分析家的欲望

分析家作为欲望的客体

Loaded with the question as to what an analyst is, Lacan embarked
on an investigation of what could possibly lie beyond the technique of
psychoanalysis. For what analysts are supposed to say and do in the
context of interpretation and transference handling, some technical
guidelines can be formulated, yet when it comes to describing what an
analyst should be, technical rules are fundamentally inadequate. As I
pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, Freud sought solace in a
plead of imaginative metaphors to answer the question ‘What is an
analyst?’, singling out that of the archaeologist as the most representative
trope.

关于精神分析家的生命实存,充满各种问题,拉康开始从事研究在精神分析的技术之外,可能隐藏什么东西。因为在解释与处理移情的内文里,精神分析家应该要说与要做的事情,某些的技术的引导方针能够被说明。可是,当提到描述精神分析家应该做什么时,技术性的规则基本上是不足够的。如同我在这个章节的开始指出,弗洛伊德寻求安慰,诉诸于想像的隐喻来回答这个问题:“精神分析家是什么?”弗洛伊德挑选出考古学家,作为是最具代表性的团体。

Rather than espousing Freud’s metaphors, Lacan, for his part, tried
to capture their signification within the realm of desire.42 Not satisfied
with the analyst as a clinical archaeologist or a mental health sleuth,
Lacan began to explore what really animates these people, adding new
and different metaphors to the Freudian list as he went along. In this
way, Lacan’s concept of the desire of the analyst was born, alongside a
profound reflection upon the ethics of psychoanalysis as the necessary
counterpart to clinical technique. By situating the most fundamental of
analytic policies within the realm of desire and ethics, he at once solved
the impasse of reciprocal demands within an intersubjective relationship:
the analyst was no longer simply an Other subject but a figure imbued
with a specific desire.

拉康并没有铨释弗洛伊德的隐喻。就拉康而言,他尝试捕捉这些隐喻的意义,在欲望的领域之内。因为拉康并不满意精神分析家作为是临床的考古学家,或是精神健康的专家。他开始探索确实激发这些人们的动机是什么。随着他的进展,他补充新鲜而且不同的隐喻,到弗洛伊德的名单。用这个方式,拉康对于精神分析的欲望的观念诞生,伴随着深刻的反思,对于精神分析伦理学,作为是临床技术的必要的对应之物。凭借将精神分析策略的最基本的东西定位在欲望与伦理学的领域之内,他立即解答在互为主体性的关系里面,互惠的要求的僵局。精神分析家不再仅是大他者的主体,而是充满明确欲望的人物。

But what is this desire of the analyst? Where does it come from and
what is it aimed at? If it involves a judgement on the nature of analytic
action, what kind of judgement is it? Does the analyst communicate this
judgement to the analysand and, if so, how? And how does a concrete
analyst experience and sustain this desire during psychoanalytic
treatment?

但是精神分析家的这个欲望是什么呢?分析家的欲望从何而来?分析家的欲望目标朝着什么?这牵涉到对于精神分析的行动的特性的判断。它是什么性质的判断?精神分析家会跟分析者沟通这个判断吗?假如会,要如何沟通?一位具体的精神分析家如何经验与维持这个欲望,在精神分析的治疗的期间?

Apropos of the first question, Lacan responded initially, and in his
customary mode, by saying what the desire of the analyst should not
encompass. Some of these negative definitions followed directly from
his previous elaborations. As such, he argued that the desire of the analyst
is not a desire to understand the analysand, because the analyst’s
understanding will always be illusory and it will inevitably dampen down
the production of speech on the side of the patient. In ‘The Direction of
the Treatment’ he wrote: ‘To think, it is often better not to understand,
and one can gallop through miles of understanding without the least
thought being produced’ (ibid.: 252).

