背。第一位认为他已经想出他的颜色的特色的人,以及第一位能够解释他如何获得这个结论的犯人,将会被释放。

It goes without saying that the evil governor attaches a white disk to
each prisoner’s back, thus putting them in the same position.55 From the
moment the exercise starts, each prisoner sees two white disks, which is
likely to stir bewilderment, confusion and anxiety. This is what Lacan
called ‘the instant of the glance’ (l’instant du regard) (ibid.: 206). What
happens next is difficult to grasp, yet the prisoner who succeeds in
deducing the colour of his disk correctly—‘the moment of concluding’
(le moment de conclure) in Lacan’s terminology—can claim, in retrospect,
that the time between these two moments (of seeing and concluding)
was taken up by a fruitful ‘time for comprehending’ (temps pour
comprendre). Not until the final assertion (‘I am black’, ‘I am white’)
can the existence of genuine understanding be substantiated and measured
in its quality of understanding.56

自不待言的是,邪恶的典狱长附加一个白色的园盘到每位犯人的背上,然后将他们放置相同的位置。从这个运用开始,每位犯人看见两个白色园盘,很可能引起困窘,困惑与焦虑的园盘。这就是拉康所谓的”瞥见的瞬间“,可是,成功于正确推论出他的园盘的颜色的这位犯人,”结论的时刻“—能够宣称,回顾地,处于这两个时刻的时间(看见与下结论),被接续而来的具有成果的”理解的时刻“。直到最后的主张(”我是黑色“”我是白色“),真正的理论的存在才会成为具体,根据它的理解的品质来测量。

Consequently, the ontological status of what is situated between the
instant of the glance and the moment of concluding is highly peculiar.
As long as the moment of concluding has not occurred, one cannot be
sure that comprehending (the fruitful production of knowledge) exists at
all, whereas from the moment a conclusion is reached, comprehending
exists no more, relegated as it is to a past experience.

结果,被定位在瞥见的瞬间与下结论的时刻之间的本体的地位,非常特殊。只要下结论的时刻还没有发生,我们无法确定,理解会不会存在(具有成功的知识的产物。另一方面,从结论的时刻被到达时,理解就不再存在,因为它分配给过去的经验。

To Lacan, logical time offered a new explanation of how the unconscious
operates temporally. Disputing Freud’s claim that the unconscious is not
marked by a temporal order, he argued that it may be impossible to
‘measure’ the unconscious in terms of duration over time, but that its
existence can be substantiated as a logical inference. Like the time for
comprehending in the story of the three prisoners, the unconscious thus
acquired the peculiar ontological status—although Lacan preferred to call
it ‘pre-ontological’ or ‘ontic’—of neither being, nor non-being (Lacan
1977b[1964]:29, 31).

对于拉康,逻辑时间提供一个新的解释,对于无意识如何时间地运转。当拉康争论弗洛伊德的主张:无意识并没有被时间的秩序。拉康主张,要凭借时间里的期间,来“测量“无意识是不可能的。但是无意识的存在能够被具体表现,作为是逻辑的推论。就像作为理解的时间,在三位犯人的故事里,无意识因此获得特殊的本体的地位—虽然拉康宁可称它为”前-本体“或”本体的“,既不是”生命实存“,也非”非生命实存“。

Throughout Seminar XI he launched a range of terms
to capture this status, from the unrealized to the function of limbo (ibid.:
30). In ‘Position of the Unconscious’, a text con temporary to Seminar XI,
he even compared the unconscious to a cave where one can never arrive
before closing-time and whose gate only opens when somebody knocks
from the inside (Lacan 1995a[1964]:267).

在第11研讨班,拉康发动一连串的术语来捕捉这个地位,从没有被实现的地位,到力比多的功能。在“无意识的位置“,跟第11研讨班同时的文本,拉康甚至将无意识比喻为一个洞穴。在洞穴那里,我们永远无法在结束时间以前到达。这个洞穴的大门仅有当某个人东里面敲门,它才会打开。

With this definition of the unconscious as an elusive, unrealized
structure in mind, Lacan returned to the clinical impasse of Freudian
analysis. To Freud, remembering reached its limit in the unconscious
striving for repetition; a process inherent to the unconscious vehemently
opposes the analytic retrieval of repressed impulses and the ensuing
reduction of their pathogenic influence. In Lacan’s reinterpretation of
these dynamics, repetition did no longer constitute an insuperable problem
for the progression of psychoanalytic treatment, or a factor whose
influence psychoanalysts should try to neutralize. Whereas Freud had
argued that repetition symbolizes the inertia of unconscious processes
and the imminent failure of the analytic enterprise, Lacan refused to
conceptualize repetition as the evil counterpart of remembering. For
example, in Seminar XI he pointed out:

当无意识的定义,作为是闪烁,没有被实现的心灵的结构,拉康回到弗洛伊德的精神分析的临床的僵局。对于弗洛伊的,回忆到达它的极限,在无意识的追寻重复。作为无意识本质具有的过程,强烈地对立于被压迫的冲动的精神分析的复得,以及随之而来的化简他们的病因的影响。当拉康解释这些动力时,重复并不再形成一个无法被克服的难题,对于精神分析的治疗的进展,或是一个因素。这个影响精神分析的因素应该尝试保持中立。虽然弗洛伊德曾经主张,重复象征无意识的过程的惰性,以及精神分析事业的逼近的失败。拉康拒绝将重概念化,作为是记忆的邪恶复本。譬如,在第11研讨班,拉康指出:

Remembering always involves a limit. And, no doubt, it can be
obtained more completely by other ways than analysis…It is here
that we must distinguish the scope of these two directions,
remembering and repetition. From the one to the other, there is no
more temporal orientation than there is reversibility. It is simply
that they are not commutative—to begin by remembering in order
to deal with the resistances of repetition is not the same thing as to
begin by repetition in order to tackle remembering.
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:40)

记忆总是牵涉到限制。无可置疑,记忆能够更加完成地被获得,凭借除了精神分析以外的其他方法。就在这里,我们必须区别这两个方向的范围,记忆与重复。从记忆到重复,除了逆转之外,不再有时间的定向。这仅是因为记忆与重复并没有互相沟通—凭借记忆开始,为了处理重复的抗菌,并不相同于,凭借重复开始,为了克服记忆。

In highlighting the non-commutativity of the relationship between
remembering and repetition, Lacan claimed that repetition is an essential
feature of the unconscious whose power cannot be diminished by
encouraging the analysand to remember, although a momentary standstill
of the repetitive cycle may induce recollection.57

当拉康强调记忆与重复之间的关系的非-沟通时,拉康宣称,重复是无意识的一个基本的特征。无意识的力量无法被减少,凭借鼓励分析者记者。虽然重复的循环的暂时的停顿可能引起回忆。

Lacan had already extrapolated Freud’s thesis that repetition is inherent
to the unconscious, despite being beyond the pleasure principle, in Seminar
II, in which he had broached the linguistic organization of the unconscious:

拉康已经列举弗洛伊德的主题:重复说无意识本质具有。尽管无意识超越快乐原则。在第二研讨班,拉康曾经将无意识的语言的组织粗略描绘。

[T]he unconscious is the discourse of the other. This discourse of
the other is not the discourse of the abstract other, of the other in the
dyad, of my correspondent, nor even of my slave, it is the discourse
of the circuit in which I am integrated. I am one of its links. It is the
discourse of my father for instance, in so far as my father made
mistakes which I am absolutely condemned to reproduce…That’s
what the need for repetition is, as we see it emerge beyond the
pleasure principle. It vacillates beyond all the biological mechanisms
of equilibration, of harmonisation and of agreement. It is only
introduced by the register of language, by the function of the symbol,
by the problematic of the question within the human order.
(Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:89–90)

无意识是大他者的辞说。大他者的辞说并不是抽象的大他者,二元的大他者,我的对应者的辞说,甚至也不是我的奴隶的辞说。大他者的辞说是循环的辞说,我被合并在那个循环里。我是其中一个连接。譬如,我的父亲的辞识,因为我的父亲犯下错误,我绝的被注意要复制的错误。那就是重复的需要,如同我们看见它出现,超越快乐原则。它摇摆于超越所有生物的平衡,和谐与同意的机制。重复的需要被介绍,仅是凭借语言的铭记,凭借象征的功能,凭借这个问题的难题,在人类的秩序里。

Repetition appears not as an obscure unconscious mechanism which puts
human beings continuously under the infernal spell of pain, ultimately
driving them towards self-destruction, but as an irreducible aspect of the
symbolic embodment of the unconscious. Like the transmission of signals
within an electronic circuit, signifiers circulate within the symbolic network
of the unconscious, which is what Lacan dubbed ‘repetition automatism’
(automatisme de repetition) (Lacan 1972[1956]:39).