关于这个最初的问题,拉康最初回应。用他的习惯的模式,拉康说,精神分析家的欲望不应该涵盖什么。有些的负面的定义直接从先前的建构推衍而来。作为这样的定义,拉康主张,精神分析家的欲望并不是想要理解分析者的欲望。因为精神分析家的理解将总是一种幻觉,它无可避免地会浸湿病人这边的言说的产物。在“治疗的引导”,拉康写道:「想想看!不去理解往往还比较好些。我们理解了好半天,其实什么思想也没产生。」

The corollary of this first admonition
was that the desire of the analyst should neither be a desire to fulfil the
analysand’s demands—whatever they are and whether implicit or
explicit—because responding to these demands can only proceed from
an understanding of what they convey (ibid.: 254). In light of this ethical
principle of non-understanding Lacan later rejuvenated Freud’s idea that
analysts should suspend their previous knowledge and experience, each
time they are confronted with a new case, in order to recognize and reveal
its singularity (Freud 1912e:114; 1933a[1932]:173–175).

这个最初的警告的必然的结果是,精神分析家的欲望,既不应该是满足分析者的要求—无论这些要求是什么,无论是暗示或明确的要求—因为回应这些要求仅是从理解它们传递的东西前进。从非理解的伦理的原则的观点,拉康后来重新更新弗洛伊德的观念:精神分析家应该悬置他们的先前的知识与经验,每当他们面对新的个案。为了要体认而且显示这个个案的独异性。

Lacan fully
endorsed Freud’s opinion, stating that one of the most important matters
for psychoanalysis is ‘the intentional consolidation in him [the analyst]
of his ignorance of each subject who comes to him for analysis, of an
ever renewed ignorance that prevents anyone becoming a “case”’ (Lacan
1977k[1960]:322).

拉康充分认同弗洛伊德的意见。他陈述:对于精神分析,最重要的事情之一精神“精神分析家意图跟他对每个主体的无知团结一块,每个前来跟他就诊的主体。这种无知永远在更新当中,阻止任何人成为”个案“。

To the analysand’s ignorance, which undergirds both her desire to
know the truth about her symptoms and her investment of the analyst
with the function of supposed subject of knowing, the analyst is thus
held to respond with ignorance too!43 This idea tallies with Lacan’s
advocacy in Seminar I of the analyst’s ignorantia docta (wise ignorance)
as an alternative to the clinical proclamation of knowledge, and follows
directly from Freud’s observation in ‘On Beginning the Treatment’
(1913c:141–142) that it is counter-productive to imbue hysterics with
the knowledge they consciously lack. However, it is not because the
analyst and the analysand proceed from ignorance that their attitude to
that ignorance is the same.

对于分析者的这个无知,支持她想要知道真理的欲望,关于她1的症状与她对于精神分析的投注具有应该知道的主体的功能。精神分析家因此被认为也用无知来回应。这个观念符合拉康的主张,在第一研讨班,谈论到精神分析家的“大智若愚“,作为是替代临床具有知识的宣称。拉康从弗洛伊德的观察,在”治疗的开始“,直接推论出来:让癔症者充满他们在意识层面欠缺的知识,并没有正面产生的效果。可是,精神分析家与分析者虽然都从无知前进,他们对于那种无知的态度,并不一样。

As Lacan explained in the opening session of
Seminar XX (1998a[1972–73]:1–2), the analyst’s ignorance, his ‘I don’t
want to know anything about it’, is perfectly adequate to him, whereas
the analysand experiences his ignorance as a burden whose weight can
only be reduced by the acquisition of additional knowledge. Moreover,
it is not because the analyst refrains from producing knowledge that the
analysand will automatically perceive him as stupid, i.e. that he will loose
his status as supposed subject of knowing.