重复出现,并不是作为一个模糊的无意识的机制。这个无意识的机制让人类继续承受内部的痛苦的压力,最后逼迫人类朝向自我毁灭。重复出现,作为无法无意识的象征的具体化身的化简的层面。就像在电子的循环迴路里,讯号的传递,能指在无意识的象征的网络里循环1。这就是拉康所谓的“重复的自动机制”。

The replacement of
Freud’s ‘compulsion’ with the new ‘automation’ signals the self-regulating
quality of the process.58 The pre-eminent clinical implication of this idea
is that every analytic attempt at countering repetition unavoidably runs
aground on the durability of the unconscious. Since repetition is part and
parcel of the symbolically structured unconscious and psychoanalysis
cannot lay claim to eradicating the unconscious, the reign of repetition
must remain unblemished. This insight prompted Lacan to take issue with
the envisaged reintegration of the patient’s life history via an induced
verbalization of its censored chapters, notably Freud’s own view on the
goal of psychoanalysis which he himself had embraced during the early
1950s (Lacan 1977e[1953]:46–48).

弗洛伊德的“冲动”被替换为新的“自动机制”,意味着这个过程的自我-规范的特质。这个观念具有优先的临床的暗示是,每个精神分析的企图反对重复,无可避免地失败,在无意识的期间。因为重复是做为象征的结构的无意识的部分与包裹。精神分析无法宣称抹除无意识,重复的统治必须始终没有瑕疵。这个洞见激发拉康主张病人的一生的历史被构想地重新融合,经由它的被审查的章节的文辞表达。特别是弗洛伊德自己的观点,针对精神分析的目标。他自己在1950年代主张的精神分析的目标。

In Seminar XI, Lacan re-examined these dynamics, relativizing his own
previous propositions on the signifier as object of repetition. Two central
issues were at stake. First, what is the nature of the event that is being
repeated? And second, what is responsible for the process of repetition
itself? To answer these questions, Lacan mustered the notions of tuche
and automaton from the second book of Aristotle’s Physics (1996:42–
48).

在第11研讨班,拉康重新检查这些动力,将他自己先前的主张相对化,针对将能指视为重复的客体。两个主要的命题岌岌可危。首先,正在被重复的事件的特性是什么?其次,是什么负责重复本身的过程?为了回答这些问题,拉康聚集“邂逅”与“自动机制”的观念,从亚里斯多德得到“物理学”。

Tuche literally means ‘accident’ or ‘chance’, as in ‘something which
happens by accident’ or ‘a chance encounter’, yet the term also conveys
‘luck’ and ‘fortune’, as in ‘I was lucky enough to escape’ or ‘I was fortunate
to have him around’. Each of these meanings points towards uncontrollable
circumstances, events which a human being cannot foresee.59 Lacan
redefined tuche in his own nomenclature as an encounter with the real,
and designated it as the object of repetition (Lacan 1977b[1964]:69).

“邂逅”实质上意味着“意外”或“偶然”,作为是某件偶然发生的事情,或“偶然的遭遇”。可是,这个术语也传达“运气”与“幸运”,如同“我足够幸运逃避出来”或是“我足够好运拥有他作伴”。这些意义的每一个都指向无法控制的环境,人类无法预先看见的事件。拉康重新定义“邂逅”,用他自己的专业术语,作为是“与实在界遭遇”,并且指明“邂逅”,作为是重复的客体。

Whereas Lacan’s concept of the real had scarcely outweighed that of
common-sense reality during the first ten years of his seminar, he now
considered it to be the equivalent of the impossible (ibid.: 167). As an
encounter with the real, an accident always entails the emergence of the
impossible, because the subject never expects the event in question to
happen. Since it is impossible to prepare oneself for what happens by
accident, Lacan also claimed that encounters with the real are inherently
missed and inescapably traumatic (ibid.: 55). The event itself can be either
pleasurable (eutuchia, good fortune) or unpleasurable (dustuchia, bad
fortune), but this has no bearing whatsoever on its devastating impact.
Encounters with the real therefore operate beyond good and bad or, in
Freudian terms, beyond the pleasure principle (ibid.: 53–54).

虽然拉康对于实在界的观念几乎没有超过共同常识的现实,在他研讨班的前十年。他现在则是认为实在界是相等于是不可能界。作为跟实在界遭遇,一个意外事件总是意味着不可能界的出现。因为主体从来没有预期这个受到质疑的事件会发生。因为要意外发生的事件有心理准备是不可能的。拉康也宣称,跟实在界的遭遇本质上会被错过,并且无可逃避地形成创伤。这个事件本身要就是令人愉快(好运),要不就是令人不愉快(坏运)。但是,这跟它的毁灭性的影响并没有丝毫的关系。跟实在界的遭遇,运作超越善与恶。或者,用弗洛伊德的术语来说,超越快乐原则。

Having defined the object of repetition as tuche, an essentially
traumatic encounter with the real, Lacan then employed Aristotle’s term
automaton to describe the ‘engine’ of repetition (ibid.: 52). Automaton
is usually rendered as ‘spontaneity’ in English translations of Aristotle’s
Physics, a term whose meaning is not too far removed from that of the
transliteration ‘automatism’. Both ‘spontaneous’ and ‘automatic’ indicate
that something in the nature of the event itself triggered its occurrence,
as in ‘spontaneous combustion’. In Lacan’s discourse automaton
coincided with the insistence of the network of signifiers and with Freud’s
pleasure principle (ibid.: 54).

拉康将重复的客体定义为“邂逅”,基本上是跟实在界的创伤的遭遇。然后,拉康运用亚里斯多德的术语“自动机制”来描述重复的“引擎”。自动机制automaton通常被翻译成为啥“自动自发’, 用英文翻译亚里斯多德的物理学来说。这一个术语的意义,跟实质翻译的automatism(自动机制),意思相差不远。”自动自发” 与“自动的”都指示著,某件事情,具有事件的特性,触动它的发生。如同在“自动自发的冲动”。在拉康的辞说“自动机制”,巧合于能指的网络的坚持,也恰合于弗洛伊德的快乐原则。

This seemingly abstruse connection is fairly
easy to understand when taking into account that the transition from
‘chance encounter’ to ‘repetition’ involves a transformation of
‘contingency’ into ‘necessity’. Such a transformation can only take place
if a de-randomizing operator is capable of reducing the chance element.
In other words, for an (unfortunate or lucky) accident to leave an indelible
mark, for a trauma to induce ineradicable mental and or physical scars,
something must have transformed the missed encounter into unavoidable
destiny. Lacan believed that the symbolic order, the network of signifiers
functioning in the unconscious, constitutes the powerhouse of this
transformation. Without a symbolic structure, however simple or
complicated it may be, fate will never catch up with people after they
have been the victim of an encounter with the real.60

表面上是抽象的关联,则是非常容易理解。假如我们考虑到,从“偶然的遭遇”到“重复”的转变,牵涉到“偶然性”的转化成为“必要性”。这样的转化的发生,仅有当一个除掉-任意性的运作者能够减少偶然的元素。换句话说,为了让一个(不幸或幸运)的意外,留下无法抹灭的记号,为了让一个创伤减少无法抹除的精神与生理的疤痕。某件东西必须已经将错过的遭遇,转化成为无法避免的命运。拉康相信,象征的秩序,在无意识里运作的能指的网络,组成转化的发电所。假如没有象征的结构,无论多么简单或复制,命运将永远追赶不上人们,在他们已经成为跟实在界遭遇的受害者之后。

Lacan’s analysis of the object and engine of repetition defied Freud’s
own views on repetition in at least four respects. First, whereas repetition
had appeared to Freud as a stubborn resistance to remembering, in Lacan’s
theory it followed an ‘automatic’ process based on a real encounter and
a symbolic machinery. Second, whilst Freud had situated repetition
entirely beyond the pleasure principle, Lacan only assigned the object
of repetition to this ‘beyond’, situating the engine firmly within the
boundaries of the pleasure principle.

拉康对于重复的客体与引擎的分析,挑衅到弗洛伊德自己对重复的观点,至少有两个层面。第一,对于弗洛伊德,重复出现作为是顽固的抗拒记忆;在拉康的理论,重复则是遵循一个“自动机制”的过程,以跟实在界遭遇与象征的机器作为基础。其次,弗洛伊德曾经将重复定位,完全超越快乐原则之外;拉康则仅是将重复的客体指定给这个“超越”,将引擎牢固的定位快乐原则的边界内部。

Third, whereas Freud had studied
repetition mainly on the level of behavioural acts (as opposed to verbal
productions), Lacan conceived repetition as a process strictly belonging
to the network of signifiers and thus to the structure of language. In
Lacan’s account, every repetitive event, whether verbal (digital) or
behavioural (analogous), had a symbolic status. Fourth, whilst Freud
had remained convinced that the stream of repetition could be embanked,
igniting a partial liberation of the pathogenic impulses and their
reintegration into the patient’s history as past events, Lacan posited that
repetition, being an essential function of the symbolic order, cannot be
cancelled out.