如同拉康在第20研讨班的开始的一堂解释说,精神分析家的无知,他的“我不想要知道关于它的任何东西“。这对精神分析家而言是相当足够的。但是分析者经验他的无知,则是作为一种负担。这个负担的重量,仅能凭借获得额外的知识,才能够被减少。而且,分析者并不会因为分享家的节制不产生知识,就因此自动地将分析家视为是愚笨。他仍然没有放松他的地位,作为是应该知道的主体。

On the contrary, the analyst
hails ‘the sublimity of stupidity’ (ibid.: 13) because he can maintain his
position of supposed wisdom more effectively by the enunciation of
ostensibly stupid sentences, than by the proclamation of rocket science.
This paradox of stupidity (the more one expresses knowledge, the more
one is regarded as stupid, and vice versa) and its relation to the
maintenance of transference emboldened Lacan on numerous occasions
to portray the analyst as a latter-day Socrates or a Western Zen-master.44

相反地•精神分析家欢呼“愚笨的升华“。因为他能够更加有效地维持他具有被认为的智慧的地位,凭借发表表面上是愚蠢的句子。比起凭借宣称具有火箭的科学。愚笨的这个悖论(我们越是表达知识,我们越是被认为是愚笨。)以及它跟维持移情的关系,让拉康在许多的场合,大胆地描绘精神分析家,作为是晚年的苏格拉底,或西方的禅宗大师。

Even more provocatively, Lacan stated that the desire of the analyst should
not be geared towards the advancement of the patient’s well-being, let alone
the promotion of happiness. Much more than ‘The Direction of the Treatment’
this theme pervaded Lacan’s Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, in
which he claimed that analysts who promise their patients a full restoration
of their mental, physical and social happiness are simply deluding them
with false hopes, despite the fact that happiness may be their patients’ one
and only demand.

更加具有挑衅地,拉康陈述:精神分析家的欲望不应该被发动朝向提升病人的幸福,更不用说是朝向快乐的提升。比起“治疗的方向“更加过分,这次的主题弥漫着第七研讨班,”精神分析的伦理学“。在那里,拉康宣称:假如精神分析家给他们的病人承诺,要完全恢复他们的健康,生理与社会的快乐,他们是在欺骗分析者,用虚假的希望。尽管这个事实:快乐是他们的病人的仅有的一个要求。

To Lacan, the analyst not only does not ‘have that Sovereign
Good that is asked of him, but he also knows there isn’t any’ (Lacan
1992[1959–60]:300). Happiness was only one amongst a multitude of values
Lacan felt obliged to discard as fraudulent ‘analytic ideals’—a proliferous,
yet prolific list including also the moral goals of genital sexuality, authenticity,
independence and temperateness. This perspective matched Lacan’s deeprooted
contempt for the preferential therapeutic goals of psychoanalysis, a
view which he deemed fully compatible with that of the founder. For instance,
in his 1955 ‘Variations of the Standard Treatment’ he had argued that the
analyst is better off without therapeutic ambitions, designating ‘health’ as a
bonus of psychoanalytic treatment:

对于拉康,精神分析家不但没有人家对他要求的“拥有那个统辖的善“,而且分析家也知道,并没有任何统辖的善。快乐仅是众多的价值中间的一个。拉康觉得有这个义务,要抛弃这些价值,作为是欺骗的”精神分析的理想“—这个增加,可是又多产的名单,包括性器官交媾的道德目标,真诚性,对立与中庸。跟这个观点相匹配的是拉康根深蒂固地藐视精神分析的被偏爱的治疗的目标。他认为这个观点跟创办者的观点是完全和谐的。譬如,在1955年的”标准治疗的各种类型“,他主张,假如没有治疗的企图心,分析家的情况会好些。拉康指明”健康“作为是精神分析治疗的额外收获。

Thoroughly warned by Freud to look closely at the effects in his
[the analyst’s] experience of that whose danger the term furor
sanandi sufficiently draws the attention to, after all he [the analyst]
does not really care to keep up its appearances. If he thus accepts
healing as a supplementary benefit of the psychoanalytic treatment,
he guards himself against any abuse of the desire to heal…
(Lacan 1966b[1955]:324)

弗洛伊德彻底警告要仔细看待这些影响,在精神分析家经验到“治疗激情”这个术语提醒我们注意的危险。毕竟,精神分析家并没有确实想要维持“治疗的激情”的外表。假如精神分析因此接受治疗,当著是精神分析治疗的辅助的利益,他也警戒他自己,不要过分使用“治疗的欲望”。