第三,弗洛伊德曾经研究重复,主要是指行为的行为的层面(跟文辞的产生相对立);拉康则是构想重复,作为是严格属于能指的网络的过程,因此属于语言的结构的过程。在拉康的描述里,每个重复的事件,无论是文词(数位)或行为的(类似的)的事件,它们都有象征的地位。第四,弗洛伊德始终相信,重复的水流能够用堤岸拦住,触发病因的冲动的部分解放;拉康则是假设,重复,由于是象征的秩序的基本的功能,无法被完全取消。

This does not imply that psychic change is altogether impossible within
Lacan’s conception of analytic treatment. It simply means that psychic
change needs to be situated on an entirely different level. Whereas Freud
believed he could dismantle the unconscious machinery of repetition
with the lever of remembering, Lacan set out to bring the endless
circulation of traumatic events within the machine’s memory to a halt by
modifying the structure of the machine itself. Indeed, if we accept that
the unconscious operates as a pre-ontological, permanently inchoate
structure, in accordance with the principle of logical time, and if we also
acknowledge that repetition is governed by the network of signifiers, a
huge arsenal of new opportunities for psychic change is opened.

这并不意味着,心灵的改变是完全不可能,在拉康的精神分析的治疗的构想里面。它仅是意味着,心灵的改变需要被定位在完全不同的层面。虽然弗洛伊德相信,他能够拆解重复的无意识的机器,用记忆作为杆杠。拉康则是出发,将机器的记忆里,创伤事件的无穷尽的循环,让它停止,凭借修改机器本身的结构。的确,假如我们接受,无意识运作作为前-本体的,永远是未完成的结构,以符合逻辑时间的原则。假如我们也承认,重复被能指的网络所统辖,作为心灵改变的新的机会,就像巨大军火库被打开。

Starting with the threefold structure of logical time, the story of the
three prisoners makes clear that the moment of concluding, through which
the preceding ‘time for comprehending’ becomes meaningful, is not a
moment of certainty. When one of the prisoners finally decides that he is
white, the only criterion he can rely on for making that decision is the
hesitation, or perhaps the indecisiveness of the two other prisoners, which
is of course not a reliable criterion. Hence, on the basis of what he has
concocted during the interval, the prisoner cannot be absolutely certain
about the truth of his decision. At the moment of concluding, he can
only anticipate its truth value. When the director eventually reveals to
the prisoner that his disk is white, it will prove to him that he has been
correct in assuming that the hesitation of the other prisoners was proof
of his being white. In case his disk turns out to be black, it will prove to
him that he had erroneously interpreted the hesitation of the others, or
that his time for comprehending was not about comprehending at all.

从逻辑时间的三重结构开始,这三位犯人清楚显示,通过结论的时刻,先前的“理解的时间”才变得具有意义。这个结论的时刻并不是确定的时刻。当其中一位犯人最后决的,他背后的盘子是白色,他做那个决定所依靠的唯一的标准,就是犹豫,或者说是前两位其他犯人的不作决定。这当然并不是一个可靠的标准。因此,根据在过程期间,他所编造的东西,作为基础。这位犯人无法绝对确定关于这个决定具有真理的价值。当导演最后给这位犯人显示,他背后的园盘是白色,这将跟他证明:他已经正确地假定,前两位犯人的犹豫证明他背后的园盘是白色。万一他背后的园盘是黑色,或是他错误地解释其他两位犯人的犹豫,或是他的理解的时间,根本就不是关于理解。

As formations of the unconscious, symptoms are also structured along
these lines of logical time. Rather than being controlled by a historical
event, the truth of a symptom—including its very status of symptom—
is pending, which encouraged Lacan to produce the pun that the reality
of the subject is always en souffrance, that is to say both ‘in a state of
suffering’ and ‘in abeyance’ (ibid.: 56). Due to the fact that the truth of
a symptom depends on something occurring in the future, Lacan
exchanged the Freudian ‘present perfect tense’ for a ‘future perfect tense’
(futur anterieur). The gist of this idea was already contained in a paragraph
from his ‘Rome Discourse’:

作为无意识的形成,症状也是沿着逻辑时间的脉络作为结构。征状的真理并没有受的历史事件的控制。症状的真理,以及症状的真理的地位,都拖延来临。这鼓励拉康产生这个双关语,主体的现实总是“en souffrance,”(尚未被接收),换句话说,“处于遭受痛苦的状态”与悬置当中。由于这个事实:症状的真理依靠某件未来发生的事情。拉康将弗洛伊德的“现在完成式”,改换成我“未来完成式”的时态。这个观念的要点已经被包含在他的“罗马辞说”的一个段落里。

What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was,
since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in
what I am, but the future perfect of what I shall have been for what
I am in the process of becoming.

在我的历史中被实现的东西,并不是过去明确地存在过的东西。因为它目前并不再存在,或甚至是在我的生命实存里,曾经存在过的事情的现在完成式。而是未来完成式,对于我未来将已经形成的事情,针对我在生成的过程里,我的生命实存。
(Lacan 1977e[1953]:86, translation modified)

Instead of the classical analytic question ‘What has happened to me (during
my childhood) that could possibly explain my present misery?’, the
Lacanian analyst ushers the patient to ask ‘What is going to happen to me
that will explain both my current situation and my life-history?’.

并非是古典的精神分析的问题:「我曾经发生什么事(在我的童年),可以用来解释我的目前的悲惨?」拉康派的精神分析家引导病人询问:「我将会发生什么事,将会解释我的目前的情境,与我的一生的历史?」

For the
analysand, this Lacanian strategy implies that he is freed from the
deterministic historical truth and introduced into a new realm of freedom.
Whereas in a Freudian setting analysands cannot alter the pathogenic impact
of the circumstances they have been subjected to, Lacanian analysands
are being given the keys to their own destiny, since the pathogenic impact
of an event is dependent upon the future, whose face has evidently not
been decided upon. Rather than reducing the impact of traumatic events
by liberating them from their historical dungeons and relocating them into
a remote, innocuous past, the Lacanian analyst is thus held to liberate
history as such by ensuring that its meaning can depend on the future.

对于分析者,这位拉康派的策略暗示着:他被免除这个命定论的历史的真理,并且被介绍进入自由的新的领域。虽然在弗洛伊德学派的背景,分析者无法改变环境的病因的影响,他们一直被隶属于的环境。拉康派对分析者正在被给予他们自己的命运的钥匙。因为事件作为病因的影响依靠着未来,未来的脸孔显而易见地还没有被决定。非但没有减少创伤的事件的影响,凭借解放它们,从历史的地牢,并且重新分派它们进入遥远,而无害的过去。拉康派对分析家因此被认为是将历史本身解放出来,凭借保证,历史的意义依靠未来。

A further possibility of change resides in Lacan’s assertion that
repetition is part and parcel of the network of signifiers. As an organization
of innumerable discrete elements, the symbolic order does not represent
a closed circuit characterized by stability, inertia and linear causality.
Each signifier can contribute to the organization of the symbolic order, a
particular series of signifiers can spark off a whole range of subsequent
signifiers, one signifier can originate in a variety of previous signifiers,
and there is a continuous effect of ‘retro-version’ (feedback) whereby
every signifier is simultaneously the cause and the effect of another
signifier (Lacan 1977k[1960]:306).

一个更进一步的改变的可能性驻居在拉康的主张:重复苏能指的网络的部分与包裹。作为无数的众多的元素的组织,象征的秩序并没有代表一个封闭的循环,具有稳定,惰性,与直线的因果律特色。每个能指都能够贡献象征秩序的组织,特殊的系列的能指能够激发整个范围的随后的能指,一个能指能够起源于各色各样的先前的能指,并且存在着“反向逆转”的连续的影响(回馈),在那里,每个能指既是另外一个能指的原因,又是结果。

The rise and development of
cybernetics during the 1950s inspired Lacan to model this functioning
of the symbolic order on the patterns of interaction within natural and
artificial systems as described by Norbert Wiener, Ludwig von Bertalanffy
and others. The results of cybernetics informed Lacan’s Seminar II
(1988c[1954–55]: 294–308), especially his reading of the itinerary of
the letter in Poe’s story of ‘The Purloined Letter’ (1972[1956]), but they
continued to support his descriptions of the symbolic order, as well as
his graphical representations of unconscious processes.61

在1960年代,网际网络的興起与发展,启发拉康模拟象征秩序的功能,针对自然与人为的系统的内部,互相运作的模式。如同诺博特 温纳,范 博塔坦非与其他人们所描述的。网际网络的结果告知拉康的第二研讨班,特别是他阅读爱伦坡的故事“被偷窃的信”,信的流落途径。但是他们无法继续他的描述象征的秩序,以及无意识的过程的画面式的再现。

Because the symbolic order operates according to the principles of an
open system, its patterns of repetition are not inherently durable. When
durable patterns do occur, it is due to an installed impermeability, an inflexible
obduracy, or what could perhaps also be dubbed ‘network sclerosis’. Hence,
enduring patterns of repetition only come into operation when something
(an accident, an encounter with the real) has been sedimented into a sclerotic
nucleus. Countering these sclerotic nuclei implies that their force is being
weakened to the point where their constitutive parts re-enter a relationship
with the other components of the network.