In scorning the analyst’s ‘healing fury’ Lacan clearly recalled Freud’s
assertion in his paper on transference-love (1915a[1914]:171) that a
human society needs furor sanandi as little as any other type of fanaticism.
Applying this principle to his own practice, Freud had actually repeated
on various occasions, in private correspondence as well as published
writings, that he was not possessed with a desire to heal.45

拉康藐视精神分析家的“治疗的狂热”。在他探讨移情与爱的论文,拉康清楚地提醒弗洛伊德的主张:人类的社会很少需要“治疗的激情”,如同很少需要任何其他种类的狂热主义。弗洛伊德将这个原则运用到他自己的实践,他实际上在好几个场合重复说,在私人的通信与出版的著作里,他并没有著魔于治疗的欲望。

‘At every moment’, Lacan contended in Seminar VII, ‘we need to know
what our effective relationship is to the desire to do good, to the desire to
cure’ (Lacan 1992[1959–60]:218). But is there a positive way to define this
relationship? After having designated what the desire of the analyst is not, is
it possible to name its essential qualities? ‘Desire must be taken literally’,
Lacan proclaimed in ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ (1977i[1958]:256),
which seemed to imply that the desire in question must be contemplated as
a restless, objectless yearning, a relentless striving to obtain nothing. So
much was at least confirmed in Seminar VII, where Lacan compared the
analyst’s desire to that of Antigone in Sophocles’ eponymous play: it concerns
a pure desire, a desire for nothing, even a desire for death inasmuch as death
is the ultimate non-object (Lacan 1992[1959–60]: 282–283).

拉康在第七研讨班主张:「在每个时刻,我们需要知的我们有效的关系,是跟行善的欲望的关系,跟治疗的欲望的关系」。但是,有一个积极的方式来定义这个关系吗?当拉康指明精神分析家的欲望的负面本质后,命名分析家的欲望的基本的特质是可能的吗?“欲望必须被实质地看待”,拉康在“治疗的方向”一文里宣称。这句话似乎暗示着:受到质疑的欲望必须被沉思,作为是一种没有休止,没有目标的渴望,无情地奋斗,想要获得空无。在第七研讨班,如此多的欲望至少被证实。在那里,拉康将精神分析家的欲望比喻为索福克利斯的同名标题“安提戈涅”戏剧里的安提戈涅:这个戏剧关注一个纯粹的欲望,追寻空无的欲望,甚至是追寻死亡的欲望。因为死亡是最后的非-客体。

In Lacan’s interpretation, Antigone had succeeded in ridding her desire of all the worldly
objects and concerns which foul human desire, in order to follow the course
of her desire as a formal ethical duty. Antigone’s desire had acceded to the
level of a Kantian categorical imperative, with which one complies for no
other reason than the naked fact of its imposition.46 In his ethics of
psychoanalysis Lacan accordingly propagated the analysts’ mandatory
involvement in their practice as categorically desiring beings. The ethical
judgement with which analysts have to pay in order to direct their treatment
properly concerns the acknowledgement that their action is inhabited by an
absolute desire and not, for that matter, by the formulation of demands or
the promulgation of moral goals.

用拉康的解释,安提戈涅已经成功地将她的欲望,解除卑下人类所欲望的所有的世界的客体与关注。为了遵循她的欲望的途径,作为正式的伦理的责任。安提戈涅的欲望认同康德的范畴的命令的层次。她同意康德的范畴的命令,没有任何其他理由,除了就是范畴命令的赋加的这个赤裸的事实。在他的精神分析伦理学,拉康因此主张精神分析家的强迫性地参与,在他们的实践里,作为是具有范畴方面的欲望的生命人物。精神分析家必须用伦理学的判断来付出代价,为了恰如其分地引导他们的治疗。这个伦理的判断关注到这个承认:就那件事而言,他们的行动充满绝对的欲望,而不是要求的说明,或道德目标的宣扬。