因为象征的秩序运作,依照开放的系统的原则,它的重复的模式并没有本质上的持续期间。当持续期间确实发生,那是由于被安置的不可穿透性,一种没有弹性的不受劝告,或许可能被称为是“网络的硬化症”。因此,仅有当某件事情(意味,跟实在界的遭遇),已经被沉淀成为硬化症的核心,重复的持久的模式才会发生。反抗这些硬化症的核心暗示着:他们的力量被在被减弱,甚至他们的形成的部分重新进入关系,跟网络的其他成分的关系。

Strange as it may seem, this is exactly what the Lacanian analyst is
held to do, at least with neurotics and perverts.62 Dissolving coagulated
centres of signification, undermining the vicious circle of recurrent
combinations of signifiers, opening up a space of desire between ageold
patterns of demand and complaint, and urging the analysand to avow
this desire, the Lacanian analyst operates on the network of signifiers in
light of the production of something new. Unlike the Freudian analyst,
the Lacanian practitioner does not engage in archaeological sleuthing.
Within a Lacanian analytic format, change is not to be expected from
plumbing the depths of the psyche—as Freud himself was forced to
confess now and again—but only from the reorganization of the symbolic
system.

虽然听起来似乎古怪,这确实就是拉康派的精神分析家被认为要做的事情,至少就神经症者与倒错症者而言。拉康的分析家瓦解被凝固的意义的中心,逐渐损坏各种能指的反复的组合的恶性循环,打开处于要求与抱怨的古老的模式之间的欲望的空间,并且建议分析者宣称这个欲望。拉康派的分析家运作能指的网络,从某件新的东西的产生的观点。不像弗络伊德的分析家,拉康派的实践者并没有参与考古学的专业技术。在拉康派的精神分析的格式里,改变并没有被期望,从探索心灵的深处。如同弗洛伊德自己被迫要一再地坦白承认,但是仅是从象征系统的重新组织。

To the extent that Freudian analysis can be associated with ‘depth
psychology’, Lacanian practice is therefore extremely ‘superficial’.63
When faced with psychotic patients, whether in a residential setting or
in private practice, Lacanian analysts have also espoused the ethical
principle according to which their clinical practice is governed by a desire
to obtain absolute difference, and not by the imposition of rules or the
promise of happiness. Their strength of purpose reflects a strict adherence
to the idea that a treatment can only be called psychoanalysis if its
fundamental ethical principle is acknowledged.

因为弗洛伊德学派的精神分析家能够跟“深度心理学”联想一块,拉康派的实践因此是极端表面。当拉康派的精神分析家面对精神病的病人时,无论是住宅的背景或是私人诊所,分析家也主张伦理学的原则。依照这个伦理学的原则,他们的临床的实践,受到获得绝对差异的欲望的统辖,并且并不是凭借赋家规则或许诺给予幸福。他们的目的的力量反映出一个严格的坚持这个观念:仅有当它的基本的伦理的原则被承认时,治疗才能够被称为是精神分析。

As far as the analysand’s
‘avowal of desire’ is concerned—the envisaged goal of a Lacanian analytic
process—psychotic patients are not regarded as being capable of achieving
this aim, owing to the fact that desire is an outcome of the psychic integration
of the symbolic order, an effect of the symbolic castration which the
psychotic, according to Lacanian theory, has not undergone. Since the
three mental structures of psychosis, neurosis and perversion are defined
as mutually exclusive categories, trying to neuroticize psychotics by
stimulating this symbolic castration is a futile enterprise.