Needless to say that an analyst is not born with such a pure desire; his
desire is as much governed by ‘pathological’ objects (in the Kantian
sense) and vivid fantasies as that of the majority of people. The analyst’s
is an ‘experienced desire’ (ibid.: 300–301) which is the result of a
fundamental ‘mutation in the economy of desire’ (Lacan 1991b[1960–
61]:220–221) that has occurred during her training analysis. With this
‘mutation in the economy of desire’, Lacan pointed towards the necessary
reduction of the status of the object as a mesmerizing, fascinating
otherness in the analysand’s fantasy.

自不待言,精神分析家并没有诞生时就具有纯粹的欲望。他的欲望同样“受到污染的”客体的污染(用康德的意义来说),同样具有生动的幻想,跟大多数的人们的欲望一样。精神分析家的欲望是一个“被经验过的”欲望,是欲望的经济活力的基本的切割的结果,这个基本的切割发生在她的精神分析训练的期间。拉康用这个“欲望的活力的切割”来指出,朝向将客体的地位的必要的化减成为是在分析者的幻见里的纠缠而令人著迷的他者。

Since ‘being an analyst’ also
occupies the place of such an object, the upshot was that the candidate
who desired to be an analyst was supposed to perform a mutation of that
object too, even to the point where it lost all its seductive colours, before
he could have access to the pure desire of the analyst.

因为“成为分析家”也占有如此一个客体的地位,结果是,欲望成为分析家的候选人,被认为是也是执行那个客体的切割,甚至它丧失所有的客体的诱拐的颜色。这样,他才能够得以进入分析家的纯粹的欲望。

As Lacan conceived
it, the desire to be an analyst was as much a hindrance to the emergence
of the desire of the analyst as any other ‘pathological’ desire.47
Prima facie, this renewed picture of the analyst seemed to substantiate
the popular image of the analyst as somebody who has realized the Stoic
ideal of apathy.

如同拉康构想它,成为分析家的欲望同样是一种阻碍,对于分析家的欲望的出现,如同任何的“受到污染”的欲望。乍然看来,分析家的这个更新的画面似乎具体表现分析家的通俗的意象,作为是某位已经实践禁欲学派的冷漠的理想的人。

Stoic wisdom, as exemplified in the works of Epictetus
and Seneca, demands sustine et abstine (people should endure what they
are supposed to do and refrain from doing anything else) whilst
simultaneously exonerating people from all blame when they exercise their
power or express their desire.48 Isn’t this an accurate representation of the
analyst acting upon pure desire? Aren’t analysts indeed expected to fulfil
their duty without reproaching their patients for indulging in the satisfaction
of their unconscious desires?

禁欲学派的智慧,以伊壁鸠鲁与西尼卡的著作作为榜样。他们要求“人们应该忍受他们被认为应该要做的事情,并且自我节制,不要做任何其他事情”。另一方面,他们同时也让人们免除所有的责备,当他们运用他们的力量,或表达他们的欲望。这难道不就是分析家根据纯粹的欲望来行动的正确的表象吗?分析家难道不确实就是被期望要实践他们的责任,但是又没有谴责他们的病人,因为耽溺于他们的无意识的欲望的满足?

At the end of Seminar VII Lacan suggested,
albeit implicitly, that the philosophical position of Stoicism cannot be
brought in line with the ethics of psychoanalysis. In Stoically tolerating
the Other’s betrayal of confidence, or the mere whimsicality of the Other’s
desire, analysts give ground relative to their own desire, in which case
they do not act in accordance with the ethical standards of their practice
(Lacan 1992[1959–60]:320–321).

在第七研讨班的结束时,拉康建议,虽然是暗示地建议,禁欲学派的哲学的立场无法被带来符合精神分析的伦理学。当分析家以禁欲学派的方式容忍大他者的背叛的信任时,或是大他者的欲望的怪异想像时,分析对于他们自己的欲望,相对地退让。在那样的情况,分析家并不是遵照他们的实践的伦理的标准来行动。

More fundamentally, Lacan intimated
that analysts who adopt the Stoic ideal of apathy silently associate
themselves with the morality of the master/tyrant and, more generally,
with the reigning discourse of power.49 This does not mean that they agree
with the Other’s limitless enjoyment; they merely believe that once the
Other has discovered the meaning of its action, it will automatically repent.
Remarkably, this principle is quite similar to Freud’s conviction that
recovery will follow spontaneously once the patient’s historical truth
(the true meaning of the symptoms) has been excavated, according to
the paradigm of archaeological sleuthing. Yet Lacan was deeply sceptical
about the expected outcome:

更加基本地,拉康暗示说,採用禁欲学派的的冷漠的分析家,沉默地将他们自己,跟主人与暴君的道德联想一块。更加通俗地说,跟统辖的权力的辞说联想一块。这并不意味着,他们同意大他者的无限的享乐。他们仅是相信,一旦大他者已经发现它的行动的意义,它将会自动地後悔。明显地,这个原则跟弗洛伊德的信念相当一致:一旦病人的历史的真理(症状的真实的意义)已经被挖掘出来,康复将会自动自发地跟随而来,依照考古学专业的典范。可是,拉康表示深深地怀疑,对于这个被期望的结果。

The question is, once it is over, once the return to the meaning of
an action has been accomplished, once the deep meaning has been
liberated—that is to say, separated out through a catharsis in the
sense of decantation—will everything work out right by itself? Or,
to be more precise, will there be nothing but goodness?
(ibid.: 312)

问题是,一旦它已经结束,一旦回归到行动的意义已经被完成,一旦深层意义已经被解放出来—换句话说,一旦它经由分离意义的心理倾注而被分离开来—每样东西都会自动自发地获得恰当的解决吗?或者,更加确实地说,存在的将仅就是善意吗?

Whatever their philosophy may dictate, Stoics should not rest assured
that their apathy will have a redemptive effect, partly because the Other
might just sustain its jouissance, partly because the Other might try to
eradicate its repentance by neutralizing the one who instilled it.50 In
refusing to be the guarantees of the jouissance of the Other, in declining
to provide their patients with the satisfaction they desperately miss,
analysts at once refrain from adopting the position of the pervert, to
which the nature of their practice surreptitiously invites them. Put
differently, to the extent that analysts neither advocate, nor condone a
‘discourse of the right to jouissance’, they withstand the looming threat
of becoming institutionalized perverts. This is a decisive criterion for
differentiating between an analyst and a pervert, whose positions with
respect to the fantasy are otherwise remarkably similar.51

无论他们的哲学指示什么,禁欲学派不应该满意确定:他们的冷漠将具有救赎的效果。部分是因为大他者可能刚刚维持它的欢爽,部分是因为大他者可能尝试抹除它的后悔,凭借将灌输后悔观念的人保持中立。当分析家拒绝大他者的欢爽的保证,当分析家婉拒供应给病人,用病人迫切想要的满足,分析家立即自我节制,不採用倒错症者的立场。分析家的实践的特性秘密地邀请他们採取倒错症者的立场。换句话说,甚至,分析家既没有主张,也没有宽恕获得欢爽的权利的辞说。分析抵挡这个隐隐在现的威胁:成为被体制同化的倒错症者。这是一个决定性的标准,用来区别分析家与倒错症者。关于幻见,他们两者的立场在其他方面非常酷似。

During the early 1960s, Lacan realized that grounding the desire of
the analyst merely in Kant’s categorical imperative clears the path for its
return as a ruthless, moral tyranny of power. As he demonstrated in ‘Kant
with Sade’ (1989a[1962]), the Sadian universe of radical evil is strictly
congruent with the Kantian universe of detached morality.52 At the end
of Seminar XI, Lacan reiterated that for Kant ‘the moral law…is simply
desire in its pure state’, yet now adding that:

在960年代早期,拉康体会到,将分析家的欲望的基础,仅是定位在康德的范畴命令,替它清理途径,可以回转,作为权力的无情的道德暴君。如同拉康在“康德与萨德”一文里证明,萨德的强烈邪恶的宇宙,跟康德的保持中立的道德的宇宙,严格地不谋而合。在第11研讨班的结尾,拉康重复强调:对于康德,道德的法则仅是纯粹状态的欲望。可是,现在,拉康补充说:

[it] culminates in the sacrifice, strictly speaking, of everything that
is the object of love in one’s human tenderness—I would say, not
only in the rejection of the pathological object, but also in its
sacrifice and murder. That is why I wrote ‘Kant avec Sade’.
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:275–276)

道德的法则以牺牲来获得高潮,严格地说,就是以牺牲人的温柔里一切属于爱的客体的东西,来获得高潮。我不妨说,道德法则不但拒绝受到世俗污染的客体,而且拒绝这个客体的牺性与谋杀。那就是为什么我书写“康德与萨德”。

Because the desire of the analyst cannot possibly coincide with an
institutionalized, systematic extermination of all goods, Lacan was forced
to modify his earlier view on the purity of the analyst’s desire. Once the
obscene underside of Kant’s moral law exposed, he ended his Seminar
XI with the statement: ‘The analyst’s desire is not a pure desire. It is a
desire to obtain absolute difference’ (ibid.: 276).

因为分析家的欲望不可能巧合于被体制同化的系统的毁灭所有的善,拉康被迫修改他较早期的观点,对于分析家的欲望。一旦康德的道德的法则的卑下的阴谋被揭露,他结束他的第11研讨班,用这个陈述:分析家的欲望并不是纯粹的欲望。分析家的欲望是想要获得绝对差异的欲望。

Compared to previous
definitions, the analyst’s desire emerged here not as a desire for nothing,
but as a structural, symbolic force which recognizes and sustains the
other as Other. Instead of manoeuvring the analysands into a situation
where they can identify with their analyst, analysts had to manoeuvre
themselves into a position which enabled their analysands to dis-identify,
to discover their desire in its modulation by the desire of the Other, and
to avow that desire in its essential nothingness. Lacan believed that this
process would only unfold if the analyst puts himself into the position of
the support of object a, not an object with which the analysands can
satisfy their desire, but an object which causes it (ibid.: 273).

跟先前的定义比较起来,分析家的欲望出现这里,并不是作为追寻空无的欲望,而是作为结构的,象征的力量。这个力量体认而且维持他者作为大他者的地位。分析家并没有将分析者操控进入这么一个情境,让他们能够认同分析家的情境。代替的,分析家必须操控他们自己进入这么一个立场,让他们的分析者能够解除-认同,能够发现他们的欲望,在分析者的基本的空无里。拉康相信:仅有当分析家将自己放进小客体的支持的立场,这个过程才会展开。这个小客体并不是分析者能够用来满足他们的欲望的客体,而是引起他们的欲望的客体。

The difference between Lacan’ s 1964 conception of the position of
the analyst and his earlier view on the topic could not have been more
radical. Here the analyst was no longer expected to act as an Other subject
in an intersubjective relationship with the analysand, but as an objectcause
within a bond marked by subjective disparity. As the support of
object a within this new bond, the analyst was neither expected to
understand the analysand’s desire, nor to think about what could possibly
be causing it, to the extent that such thinking could only proceed from
the illusory constraints of the analyst’s own fantasy.53

在拉康1964年的分析家的立场的观念,与他较早前针对这个主题的观点之家的差异,在这个地方表现最为强烈。在此,分析家不再被期望行动,作为一个大者的主体,跟分析者处于互为主体性的关系。而是作为分析者的欲望的客体的原因,这个盟约的特征是主体性的差异。分析家作为在这个新的盟约内部的小客体的支持,分析家既没有被期望要理解分析者的欲望,也没有被期望要思维是什么引起分析者的欲望。甚至,这样的思维的前进,仅是由于分析家自己的幻见的幻觉的自我约束。

If thinking about the cause of the analysand’s desire was not an
appropriate solution, then perhaps being this cause was a better one, but
how could an analyst ever incarnate an object devoid of substance?
Furthermore, being an object a, in so far as it is fully achievable, seemed
to coincide with a state of jouissance, which one could hardly deem
compatible with the desire of the analyst. In a small yet instructive text
from the late 1960s, Lacan explained the difficulty of the analyst’s
position in the following terms:

假如思维到分析者的欲望的原因,并不是适当的解决。那么,或许成为分析者的欲望的原因是较恰当的解决。但是,分析家如何能够具体表现一个没有物质的客体?而且,成为小客体,就它所能够被充分完成而言,似乎是巧合于欢爽的状态。我们很少将这种欢爽的状体,认为是跟分析家的欲望互相和谐。在一篇从1960年代晚期的简短而且有启发的文本,拉康解释分析家的立场的困难,用以下的术语:

The analysand is the one who manages to realize that his ‘I think’
is an alienation, that is to say who discovers the fantasy as the
motor of psychic reality, that of the divided subject. He can only
do that by granting the analyst the function of (a), which he [the
analyst] would not be capable of being without vanishing
immediately.

分析者是这个人,他成功地体会到这一点:他的”我思“是一种异化。换句话说,分析者发现这个幻见,作为是心灵现实的动力,作为分裂的主体的动力。分析者要先承认分析家具有小客体的功能,他才能够那样做。分析家若是能够成为小客体的功能,他必然立即消失。

Hence, the analyst ought to know that, far from being
the measure of reality, he only clears the ground for the subject’s
truth by offering himself as support of this disbeing [desetre]…Well
then, this is where the psychoanalyst finds himself in an untenable
position: an alienation conditioned by an ‘I am’ whose own
condition…is an ‘I am not thinking’, reinforced by the addition
that…he [the analyst] knows it.
(Lacan 1968a[1967]:59)

因此,分析家应该知道,他根本就不是现实的测量者。他仅是清理作为主体的这个场地,他提供他自己,作为这个“没有生命实存“的支持。呵呵,这就是这个地方,精神分析家发现他自己处于无法自园其说的立场:由”我具有生命实存“所制约的异化。这个”我具有生命实存“的自己的情况是:”我并没有在思维“。这个情况的更加强化的补充是:他(分析家)知道这个情况。

As one can derive from this paragraph, Lacan’s answer to the question
as to what analysts should do or be with regard to their supporting of the
object a highlighted the analysts’ disbeing (desetre), their semblance of
being object a. This position allows them to function as object a for the
analysand whilst retaining their desire as analysts. Contrary to what he
had claimed in ‘The Direction of the Treatment’, Lacan now stressed
that analysts should not act with their being, but with their ‘disbeing’,
and it is easy to see that this guideline did not make the analyst’s position
more feasible. I will explore the issue further in the final part of this
chapter, when discussing Freud’s take on psychoanalysis as an impossible
profession and Lacan’s integration of this impossibility in his formula
of the discourse of the analyst.

如同我们能够从这个段落获得,拉康对于这个问题的回答,关于分析家应该做什么,或关于分析家作为小客体的支持。拉康的回答强调:分析家并没有生命实存,分析家类似小客体。这个立场让分析家能够发挥作为小客体的功能,针对分析者。 另一方面,这个立场保留分析家的欲望,作为分析家的欲望。跟拉康在“治疗的方向“里所宣称的恰恰相反,拉康现在强调,分析家不应该用他们的生命实存来行为,而是要用他们的”没有生命实存“。我们很容易看出,这个引导方针并没有让分析家的立场更加具有实用性。在这个章节的最后的部分,我将更加深入地探索这个议题。我将讨论弗洛伊德的看待精神分析,视为是不可能的专业。以及拉康将这个不可能,融合在他的公式,分析家的辞说的公式。

雄伯译
32hsiung@cphome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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