就分析者的“宣称欲望”而言—拉康派的精神分析的过程的被拟想的目标—精神病的病人并没有被认为是能够达到这个目标。由于这个事实:欲望是象征秩序的心灵的融合的结果,是象征阉割的影响。依照拉康的理论,精神病者并没有经历象征的阉割。因为精神病,神经症,与倒错症的三个精神的结构,被定义为互相排斥的范畴。尝试让精神病者成为神经症,凭借刺激这个象征的阉割,是件失败的事业。

None the less, Lacanian analysts have deployed a plethora of alternative
strategies to relieve psychotic suffering, encouraged by Lacan’s directive
that the analyst must not back away from psychosis (Lacan 19771:12). In
this way, Lacanians have, for example, argued that an analyst working
with psychotics should adopt the position of a detached secretary (Lacan
1993[1955–56]:206) or a silent witness who registers the patients’ words
whilst prompting them to elaborate their visions of the world, in order to
accelerate their construction of a solid and stable delusion (Soler 1987).

可是,拉康派的精神分析家曾经运用大量的替代的策略,来解除精神病的痛苦,由拉康的指令所鼓励。分析家一定不要看见精神病者就撤退。用这个方式,譬如,拉康学派主张,从事治疗精神病者的分析家,应该採有中立的秘书的立场,或是沉默的见证人,铭记病人的话语。另一方面,激励他们建构他们对于世界的幻景。为了加速他们的建构牢固而稳定的幻觉。

In keeping with Freud’s propositions on the stabilizing function of Schreber’s
delusion (Freud 1911c[1910]:71), these Lacanians believe that the
construction of a balanced delusional system has a tranquillizing effect on
the patient’s mind, facilitating reintegration into society. Relying on Lacan’s
promotion, in his year-long seminar on Joyce (Lacan 1976–77 [1975–
76]), of the term ‘suppletion’ (suppleance) as an umbrella for a variety of
phenomena preventing the outbreak of psychosis or stabilizing the
psychotic breakdown,

这些拉康学派分析家为了符合弗洛伊德的命题,针对许瑞伯的幻觉的具有稳定的功能。他们相信,一个平衡的幻觉的系统的建构具有稳的效果,对于病人的心灵,有利于重新融合进入社会。依靠拉康的提倡,在他一年之久的探讨乔伊斯的研讨班。拉康提倡这个术语“异根补充”,作为是各式各样的现象的雨伞,阻止精神病的暴发,或是稳的精神病的崩溃。

Lacanian analysts have also advocated the
installation and/or maintenance of suppletions as a possible analytic goal
in the treatment of psychotics (Brousse 1988; Liart 1988; Stevens 1988).
These suppletions can be imaginary (in the form of identifications leading
to the formation of a new ego), symbolic (through writing and fine art) or
real (via so-called psychosomatic phenomena). In general they serve as
limitations of the psychotic’s overwhelming intrusive enjoyment, enabling
him to lead a relatively decent social life, whether before the psychosis
has become manifest or after the actual outbreak.64

拉康的精神分析家也主张“异根补充”的安置与(或)维护,作为是精神病的治疗的可能的精神分析的目标。这些异根补充有时是想像界(以认同的形式,导致新的自我的形成),有时是象征界(经有写作与精美的艺术),或有时是实在界(经由所谓的心理与生理的现象)。一般说来,它们充当限制精神病的压倒性的侵凌的享乐,让他能够过着比较正常的社会的生活。无论是精神病已经变得明显之前,或实际的崩溃之后。

In trying to overcome the deadlock of Freudian analysis Lacan thus
developed a clinical framework that is less deterministic, for including
more radical options of freedom, less historical, for strictly future orientated,
and less restrictive, for also accommodating psychotic
patients.65 Does this make the analyst’s task easier, or less impossible
than that of the Freudian clinician? Does Lacan’s logical time-machine
make analysts feel more at home within the constraints of their clinical
practice? In order to answer these questions we must return to the concepts
Lacan coined during the late 1960s as the theoretical cornerstones of the
analyst’s position: the desire of the analyst, object a and disbeing.
What does the analyst want? 89

当拉康尝试克服弗洛伊德的精神分析的僵局时,拉康因此发展一个临床的架构。这个临床的架构比较不那么命定论,因为包含更多的强烈的选择的自由,也比较不那么历史性质,因为它严格地以未来为定向。也比较不那么具有限制,因为它也接纳精神病者。这种临床架构难的让精神分析家的工作变得比较容易吗?或是比较不可能,比起弗洛伊德学派的临床医生?拉康的逻辑时间机器让精神分析家在他们的临床实践的约束里面,会感觉更加地自在吗?为了回答这些问题,我们必须回到拉康铸造的观念,在1960年代晚期。作为是精神分析家的立场的理论的基石;精神分析家的欲望,作为小客体与没有生命实存。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s


%d bloggers like this: