Archive for October, 2015

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践 8

October 16, 2015

The problematic nature of the ‘supposed subject of knowing’ in
obsessional neurosis, and the hysterical promotion of the unconscious (as
functional yet inaccessible knowledge) probably emboldened Lacan to
argue that the hysterisation of the patient is the subjective condition for the
deployment of the analytic discourse. In Seminar XVII he put it as follows:
What the analyst institutes as analytic experience can be said simply
—it is the hysterisation of discourse. In other words, it is the
structural introduction, under artificial conditions, of the discourse
of the hysteric…
(Lacan 1991a[1969–70]:35–36)

“被认为是知道的主体“,在妄想神经症者是一个问题重重的特性。癔症者将无意识提升(作为功能,可是无法接近的知识),可能让拉康大胆主张,病人的成为癔症,是主体获得精神分析辞说的策略的情况。在第七研讨班,拉康表达它如下:精神分析家所开启的东西,作为精神分析的经验,能够简单地说:让辞说成为癔症。换句话说,在人为的情况下,癔症者的辞说介绍结构、、、

Hysteria is a precondition for the pursuit of proper analytic treatment
because only hysterical transference involves the installation of a
‘supposed subject of knowing’ in combination with a ‘knowledge that is
not known’ (un savoir qui ne se sait pas) (ibid.: 32–33). The process of
hysterisation itself involves no more no less than the analyst’s induction
of a question on the side of the analysand.

癔症是精神分析治疗的追寻的先前情况。因为仅有癔症的移情牵涉到“被认为是知道的主体“的安置,跟”没有被知道的知识“组合一块。成为癔症的过程本身就牵涉到恰恰就是精神分析家,站在分析者的这边,推论问题。

When faced with obsessional
neurotics, hysterisation implies that the analyst tries to bring his patients
to the point where they admit that the analyst is not merely a necessary
burden, a slightly annoying artefact of the analytic disposition, but a
figure from whom they can expect a solution to their problems. Such an
avowal presupposes the obsessional patients’ acknowledgement that they
lack conscious control over some key aspects of their lives or, in Lacanese,
that some kind of knowledge seems to be at work in them that they
themselves know nothing about (a headless knowledge, so to speak).

当成为癔症面临妄想神经症,这暗示着,精神分析家尝试要将病人带地这个点:他们承认,精神分析家不仅是一个必要的负担,精神分析的性情的稍微令人懊恼的人工赝品。而且也是一个人物,他们期望从他那里获得他们的难题的解答。这样一个宣称预先假设妄想症的病人的承认:他们欠缺意识的控制他们生活的某些关键的层面。或者,用拉康的话说,某种的知识似乎正在他们身上运作。他们自己什么都不知的,关于(一个无头无脑的知识,也就是说)。

Analysts might infer from the hysterical supposition of knowledge
that it gives them a privileged position in the treatment, to the extent that
it enables them to apply their theoretical and clinical expertise to the
details of the individual life-history and to initiate their hysterical patients
into the true nature of their suffering. However, matters are not that
straightforward. By way of example I can refer to Freud’s description of
what happened in the case of a young girl each time he revealed to her
the details of a homosexual experience which she had apparently
repressed, and of which the girl’s mother had informed him:

精神分析可能推论,根据癔症者对于知识的假设,这给予他们具有特权的地位,在治疗里。甚至,这让他们能够运用他们的理论与临床的专业,探讨个人生命-历史的细节,并且启发他们的癔症的病人,探讨他们痛苦的真实的特性。可是,事情并不是那样直接了当。作为例子,我能够提到弗洛伊德的描述,对于一位年轻女孩的个案所发生的事情。每一次他跟她显示同性恋的经验的细节,她显而易见曾经压抑的同性恋的经验。这女孩的母亲曾经告诉他,有关这个同性恋:

Every time I repeated her mother’s story to the girl she reacted
with a hysterical attack, and after this she forgot the story once
more. There is no doubt that the patient was expressing a violent
resistance against the knowledge that was being forced upon her.
Finally she simulated feeble-mindedness and a complete loss of
memory in order to protect herself against what I had told her.
(Freud 1913c:141–142)

每次,我对这位女孩重复她的母亲的故事,她的反应是癔症的发作。癔症发作之后,她再次忘记这个故事。无可置疑地,病人正在表达猛烈的抗拒,对抗被强制在他身上的这个知识。最后,她伪装精神衰弱,以及完全丧失记忆,为了保护她自己,对抗我告诉他的东西。

This hysterical patient suffered from a severe lapse of memory and an
ardent desire to know the truth, but as soon as Freud told her what had
happened she refused to acknowledge it, pretending she had not heard,
or developing new symptoms merely to challenge the validity of the
analyst’s comments.45

这位癔症的病人遭受严重的记忆的丧失的痛苦,以及熱切地想要知道真理。但是当弗洛伊德告诉他所曾经发生过的事情,她拒绝承认它。她假装她没有听见,或是显示新的症状,仅是为了挑战精神分析家评论的正确性。

This process indicates how the hysterical cultivation of the relativity
of knowledge not only distorts the patients’ memories, but also invalidates
the theories with which they are being imbued by those who believe that
hysterics are merely seeking to know. By the very nature of their
relationship to knowledge, hysterics are keen to find omnipotent sources
of learning, but as soon as these master-figures become convinced of the
reality of their positions the power of their knowledge is nullified. In yet
another discussion of Freud’s Dora case, Lacan claimed that the hysteric
incarnates the truth of the master, which is that the master is castrated
(Lacan 1991a[1969–70]:110).

这个过程指示著,这位癔症者对于知识的相对性的培养,不但扭曲病人的记忆,而且让理论成为无效。他们正在被灌输的这些理论,被那些人们。那些人们相信癔症者仅是尝试要知道。由于他们跟知识的关系的这特性,癔症者很渴望找到无所不能的学问的来源。但是当这些大师-人物变得相信他们的立场的现实,知识的力量被变成无效。在弗洛伊德探讨朵拉的个案的另一个讨论。拉康宣称,癔症者具体表现主人的真理。那就是,这位主人被阉割。

This dynamics poses a major challenge to the analyst working with
(hystericized) neurotic patients, because he must refrain from complying
with their incessant demands for knowledge whilst ensuring that this
‘refusal to answer’ does not eliminate the symbolic transference, i.e. the
patient’s view of the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing. Another
difficulty concerns the hysterical indulgence in so-called ‘lateral
transferences’, whereby patients submerge themselves in a panoply of
relationships with alternative ‘supposed subjects of knowing’—including
friends, family members, and non-analytic professionals—merely to
discredit the analyst’s interventions. In this situation, the analyst may
feel that she has to compete with a score of would-be analysts, since the
patient is incessantly comparing her interpretations to those of others.

这个动力结构形成一个主要的挑战,对于研究(癔症)的神经症的病人的精神分析家。因为他必须控制不要同意他们的不断的要求获得知识。另一方面,他必须保证,这个“拒绝回答“病没有减少象征的移情。譬如,病人对于精神分析家的观点,作为是被认为是知道的主体。另外一个困难关系到癔症者耽溺于所谓的”后期的移情“。在那里,病人隐藏自己在跟替代的”被认为知道的主体“的关系的华服美饰。包括朋友,家庭成员,与非-精神分析的专业。仅是为了否定精神分析家的介入。在这个情况,精神分析家可能感觉,她必须跟许多的自愿的精神分析分庭抗礼。因为病人不断地将她的解释跟其他人们的解释做比较。

In the final session of his seminar on Freud’s technical papers, Lacan
tried to solve these problems by arguing that the analyst’s position should
emblematize ignorantia docta, a ‘wise ignorance’, in the sense of a
recognition of the limits of one’s understanding, as described by the
German Renaissance philosopher Nicholas Cusanus (Lacan 1988b[1953–
54]: 278).46 At the end of the 1960s, he formalized this analytic ignorantia
docta in the so-called ‘discourse of the analyst’, in which knowledge
(savoir) functions on the place of truth and the ‘supposed subject of
knowing’ is transferred to the side of the patient (Lacan 1991a[1969–
70]: 32–42).47

在拉康探讨弗洛伊德的精神分析技术论文的最后几堂,拉康尝试解决这些难题。他主张说,精神分析家的立场应该让“大智若愚“成为标志。因为分析家体认到一个人的理解力的限制。如同德国文艺复興时期的哲学家尼古拉 邱撒那所描述的。在1960年代末期,拉康说明精神分析家的“大智若愚”,用所谓的“精神分析家的辞说”。在那里,知识在真理的位置发挥功能,“被认为知道的主体”被转移到病人的这一边。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

从他者到大他者 69

October 16, 2015

From an other to the Other 69
从他者到大他者

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

But he did not need to think to be fixed as o. It is already done, contrary to what can
be imagine^ precisely because of the lamentable shirking, of the more and more
striking futility of all philosophy, namely, that you can upset the gaming table. I can
upset this one, of course, and blow up the tables at Vincennes and elsewhere, but that
does not prevent the read table, the gaming table from being still there. It is not the
university table that is at stake! The table around which the boss is reunited, whether
with the pupils in a pretty little interior, when this interior is his own, nice and warm
and grandfatherly, or the one in which it is framed in model nurseries!

但是他并不需要认为被固定为0。这个0已经被形成,跟我们能够想像的内容恰恰相反。确实是因为令人哀悼的绕过,因为一切哲学的越来越明显的徒劳。换句话说,你们能够扰乱在个赌盘桌。我当然能够扰乱这个赌盘桌,并且在敏西尼与别的地方,弄翻这些赌盘桌。但是那并没有阻止这个看盘的桌子,这个赌盘桌,没有依旧存在那里。岌岌可危的,并不是大学的桌子!老板被重新结合,环绕这个桌子,无论是跟学生重新结合,在非常小的内圈,当这个内圈是他自己的内圈,美好,温暖,而且慈祥。在这个内圈里,它被框架于模范护理。

This precisely is where the question is. That is why I allowed myself, in a scribbling
that I do not know whether you will see appearing or not – it is not at all a scribbling,
I spent a lot of time on it the day before yesterday — anyway I do not know whether
you will see it appearing, because it will appear in only one place or it will not appear
at all, and I am interested in whether it will appear or not appear! In short I went as
far as this delusional exorbitance — because for some time I have been deluding in my
own heart, these things always come out one day, in one form or another — I would
like it to be noticed, this is my delusion or not, that it is no longer possible to play the
role that is necessary for the transmission of knowledge if it does not involve the
transmission of value, even though now this is inscribed in the registers of credits
(unite de valeur), but to grasp what can be called a formation effect.

这确实是问题所在的地方。那是为什么我容许我自己,用潦草书写,我并不知的,你们将会看见它出现与否。那根本就不是潦草书写,前一天,我花费许的时间在书写—无论如何,我并不知的你们是否会看见它出现。因为它将仅是出现在一个地方,或它将根本就不会出现。我感到興趣的是,它是否将会出现,或不会出现!总之,我过分到享受这个幻觉的奢华。因为有段时间,我一直在我的心里产生幻觉。这些东西总是在某一天出来,用某种的形式。我想要它被人注意。这就是我的幻觉与否。这不再是可能的,扮演这个角色,对于知识的传递必要的角色。假如它没有牵涉到价值的传递。即使现在,这被铭记在学分的铭记里,但是要理解所谓的形成的影响。

This is why, in
any case, whoever in the future, precisely because something has happened to this
value o f knowledge., wants to occupy a place that contributes in any way to this place
of formation, even if it is mathematics, biochemistry or anything else whatsoever,
would do well to be a psychoanalyst, if this is how there must be defined someone for
whom there exists this question of the dependence of the subject with respect to the
discourse that holds him, and not that he holds.

这就是为什么,无论如何,在未来,无论是谁想要占有一个位置,对于形成的这个位置有所贡献,因为有某件东西曾经发生到知识的价值。即使那个知识是数学,生物-化学,或任何其他东西。他最好成为一位精神分析家。假如这是某个人必须被定义的方式。对于这个人,主体的依靠的问题存在着,关于维持他的这个辞说,而是他维持这个辞说。

5.2.69
So then it is worth saying, since you see that I have just avoided something because of
the fact that you are all products of the school, namely, of philosophical teaching. I
know that I cannot tackle in too abrupt a fashion what is involved in terms of the
change that is written in the second matrix, namely, pose the question of what is
meant by the fact that here it is not o or zero because it has never been o or zero as I
have just indicated it to you and as Pascal says. But since it is only ever philosophers
that have read him, everyone has remained deaf. He said o is zero, which means that
(126) o is the bet. It was nevertheless clearly specified in games’ theory. No, that
changed nothing, they remained deaf!

所以,这是值得一说的。因为你们看见,我刚刚避免某件东西,因为这个事实:你们都是这个学派的产物。换句话说,这个哲学教学的产物。我知的,我无法用太过于倉促的方式来克服所被牵涉的东西,用在第二个基座所被书写的改变。换句话说,我提出这个问题:在此,这并不是0或零的这个事实,意味着什么。因为它从来就不是0或零,如同我刚刚跟你们指示它,并且依照巴斯卡所说。但是,因为仅是哲学家在阅读巴斯卡,每个人始终充耳不闻。他说0就是零。这意味着,0就是这个赌注。在游戏理论,它仍然清楚地被指明。不,那并没有改变任何东西。人们始终充耳不闻!

And zero is zero with respect to infinity.
Rubbish! What is changed by the fact that there is now not, as has been vainly said,
in an imaginary fashion o or zero, but o or -o. And if-o effectively means what it
seems to say, namely, that it is inverted, what can this thing be? And then also that in
one case, whatever happens, even if it is at the cost of something that to be inscribed,
appears to need to be costly, what again is this correlation, this equivalence that
perhaps allows us to put elsewhere, to perceive that our connecting signs are upset. In
any case here are two links that appear to me to be worth questioning. You see that
they are not classified quite like the earlier ones.

零就是关于无限的零。废话!所被改变的东西,凭借这个事实:现在并没有0或零,而是0或-0,如同曾经徒劳地说过,用想像的方式。假如-0有效地意味着它似乎要说的东西。换句话说,它被倒转,那这个这个被倒转的东西是什么?在某个情况,无论发生什么事,即使是耗费某件东西。这个东西似乎是需要代价昂贵,为了被铭记。这个相关是什么,或许让我们在别的地方能够表达的平衡是什么,让我们能够感知,我们的联接的讯息被扰乱。无论如何,在此是两个联接,我觉得是值得询问的。你们看见,它们并没有完全像早先的那些联接被分类。

Here, I regret not being further on than what I already, but too quickly, articulated in
the last minutes of the last time. Namely, that I recalled that to start from the figure
that is indicated here in Pascal’s scribbling, the first link, this horizontal line from
small o to -oo, we say, is hell. I shouted it out to people who were already making
for the exit. But, on the whole, I pointed out to you that hell is something we know.
It is everyday life. A curious thing, people know it, people say it, people say nothing
but that But it is limited to discourse and to some symptoms of course. Thank God,
if there were no symptoms, it would not be noticed! If neurotic symptoms did not
exist, there would not have been Freud! If the hysterics had not already opened up the
question, there is no chance that even the truth would have show the tip of its ear!

在此,我遗憾我没有更加深入探讨,超过为已经太快地表达的东西,在上次的最后几分钟。换句话说,我提醒,为了从这个数字开始,在巴斯卡的潦草书写里被铭记的东西。这第一个联接,这个水平的线,从小小的0,到-00,我们说,那是地狱。我对人们大声喊出,对于那些已经朝向出口的人们大声喊出。但是,大体上,我跟你们指出,地狱就是某件我们知道的东西。地狱就是日常生活。耐人寻味的事情是,人们知道地狱,人们说出地狱,人们说的仅是地狱。但是,地狱被限制于辞说,当然,地狱被限制于某些的症状。感谢上帝!假如没有症状,地狱将不会被注意到!假如癔症者当时没有展开这个问题,这个真理甚至没有机会出现在它的耳朵的尖端!
5.2.69 X 10

So then here, we must make a short halt. Someone that I thank – because you should
always thank people through whom presents arrive – reminded me for external
reasons about the existence of the chapter of Bergler called “The underestimated
superego”, it is in the famous Basic neurosis that explains everything. You are not
going to tell me that I explain everything. I explain nothing, precisely. This is even
what interests you! I try at different levels, not simply here, to ensure that there are
(127) psychoanalysts who are not imbeciles.

所以,在此,我们必须短暂地停顿一下。我感谢某个人-因为你们应该总是感谢人们,礼物是经由这些人们呈现。这个人提醒我,因为外在的理由,关于被称为“被低估的超我”的博格勒的章节的存在。在这个著名的“基本”里,神经者解释一切。你们将不要告诉我,我解释一切。我什么都没有解释,确实地。这甚至是你们感到興趣的东西!我在不同的层面尝试,不仅是在这里,为了确认:并不是所有精神分析家都是白痴!

My operation is an advertising
operation, not to draw people into the hole of a school, but to try to give the
equivalent of what psychoanalysts ought to have to people who have no means of
getting it. It is a despairing enterprise. But experience proved that the other also, that
of teaching it to psychoanalysts themselves, seems destined to fail, as I already wrote.
Imbeciles, I mean as subjects, because as regards getting on in their practice, they are
pretty smart! And it is precisely a consequence of what I am in the process of stating
here. It is in conformity with the theory.

我的运作是广告的运作,并不是要将人们吸引到学派的空洞里,而是要尝试给予这个相等物,精神分析应该要拥有的东西,对于没有获得它的工具的人们。这是一个令人绝望的企业。但是精神分析经验证明,另外一个企业似乎注定失败。教导精神分析的企业,对精神分析家自己。如同我已经书写过。白痴,我指的是主体。因为关于在他们的实践里获得成功,他们卖弄聪明!这确实是我的生命的本质的结果,当我在此处于陈述的过程。这个结果是跟理论保持一致。

This is what proves not alone that there is
no need to be a philosopher but that it is much better not to be one. Only that has a
consequence, which is that one understands nothing. Hence what I also spend my
time stating, that it is much better not to understand. Only the problem is that they
understand all kinds of little things, so it is swarming.

这就是所证明的东西,不单是,没有需要成为哲学家,而且,最好是不要成为哲学家。只是,那会有一个结果。那就是,我们什么都没有理解。因此,我也花费我的时间在陈述的东西,最好不要去理解。只是这个难题是,他们理解各式各样的琐碎的事物,所以蜂拥一团。

For example ‘The
underestimated superego” is a brilliant chapter, first of all because it collects together
all the ways in which the superego has been articulated in Freud. Since he is not a
philosopher, he absolutely does not see that they all hang together. Moreover he is
charming, and he admits it. That is what is good about psychoanalysts, they admit
everything! He admits that he has written to a gentleman, it is in a note, Mr H H
Heart, who was making extracts from Freud. So then he wrote to him: “Send me
some quotations about the superego”. After all that can be done; it is moreover also in
conformity with the theory; you can take things like that, with a pair of scissors, if
writing is so important, everywhere there is superego, snip, snip, you cut it out!

譬如,“这个被低估的超我”是一篇优秀的章节。首先,因为它将所有的方式收集一块。在弗洛伊德那里,超我曾经被表达过的方式。因为他并非是一位哲学家,他绝对没有看错,这些方式都垂挂一块。而且,他很迷人,他承认这一点。那就是关于精神分析家美好的东西。他们承认一切!他承认,他曾经写信给一位绅士,那是以纸条的方式。霍特先生从弗洛伊德那里抽取出来。所以,当时他写信给他:「请你寄给我关于超我的引述段落」。毕竟,那件事情能够被做到。而且,也与理论保持一致。你们能够像那样看待事情,用一把剪刀。假如书写时如此重要,每个地方,都有超我,咔嚓,咔嚓,你们将超我剪开

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

http://www.lacaninireland.com
5.2.69 X 11

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践 7

October 15, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of
Psychoanalysis

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and
Transference
第一章
经由言说与移情的诊断

HYSTERIA AND OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS
癔症与妄想神经症

Although all neurotics are uniformly under the spell of repression,
suffering from something unspoken which none the less continues to
speak in a different realm, Lacan maintained Freud’s decomposition of
the neurotic picture in a hysterical and an obsessional side.28 From the
1890s till the 1930s, Freud had experimented with a whole gamut of
criteria distinguishing hysterics from obsessional neurotics, such as the
time and nature of the traumatic sexual experience, constitutional factors,
the moment of disease onset, the location of the symptoms, the fixated
phase of libidinal development, the type of repression, and the patients’
unconscious attitudes towards sexuality.

虽然所有的神经症者都一致地受到压抑的影响,他们遭受某件没有说出的东西的痛苦。这个没有说出的东西仍然继续言说,在不同的领域。拉康维持弗洛伊德对于神经症画面的解构,处于癔症与妄想症的这一边。从1890年,直到1930年,弗洛伊德曾经试验一整套的标准,区别癔症跟妄想神经症的不同,譬如,创伤的性的经验的时间与特性,结构性的因素,疾病开始的时刻,症状的位置,力比多发展的固定的时期,压抑的种类,与病人对应性的无意识的态度。

Some of these criteria, notably
the nature of the traumatic sexual experience (passive and painful in
hysteria versus active and pleasurable in obsessional neurosis), he had
come to reject as his theory evolved, whereas others he had suggested
without detailing their impact.29 On various occasions, Freud (1918b
[1914]:76; 1926d[1925]:113) had also conceded that every obsessional
neurosis seems to encapsulate a hysterical nucleus, out of which it
develops along complex, obscure pathways. Unlocking the mystery of
obsessional neurosis thus involved the challenge of finding its formula
of transformation, something for which Freud never claimed credit.
Lacan dressed his own differentiation of hysteria and obsessional
neurosis in his preferred conceptual garments of subject, Other, object,
fantasy, desire and jouissance, without betraying his allegiance to Freud.

有一些的这些标准,特别是创伤的性的经验的癔症(癔症者的被动与令人痛苦,对比于妄想症者的主动与快乐),他逐渐排除它们,随着他的理论的进展。另一方面,他曾经建议其他的标准,但是没有详述它们的影响。在各个不同的场合,弗洛伊德也曾经承认,每个妄想症的神经症似乎总栝癔症的核心。每个妄想神经症就从癔症的核心发展出来,沿着复杂而模糊的途径。解答妄想神经症的神秘,因此牵涉到这个挑战:要找出它的转化的公式,对于这个转化的公式,弗洛伊德从来宣称予以推崇。拉康则是用他较为喜爱的观念的外衣:主体,大他者,客体,幻见,欲望与欢爽,装扮他自己对于癔症与妄想症的区别。但是拉康病没有背叛对于弗洛伊德的忠诚。

Here, Lacan’s Freudian inspiration can be inferred from his unremitting
faith in the value of Freud’s case-studies of Dora (1905e[1901]), the Rat
Man (1909d) and the Wolf Man (1918b[1914]), as well as from his
trenchant critique of the purportedly ‘deviant’, post-Freudian accounts
of hysteria and obsessional neurosis, such as the object-relations
perspective espoused by Maurice Bouvet during the late 1940s and 1950s
(Lacan 1994[1956–57]:26–28; 1998b[1957–58]:387–421).30

在此,拉康的获得弗洛伊德的启发,可以从头永不休止的信仰弗洛伊的个案研究的价值推论出来:“朵拉”,“鼠人”,“狼人”,以及从他的锐利地批判据说是“偏离的”后-弗洛伊德学派,他们对于癔症与妄想症的描述。譬如,莫瑞斯,博维特主张的客体关系的观点,在1940年代晚期与1950年代。

Following Freud (1909d:156), Lacan argued that the analysis of obsessional
neurotics is much more demanding than that of hysterical patients, since
what the analyst needs is ‘not only the plan of a reconstructed labyrinth,
or even a batch of plans already drawn up’, but also ‘the general
combinatory that governs their variety…[and], even more usefully,
accounts for the illusions, or rather shifts of perspective to be found in
the labyrinth (Lacan 1977i[1958]:266).

追随弗洛伊德之后,拉康主张,妄想神经症的分析,比起癔症病人的分析,要求严格得多。因为精神分析家所需要的东西,“不但是重新建立迷宫的计划,或甚至是一堆已经被拟定的计划,而且是统辖它们的多样态的一般组合、、、甚至更加有用地,对于幻觉的描述,或者说,在迷宫里能够被找到的观点的改变。

In keeping with Freud
(1913i:319), Lacan also surmised that hysteria and obsessional neurosis
are two neurotic languages, whereby the obsessional idiom is a dialect
of the hysterical standard. Towards the end of his career, Lacan even
adduced that the psychoanalytic treatment of all neurotics rests upon a
‘hysterisation’ of the patient, which indicates that he agreed with Freud
on the hysterical core within obsessional neurosis (Lacan 1991a[1969–
70]:35–36).

虽然遵循弗洛伊德,拉康也推断,癔症与妄想神经症是两种神经症的语言。妄想神经症的词语是癔症的标准语的方言。在他事业的末期,拉康甚至补充说:精神分析对于所有的神经症的治疗,依靠病人的“成为癔症“,这指示著:拉康同意弗洛伊德,对于癔症的核心,在妄想神经症内部。

Lacan’s proposition that every neurotic subject recognizes and is being
recognized by the Other (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:168) provides a good
starting-point for a summary of his ideas on hysteria and obsessional
neurosis.31 Throughout his seminars, Lacan explored the effects of this
neurotic acknowledgement of the Other (the laws of language, the
language of laws, the sociocultural rules and regulations), both on the
human condition and on the structure of language itself. In a first
movement, he aligned the individual’s assimilation of the symbolic order
with the normal deployment of the Oedipus and castration complexes in
Freud’s theory, according to which the child relinquishes its primary
love-object (the mother) in favour of an identification with the father as
the representative of the law (Freud 1924d; Lacan 1994[1956–57]:61,
199–230).

拉康的命题是:每个神经症的主体体认出大他者,而且正在被大他者体认。这个命题提供一个很好的出发点,作为他对于癔症与妄想神经症的观念的总结。在他的研讨班里,拉康探索这个神经症的承认大他者的影响(语言的法则,法则的语言,社会与文化的规则与规定)。一方面是依据人类的情况,另一方面则是依据语言本身的结构。在一个最初的运动里,拉康将个人的接受象征秩序,等同于弗洛伊德的理论里,伊狄浦斯与阉割情结的正常的发展。依照弗洛伊德的理论,小孩放弃它的最初的爱的客体(母亲),以迁就对于父亲的认同,作为是法则的代表。

Concurrently, Lacan reinterpreted Freud’s notion of castration
—the boy’s observation that his mother lacks a penis and the ensuing
fear that his own will be cut off by way of punishment for violating a
prohibition—as a symbolic cut resulting from the individual’s compliance
with the Other.32 According to Lacan, every society forces human beings
to postpone the satisfaction of some of their drives and prohibits the
expression of some drives altogether, which implies ‘that jouissance
[enjoyment] is forbidden to him who speaks as such’ (Lacan 1977k
[1960]:319).

同时,拉康重新解释弗洛伊德对于阉割的观念—小孩观察到,他的母亲欠缺阳具,并且随后恐惧,他自己的阳具将会被切割,作为处罚,因为他违背一个禁令—作为因为个人的同意大他者造成的象征的切割。依照拉康,每个社会都强迫人类拖延某些的冲动的满足,并且也一块禁止某些冲动的表达。这暗示着:欢爽被禁止,对于言说作为欢爽的人。

Originally defined by Freud as a perceived punishment for
transgressing a symbolic law (the incest prohibition), in Lacan’s version
castration became part and parcel of leading a law-abiding life. Following
this symbolic cut of castration, the neurotic individual experiences both
a loss of jouissance, which Lacan designated as -f, and an internal lack,
which he dubbed or split subject.33 The entire operation awakens the
neurotic’s desire to retrieve what is lost and to annihilate the lack. Desire
and jouissance are therefore the two poles of the psychic spectrum within
which the neurotic individual has to organize his life (Lacan 1998b[1957–
58]:261–317).

阉割原先被弗洛伊德定义,作为是被感知的处罚,因为逾越象征的法则(乱伦的禁令)。在拉康的版本,阉割则是成为遵守法则的生活的部分与包裹。神经症的个人遵循这个阉割的象征,并且经验到欢爽的丧失与内部的欠缺。前者,拉康指明作为是-f;后者,他称之为分裂的主体。整个的运作唤醒神经症的欲望,要重新获得丧失的东西,并且消灭这个欠缺。欲望与欢爽因此是心灵光谱的两个极端。在这心灵光谱内部,神经症的个人必须组织他的生活。

In a second movement, Lacan investigated the relationship between
the neurotic’s lack (the split subject ) and the objects with which she tries
to neutralize it, simultaneously satisfying her desire and reinstating the
feeling of ‘fullness’. This entailed an extrapolation of Freud’s suggestion,
in the final pages of his ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’
(1905d:222–230), that the objects to which a person turns in adulthood
are always but substitutes for a lost primary object which can never be
retrieved.

在第二个运动,拉康研究神经症者的欠缺(分裂的主体)与客体的关系。神经症者尝试用这些客体来让关系保持中立,同时又满足她的欲望,并且重新恢复“充实“的感觉。这意味着推断弗洛伊德的建议,在”性学三论文“的最后几页。一个人在成年时转向这些客体,这些客体总是仅是已经丧失的原初的客体的替代品。已经丧失的原初的客体永远无法被重新获得。

From the late 1950s Lacan conceptualized these fascinating, yet
inadequate, objects which turn the neurotic individual on because he ‘reads’
their promise of fulfilment as objects a. In Seminar VI he described an
object a as something which ‘satisfies no need and is itself already relative,
i.e. placed in relation to the subject…The object takes the place, I would
say, of what the subject is—symbolically—deprived of (Lacan
1977a[1959]:15). Again in accordance with Freud, Lacan defined an
individual’s relationship with these purportedly satisfying objects as
‘fantasy’, for which he constructed the algebraic formula ? a in which ?
stands for ‘desire of/for’ (Lacan 1977k[1960]:313).34

从1950年晚期,拉康将这些令人著迷,可是又不充足的客体建构成概念。这些客体让神经症者感到著迷,因为他“阅读“出它们作为客体,具有让人满足的展望。在第六研讨班,拉康描述一个小客体,作为是某件并没有满足任何需要,小客体本身总是相对价值,譬如,小客体跟主体的相对地位。我不妨说,小客体具有主体被剥夺的东西的这个位置—象征方面而言。而且,为了符合弗洛伊德,拉康定义一个人跟这些据说令人满足的客体的关系,作为是”幻见“。拉康替这个”幻见“建构一个代数的公数”Sa“,在这个公式里,a代表”欲望所在,或欲望的目标“。

To the extent that an individual’s partners (parents, peers, lovers,
colleagues) have also integrated the Other, they will equally function
according to this dynamics of desire and jouissance. Hence, neurotics not
only fantasize about what they themselves desire, but also about what other
people desire—in their capacity as Other—and about how to transform
themselves into desirable, loveable objects for these others. Until his
conceptualization of the object a during the late 1950s, Lacan contended
that a child who wants to satisfy its mother will identify with the imaginary
phallus (f), the object she has ostensibly lost, and vice versa that a mother
who uses her child as a new source of enjoyment will approach it as an
imaginary phallus (Lacan 1994[1956–57]:71).

随着个人的伙伴(父母,同侪,情人,同事)也已经将大他者融合一块,他们同样地发挥功能,依照欲望与欢爽的动力结构。因此,神经症者不但幻想有关他们自己的欲望的东西,他们也幻想别人欲望的东西—由于他们具有充当大他者的能力—他们幻想如何将他们自己转化成为被欲望的,可爱的客体,对于这些别人。一直到1950年代的晚期,拉康都将这个小客体,建构观念。拉康主张,想要满足它的母亲的欲望的小孩,将会认同想像的阳具,(f),她已经明显地丧失的客体。反过来说也是一样。使用她的小孩充当享乐的来源的母亲,将会接近小孩,充当是想像的阳具。

Later on he argued that
human beings can only relate to the Other’s objects of desire (the objects
a), about which they fantasize and with which they try to satisfy the Other.
Rather than something with which human beings identify, the objects a
are a kind of exchange objects which enable them to enter relationships
with others, at once attempting to satisfy themselves and their partners.
Yet since the objects a are but inadequate substitutes for the lost enjoyment,
neither of these ambitions to obtain satisfaction will ever be realized.

后来,拉康主张,人类仅能跟大他这的欲望的客体(小客体)扯上关联。他们幻想关于这些小客体,他们尝试用这些小客体满足大他者。这些小客体并不是人类认同的东西。它们是一种交换的小客体,让他们能够进入跟别人的关系。他们企图满足他们自己,也同时满足他们的伙伴。可是,因为这些小客体仅是丧失的享乐的不充足的替代品,想要获得满足的这些企图心,没有一样将会永久地实现。

According to Lacan (1998a[1972–73]:126) the formula ‘I ask you to refuse
what I offer you because that’s not it’ captured the unconscious truth of
any neurotic love-relationship, because the object that is offered by the
lover is inefficient for restoring the lost enjoyment of the beloved.

依照拉康,这个公式“我要求你拒绝我提供给你的东西,因为那并不是我提供给你的东西),掌握到任何神经者的爱的关系的无意识的真理。因为被情人提供的这个客体,并没有能力来恢复被爱的人的丧失的享乐。

Once the conceptual beacons of Lacan’s theoretical itinerary during
the 1950s and 1960s have been described, it is relatively easy to explain
how he differentiated between hysterics and obsessional neurotics.35
Hysterical subjects take the Other—whether one of its concrete
representatives, or society in general—unconsciously to task for
tampering with their enjoyment. They hold the Other responsible for
their current misery and swear to take revenge on the Other for all the
harm that has been done to them.

一旦1950年代与1960年代,拉康的理论的脉络的观念的灯塔已经被描述出来。我们就比较容易解释,为什么他区别癔症与妄想神经症。癔症的主体无意识地谴责大他者—无论大他者是它的具体代表,或一般的社会的其中一位–因为大他者损害他们的享乐。他们要大他者替他们目前的悲惨负起责任,并且宣誓要对大他者报复,因为大他者对于他们造成的伤害。

It is this hysterical accusation of the
Other which Freud initially mistook for a genuine account of sexual
abuse during an infantile scene of seduction (Masson 1985:212).
Subsequently, hysterics attempt to recuperate what they believe to be
unjustly in the possession of the Other through arousing the Other’s desire,
which serves as sufficient proof that the Other has been deprived of
something. This hysterical strategy prompted Lacan to propose that ‘the
hysteric’s desire is not the desire for an object, but the desire for a desire,
an effort to maintain oneself in front of this point…where the desire of
the Other is’ (Lacan 1998b [1957–58]:407).

就是癔症的指控大他者,弗洛伊德最初将它误解成为是性的凌虐的真诚的描述,在婴孩时代受的诱拐的场景。随后,癔症者企图恢复他们相信不公正地被大他者占有的东西,通过唤醒大他者的欲望。大他者的欲望充当充分的证据:大他者被剥夺掉某件东西。这个癔症的策略激发拉康建议:癔症者的欲望并不是欲望一个客体,而是对于欲望的欲望。癔症者努力要维持他自己,在这一点的面前。大他者的欲望所在的地方。

To elicit this desire of the Other, hysterics mould themselves into a
figure which they think will arouse the Other, something which grips the
Other’s attention and which provokes interest, fascination, attachment
or love. And in transforming themselves into an enticing object for the
Other, they try to kill two birds with one stone: whilst inducing the lack
of the Other, they also annihilate their own (neurotic) loss of enjoyment.
For hysterics unconsciously enjoy their complicated ploys to trigger the
Other’s desire by incarnating its presumed object.

为了召唤大他者的欲望,癔症者塑造他们自己成为他们认为可以唤醒大他者的人物。吸引大他者注意的东西,并且引起興趣,著迷,情感或爱。当癔症者将他们自己转化成为对于大他者是引诱人的客体,他们尝试一举两得。一方面,他们诱拐大他者的欠缺;另一方面,他们也消灭他们自己(神经症)的享乐的丧失。因为癔症者无意识地享受他们的复杂的策略,为了触发大他者的欲望,凭借将它被认为的客体具体体现。

As to the hysteric’s own desire, Lacan stressed on various occasions
that it is fundamentally unsatisfied, to the benefit of the desire of the Other
(Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:407; 1977i[1958]:261; 1977k[1960]:321).36
Hysterics give the impression of sacrificing their own interests, of
postponing the fulfilment of their own desire, and of putting themselves to
extreme inconvenience in favour of the Other. It goes without saying that
this self-immolation is only a semblance because it is an inherent part of
the hysterical strategy to manipulate the Other.

至于癔症者自己的欲望,拉康在各个不同的场合强调:癔症者的欲望基本上是没有被满足,结果有利于大他者的欲望。癔症者给予的印象是:牺性他们自己的利益,拖延他们自己的欲望的满足,并且将他们自己置身于极端不利当中,以迁就大他者。自不待言的是,这种自我牺性1仅是一种类似物,因为它是癔症者的策略的本质的部分,为了操控大他者。
No matter what they display,
hysterics do not really want to compensate the desire of the Other, but to
sustain it in its very status as lack, deficit, shortcoming. Hysterical subjects
are at great pains to keep the Other’s desire unsatisfied too, by preventing
the Other from enjoying what they have to offer. When the enjoyment of
the Other does loom up, hysterics do their utmost best to change their
object-status or to disappear altogether. In 1960 Lacan wrote: ‘[D]esire is
maintained [in the Other] only through the lack of satisfaction [the hysteric]
produces in it by slipping away from it as object’ (Lacan 1977k[1960]:320,
translation modified).

无论癔症者展现什么,他们并没有确实想要补偿大他者的欲望。而是想要维持大他者的欲望,作为欠缺,失落,缺点的现状。癔症者的主体费尽心力想要维持大他者的欲望也没有被满足。他们阻止大他者不能享受他们必须提供的东西。当大他者的享乐隐隐在望,癔症者尽他们的全力改变他们的客体的地位,或完全消失。在1960年,拉康写到:「欲望被维持在大他者那里,仅是凭借癔症者在它那里产生的满足的欠缺。他们从它那里溜走掉,作为客体。」

In a clinical setting the psychoanalyst can derive this hysterical economy
from the way in which patients talk about their professional and/or love
relationships. As a matter of fact, there is hardly anything else hysterics
talk and complain about. The following example illustrates how hysteria
manifests itself on the level of speech. During analysis, a woman describes
her continuous efforts to make herself loveable for her environment, whilst
complaining about the fact that she only attracts people who want to take
advantage of her or who refuse to take her seriously. Every time she
manages to secure herself of somebody’s love, she feels that her partner
uses her merely as an interchangeable commodity or as an instrument
designed for the satisfaction of sexual lust, which compels her to escape
the relationship, physically and/or mentally.

在临床的背景,精神分析家能够获得这个癔症者的经济活力,从病人谈谈他们的专业与(或)爱的关系的方式。事实上,癔症者谈论或抱怨的东西,几乎不是任何的其他的东西。以下的例子说明癔症者如何展示它自己,在言说的层面。在精神分析期间,一位女人描述她继续不断的努力,想要让她自己变得可爱,对于她的环境。另一方面,她抱怨关于这个事实:她仅是吸引那些想要利用她的人们,他们拒绝认真地看待她。每一次她成功地让自己获得某个人的爱,她感觉,她的伴侣使用她,仅是充当一个互相交换的货品,或是充当一个工具,被设计来满足性的欲望的工具。这个性的欲望驱使他讨避这个关系,无论是生理上或是精神上的关系。

She scorns men for using her
vagina merely as a tool for masturbating, but she cannot refrain from
offering it to them because it makes her feel important. Whilst priding
herself on her ability to lure every partner she wants, she bears witness to
an extreme sense of loneliness and despondency.

她轻视男人,因为他们使用她的阴户,仅是作为手淫的工具。但是她无法控制不提供阴户给男人。因为这让她感觉重要。虽然她以她诱拐她想要的每个伴侣的能力沾沾自傲,她见证到极端的孤独与沮丧的感觉。

And although she realizes
that she is capable of triggering everybody’s desire, she basically suffers
from the fact that nobody desires her as she wants to be desired, inasmuch
as all the people she seduces are still interested in other women, or seem to
enjoy her simply as a sex object. In other words, no matter how hard she
tries in making people desire her, they never desire her enough, because
they either desire other people too, or employ her simply as an object for
their own satisfaction.37 Since she is constantly enmeshed in complicated
intrigues, secret affairs and impossible relationships, she wonders about
what it really means to be a woman for a man and for other women.38 To
solve this question, she sometimes identifies with other men—assuming
that they know women better than women know themselves—or draws
other women into friendships that are pervaded by admiration as well as
rivalry.

虽然她体会到,她能够激发每个人的欲望,她基本上遭受痛苦,对于这个事实:没有人欲望她,依照她想要被欲望的,或甚至似乎享受她,仅是当著是性的客体。换句话说,无论她如何努力尝试让人们欲望她,他们从来没有充分地欲望她。因为他们要不就是也欲望别人,要不然就是仅是将她作为满足他们自己的客体。因为她不断地纠缠于复杂的诡计,秘密的私通,与不可能的关系。她想要知道关于成为女人究竟是什么意义,对于男人与其他女人。为了解答这个问题,她有时认同其他的男人—她假设男人知道女人,更胜过女人认识女人自己。或是,她吸引其他女人跟她产生关系,瀰漫著崇拜与敌意的关系。

By contrast, obsessional neurotics refuse to accept that the intervention
of the Other has in any way affected their enjoyment. Unlike hysterics
they do not accuse the Other of stealing something precious from them.
Instead they unconsciously strive to minimize the power which the Other
exercises by neutralizing the Other’s desire.

对照起来,妄想症神经症者拒绝接受;大他者的介入,有任何方式影响他们的享乐。不像癔症者,他们并没有控诉大他者,从他们那里偷窃某个珍贵的东西。相反地,他们无意识地奋斗,要轻视大他者运用的这个力量。他们将大他者的欲望保持中立。

To Lacan, this becomes
apparent primarily on the level of language, through the protective
formulae with which obsessional neurotics defend themselves against
all kinds of imaginary dangers. For example, in Seminar V he stated:
[O]bsession is always verbalised. Freud has no doubts about this.
Even when he is faced with a latent obsessional conduct, he bears
in mind that it has not revealed its structure until it has taken the
shape of a verbal obsession…All obsessional formulae have to do
with a well articulated destruction…

对于拉康,最初这变成显而易见,在语言的层面。凭借保护的公式,妄想神经症防卫他们自己,对抗各种各样的想像危险。譬如,在第五研讨班,拉康陈述:妄想症者总是侃侃而言。弗洛伊德并没有怀疑关于这点。甚至当他面对一个潜在的妄想症的行为,弗洛伊德牢记在心:妄想症者直到它採取文词的妄想的形状,它才会显露它的结构。所有妄想症的公式都必须处理侃侃而谈的毁灭性。

(Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:470)39
Besides these formulae, obsessional neurotics espouse a score of other
unconscious strategies to neutralize the Other’s desire. From time to time
they may ensconce in vivid fantasies of oblation, meeting all of the Other’s
requests following the principle ‘Your wish is my command’. By
satisfying all of the Other’ s demands, they believe that the Other will
have nothing to desire anymore.40

除了这些公式,妄想症神经症者信奉许的的其他的无意识的策略,为了让大他者的欲望保持中立。有时,他们用生活的钩消的幻想安顿下来,满足所有的大他者的要求遵循这个原则:“你的愿望就是我的命令。”凭借满足大他者的所有的命令,他们相信:大他者将会不再有任何欲望的东西。

Alternatively, they may go to all lengths
to obtain the Other’s approval before embarking on a particular project,
from starting a relationship to choosing a career. The rationale is that if
something is done with the Other’ s explicit permission the desire of the
Other can be stilled. Furthermore, obsessional neurotics may harbour
sadistic fantasies of torture, destruction and mass extermination, which
serve the same purpose of killing the desire of the Other. With regard to
these sadistic fantasies, Lacan emphasized in Seminar V:

替代地,他们可能尽一切力量,为了获得大他者的同意。这样,他们才从事一个特殊的计划,从开始一个关系,到选择一个事业。基本原理是,假如有某件东西是凭借大他者的明确的容许才做成,大他者的欲望就能够被平静下来。而且,妄想神经症者可能怀抱中折磨,毁灭,集体消灭的凌虐的幻想。这些幻想充当相同的目的,杀死大他者的欲望。关于这些凌虐的幻想,拉康在第五研讨班强调:

[W]e cannot content ourselves with articulating them as
manifestations of a tendency; we ought to see in them an
organisation which is itself indicative [signifiante] of the
relationships between the subject and the Other as such. It is of the
economic role of these fantasies as they are articulated that we
have to present a formula. In the obsessional subject, these fantasies
are characterized by the fact that they remain on the level of
fantasies. Only very exceptionally are these fantasies realized and
these realizations are always disappointing for the subject.
(ibid.: 411)

我们无法满足我们自己,以表达他们作为是一个倾向的展示。我们应该在他们身上,看出一个组织。这个组织本身指示著主体与大他者自身的关系。我们必须呈现一个公式,关于这些幻想扮演的经济活力,当它们被表达时。在妄想症者的主体,这些幻想的特色是这个事实:它们始终是在幻想的层面。仅有非常特殊的时刻,这些幻想才会被实践。这些实践总是令人失望的,对于主体而言。

Complicating the picture further, obsessionals may also try to prove to the
Other that they possess nothing of value, that they are unworthy of interest,
that they lack even the most basic of human qualities, or that they will
misuse whatever the Other invests in them. This strategy comes down to
letting other people know that they are replenished, thus cancelling out
their reasons for seeking fulfilment outside their own realm of functioning.
It goes without saying that none of these unconscious obsessional
strategies is completely successful and that obsessionals will encounter
the desire of the Other time and again.

妄想症者将这个画面弄得更加复杂。他们可能也尝试对大他者证明,他们并没有拥有任何有价值的东西。他们并不值得引起興趣,他们甚至欠缺最基本的人类的特质,或是他们将会误用任何大他者投注他们的东西。这个策略总结成为:让别人知的他们被重新补足,因此他们取消他们的理由,作为寻求满足的理由,在他们自己的功能的领域之外。不用说,这些无意识的妄想症的策略,没有一样是完全成功。妄想症者将会一再地遭遇大他者的欲望。

Whereas hysterics decry the fact
that the Other’s desire is never enough, obsessionals describe the Other’s
desire as being always too much. For example, an obsessional patient
observes with anger and surprise that his wife is still interested in him,
despite his numerous openly confessed extra-marital affairs and despite
his carefully directed monstrosities at home. Likewise, another
obsessional patient confesses that she has done everything in her power
to satisfy her husband and that she has never done anything without
negotiating it with him first, yet not succeeding in eradicating her own
anxiety in the face of his desires.41

虽然癔症者抨击这个事实:大他者的欲望永远不足够。妄想症者则是描述大他者的欲望,作为总是太多。譬如,一位妄想症的病人渴望而起惊奇地观察到,他的妻子依旧对他感到興趣,尽管他无数次公开坦承有婚外情事,尽管他在家里仔细导演怪诞行为。同样地,另外一位妄想症病人坦承:她曾经尽她的力量所能,来满足她的丈夫,她每次做任何事情,她总是首先跟她的丈夫商量。可是,她并没有成功地抹除她自己的焦虑,当面临他的欲望。

Apart from the sheer multiplicity of strategies to neutralize the desire
of the Other, obsessional neurotics present a labyrinthine case to the
analyst because most of these strategies are outright paradoxical. To
preserve their own independence, obsessional neurotics indulge in the
most obsequious of behaviours.

除了用各色各样的策略来保持大他者的欲望成为中立,妄想症者呈现一个迷宫般的情况给精神分析家。因为大部分的这些策略都是彻底矛盾。为了保持他们的独立性,妄想症的神经症者耽溺于最极尽奉承的行为。

They can agree with everything the
analyst says, simply to maintain their own ideas about what is going on
in their lives. Similar to the Wolf Man during his analysis with Freud
(1918b[1914]:91), obsessional patients have no problems subjecting
themselves to the imposed rule of free association, but they only comply
with it to satisfy the analyst and to avoid what really matters to them.

他们能够同意精神分析家说的一切事情,仅是为了维持他们自己的观念,关于在他们的生活里,所正在进行的东西。类似在弗洛伊德的精神分析的“狼人”,妄想症的病人毫无困难地将他们自己隶属于自由联想赋加的规则。但是他们仅是同意这个规则,为了满足精神分析家,以及为了避免对于他们确实是重要的事情。

Whereas hysterical patients are very uncompromising in their attitude
towards the analytic setting—discussing the appointment schedule,
breaking the rule of free association by staying quiet, complaining about
the lack of attention the analyst is paying to them, in short doing
everything to dissatisfy the analyst—obsessional neurotics are generally
quite obliging and extraordinarily flexible in making appointments.
Hysterical patients often enjoy discussing appointment times, but they
hardly miss appointments once they have been made, only to remain
silent during the entire session.

虽然癔症的病人非常不妥协,在他们对待精神分析背景的态度。他们讨论看诊的行事曆,以沉默不语来违背自由联想的规则,抱怨关于精神分析家给予他们的关注的欠缺,总之,他们尽一切力量来让精神分析家感到不满意。妄想神经症者则是通常都相的顺从而且特别具有弹性,当他们约定看诊时间。癔症的病人经常喜欢讨论看诊的时间,但是他们很少错过看诊时间。一旦这些时间已经被确定。结果,在整个看诊时间里,保持沉默。

Conversely, obsessional patients can be
extremely reluctant to disagree with a suggested appointment time; they
often accept commitments that they know very well they will not meet,
or that they know they will only meet in a deceitful way, for instance by
acting the part of the good analysand within the analytic play.

相反地,妄想症的病人有时极端不愿意不同意被建议的看诊的时间,他们接受承诺,因为他们清楚知的,他们将不会会面,或是他们知的,他们用欺骗的方式会面。譬如,他们扮演乖乖的分析者的角色,在精神分析的游戏里。

Since obsessional neurotics refuse to acknowledge that the Other has
curtailed their enjoyment, they cannot bear the manifestations of their
own desire because these expressions signal the fact that they have lost
something after all. The desire of the obsessional neurotic is not
unsatisfied, but impossible (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:291).

因为妄想神经症者拒绝承认,大他者曾经切除他们的享乐。他们无法忍受他们自己的欲望的展示。因为这些表达意味著这个事实:他们毕竟已经丧失某件东西。妄想神经症者的欲望并不是没有被满足,而是不可能满足。

Consequently,
obsessional neurotics try to avoid everything they associate with the
emergence of their desire. For example, one obsessional patient divulges
that she only buys the books that do not interest her, because these are
the only books she is capable of reading. Sometimes it happens that one
of these books does rouse her interest, in which case she has to throw it
away or bring it to a second-hand bookstore. Another patient meditates
on the exceptional beauty of the girl he secretly covets, but he would not
dream of approaching her, much less starting a relationship. During a
sexual encounter with a lookalike he was impotent, which has made him
think that he is doomed to have relationships with girls whom he does
not really desire. As obsessional neurotics set out to kill their own desire
as much as the desire of the Other, they obviously worry about what
keeps them alive. Therefore the hysterical question ‘Am I a man or a
woman?’ finds its obsessional counterpart in ‘Am I dead or alive?’.

结果,妄想神经症者尝试避免一切他们联想的东西,跟他们的欲望出现联想一块的东西。譬如,有一位妄想症的病人详述:她仅是买了一些她并不感到興趣的书,因为这些书她能够阅读的仅有的书。有时,恰巧地,其中有一本书引起她的興趣。在那个情况,她必须将它丢掉,要不然就送的二手书店。另外一位病人沉思他秘密垂涎的那位女孩的特殊的美丽。但是他不愿意梦想接近她,更不用说,开始一个关系。在跟一位类似相貌的人的性的接触时,他变得性无能。这让他认为,他注的要跟那些他并确实欲望的那些女人拥有关系。当妄想神经者出发去杀死他们自己的欲望与大他者的欲望时,他们显而易见地焦虑,关于让他们保持活力的东西。因此,癔症者的问题:“我是男人?还是女人?”,找的它的妄想神经症的对应:”我死了?还是活著?“

Whereas the hysterical question highlights the issues of sexual
relationships and sexual identity, the obsessional question zooms in on
the vicissitudes of existence (Lacan 1966c [1957]:451). To reassure
themselves of their existence and to reduce accumulated libidinal tension,
obsessional neurotics may engage in all kinds of exploits, from outbursts
of senseless violence to relatively innocuous joyriding (Lacan
1998b[1957–58]:417–418). Or they may inflate their behaviours
(labouring away night and day) and their personalities (playing ringleader
to the crowd), to the point of holding themselves up to utter ridicule
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:302).

虽然癔症者的问题强调性的关系的问题,妄想症者的问题则是强调生命存在的起伏。为了让他们的生命存在安心,为了将累积的力比多的张力减少,妄想神经症者可能从事各色各样的企图,从没有意义的暴力的发泄,到比较无害的追求享乐。或者,他们可能膨胀他们的行为,(日夜地工作),与他们的人格(在群众里扮演领导者),甚至让他们自己承受完全的嘲笑。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
http://springhjero.wordpressw.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践 6

October 14, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of
Psychoanalysis

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and
Transference
第一章
经由言说与移情的诊断

NEUROTIC SPEECH
神经症的言说

In his ‘Rome Discourse’ Lacan drew attention to a second clinical paradox
in the relations between speech and language. After having categorized
as psychotic those people who talk freely and fluently without really
speaking, he defined people who also speak beyond the words they
consciously use as neurotic. In the first (psychotic) situation, language
operates without speech, whilst in the second (neurotic) case speech also
functions beyond verbalized language. Whereas psychotics do not manage
to speak, however articulate the sentences they produce, neurotics cannot
prevent themselves from saying more than what they intend to convey
(Lacan 1977e[1953]:69–70).

在他的“罗马辞说”,拉康注意到第二个临床悖论,在言说与语言之间的关系。他将那些人们归类为精神病者,那些自由地侃侃而谈而没有确实在言谈的人们。他定义那些人们,那些言说超过他们意识所使用的字词的人们,作为是神经症者。在第一个情况,精神病的情况,语言没有言说地运作。而在第二个情况,神经症的情况,言说也发挥功能,超越文词化的语言。精神病者没有成功地言说,无论他们产生的句子多么清楚。神经症者则是无法阻止他们自己言说超过他们意图要表的东西。

Twenty years later, in his seminar Encore,
Lacan rephrased this insight as follows: ‘I speak without knowing it. I
speak with my body and I do so unbeknownst to myself. Thus I always
say more than I know’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:119).

二十年后,在他的研讨班“再来”,拉康重新铨释这个洞见,如下:「我不知道言说地言说,我用我的身体言说,我这样言说,我自己却不知道。因此,我总是说出超过我知道的东西。」

Here, Lacan aimed less at a reintegration of the communicative value
of non-verbal cues in psychoanalysis—he actually vilified clinicians who
interpreted the patients’ bodily movements as well as their associations
(Lacan 1966b[1955]:337) —than at restoring neurotic symptoms,
inhibitions and anxieties as meaningful units of analysis. To Lacan, this
neurotic paradox, much more than its psychotic counterpart, encompassed
‘the privileged domain of psychoanalytic discovery’ because Freud would
not have developed psychoanalysis if he had not regarded neurotic
symptoms (ranging from bodily disorders to slips of the tongue) as being
sustained by an unconscious idea (wish, representation) that tries to
express itself (Lacan 1977e[1953]:69).

在此,拉康目标并不是朝中重新融合精神病者的非文辞的线索的沟通的价值—他实际上贬低那些临床医生,当他们铨释病人的身体的动作与他们的联想。拉康的目标是要恢复神经症者的症状,压抑与焦虑,作为是精神分析的有意义的单位。对于拉康,这个神经症的悖论,远超过它的精神病的伙伴,它涵盖精神分析的发现的特权的领域。因为弗洛伊德本来不会发展精神分析,假如他当时没有将神经症的症状(范围从生理的疾病到口误),视为是由尝试表达它自己的无意识的观念(愿望,表象)所维持。

As to the nature of this neurotic economy, Freud had already
cleared most of the ground in two seminal essays on the
neuropsychoses of defence from the mid-1890s (Freud 1894a;
1896b). In these papers, he had argued that both hysteria and
obsessional neurosis originate in an unconscious act of defence
against a traumatic experience, whose nature is always sexual.23
When individuals encounter something that is incompatible with
the reigning mass of representations (Vorstellungsmasse) in their
ego (Ich), the latter tries to maintain its integrity by driving the
event out of consciousness. Freud believed that this defence (or
repression) takes place via a withdrawal of the affect (a quantum of
energy) from the event’s psychic representation, through which the
event itself is transformed into an unconscious memory trace, while
its affect is displaced to another representation.

至于这个神经症的经济活力的特性,弗洛伊德已经清理出大部分的场域,在两篇影响巨大的论文“论神经症这与精神病者的防卫机制”,在1950年代中叶。在这些论文里,他曾经主张,癔症与妄想神经症起源于无意识的防卫行动,抵挡创伤的经验。创伤的经验总是性。当个人遭遇某件不相和谐的东西,跟他们的自我的统辖的表象集团不相和谐的东西。自我的统辖集团尝试维持它的尊严,凭借将事件从意识驱赶出去。弗洛伊德相信,这个防卫机制(或压抑),发生,凭借将情感(能源的量子)撤退,从事件的心灵的表象。通过事件的心灵表象,事件本身被转化成为无意识的记忆的痕迹。虽然它的情感被替换成为另外一个表象。

Since repression entails the dismantling and eradication of sexual
representations that are impossible to handle, neurotics can only recount
their experiences in a lacunary fashion, whereby the gaps can be either
exceedingly manifest—some patients say they have no memories at all
of what happened to them—or smoothed over by so-called ‘screenmemories’,
which generally serve to make the story coherent. Until the
1910s, Freud was convinced that neurotics had simply ‘forgotten’ the
awkward representations and that one of the analyst’s tasks consisted in
helping them to recover their lost memories.

因为压抑涵盖拆解与抹除那些不可能处理的性的表象,神经症者仅能够描述他们的经验,用有空隙的方式。这次差距要就是过分的明显—有些病人说,他们根本就没有记忆,对于发生在他们身上的事情。要不然,就是他们被所谓的“屏隔回忆”。“屏隔回忆”通常用来让故事前后一致。直到1910年,弗洛伊德相信,神经者就是“忘记”那些笨拙的表象。精神分析家的其中一个工作就是在于帮助他们恢复他们失去的记忆。

Yet clinical and theoretical
considerations led him to think that instead of suffering from a
straightforward forgetting, patients were animated by a powerful ‘not
wanting to know’ (Freud 1913c:141–142). Therefore he considered it
pointless for analysts to imbue their patients with the knowledge they
are ostensibly lacking, because this is unlikely to bring about change in
the patient’s situation—on the contrary, he might immediately erect a
protective shield against the analyst’s suggestions.24

可是,临床与理论的考虑引导他认为,病人病没有遭受直接遗忘的痛苦。相反地,病人受的强烈的“不想要知的”所触动。因此,弗洛伊德认为这是没有意义的,对于精神分析家要让病人充满他们明显欠缺的这些知识。因为这并不可能导致病人的情况的改变。相反地,他可能立即竖立起保护的盔甲,对抗精神分析家的建议。

In Seminar I, Lacan reformulated this neurotic ‘not wanting to know’
as the passion of ignorance, a dimension superseding the dualism of
knowing and not-knowing (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:277–278). Simple
ignorance does not equal a lack of conscious knowledge and, vice versa,
a huge amount of conscious knowledge can perfectly coincide with radical
ignorance. As mentioned on pp. 20–21, Lacan maintained that ignorance
underpins the patient’s capacity for symbolic transference, because it
enables him to regard the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing. By
contrast, the ‘passion of ignorance’ is a psychic power which urges
patients to prefer the deleterious status quo of their symptomatic condition
over the even more painful encounter with that which caused it. The
passion of ignorance thus coincides with the unconscious jouissance
(enjoyment) the patient derives from his symptom.

在第一研讨班,拉康重新铨释神经症“不想要知道”,作为是无知的激情。这一个维度取代知道与不知道的双重论。单纯的无知并不相等于欠缺意识的知道,反过来说,也是一样。巨大数量的意识的知识能够完美地巧合于强烈的无知。如同在20-21页所提到,拉康主张,无知强调病人接受象征移情的能力。因为它让他能够将精神分析家视为是被认为知道的主体。对照起来,“无知的激情”是一种心灵的力量,建议病人比较喜欢他们症状的情况的巧妙的现状,胜过于那甚至更加令人痛苦的遭遇,跟引起症状的东西。无知的激情因此巧合于无意识的欢爽,病人从他的症状获得的欢爽。

In Freud’s theory repression not only causes the sexual representation
to fall into the unconscious, the original affect also reconnects itself to a
relatively innocuous substitute representation. Freud regarded this ‘false
connection’ as the nucleus of the neurotic symptom. Whether a bodily
disorder or a compulsive thought process, the neurotic symptom is a
compromise between a component of the repressed event (the affect) and
an element of the repressive structure (the substitute representation), and
thus also an insidious ‘return of the repressed’.

在弗洛伊德的理论,压抑不但引起性的表象,掉落于无意识里。原初的情感也重新连接它自己跟比较无害的替换的表象。弗洛伊德将这个“虚假的连接”视为是神经症的症状的核心。无论是生理的疾病或是强迫性的思想的过程,神经症者的症状都是一种妥协,处于被压抑的事件(情感)的成分,与压抑的结构(替换的表象)的元素之间。因此,这也是“被压抑的东西的潜在的回转”。

Via the neurotic symptom,
an aspect of the event which had been driven out of consciousness tries to
express itself again, although the individual can no longer understand this.
For Lacan, this part of Freud’s theory implied that the neurotic symptom
conveys a hidden meaning, which the patient can only understand once she
has found the laws according to which its constitutive components have
been bound up with each other.

经由神经症的症状,从意识里被驱赶出来的事件的一个层面,尝试要再次表达它自己。虽然个人不再能够理解这个。对于拉康,弗洛伊德的这个部分暗示着:神经症的症状传递一个隐藏的意义。仅有当病人已经找到这些法则,她才能够理解这个隐藏的意义。依照这个法则,它的组成的成分彼此互相连接一块。

Put differently, the neurotic symptom means
something, but it is impossible to grasp that meaning until the language
system governing its combinations has been discovered. Whilst being
generally ‘silent’, neurotic symptoms continue to speak in a language that is
unknown to the individual, prompting Lacan to compare them to blazons,
enigmas, hieroglyphics, oracles, seals, etc. (Lacan 1977e[1953]:69–70) and
to identify them eventually as metaphors (Lacan 1977g[1957]:175). All of
these figures include a message, but its exact nature remains a mystery as
long as one has not found the proper code to decipher them.25

换句话说,神经症者具有某个意义。但是我们不可能理解那个意义,直到统辖它的组合的语言系统已经被发现。神经症的症状通常都是“沉默”,它们却继续言说,用个人自己并不知道的语言。这引起拉康要将它们比喻为盾章,谜团,象形文字,预言,封印,等等。并且最后将它们辨认为隐喻。所有的这些东西都包含一个讯息。但是这个讯息的确实的特性始终处于神秘当中,只有我们还没有找到合适的符码来解答它们。

Now it becomes clear how the neurotic’s speech differs from the
psychotic communication detailed above. Unlike psychotic individuals,
neurotics have no privileged access to the true meaning of their words
and their general living conditions. They are continuously under the
impression that the words they use do not capture exactly what they
want to say or, conversely, that these words express much more than
they have intended to. Whereas psychotics engage in a stereotypical form
of communication which is unmarked by redundancies and ambiguities,
neurotics are incessantly aware of the inadequacy of language for
conveying their experiences.

现在,显而易见的是,神经症者的言说,不同于以上详述的精神病的沟通。不像精神病的个人,神经症者对于他们的字词的真实意义与他们的通常的生活情况,并没有任何特权的接近。他们继续拥有这个印象:他们使用的字词并没有确是捕捉到他们想要说出的东西。或许反过来说,这些字词表达远超过他们意图要说出的东西。精神病者参与沟通的典型化的形式,这些沟通仍然是沟通,尽管充满累赘语与模糊嗳昧。神经症者则是持续地知的语言的不能胜任,来传递他们的表达。

Sometimes they feel that they simply lack
or cannot find the words to say something; at other times they are surprised
by the fact that they have said something they did not want to say at all.
Moreover, whilst psychotics are being pervaded by an infallible, full
knowledge about themselves and others, neurotics are troubled time and
again by the realization that their knowledge is incomplete, inconsistent
and incoherent.

有时,他们觉得他们仅是欠缺或是无法找到字词来说某件东西。还有些时候,他们对这个事实大吃一惊:他们已经说出某件他们并不想要说出的事情。而且,精神病者正充斥着绝对可靠,充分的知识,关于他们自己与别人。神经症者则是经常受的困扰,由于体会到:他们的知识是不完整,不一贯,而且不一致。

Eager to find unshakeable evidence, yet struck by its
fraudulent character from the moment it is established, neurotics bear
witness to a deeply ingrained feeling that nothing is really trustworthy,
that they are constantly being deceived by everything and everyone,
including themselves. Although they like to think that someone is reliable,
or that something is genuine, neurotics realize that their opinion is but a
vulnerable belief and that they could easily be duped by appearances.
Distrust and suspicion, two affects that are often associated with paranoia,
can thus be encountered as readily in neurosis as in psychosis, the difference
being that in the latter case they rest upon a firmly rooted conviction,
whereas in the former they proceed from profound uncertainty.
神经症这因为渴望找的无法动摇的证据,可是又为这个证据的欺骗的性质所迷惑,从证据被建立的开始。神经症者见证到根深蒂固的感觉:没有任何东西确实值得信任,他们不断地被欺骗,被每件事情与每个人欺骗,包括他们自己。虽然他们喜欢认为,某个人是可靠的,或是某件事情是真诚的,神经症者体会到,他们的意见仅是一个容易受到伤害的信仰。他们很容易被外表所欺骗。不信任与怀疑,这两个情感经常跟偏执狂者连想一块,在神经症者与精神病者身上,也很容易被遭遇到。差别是:在后者的情况,他们依靠根深蒂固的信念。而在前者,他们则是从深刻的不确定前进。

A psychotic
patient will approach someone with due suspicion because he has read the
other’s intentions, whereas a neurotic will harbour suspicion because she
is doubtful about the other, due to the interference of the Other. As Lacan
put it in Seminar III, the dimension of the unknown, ‘the Other of speech…is
the determining factor in neurosis’ (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:168).

精神病的病人将会接近某个人,带着适当的怀疑。因为他已经阅读出他人的意图。而神经症者则是怀抱怀孕,因为她怀疑别人,由于大他者的介入。如同拉康在第三研讨班表达它,这个未知者的维度,言说的大他者,就是神经症者的决定的因素。

This structural difference between neurotic and psychotic people,
despite the similarity of their symptoms and affects, often manifests itself
during the so-called ‘preliminary conversations’ (the Lacanian equivalent
of Freud’s ‘trial period’) when patients reflect upon the progress they
are making.

神经症者与精神病者的结构上的差异,尽管他们的症状与情感的类似,经常显示它自己,在所谓的“初期的谈话”,当病人反应出他们正在从事的进展。

When a neurotic patient voices his concern over the fact that
he has not experienced any improvement in his condition since the start
of the consultations, he will be poised between the enticing idea that his
analyst is probably not very good (indeed, that she may not be a properly
trained analyst at all) and the bitter awareness that he himself is after all
the one who has chosen her because of her acumen and charisma.

当神经症者表达他的关系,对于这个事实:自从看诊开始以来,他并没有经验的他的情况的任何的改进。他将会保持平衡,一方面是忍不住地认为:他的精神分析可能并不是很高明(的确,她可能根本就不是受过合适训练的精神分析家)。另一方面,他痛苦地知道,他自己毕竟就算选择这位分析家的人,因为分析家的敏锐与魅力。

A psychotic, on the other hand, will easily reach the conclusion that since
she has not made any progress, her analyst must be part of the same
conspiracy that is responsible for all her misery. In both instances, the
patient fears that the analyst is not what he pretends to be, yet in the
former (neurotic) case the suspicion rests upon doubt and uncertainty
rather than firm conviction.

另一方面,精神病者将会很容易地获得这个结论:因为她还没有任何的进展,她的分析家一定是相同阴谋的部分,要为她所有的悲惨负责的阴谋。无论哪个情况,病人都害怕,精神分析家并不是他伪装成为的那个样子。可是,在前者(神经症者)的情况,这个怀疑依靠怀疑与不确定,而不是依靠坚定的信念。

Contrary to psychotics, neurotics take account of the Other of speech,
which is in turn based on the installation of the ‘wall of language’ between
the speaker and her interlocutors, the presence of quilting points between
signifier and signified, and the acknowledgement of the Name-of-the-
Father. Neurotics differ from psychotics in so far as they have assimilated
the sociocultural rules embedded in language, whose principle is the
paternal function.

跟精神病者相反,神经症者考虑到言说的大他者。这个言说的大他者则是以“语言的墙壁”的安置作为基础,处于言说者与她的对谈者之间的“语言的墙壁”。能指与所指之间的缝合点的存在,与以父之名的承认。神经症者跟精神病者有所差异,因为他们已经吸收被镶嵌于语言里的社会与文化的规则。这个语言的原则就是父亲的功能。

Throughout his works, Lacan linked this psychic assimilation of the
symbolic order to Freud’s concept of repression, arguing that the
integration of the symbolic system is a necessary and sufficient condition
for repression to occur. Drawing on data gathered from Freud’s famous
case-study of the Wolf Man (1918b[1914]), he stated in Seminar I:
The trauma, in so far as it has a repressing action, intervenes after
the fact, nachtraglich.

在拉康的全集,拉康将这个心灵的接受象征的秩序,跟弗洛伊德的压抑的观念连接一块。拉康主张说,象征系统的融合是一个必要而且充分的情况,让压抑发生。依靠从弗洛伊德的著名的个案研究“狼人”收集的资料,拉康在第一研讨班陈述:因为创伤具有压抑的行动,创伤介入“事实之后”。

At this specific moment, something of the
subject’s becomes detached in the very symbolic world that he is
engaged in integrating. From then on, it will no longer be something
belonging to the subject. The subject will no longer speak it, will
no longer integrate it. Nevertheless, it will remain there, somewhere,
spoken, if one can put it this way, by something the subject does
not control. [It will be the first nucleus of what one will
subsequently call his symptoms.]26
(Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:191)

在这个明确的时刻,属于主体的某件东西变得区隔,在他参与融合的象征的世界。从那时开始,那个东西不再属于主体。主体将不再言说它,将不再将它融合一块。可是,它将始终就在那里,某个地方,被某件东西言说,请容许我这样说,被主体没有控制的东西。(那就是我们随后所谓的症状的东西的核心)。

Here Lacan tried to explain how events only become painful and fall
prey to repression from the moment the subject adopts a symbolic
framework of norms and values. What Freud had designated as an
incompatibility between two mental representations, Lacan translated
as the ‘detachment’ of signifiers from the symbolic order, as a mere
result of its assimilation by the subject. Hence, no event is inherently
traumatic; it acquires this epithet ‘after the fact’, when it becomes
meaningful through the intervention of a symbolic system.

因此,拉康尝试解释,事件如何变得仅是痛苦,并且成为压抑的猎物,从主体採用象征的架构来命名与制定价值。弗洛伊德所指明作为能指的“区隔”,跟象征秩序的区隔,作为仅是被主体吸收的结果。因此,没有一个事件是本质上的创伤。这个事件获得这个后记“事实之后”。当它经过象征的系统的介入之后,它才变得有意义。

Lacan’s view entailed that only neurotics, who have integrated the
symbolic order and its distinctions between good/right and bad/wrong,
separate traumatic from non-traumatic events in a culturally recognizable
fashion. A psychotic, who is living in an entirely different world, can put
events which a neurotic is likely to experience as shocking in a neutral
or even pleasurable context, and the other way round. A psychotic man,
for example, can be extremely affected by a score of ostensibly nonintrusive
phenomena, whilst remaining unmoved by the fact that he has
been repeatedly raped by a group of thugs in the back of a van.27
Diagnosis via speech and transference 27

拉康的观念意味著,仅有神经症者将创伤与非-创伤的事情分开,用文化层面被体认的方式。因为他们已经融合象征的秩序与它的区别善意跟正确与坏与错误。精神病者由于生活于完全不同的世界里,他们将神经症者很可能经验到的事件,当著是令人惊吓,在中立,或甚至是令人愉快的环境里,或是令人惊吓的环境当著是令人愉快。譬如,一位精神病者有时会极端地受到影响,受到许多夸张地非侵犯性的现象的影响。另一方面,他对于这个事实却又无动于衷:他已经被一群的恶棍重复地强暴,在货车的背后。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践 5

October 13, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of
Psychoanalysis

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and
Transference
第一章
经由言说与移情的诊断

PSYCHOTIC TRANSFERENCE
精神病移情

Whilst according a central diagnostic significance to the language
disturbances in psychosis, Lacan was eager to emphasize that psychosis
is not ‘a pure and simple fact of language’ (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:61).
The foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father does not only affect the
individual’s speech, but also influences his sexual identity and
relationships with others.

虽然拉康给予精神病的语言困扰,一个中心的诊断意义,他很渴望强调,精神病并不是“纯粹而简的语言的事实”。以父之名的除权弃绝并不仅影响个人的言词,而且影响他的性的认同与跟别人的关系。

Lacan was of the view that the function of the father—the cornerstone
of the symbolic order—overwrites a human being’s natural status of
‘sexuation’, and introduces her into a set of norms dictating what it is to
be masculine or feminine and defining what men and women should do
if they want to be perceived as belonging to a particular gender (Lacan
1995a[1964]:276).

拉康的观点是,父亲的功能—作为象征秩序的基石—复写一个人的性化的自然地位。并且介绍她进入一套命名。这套命名指示成为男性或成为女性是什么样子,并且定义男人与女人应该做什么,假如他们想要被感知,作为是属于特殊的性别。

The principle of this symbolic sexual order is the
symbolic phallus (F), which represents the mark of difference between
the signifiers, including those of masculinity and femininity. When the
paternal function is foreclosed the phallus does not establish itself within
the symbolic order, which induces a peculiar ‘blending’ of the signifiers
(dubbed ‘holophrase’ by Lacan) and which also blurs the culturally
installed differences between masculinity and femininity.17 In psychosis
the symbolic pegs of sexual identity do not hold, through which
masculinity and femininity start to melt into one another.

象征的性的秩序的原则就是象征的阳具。象征的阳具代表这些能指之间的差异的标记,包括男性与女性的那些差异。当父亲的功能被除权弃绝,阳具并没有建立它自己,在象征的秩序里。这导致这些能指的特殊的“混合”(被拉康命名为“单词语”)。它也模糊了被文化安置的差异,男性与女性之间的差异)。在精神病,性的认同的象征的塞子挡住,因为这样,男性与女性开始互相融合一块。

Schreber was
for instance convinced that his body was being emasculated in view of
his final transformation into a woman who, after having been inseminated
by the divine agencies, would beget a new human race.18 In a sense,
Schreber’ s conviction does not exemplify the psychotic collapse of sexual
differences as such, because it is already part and parcel of his attempt to
introduce a certain order, albeit a delusional one, into his chaotic
experiences.19 However, it does indicate to what extent he did not assume
a shared sociocultural system of distinct sexual identities, succumbing
to a sexual matrix in which the boundaries between the categories have
become very hazy.

譬如,许瑞伯相信,他的身体正在变得柔弱,因为他最后转化成为女人。经过神性的代理者的授精之后,这位女人将会生下一个新的人类的品质。许瑞伯的相信并没有替性的差异本身的精神病的崩塌,作为典范。因为它已经是他的企图的部分与包裹,企图要介绍某个秩序,虽然是幻觉的秩序,介绍进入他的混乱的经验里。可是,它确实指示他并没有担负起共享的社会与文化的系统,对于不同的性的认同。它屈从于性的基座。在这个基座里,范畴之间的边界已经变得模糊。

With regard to the psychotic’s relationships with others, Lacan drew
attention to the fact that the exclusion of the Other ushers the individual
into strange entanglements with others, which are continuously pervaded
by rivalry and competition. The divine agencies invade Schreber’s body
and mind as much as he invades their own substance, which indicates
that his relationship with his tormentors is marked by continuous rivalry.

关于精神病跟别人的关系,拉康注意到这个事实:大他者的排斥引导个人进入跟别人的奇异的纠缠。这些纠缠继续受到敌意与競争的瀰漫。神性的代理者侵入许瑞伯的身体与心灵。如同他侵人他们自己的物质。这指示著,他跟他的折磨者的关系,被继续的敌意标记。

Although Schreber has to comply with the divine bye-laws, the gods
bear witness to an incredible stupidity, through which their existence
depends as much on him as his existence depends on them. Schreber has
a mirror relationship with his world and his own bodily disintegration is
reflected in the fragmentation of the divine bodies (Lacan 1993[1955–
56]:97–101). It is as if Schreber’s persecutors were but the virtual images
of himself; figures that would not have existed without him, but whose
presence he was unable to plumb and control.

虽然许瑞伯必须同意神性的章程,众神见证一个匪夷所思的愚蠢。由于这种愚蠢,他们的存在同样依靠他,如同他的存在依靠他们。许瑞伯跟他的世界拥有一个镜像的关系。他自己的身体的瓦解被反映在神性的身体的碎片化。好像许瑞伯的迫害者仅是他自己的虚拟的意象,假如没有他,本来不会存在的人物,但是他们的存在,他不能够探索与控制。

This strictly imaginary relationship with others seriously affects
the psychotic’s position within the transference, which Freud (1916–
17a [1915–17]:431–447) defined as the patient’s emotional tie
(Gefuhlsbindung) with the analyst. Unlike Freud, Lacan did not rule
out the psychotic’s ability to develop a transference relationship with
the analyst, yet he distinguished this ‘psychotic transference’ from
the neurotic type, whereby he followed two separate directions.

跟别人的严格的想像的关系,严重地影响精神病的立场,在移情之内。弗洛伊德定义移情,作为是跟精神分析家的情感的关系。不像弗洛伊德,拉康并没有排除精神病者的能力,跟他的精神分析家发展移情的关系。可是,他区别这个‘精神病的移情“,跟神经症的移情的不同。从这里,他遵循两个不同的方向。

The first one was put into effect during the early 1950s, in the context of
his construction of the ‘L-schema’ as a dynamic model of the analytic
process.20 During this period Lacan distinguished between a symbolic
and an imaginary form of transference, the former being the
efficacious, beneficial type and the latter merely functioning as an
obstacle (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:109).

在1950年代,第一个方向被付诸实践。在建构“L-基模“,作为是精神分析过程的动态的模式的内文里。在这个时期,拉康区别象征与想像的移情的形式的差异。前者是有效的,有利益的种类。后者则仅是充当这个功能,作为阻碍的功能。

Symbolic transference
presupposes that the patient’s speech addresses itself to both the other
and the Other, which implies that the way in which somebody
approaches the analyst and speaks about himself involves a degree of
ignorance (the Other as unknown). At the end of Seminar I Lacan
even went so far as to say that ignorance is an essential condition for
(symbolic) transference to occur:

象征的移情预先假设,病人的言说针他者与大他者言谈。这暗示着这个途径,某个人接近精神分析家并且言谈关于他自己的途径。这牵涉的某个程度的无知,(大他者作为是没有被认识)。在第一研讨班的结束,拉康甚至过分到说出:无知是让移情发生的基本条件。

[I]f the subject commits himself to searching after truth as such, it
is because he places himself in the dimension of ignorance—it
doesn’t matter whether he knows it or not. That is one of the
elements making up what analysts call ‘readiness to the
transference’. There is a readiness to the transference in the patient
solely by virtue of his placing himself in the position of
acknowledging himself in speech, and searching out his truth to
the end, the end which is there in the analyst.

假如主体专注于寻找真理的本身,那是因为他将他自己放置在无知的维度。他是否知道并不重要。那是其中的一个因素,组成精神分析家所谓的“对于移情的准备“。在病人身上,有一个移情的准备,由于他放置他自己在这个位置,用言说承认他自己的位置。并且自始至终寻找他的真理。这个终点就在精神分析家那里。

(ibid.: 278–279)
The absence of ignorance on the side of the patient also opens the
gate to transference, albeit a style of transference that is imaginary,
rivalrous and potentially destructive. It is exactly this imaginary type
one can expect to find in psychotic people, governed as they are by an
exclusion of the Other and a vision of a transparent other. In general,
psychotics do not testify to a degree of ignorance about what is happening
to them or about what is going on in the world.

在病人这边,无知的缺席也展开到移情的大门。虽然移情的风格是想像的,敌意的,而且潜在具有毁灭性。这确实是想像的风范,我们能够期望找到的,在精神病的人们。虽然他们被统辖,被大他者的排除与透明的他者的幻景所统辖。一般来说,精神病者并没有证实到无知的程度,关于所正在发生的事情,对于他们,与关于在世界正在发生的事情。

On the contrary, they act
upon a firmly established knowledge, a deep-rooted conviction and a
massive certainty about the nature of their suffering. In Seminar XI, Lacan
argued that in psychotics ‘the phenomenon of the Unglauben’ (unbelief)
reigns (Lacan 1977b[1964]:238) because belief (whether positive or
negative) always includes an element of doubt, which is completely absent
in psychosis.21 The corollary of this deeply ingrained, solid psychotic
knowledge is that the other can only be approached as an alter ego, an
imaginary counterpart who supports, sustains and validates the
individual’s certainty.

相反地,他们的行为根据坚固被建立的知识,一个根深蒂固的信念与某个巨大的确定性,关于他们痛苦的特性。在第11研讨班,拉康主张,在精神病者,“没有信仰“的这个现象统辖一切,因为信仰(无论是正面或是负面的信仰),总是包括怀疑的元素。在精神病者,怀疑的元素是缺席。这个根深蒂固,牢固的精神病的知识必然结果是,他者被接近,仅能够作为替代-自我。这是一个想像的替身,他支持,维持并且证实个人的确定性。

The latter point leads to Lacan’s second criterion for distinguishing
between psychotic and neurotic transference. In Seminar XI, he grounded
transference in psychoanalysis on the installation of the function of the
sujet suppose savoir, that is to say of the ‘subject supposed to know’ or,
perhaps better, the ‘supposed subject of knowing’.22 As Lacan put it:
‘Whenever this function may be, for the subject, embodied in some
individual…the transference is established’ (ibid.: 233). Proceeding from
her own ignorance, a neurotic patient would thus come to an analyst in
order to interrogate him as a supposed subject of knowing, which signals
the start of transference.

后者的这点导致拉康的第二个标准,作为区别精神病与神经症的移情的差别。在第11研讨班,他将精神分析的移情的基础定位在sujet suppose savoir 的功能的安置。换句话说,“应该知的的主体“,或是更加贴切地,”被认为是知道的主体“。依照拉康的说法,”对于主体而言,无论这个功能何时被镶嵌在某个个人,移情就已经被建立。“当一位神经症的病人从他自己的无知,继续前进,他因此会来到精神分析家,为了询问他,作为被认为是知道的主体。这就意味着移情的开始。

Psychotic patients, however, have no reason
whatsoever to invest the analyst—nor somebody else for that matter—
with the function of the supposed subject of knowing, since they already
possess (and are possessed by) all there is to know. Whereas neurotics
are desperate to find somebody who masters the knowledge they
themselves lack, and to put that knowledge to the test, psychotics are
adamant that there is nothing more to discover than what they already
know. When they address themselves to an analyst, they are not supposing
her to be a subject of knowing, but rather someone who will understand
and authenticate their experiences. In short, they are trying to find a
‘witness for the persecution’.

可是,精神病的病人并没有丝毫理由将精神分析家—或就那件事情而言,某个其他的人—投注这个功能,被认为是知道的主体的功能。因为他们已经拥有(与被拥有)一切所需要知道的东西。虽然神经症者拼命地想要找出某个掌控这个知识的人,他们自己欠缺的知识。为了测试那个知识,精神病者坚定相信:他们已经知道的东西,就是他们所要发现的一切东西。当他们跟精神分析家对谈时,他们并没有假设她是知道的主体。相反地,而是某个将会理解与证实他们的经验的人。总之,他们正在尝试找的“迫害的见证者“。

Apart from the fact that they provide the analyst with a second,
fairly reliable diagnostic criterion (alongside the language disturbances),
these peculiarities of the psychotic transference cast a nasty chill over
the standard analytic techniques of interpretation and transference
handling. As Freud realized all too well, the orthodox analytic setting
cannot be used with psychotic patients, to which Lacan added that if
one takes prepsychotics (people with a psychotic structure but
untriggered ‘psychotic’ phenomena) into analysis, a full-blown
psychosis is likely to emerge (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:251). On the one
hand, these warnings make it all the more urgent for analysts to diagnose
psychotic patients correctly and at the earliest possible stage of the
analytic process, whereas on the other hand they also urge them to
reconsider their techniques when they venture to work analytically with
psychotics.

除了这个事实:他们供应精神分析家第二个非常可靠的诊断的标准(除了语言的困扰之外)。精神病移情的这些特殊性投下令让讨厌的寒颤,在标准的分析的解释技术与处理移情。如同弗洛伊德充分体会到,正统的精神分析的背景无法被使用在精神病的病人身上。拉康则是补充说:假如我们将精神病前期(拥有精神病的结构,但是还没有被触发的“精神病现象“的人们),带进精神分析,一个完全发展的精神病可能会出现。在一方面,这些警告让精神分析家更加迫切要正确地诊断精神病的病人,在尽可能的精神分析过程的早期阶段。另一方面,他们也建议他们要重新考虑他们的技术,当他们冒险以精神分析的方式研究精神病。

For Lacan (19771:12), it was imperative that the analyst does
not back away from psychosis, and in the following chapters I shall
give some indications of how Lacanian analysts have turned this
incentive into a score of technical modifications and
recommendations, often relying on minimal rules of thumb
suggested by Lacan himself.

对于拉康,应该要做的是,精神分析家不要从精神病者撤退。在随后的章节,我将给予某些的指示,关于拉康派的精神分析家如何将这个动机转变成为许多技术的修正与推荐。他们经常说依靠拉康自己建议的准则。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践 4

October 12, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of
Psychoanalysis

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and
Transference
第一章
经由言说与移情的诊断

THE CAUSE OF PSYCHOSIS
精神病的原因

In Seminar III, Lacan did not content himself with describing the principal
features of psychotic communication—the exclusion of the Other, the
semantic ‘shallowness’ of language, a code that has become message
and a message that has been reduced to its code, and the compulsory
nature of the exchange—he also tried to delineate the cause of these
features.

在第三研讨班,拉康并没有满足于描述精神病者的沟通的主要特征—大他者的排除,语言的语意的“浮浅化”,已经变成讯息的符码,以及被化简成为它的符码的讯息,跟交换的强迫性的特性。拉康也尝试描述这特征的原因。

Assuming that the dimension of the Other and the possibility to define
positions within a particular exchange are due to the wall imposed by
language, Lacan had to conclude that in psychosis this wall has somehow
not been erected. In psychotic patients, language has not been anchored.

当拉康假设,大他者的维度与定义特殊的交换里的立场的可能性,是由于被语言赋加的墙壁所形成。拉康必须获得结论:在精神病,这个墙壁因为某种原故,并没有被竖立。在精神病的病人身上,语言并没有被锚定。

Rather than a firmly embedded, solid structure, it is a free-floating, flat
and permeable screen. Implicitly referring to Freud’s idea that in
psychosis the link between the word-presentation and the thingpresentation
has been severed, Lacan defined this non-embedment of
language as a lack of ‘quilting points’ (points de capiton) between the
signifier and the signified (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:268–270), for which
he in turn held the foreclosure (forclusion) of the Name-of-the-Father
responsible (Lacan 1977h[1957–58]:215).8

非但不是被坚固的镶嵌的牢固的结构,在神经病者的语言是一种自由漂浮,平坦与可被污染的帘幕。拉康暗示地提到弗洛伊德的观念:在精神病者,字词表象与物表象已经被撕裂开来。拉康定义语言的非-镶嵌,作为是处于能指与所指的“锚定点的欠缺”。因为这样,精神病者自己将“以父之名”的除权封闭负起责任。

In the final session of Seminar III Lacan proposed ‘foreclosure’ as
the best translation of Freud’s term Verwerfung (Lacan 1993[1955–
56]:321). In Freud’s works, Verwerfung can hardly lay claim to conceptual
status— there are very few passages in which the term appears—and it
is not really elaborated as the specific cause of psychosis.9 In
conceptualizing Verwerfung as a distinct mechanism for psychosis, Lacan
took his main lead from Freud’s formula in his case-study of the Wolf
Man that a ‘repression [Verdrangung] is something very different from
a condemning judgement [Verwerfung]’ (Freud 1918b[1914]:79–80).

在第三研讨班的最后一堂,拉康建议“除权弃绝”作为是弗洛伊德的术语“否认”的最佳翻译。在弗洛伊德的著作里,“否认”几乎无法宣称具有观念的地位—这个术语出现的段落非常少—这个术语并没有确实地建构,作为是精神病的明确的原因。当拉康将“否认”形成观念,作为是精神病的明显的心理机制,他主要是从弗洛伊德的公式引申而来,在他研究“狼人”的个案:压抑跟谴责的判断是某件非常不同的东西。

Between 1954 and 1956, he then tried to define Verwerfung in opposition
to repression, but also in relation to the mechanisms of Verneinung
(negation) and Bejahung (affirmation), which Freud had discussed in
his paper ‘Negation’ (1925h). Eventually, Lacan reached the conclusion
that Verwerfung and Verdrangung differ with regard to their effects:
What comes under the effect of repression returns, for repression
and the return of the repressed are just the two sides of the same
coin. The repressed is always there, expressed in a perfectly
articulate manner in symptoms and a host of other phenomena. By
contrast, what falls under the effect of Verwerfung has a completely
different destiny …[W]hatever is refused in the symbolic order, in
the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.
(Lacan 1993[1955–56]:12–13)

在1054年与1056年之间,拉康因此尝试定义“否认”跟“压抑”作为对立,而且也跟“否定”与“肯定”的心理机制息息相关。弗洛伊德在1925年曾经有篇论文“论否定”讨论到。最后,拉康获得这个结论:否认与除权弃绝关于它们的影响,有所不同。在压抑的影响下来临的东西,回再回来,因为压抑与被压抑物的回来,仅是相同铜板的两面。被压抑物总是在那里,用非常清楚的方式被表达,在症状与许多其他的现象。对照起来,在“否认”的影响下发生的东西,具有完全不同的命运。在象征秩序被拒绝的任何东西,用“否认”的意义来说,会重新出现在实在界。

The meaning Lacan gave to Verwerfung here—a process through which
something reappears (as a hallucination) in the real—tallies with Freud’s
description of the mechanism of psychotic symptom formation in his
Schreber study. A paranoid patient suffering from hallucinations or
persecutory delusions was in Freud’s opinion subject to a process whereby
‘an internal perception is suppressed, and…its content enters
consciousness in the form of an external perception’ (Freud 1911c
[1910]:66).

在此,拉康给予“否认”这个意义:某件东西在实在界的重新出现(作为幻觉)的过程。这个意义符合弗洛伊德对于精神病的症状的形成的心理机制的描述,在他研究许瑞伯的案例。依照弗洛伊德,遭受幻觉或迫害狂的幻觉的妄想症的病人,隶属于这一个过程:“内部的感觉被压制,它的内容进入意识,以外在的感觉的形态”。

Initially, Freud called this process ‘projection’, but owing to
the fact that people regularly attribute their mental states to external rather
than internal causes—which also deserves to be called projection—he
came to question his own designation: ‘It was incorrect to say that the
perception which was suppressed internally is projected outwards; the
truth is rather…that what was abolished internally returns from without’
(ibid.: 71). Lacan must have noticed that Freud was looking in vain for
an appropriate denominator to grasp the psychic mechanism of psychosis,
which prompted him to designate the mechanism as Verwerfung, bearing
in mind that Freud himself had conceived Verwerfung as radically
different from repression.

起初,弗洛伊德称这个过程为“投射”,但是由于这个事实:人们规律地将他们的心灵的状态,归属于外在,而不是内在的原因–这也应该被称为是投射–弗洛伊德逐渐质疑他自己的指定:“这是不正确的,假如我们说,内部被压制的感知被投射到外部。相反地,真相是:内部被废除的东西,从外部回来。拉康当时一定曾注意到,弗洛伊德白费力气地正在寻找一个适当的分母,为了要理解精神病的心灵结构。这激发他指明这个心理机制,作为是”否认“。他切记在心:弗洛伊德自己曾经构型”否认“作为是跟压抑强烈不同的东西。

In ultimately choosing to translate Verwerfung as foreclosure, Lacan
re-emphasized the linguistic nature of the psychotic mechanism. Indeed,
whereas foreclosure is a juridical term expressing the expiration of a
person’s assigned rights (for instance, the legal access to one’s children
after a divorce) when he does not exercise them, Lacan took it from a
paper on the nature of French negations by Damourette and Pichon
(1928). With French negations generally consisting of two parts—as in
ne…pas and ne…jamais—Damourette and Pichon redefined the first part
as the discordant component and the second one as the foreclosure,
observing that the latter part is more akin to the rough logical negation
than the former, which can in some cases even be omitted without the
meaning of the sentence being lost.

当拉康最后选择将”否认“翻译成为”除权弃绝“时,他重新强调精神病的心理机制的语言的特性。的确,虽然”除权弃绝“是一个司法的术语,表达一个人的被指定的权利的终止,(譬如,离婚之后,合法地承接自己的小孩),当他没有运用这些权利时。拉康从达摩瑞特与皮琼探讨法文的”否定词“的特性的论文,获得这个观念。法文的否定词通常由两个部分组成–如同在ne…pas and ne…jamais–达摩瑞特与皮琼重新定义第一部分,作为是不协调的成分,将第二部分定义作为”除权弃绝“。他们观察到,后者部分更加类似简陋的逻辑的否定,比起前者。在某些的情况,前者会被省略,而不会丧失句子的意义。

They also considered foreclosure to
be the linguistic index of a desire to exclude the possibility that a certain
event exists or happens again, a phenomenon which they compared to
the excision (scotomization) of a perception from the field of vision.10
Without restricting himself to this particular structure of French negation,
Lacan substituted foreclosure for other translations of Verwerfung,
because in his view the operation epitomized the exclusion of a linguistic
element (a signifier) rather than an ‘internal perception’. As to the exact
nature of this signifier, he explored various avenues throughout Seminar
III, finally designating it as the Name-of-the-Father from his 1957–58
text on psychosis onwards.

他们也将”除权弃绝“认为是欲望的语言索引,欲望要排除这个可能性:某个事件存在或再次发生。某个现象,他们将它类比赛某个感知的切除,从视觉的景象里被切除。拉康并没有限制自己于法文的否定词的这个特殊结构。他将”除权弃绝“用来替换”否认“的其他翻译。因为依他的看法,除权弃绝的这个运作描绘语言元素(一个能指)的被排除,而不是”内部的感知“。至于这个能指的确是对特性,拉康探索各式各样的管道,在第三研讨班。他最后指明能指的意义,作为是”以父之名“。从拉康的1957年到1958年探讨精神病的文本开始。

Lacan had introduced the concept of the Name-of-the-Father in a 1953
lecture on the neurotic’s individual myth, in order to separate the real
father, a flesh and blood man, from the symbolic ‘function of the father’,
which he interpreted as the culturally determined regulation of the natural
order of things (Lacan 1979[1953]:422–423). In the contemporaneous
‘Rome Discourse’, he further specified that ‘in the name of the father…
we must recognize the support of the symbolic function which, from the
dawn of history, has identified his person [the person of the father] with
the figure of the law (Lacan 1977e[1953]:67).11

在1963年的演讲,拉康介绍以父之名的这个观念。他探讨神经症者的个人神话,为了将现实的父亲,血肉之躯的人,跟象征的“父亲的功能”区分开。他解释象征的父亲的功能,作为是事情的自然的秩序的文化所决定的规范。在同时间的“罗马辞说”,他更进一步地指明,以父之名,我们必须体认错象征功能的支持,自古以来,象征功能的支持已经将父亲这个人,跟法则的人物认同一致。

Hence, in Lacan’s theory
of the 1950s the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father bears a striking
resemblance to how the Jewish God Yahweh was understood by Freud in
his Moses and Monotheism (1939a[1937–39]). Yahweh is an upholding,
yet demanding agency which never reveals its true face. An immaterial,
yet speaking creature which promises redemption in exchange for a strict
obeyance to the divine law, whose first indication is the act of
circumcision, it is an abstract intangible principle imposing an alternative,
symbolic order onto the people of Israel, which reshapes their natural
living conditions.

因此,在拉康的1950年的理论,以父之名的能指具有明显的类似,跟犹太教的耶威上帝被弗洛伊德理解的方式,在他的“摩西与一神教。耶威是一位作为支撑,可是要求的代理者。它从来没有显露它的真实的面貌。它是一位抽象,可是会言说的神性,它承诺给予救赎,以交换严格的服从神性的法则。这个神性法则的第一个指示是切割包皮。这是一个抽象的非实质的原则,赋加一个替代的象征的秩序,给以色列的民族,它重新塑造自然是•生活的情况。

Lacan’s concept of the Name-of-the-Father conveys a similar meaning,
because it is held to represent an imposed transcendence of natural
provisions with a view of a higher order of mental and social functioning.
Although Lacan’s notion betrays its grounding in religion, he extended
its operation beyond this realm, conceiving it as the guiding principle of
every sociocultural organization. Similar to Moses’ God, the Name-ofthe-
Father thereby remained an essentially linguistic principle, not so
much due to the fact that it speaks, but rather because Lacan regarded it
as the cornerstone of a shared language system. He also pointed out that
in most cultures and throughout history the representation of this
regulatory father-function is considered to be one of the tasks of real
fathers, their relationships with children being less irrefutable than those
of real mothers.12

拉康对于以父之名的观念,传递类似的意义,因为以父之名被认为是代表自然情况的被赋加的超验神性。具有更高秩序的精神与社会的功能的观的。虽然拉康的观念显露它以宗教作为基础,他延伸它的运作,超越这个领域,构想它作为是每个社会与文化的组织的引导原则。跟摩西的上帝一样,以父之名因此始终是以语言为基础的原则。倒不是因为它会言说的这个事实,而是因为拉康将它视为是共享的语言的系统的基石。他也指出,在大部分的文化,有史以来,规范的父亲的功能的表象被认为是现实的父亲的其中一个工作,他们跟小孩的关系,不像现实的母亲的那些关心,那么容易反驳。

The foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father in psychosis thus means
that an individual has been excluded from the possibility of substituting
a culturally determined symbolic pact, including injunctions, prohibitions
and allowances, for an unblemished, yet chaotic natural condition.13 In
Lacan’s view, the psychotic is literally an outlaw, because she has not
assimilated the cultural laws of language. As described on p. 12, the
effect is not that language is completely eradicated, but that it no longer
sets a barrier between the individual and his environment. This foreclosure
of the Name-of-the-Father and the ensuing absence of quilting points
between the signifier and the signified also entail that the meaning of
words no longer shifts, but solidifies to the point where it becomes
petrified on the level of the code itself.

精神病者的以父之名的除权封闭意味着,个人已经被排除这个可能:替换被文化决定的象征的盟约,包含命令,禁止与容许,替换一个没有被污染,可是混乱的自然的情况。依照拉康的观点,精神病实质上是一个非法之徒。因为她并没有接受语言的文化的法则。如同第12页所描述的,结果并不是语言完全被抹除,,而是语言不再竖立一个阻碍,在个人与环境之间。父亲之名的除权弃绝与随后的能指与所指之间的缝合点的缺席,也意味着,字词的意义不再改变,而是凝固到这个程度,字词变得僵化,在符码自身的层面。

This may seem odd when taking into account that the absence of
quilting points appears to suggest an endless fluctuation of the signified
(the thing-presentation, the culturally imposed meaning) under the
signifier (the word-presentation), whereas firmly established quilting
points would signal the allocation of a fixed meaning to certain signifiers.

这看起来是古怪的,当我们考虑到,缝合点的缺陷,似乎意味着所指的永无止境地摇摆,(物表象,被文化赋加的意义),在能指之下(字词表象)。另一方面,坚固被建立的缝合点将会指示著固定的意义被分配给某些的能指。

Yet, as Lacan saw it, the absence of quilting points precludes semantic
ambiguity, because equivocality presupposes that at least two different
meanings can be balanced against each other, which in turn requires that
at least one meaning has been established.14 In Freudian terms, the
installation of a link between the word-presentation and the thing presentation
implies that the literal meaning of a word can be weighed
against the figurative one, whereas the absence of such a link makes this
process impossible.

可是,依照拉康的看法,缝合点缺席预先包含语意的模糊嗳昧。因为模糊嗳昧预先假设:至少有两个不同的意义能够被互相对抗与平衡。这反过来会要求:至少有一个意义已经被建立。用弗洛伊德的术语来说,字词表象与物表象之间的关联的安置暗示着:字词的实质意义能够被用来跟想像的意义互相抗衡。另一方面,这样的联接的缺席让这个过程成为不可能。

Who or what is responsible for the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-
Father is a particularly vexed issue within Lacanian theory. In the final
pages of his 1957–58 paper on psychosis Lacan proceeded with the
greatest caution when broaching this question.

在拉康的理论里,一个特殊的令人懊恼的问题是:谁来负责,或什么在负责以父之名的这个除权封闭?在1957年到1958年之久的最后几页,拉康探讨精神病,他小心翼翼地进行,当他揭露这个问题。
First of all, he repudiated
the idea that foreclosure stems from the parent’s mutual competition to
win and sustain the child’s love, whereby the mother would for instance
ridicule the father systematically in front of her child. Instead of this
parental rivalry to the detriment of one parent (notably the father), Lacan
highlighted the place each parent accords to the symbolic position of the
Name-of-the-Father in his or her relationship with the child. In this way,
he decomposed the classic Oedipal triangle of mother-father-child into
two sub-structures, mother-child-Name-of-the-Father and father-child18
Name-of-the-Father.

首先,他排除这个观念:除权弃绝起源于病人的互相竸争要战胜,并且维持小孩的爱。譬如,母亲经常会在小孩的面前,习惯性嘲笑父亲。并不是父母的敌对,结果伤害其中一位父母(特别是父亲)。相反地,拉康强调这个位置,每位父母给予以父之名的象征的地位,在他跟小孩的关系。以这个方式,他瓦解古典的伊狄浦斯的母亲-父亲-儿子的三角地位,成为是次级结构:母亲-小孩-以父之名,与父亲-小孩-以父之名。

Within each of these sub-structures, the parental
agencies ought to ensure that the transcendental, symbolic paternal
function is acknowledged. This implies that the father and the mother
need to let the child know in no uncertain terms that they are subjected
to a symbolic order which they cannot alter or control. Both the father
and the mother need to acknowledge that they do not epitomize the law,
but that the law transcends them and that they themselves are forced to
comply with it as much as everybody else. To put it in even more concrete
terms, this comes down to the parents telling their children that they are
expected to observe certain social rules (for example, the basic ‘Freudian
rule’ of the incest prohibition) and that this expectation also applies to
them, despite the fact that they are in a parental position. Such a
concession might pose serious difficulties, as Lacan stressed, to those
fathers who really have the function of legislators (Lacan 1977h[1957–
58]: 218–219).

在每个这些次级结构里,父母作为代理者应该保证,这个超验,象征的父母的功能比承认。这暗示着,父亲与母亲需要让小孩知道,用明确的术语,他们隶属于象征的秩序,他们无法改变或控制这个象征秩序。父亲与母亲需要承认,他们并没有具体体现法则,而是法则作为他们的超验神性。他们自己被迫同意法则,如同其他的人一样。用更加具体的术语言,这总结作为父母告须他们的小孩,他们被期望遵守某些的社会的规则(譬如,乱论禁忌作为基本的弗洛伊德的规则)。这个期望也运用到他们身上。尽皆这个事实:他们处于父母的立场。这样一种退让可能形成严重的困难,如同拉康强调的,对于那些拥有立法的功能的父亲。

Needless to say that Lacan’s deconstruction of the Freudian Oedipal
triangle into two distinct triads does not yet outline the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father and
the ensuing emergence of a psychotic structure in the child. Is it sufficient
for one of the child’s parents to dishonour the paternal function, or should
the parents do it in tandem? And if the Name-of-the-Father is debased
by both parents, does that automatically induce psychosis in the child or
should some auxiliary condition be fulfilled?

自不待言,拉康的解构弗洛伊德的三角位置,成为两个清楚的三角位置,并没有描绘以父之名的除权弃绝的必要与充分的条件。以及在小孩身上,精神病的结构的随后的出现。让小孩的父母的其中一位不尊敬父权的功能就足够了吗?或者,父母应该协调来不尊敬父权的功能?假如以父之名被父母亲除掉基础,那会自动自发地导致小孩的精神病吗?或是,某个辅助的条件应该被满足?

On occasion, people
commenting on Lacan’s theory have argued that the mother’s refusal to
accept the paternal authority is sufficient for psychosis to occur in the
child, by which they have reduced Lacan’s complex Oedipal schema to
its simple triangular roots, and by which they have also realigned it with
the post-Freudian view that a child’s psychic normality is predicated
upon its separation from the pre-Oedipal dyadic relation with the mother,
through the intervention of the father and the concurrent ‘triangulation’.15

有时,评论拉康的理论的人们争辩说:母亲的拒绝接受父权的权威,就足够让精神病发生在小孩身上。凭借这个,他们将拉康的复杂的伊狄浦斯情结的基模化简成为简单的三角位置的根源。评借这个,他们也重新安排它,用后-弗洛伊德的观点: 小孩的心灵的正常被陈述在它跟前-伊狄浦斯跟母亲的二元关系的分开。通过父亲与同时间的“三角位置”的介入。

Nowhere does Lacan’s work allow us to make these kinds of inferences,
yet neither does it suggest a good alternative answer to the problem.
Jacques-Alain Miller (1987) has proposed to complicate Lacan’s
model even further by taking into account the child’s own involvement.
Explicitly eschewing a structuralist (social constructionist) conception
of Lacanian theory, Miller took his bearings from Lacan’s 1946 essay
on psychic causality, in which he had asserted that psychosis ultimately
rests upon an ‘unfathomable decision of being’ (Lacan
1966a[1946]:177).16

拉康的研究根本没有让我们能够从事这些种类的推测。它也没有暗示对于这个难题有一个好的替代答案。艾伦 米勒曾经建议要将拉康的模式甚至变得更加复杂。他考虑到小孩自己的参与。当米勒明确地规避拉康的理论的结构主义(社会建构主义)的观念。他从拉康的1946年的论文“探讨心灵的因果律”开始申论。在那篇论文,拉康曾经主张,精神病最后依靠“深不可测的生命实存的决定”。

According to Miller, ‘the formula of foreclosure
has paralysed the debate on madness to such an extent that it has become
impossible for us to read what is supporting this formula, notably that it
is unthinkable without the implication of a subjective position’ (Miller
1987:143). When human beings become psychotic, it is not simply
because they have been the passive victim of deleterious parental attitudes,
but because they themselves have ‘decided’ to reject the Name-of-the-
Father, just as much as neurotics themselves, rather than their parents,
have repressed certain traumatic incidents.

依照米勒,除权弃绝的公式让对于疯狂的辩论动弹不得。我们甚至不可能阅读支持这个公式的东西。特别是,这是不可思议的,假如没有主体的立场的暗示。当人类变成精神病,这不仅是因为他们是灵巧的父亲的态度的受害者,而且是因为他们自己已经“决定”要拒绝以父之名。如同神经症者已经压抑某些的创伤的意外,而不是他们的父母亲压抑。

However, Lacan’s statement
also underscored that it is impossible to probe into the exact nature of
this ‘decision’. Although foreclosure cannot be operative without a
supporting subject, how, when and where this component has entered,
or will enter the play remains a mystery. In its impenetrability, the decision
is both untraceable and unforeseeable. Likewise, we are forced to remain
silent concerning the question as to whether this decision implies a free
choice or has already been shaped by the demands and desires of others,
and perhaps also as to whether it is modifiable or not.

可是,拉康的陈述也被强调。我们不可能探索这个“决定”的确实的特性。虽然除权弃绝无法运作,而没有一个支持的主体。这个成分用什么方式,何时,何地,进入,或将会进入这个运作,始终是个神秘。由于它的不可贯穿,这个决定既是无法追踪,也是无法预先看见。同样地,我们被迫保持沉默,关于这个问题,关于这个决定是否暗示一个自由的选择。或已经被塑造,被别人的要求与欲望,或许,也关于它是否可以被修改。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践3

October 10, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of
Psychoanalysis

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and
Transference
第一章
经由言说与移情的诊断

PSYCHOTIC COMMUNICATION
精神病的沟通
In his so-called ‘Rome Discourse’ (1977e[1953]), Lacan set out to revalue
the function of speech within psychoanalytic treatment. Observing that
psychoanalysis was drifting away towards some kind of enlightened
behaviourism, he argued that psychoanalysts urgently needed to
acknowledge that their clinical practice was invented as a ‘talking cure’
and that its salutary effects were predicated upon the power of speech.

在他所谓的“罗马辞说”,拉康开始重新评估言说的功能,在精神分析的治疗内部。当他观察到,精神分析正在漂浮离开,朝向某种的被启蒙的行为主义,他主张说,精神分析迫切地需要承认,他们的临床的实践被发明,作为一种“谈话治疗”。这个谈话治疗的有益的效果,就在言说的力量里被判定。

To Lacan, the truly Freudian revolution lay in the discovery that words
have the potential to precipitate, perpetuate and eradicate both physical
and mental symptoms, a conclusion which psychoanalysts were more
and more neglecting in favour of pre-verbal, ‘behavioural engineering’.
Redeeming Freud’s legacy, Lacan asserted that the power of speech is
nothing magical, but a quality derived from the fact that a human being’s
law is the law of language (ibid.: 61). The symbolic structure of language
presides over human beings, who not only derive their speech but their
entire ‘humanity’ from it, including their specific problems.

对于拉康,这个确实是弗洛伊德的革命就在于这个发现:文字具有判定,使存在,与抹除生理与心理的症状的潜力。可是,精神分析越来越加排斥这个结论,而赞同文辞之前,‘行为主义的工程学“。当他赎回弗洛伊德的遗产时,拉康主张,言说的力量并不是什么魔法的东西,而且从这个事实得来的特质:人类的法则就是语言的法则。语言的症状的结构操控着人类。人类不但从语言获得他们的言说,而且获得他们的完整的”人性“,包括他们的明确的难题。

This being the kernel of Lacan’s 1953 discourse and his main argument
for reorganizing psychoanalysis around speech and language, he at once
pointed out that not every human being integrates these structuring
components in the same manner. Lacan even went so far as to say that
the relation between speech and language can sometimes be outright
paradoxical in particular subjects (ibid.: 68).

当这个结论成为拉康的1953年的辞说与主要论述,用来重新组织环绕言说与语言的精神分析,拉康立即指出,并不是每个人都会融合这些作为结构的成分,用相同的方式。拉康甚至过分地说:言说与语言之间的关系有时是彻底的悖论,在特殊的主体身上。

As a first example of this,
he adduced the general clinical category of madness (folie). Here, the
paradox is that people can talk freely about what bothers them, that they
use language flexibly in order to construct extremely sophisticated
delusional systems, and play with words uninhibitedly, whilst at the same
time completely disowning their own language.

作为这个主张的第一个例子,拉康补充疯狂的通用临床范畴。在此,这个悖论是,人类能够自由地谈论有关困扰他们的事情。他们有弹性地使用语言,为了建构极端精致的幻觉的系统,病情没有压抑地玩弄文字。同时,他们又完全不承认他们自己的语言。

Lacan indicated that in
psychosis radical freedom of speech is paired with an absence of the
spoken word, because the latter no longer addresses itself to somebody
else: ‘the subject, one might say, is spoken rather than speaking’ (ibid.:
69). As Lacan had already underscored in a 1946 discussion with Henri
Ey, psychotic people are in a sense the most free individuals one can
imagine, yet for this radical freedom they have to pay with their bodies
and souls (Lacan 1966a[1946]:176; Miller 1987:143).6

拉康指出,在精神病,强烈的言说的自由,匹配著被言说的文词的缺席。因为被言说的文词不再针对另外一个人言说它自己:我们不妨说,「主体被言说,而不是正在言说」。如同在1946年跟亨利 艾伊的讨论,拉康已经强调,精神病的人们在某个意义上是我们能够想像的最自由的个人。可是,为了获得这个强烈的自由,他们用身体与灵魂付出代价。

It was not until 1955–56, when Lacan embarked on an investigation
of the memoirs of President Schreber (Schreber 1988[1903]) and Freud’s
analysis of the book (Freud 1911c[1910]), that he further specified the
singular nature of speech and language in psychosis. At the start of
Seminar III, Lacan maintained that speech generally addresses itself to
others (interlocutors and addressees, including oneself), yet immediately
adding that beyond these others, speech also involves the Other (Lacan
1993[1955–56]:36–38).

直到1955-56年,当拉康从事研究许瑞伯庭长的回忆录与弗洛伊德对于这本书的分析,他才更进一步地指明在精神病者,言说与语言的独异性特性。在第三研讨班的开始,拉康主张,言说通常针对别人言说它自己(对谈者与言说者,包括自己)。可是,他马上就补充说:除了这些别人之外,言说也牵涉到大他者。

The Other is nothing but the dimension of the
others that remains unknown to the speaker, because he approaches them
via language. Language erects a wall between the addresser and the
addressee, as a result of which the others become partly unfathomable
(Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:244–247). Put differently, the other represents
the addressee in so far as she is recognized and known (as another self,
an alter ego) by the speaker, whereas the Other entails the recognized,
yet never fully ascertained aspect of this addressee.

大他者仅仅就是被人的维度,在言说者始终并不知道。因为他接近他们,经由语言。语言竖立起一个墙壁,在言说者与对谈者之间。由于这个墙壁的结果,其余的人们有些部分变得深不可测。换句话说,另一个人代表被对谈者。因为她被体认,被知道,被言说者,作为另外一个自我,一个他我。另一方面,大他者涵盖这位被言说者的被体认,可是又永远没有充分被确定的层面。
To illustrate this, Lacan referred to a message such as ‘You are my master’,
transmitted by an individual to a known other (the ‘you’ in the sentence)
without the sender being able to know for sure whether this other person
really is or wants to be a master (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:37–38).

为了说明这个,拉康提到一个讯息,例如,“你是我的主人“,被一位个人传递给一位认识的他者(在句子里的这个”你“)。送讯息的人并不能够确实知道,这位他者是否确实是主人,或想要成为主人。

Here, communication is not a simple process of two comparable agencies (senders
and receivers) exchanging information, but a threefold interaction between
two (or more) individuals and the Other, in which assumptions are being
made and agreements being sought. Indeed, the wall imposed by language
between the speaker and her interlocutors requires people to set limits in
order to define and control each other’s positions. The wall does not merely
bar access to the complete other; it also urges people to make arrangements
about each other’s specific contributions in the interaction, and to engage
themselves in the establishment of symbolic pacts.

在此,沟通并不是两个对比的代理者的交换讯息的一个简单的过程(送讯息者与接收讯息者)。而是三重的互动,在两位或更多位个人与大他者之间。在这个三重互动里,假设被形成,共识被寻求。的确,语言所赋加的墙壁,在言说者与她的对谈者之间的墙壁,要求人们竖立限制,为了要定义与控制互相的立场。这个墙壁并不仅禁止接近完整的他者,墙壁也建议人们从事一些安排,关于彼此的明确的贡献,在这个互动里,并且参与象征盟约的建立。

Applying this dynamics to what is happening with psychotics, Lacan
arrived at the key insight that in psychosis the Other is excluded (ibid.:
52–53). This does not mean that language and speech disappear— indeed,
psychotics can be very loquacious, and when they do remain silent, it is
often because they are invaded by highly eloquent voices—but that
communication has lost its dimension of the unknown.

当拉康运用这个动力到精神病者正在发生的情况,拉康获得这个关键的洞察力:在精神病,大他者被排除在外。这并不意味着,语言与言说消失—的确,精神病者有时会侃侃而谈。当他们确实保持沉默时,那经常是因为他们被高度滔滔不绝的声音所侵犯。但是,那种沟通已经丧失它拥有这个未知者的维度。

For a psychotic person, nothing is unsure within what is being transmitted; sentences are
unidimensional, a word does not carry any other meaning than that which
is presented by the word itself. This evidently brings to mind Freud’s
example of the woman with the twisted eyes, for whom it was impossible
to assimilate that Augenverdreher (also and primarily) means ‘deceiver’.
Lacan reformulated this mechanism saying that ‘the signifier itself (and
not that which it signifies)…is the object of the communication’, which
entails fundamental modifications of the entire language structure (the
symbolic code) (Lacan 1977h[1957–58]:184).

对于一位精神病者,在正在被传递的东西之内,没有一样东西不确定,句子是单一维度,一个字词并没有带著任何的其他意义,除了就是这个字词自身呈现的东西。这显而易见地让人想起弗洛伊德例子:眼睛戴着眼罩的女人。对于她,接受那个t Augenverdreher 是不可能的,(那个字词也意味着,主要意味著“欺骗者)。拉康重新铨释这个心理机制,他说:「能指自身(并不是它指示的东西) 就是沟通的目标」,这个目标涵盖基本的修正完整的语言结构(象征的模式)。

This altered psychotic language system demonstrates a number of
peculiarities. According to Lacan, one of the most salient phenomena of the
psychotic ‘neo-code’ concerns its containment of new linguistic formations,
‘expressions that are neological in form…and usage’ (ibid.: 184). Schreber’s
designation for his own ‘neo-code’, the Grundsprache (basic language) is
an example of a formal neologism, because it does not belong as such to a
shared linguistic domain.

这个被改变的精神病的语言系统,证明许多的特殊性。依照拉康,精神病的“新符码”的其中最主要的现象,关系到它包含新的语言的形成,“在形式上与用法上是新形成的表达”。许瑞伯的设计对于他自己的“新符码”,这个“基本语言”是正式的新词的例子,因为它的自身并没有属于共同分享的语言的领域。

His notion of Seelenmord (soul murder) could be
termed a neologism of usage, because it was transferred from an already
existing discourse to a delusional context.7 Both types of neologism convey
nothing more than their ‘nominal’ meaning. Lacan stated that ‘for the subject
this high voltage of the signifier drops’ (ibid.: 185), that is to say, the signifier
is being discharged to the point where but one meaningful unit remains.
Consequently, expressions impose themselves on the psychotic patient as
refrains in a popular song; they reappear time and again in the same fashion.

他对于“谋杀灵魂”的观念,能够被给予用法的新词的术语,因为它从一个已经存在的辞说里被转移到幻觉的内涵里。两种的新词传递的仅仅是它们的“正常的”意义。拉康陈述:「对于主体,这个能指的高瓦特降低下来」。换句话说,这个能指正在被解除电荷到仅剩一个意义的单位的程度。结果,各种的表达赋加它们自己到精神病人身上,如同流行歌曲的这些叠句:这些叠句以相同的方式一再地重新出现。

For people are evidently only driven to use different words and phrases
when they feel that their previous expressions have not adequately conveyed
the intended meaning, or when there is a risk that the others will understand
them incorrectly. When there is no such risk because ambiguity has been
excluded, different words are unnecessary.

因为,当人们感觉他们先前的表达并没有充分地传达所意图的意义时,或是当别人将会错误地理解他们时的危险时,他们显而易见地仅是被迫使用不同的文词与词语。当这样的危险并不存在时,因为模糊嗳昧已经被排除,不同的字词是不必要的。

Apart from these alterations of the language system, psychotics also
manifest idiosyncrasies on the level of the message. Relying on examples
reported by Schreber in his memoirs, Lacan pointed out that psychotic
messages always include a challenge between the involved partners.
Schreber for instance described how divine figures tormented him day
and night by uttering unfinished sentences such as ‘Now I will myself
and ‘You ought to…’, which he was then forced to complete with the
appropriate endpart, respectively ‘…face the fact that I am an idiot’ and
‘…be exposed as the negator of God and as given up to dissolute
sensuality, not to mention other things’.

除了语言系统的这些轮替,精神病者也展现一下怪癖,在讯息的层面。当拉康凭借许瑞伯在他的回忆录报导的各种例子,他指出说:精神病的讯息总是包括被牵涉到伴侣之间一个挑战。譬如,许瑞伯描述,神性的形象如何日夜地折磨他。他们讲出没有完整的句子,譬如,“现在我意愿我自己、、、”与“你应该、、、、”他因此被迫来完成这些句子,用合适的结尾,各别是“我愿意面对这个事实:我是一位白痴”与“你应该被揭发,作为否定上帝的人,并且是耽溺于放荡的感官享受的人,更不用说是耽溺于其他的东西的人。”

A first salient characteristic of these messages, on Lacan’s account, is
that the sending agency, in stopping just before the part of the sentence
that would make the content of the message clear, reduces the message to
a grammatical form of address. The only meaning the fragmented sentences
uttered by Schreber’s voices still have is the meaning of ‘message’ as
such. The interrupted messages mean nothing except for the grammatically
determined fact that they are being addressed to somebody.

根据拉康的描述,这些讯息的一个最初突出的特征是:送出的代理者,当他仅是停顿在句子的这个部分的前面,这个部分将会让讯息的内容明朗。送出的代理者将这个讯息化简成为对谈的文法的形式。许瑞伯的声音表达的这些成为片断的句子依旧拥有的唯一的意义,是“讯息”作为自身的意义。被中断的那些讯息并没有意味别的,除了就是被文法决定的这个事实:它们正在被用来针对某个人的言谈。

A second distinguishing feature of these messages is that Schreber has to add his
own part on the basis of his knowledge of the code—every beginning has
its proper ending—in order to restore their communicative value. The
messages are, in Lacan’s words, ‘a hallucinatory provocation’ (ibid.: 186)
because they incite and coerce Schreber to produce what he knows. In
addition, Schreber cannot refrain from retorting and his reply does not
silence the voices. Neither the divine interventions nor Schreber’s own
answers are subject to his individual control, which confirms Lacan’s idea
that the psychotic is spoken rather than speaking.

这些讯息的第二个显著的特征是,许瑞伯必须补充他自己的部分,根据他对于这个符码的知识的基础:每一样开始东西都拥有它的合适的结尾。为了恢复它们的沟通的价值。用拉康的话来说,这些讯息是“幻觉的挑衅”。因为它们煽动并且强迫许瑞伯产生他所知道的东西。除外,许瑞伯无法控制不要去反驳。他的回答并没有让这些声音平息下来。无论是神性的介入,或是许瑞伯自己的回答,都没有隶属于他的个人的控制。这证实拉康的观念:精神病者正在被对谈,而不是言谈。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践2

October 9, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of
Psychoanalysis

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and
Transference
第一章
经由言说与移情的诊断

DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA
诊断的标准
So how does the analyst actually arrive at a diagnosis? In ‘On Beginning
the Treatment’, Freud was not very forthcoming about how to distinguish
practically neurosis from psychosis, yet he did warn his readers about
the deceitfulness of the clinical picture:

所以,精神分析家实际上获得诊断没有?在“论治疗的开始”,弗洛伊德并没有直接提出如何实践时区别神经症与精神病。可是,他确实警告他的读者,关于这个临床画面的欺骗性。

Often enough, when one sees a neurosis with hysterical or
obsessional symptoms, which is not excessively marked and has
not been in existence for long—just the type of case, that is, that
one would regard as suitable for treatment—one has to reckon with
the possibility that it may be a preliminary stage of what is known
as dementia praecox (‘schizophrenia’, in Bleuler’s terminology;
‘paraphrenia’, as I have proposed to call it), and that sooner or
later it will show a well-marked picture of that affection.

经常地,当我们看见一位神经诊者具有癔症或妄想症的症状时,这并不是过分明显,并且并没有长久存在。它仅是这种个案,换句话说,我们将会认为这位神经症是适合于治疗。我们必须考虑这个可能性:这可能是一个初期的阶段,对于众所周知的“精神病”(精神分裂症schizophrenia,用布鲁尔的术语,paraphrenia,依照我对它的建议称呼)。迟早,它将会显示一个属于那种情感的明显的画面。

(Freud 1913c:124)
8 Jacques Lacan and the Freudian practice of psychoanalysis
Freud contended that ostensibly neurotic symptoms (such as elusive
bodily pains and compulsive behaviours) should not be taken as
unambiguous signs of an underlying neurotic illness, however
conspicuous they may be.

弗洛伊德主张,夸张的神经症的症状(譬如,难以捉摸的身体的疼痛与强迫性的行为),应该被视为是并不模糊的迹象,属于潜在的神经症疾病,无论它们可能很明显。

A psychosis can hide under the mask of a
neurosis, and the analyst should not be misled by the colours of the clinical
guise.2 To many of his contemporaries, Freud’s admonition must have
seemed odd, used as they were in privileging strict relationships between
certain symptoms and certain disorders. Yet it may also surprise those
contemporary clinicians who still believe that hallucinations are sufficient
for diagnosing psychosis or that persistent offending is pathognomonic
for psychopathy.

精神病有时隐藏在神经症的面具之下。精神分析家不应该被临床时的伪装模样所误导。对于许多他的当代的人们,弗洛伊德的警告当时一定显得奇怪。虽然它们被用来让某些的症状与某些的疾病之间的严谨的关系具有特权。可是,那些当代的临床医生可能也会大吃一惊,因为他们依旧相信,光凭幻觉就足够诊断精神病,或是他们相信,持续的冒犯是属于精神病的特殊病症。

None the less, Freud’s first, negative diagnostic rule
read that one should not take symptoms at face value. Mental organization
had to be dislodged from observable phenomena, and analysts were urged
to suspend their judgement and to look for more reliable criteria.
Defining such criteria proved more onerous than exposing the
misleading ones though.

现在仍然是如此,弗洛伊德的最初,负面的诊断的规则写著:我们不应该将症状就表面看待。精神病的组织必须跟可被观察到现象驱离开来。精神分析家被建议要悬置他们的判断,并且寻找更多可靠的标准。定义这些标准证明更加的繁重,比起揭露那些误导的标准。

Freud was adamant that the psychoanalytic
process is unpredictable and that the analyst’s initial diagnosis can always
be disproved by the vicissitudes of the treatment, in which case analysts
should be willing to change their minds about the patient’s psychic
economy. Paradoxically, the most correct analytic diagnosis would be
that which the analyst is able to formulate at the end of the treatment,
which is unfortunately a point of no return. The whole diagnostic
enterprise reminded Freud (1933a[1932]:155) of the medieval ordeal by
water, albeit with the analyst rather than the patient in the position of the
victim.

弗洛伊德坚决主张,精神分析的过程是无法被预测的,精神分析家的最初的诊断有时能够被反驳,由于治疗的起伏。在治疗的情况,精神分析家应该愿意改变他们的心意,关于病人的心灵的活动。悖论地,即使是最正确的精神分析的诊断都将会是精神分析家能够说明的东西,在治疗的结束时。很不幸地,那是没有回转的时刻。整个的诊断的企业让弗洛伊德想起中世纪的用水的磨难,虽然处于受害者的立场的是精神分析家,而非病人。

Despite these problems, and despite his advocacy of a ‘dynamic
diagnosis’, Freud did suggest at least two positive diagnostic criteria.
The first criterion can be inferred from his alternative tabulation of
neuroses and psychoses as transference neuroses and narcissistic neuroses
respectively. On the one hand, Freud classified anxiety hysteria (phobia),
conversion hysteria and obsessional neurosis as transference neuroses,
because the emotional tie connecting the patient to the analyst acquires
in these cases an ‘extraordinary, and for the treatment, positively central,
importance’ (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:445).

尽管这些难题,尽管弗洛伊德主张“动态的诊断“,他确实建议至少要有两个正面的诊断的标准。第一个标准能够被推论,根据神经症者与精神病者的替换的表格,分别作为移情的神经症与自恋的神经症。在一方面,弗洛伊德将焦虑的癔症(恐惧症),转化的癔症与妄想的神经症,分类为移情的神经症。因为情感的关系,连系病人跟分析家,在这些个案里,获得”特殊的重要性,对于治疗而言,是非常核心的重要性“。

On the other hand, patients
suffering from a narcissistic neurosis—dementia praecox, paranoia or
melancholia—‘have no capacity for transference or only insufficient
residues of it’ (ibid.: 447). When faced with the task of distinguishing
between neurosis and psychosis, the analyst should thus investigate
whether the patient is capable of developing and maintaining an emotional
tie, the absence of such an ability indicating psychosis and giving the
analyst enough reason to rule out psychoanalytic treatment.

另一方面,遭受自恋的神经症痛苦的病人—精神分裂症,妄想症或忧郁症—他们“并没有移情的能力,或仅是移情的不充足的残渣“。当他们面对区别的工作,区别神经症与精神病,精神分析家因此应该研究病人是否能够发展或维持情感的关联。缺乏这样的能力指示精神病,并且给予精神分析足够理由来排除精神分析的治疗。

Here Freud
exchanged the objective diagnosis based on ‘symptoms interpreted as
signs’ for an intersubjective diagnosis, resting on the evaluation of a
relationship.

在此,弗洛伊德将客观的诊断,以被解释为迹象的症状作为基础的客体的诊断,交换为互为主观性的诊断。这个诊断依靠关系的评估。

However, transference was not the only and perhaps not even the most
significant criterion Freud employed to discriminate between neurosis
and psychosis. In his metapsychological paper ‘The Unconscious’
(1915e), he opposed schizophrenia to hysteria and obsessional neurosis
on no other grounds than the patient’s speech. According to Freud, a
schizophrenic patient’s speech bears witness to a remarkable
meticulousness, with expressions often displaying a degree of artificiality,
sentences becoming disorganized and words getting strangely mixed up
with the body.

可是,移情并不是唯一,或许甚至并不是最重要的标准,弗洛伊德使用来区别神经症与精神病。在他的后设心理学的论文,“无意识”,他将精神分裂症跟癔症与妄想症相提并论,根据的理由仅是病人的言词。依照弗洛伊德,精神分裂的病人的言词见证到明显的讲究细节,表达经常展示矫揉造作的程度,句子变得散乱,文词跟身体奇怪地混合一块。

Schizophrenic patients appear to be using ‘condensed
speech’, because whole series of thoughts find an outlet in single words,
which consequently acquire massive meaning and become linked to a
bodily organ or process.3 Freud attributed these extraordinary
schizophrenic speech characteristics to the prevalence of wordconnections
over thing-connections in psychosis. In psychotic patients,
the relationship between what Freud called ‘word-presentations’
(Wortvorstellungen) and ‘thing-presentations’ (Sachvorstellungen) has
been severed, resulting in a closed circuit of symptomatic wordconnections.
Patients are no longer concerned about the actual ‘things’
that words represent in a particular language; they merely relate to their
verbal content.4

精神分裂症的病人似乎使用“浓缩的言词”,因为思想的整个的意义就在这些字词里找到发泄。这些字词结果获得重大的意义,并且跟身体的器官或过程连接一块。弗洛伊德将这些特殊的精神分析的言词特征,归属于精神病的字词连接压倒过事物的连接。在精神病的病人,这个关系已经比分割,弗洛伊德所谓的“字词-表象”与“物表象”之间的关系。结果形成症状的字词的一个封闭的迴圈。病人不再关心现实的事物,那是字词用特殊的语言所代表。它们仅是跟它们的文词内容有关系。

A clear illustration of this radical inertia of thing-presentations in
psychosis is offered by a girl who complains that her eyes have been
twisted—an example Freud borrowed from Victor Tausk (1919) —
because her lover is a genuine eye-twister (Augenverdreher). In German,
an Augenverdreher is an arrant deceiver, and although the woman is aware
of this meaning (the thing-presentation), she is unable to assimilate it.
She can only relate to the literal meaning (the word-presentation) of
Augenverdreher, through which she is forced to conclude that her lover
has twisted her eyes physically.5 The woman’s conviction that she is
suffering from twisted eyes (her symptom) is determined by the broken
connection between the word-presentation and the thing-presentation.
Although she knows the thing-presentation, it is impossible for her to
use this meaning in order to relativize the literal one.

在精神病,物表象的这个强烈的贯性,有一个清楚的例子,由一位女孩提供。她抱怨她的眼睛已经被障眼—弗洛伊德从维克多 陶斯特借用的一个例子—因为她的爱人是一位真诚的障眼术者。在德文,障眼术者是一位声名狼藉的欺骗者。虽然这位女人知道这个意义(物表象),她不能够接受它。她仅是描述障眼术者的字面意义(词表象)。通过这个意义,她被迫下结论说,她的爱人已经在生理方面障眼她的眼睛。这位女人确信,她正在遭受被障眼的痛苦(她的症状),是由于字词表象与物表象之间的关联度中断所造成。虽然她并不知道物表象,她不可能使用这个意义,为了将字面意义相对化。

Another example of this linguistic mechanism, reported to me by a
colleague, concerns a man who threatens to sabotage the central heating
of the psychiatric clinic where he was based, and even to set the whole
building on fire, in order to take revenge on those members of staff who
have left him out in the cold. Like the female patient, this man is incapable
of assimilating the thing-presentation of the expression ‘to be left out in
the cold’, i.e. to be left behind, although he is perfectly aware of it. To
him, ‘to be left out in the cold’ means that some people have tried to
lower his body temperature, and therefore he feels that these scoundrels
deserve tit for tat.

这个语言的机制的另外一个例子,一位同事跟我报导,关于一个人。他威胁要破坏精神病诊所的中央冷气系统,他以那里作为基地。他甚至要放火烧掉整栋建筑物,为了报复那些将他排除在外的成员。就像那位女性病人,这位男人无法接受“被冷落在外”的这个表达的物表象,也就是被抛弃一旁,虽然他完全知道它。对于他,“被冷落在外”意味着,某些人们尝试降低他的身体的温度,因此,他感觉,这些坏蛋应该被以牙还牙。

On the surface, neurotic patients can suffer from the same kinds of
symptoms (twisted eyes, physical coldness) as psychotics, which is
exactly what Freud intended to demonstrate, but the neurotic symptoms
respond to an entirely different psychic economy. In neurosis, the wordpresentation
has not been cut off from the thing-presentation, but the
word-presentation has been repressed. It has been driven out of the
patient’s consciousness into the unconscious. The upshot is that the wordpresentation
exercises its influence without the patient being aware of
what has produced the symptoms.

表面上,神经症的病人会遭受相同种类的症状的痛苦(眼睛被障眼,生理感到寒冷),当作是精神病。这确实是弗洛伊德打算要证明的。但是,神经症的症状回应一个完全不同的心灵的活动。在神经症者,字词表象并没有跟物表象隔离开来。而是字词表象已经被压抑。字词表象已经从病人的意识驱赶进入无意识。结果是,字词表象运用它的影响,而病人却不知道是什么产生这个症状。

In neurosis, symptoms are determined
by a repressed, unconscious representation and it is the analyst’s task to
bring the patient to the point where this hidden factor can be retrieved.
Put differently, neurotic patients somehow suffer from a ‘lacking word’,
which the analytic process can help to recover. In psychosis, matters are
completely different. Although symptoms are also determined by wordpresentations,
the latter are not repressed and neither are the thingpresentations.

在神经症,症状被决定,根据被压抑的无意识的表象。精神分析家的工作就是要将病人带到这个时刻,这个被隐藏的因素能够被重新获得的时刻。换句话说,神经症的病人有些遭受“文词欠缺”的痛苦,精神分析的过程能够帮忙他重新获得。在精神病,事情完全不同。虽然症状被决定,也是由于字词表象,字词表象并没有被压抑,物表象也没有。

Whereas a neurotic patient fails to find the building blocks
of her symptoms, a psychotic patient has nothing to hide. All the materials
are out in the open. This is why Freud, talking about the schizophrenic
woman, observed: ‘The patient’s comments…have the value of an
analysis…They throw light at the same time on the meaning and the
genesis of schizophrenic word-formation’ (Freud 1915e:198). Of course,
the drama is that in psychosis the ‘analytic’ value of the patient’s
utterances has no bearing whatsoever on the destabilization of the
symptoms.

虽然神经症的病人无法找到她的症状的建筑方块,精神病的病人却是没有什么东西可让他隐藏。所有的材料都暴露在外面。这就是为什么弗洛伊德谈论关于精神分裂症的女人时,他观察到:「这位病人的评论具有精神分析的价值。这些评论同时让我们明白精神分裂症者的字词形成的意义与戏剧。当然,戏剧是,在精神病,病人的表达的“精神分析的价值”,跟症状的不稳定,并没有丝毫的关系。

Freud’s considerations on differential diagnostics form the nucleus
of Lacan’s distinctions between neurosis, psychosis and perversion.
Within a Lacanian orientation, psychic structures do not differ as far as
the clinical picture is concerned, but on the basis of speech and language,
and with respect to the subject’s relationships with his peers, family
members, colleagues, lovers, therapists, etc.

弗洛伊德对不同的诊断的考虑,形成拉康的区别的核心,区别神经症,精神病与倒错症。在拉康的定向里,心灵的结构并没有差异,就临床的画面而言。而是,根据言说与语言的基础,关于主体跟他的同侪,家庭成员,同事,情人,治疗师等等的关系。

Lacan had already drawn
attention to both these criteria in his earliest writings on paranoia (Lacan
1975a[1931]; 1975b[1932]; 1988d[1933]), but they did not start to gain
momentum until the 1950s, as part of his ‘return to Freud’ and his
aspiration to restore the value of speech and language in psychoanalysis.
Perhaps as a result of his own training as a clinical psychiatrist working
with psychotic patients, Lacan detailed these criteria most emphatically
for the psychic structure of psychosis and he was least explicit concerning
perversion.

拉康已经注意到这两个标准,在他的早期探讨妄想症的著作。但是,直到1950年代,这些著作才开始获得重视,作为他“回到弗洛伊德”的部分。拉康渴望恢复言说与语言在精神分析的价值。或许,由于他自己作为临床精神病医生的训练的结果,他研究精神病人。拉康因此强调地详细列举这些标准,作为精神病的心灵的结构。关于倒错症,他则是没讲得那么明确。

Moreover, in his discussion of the various psychic structures
he usually highlighted the speech and language features, the nature of
the transference being regarded as an effect of these characteristics.
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I will follow a similar
trajectory, from psychosis to neurosis and perversion, and from speech
to transference. As Lacan’s comments on perversion are less elaborated
and coherent than those on psychosis and neurosis, the section on
perversion will necessarily be more tributary to others’ and my own
interpretations of Lacan’s works than the preceding ones.

而且,当他讨论各色各样的心灵结构时,他通常强调言说与语言的特征。移情的特性则是被认为是这些特征的影响。在这个章节的随后的部分,我将遵循类似的途径,从精神病到神经症与倒错症,并且从言说到移情。因为拉康评论倒错症,并没有像评论精神病与神经症那么精细与一致性。讨论倒错的部分将必然更加枝枝节节,比起其他两个,以及我自己对于拉康的著作的解释,比起前面的那些解释。

雄伯译
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拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践

October 8, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of
Psychoanalysis

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and
Transference
第一章
经由言说与移情的诊断
WHY DIAGNOSIS?
为什么诊断?

Throughout his works, Lacan insisted on the differences between various
mental organizations, on the analyst’s need to recognize these differences,
and on the mandatory adoption of a differential treatment approach in
the light of the psychic economy the analyst has acknowledged in the
patient. The ‘Lacanian analyst’ has to bear in mind some basic nosological
categories and is held to diagnose patients at the earliest stage of the
clinical process, because her position within the treatment should differ
according to the psychic structure of the patient. Hence, the initial
assessment of the patient is not merely a matter of registration, due to
the fact that it has major clinical consequences.

在拉康的著作里,他坚持这些差异,在各色各样的精神病组织之间的差异,当它们探讨分析家体认这些差异的需要,与探讨义务地採用差异的治疗方法,从分析家在病人身上洞见的心灵活动的观点。“拉康派的分析家”必须将一些基本的疾病分类牢记在心,并且被认为应该诊断病人,在临床过程的最早期的阶段,因为分析家在治疗中的立场应该有所不同,依照病人的心灵的结构。因此,对于病人的最初的评估不仅是铭记的事情,由于这个事实:它具有重大的临床的结果。

Like so many other aspects of Lacan’s clinical theory, the importance
of a correct diagnosis prior to the beginning of psychoanalytic treatment
is rooted in Freud’s papers on technique. In ‘On Beginning the Treatment’
(Freud 1913c), Freud argued in favour of a trial period (Probezeit,
Erprobung, Sondierung) of one or two weeks before the start of the
treatment, for which he adduced the necessary, yet laborious diagnostic
procedure as one of the main reasons.

像拉康的临床理论的许多其他的层面,在精神分析的治疗的开始之前,正确的诊断的重要性,是以弗洛伊德探讨精神分析技术的论文作为依据。在“论治疗的开始”(弗洛伊德1913c),弗洛伊主张,他赞同在治疗开始之前,要有一段大约一到两个星期的尝试期。他举出这个必要,但是费力的诊断的程序,作为这个尝试期的其中一个主要的理由。

Until the end of his career, Freud
remained convinced that the standard method of psychoanalysis was of
no use to people suffering from paraphrenia—or some other form of
psychosis—which prompted him to demand that the analyst recognize
this contraindication during the trial period (ibid.: 124).1 Failure to do
so, or making a diagnostic mistake, would be disastrous as some patients
(neurotics wrongly diagnosed as paraphrenics) would be unjustly
excluded from treatment, whereas others (paraphrenics erroneously
qualified as neurotics) would be unjustly admitted.

一直到他从事业退休,弗洛伊德始终相信,精神分析的这个标准方法对于患精神分裂症的人们是没有用途,或是对某个其他种类的精神病。这引起他做这个要求:精神分析家应该在尝试期,就体认这个禁忌徵侯。假如精神分析家没有体认出来,或是犯了诊断的错误,那将会是个灾难。因为病人(神经症者被错误诊断成为精神分裂症者),将会不公平地被排除在治疗之外。另一方面,其他的病人(精神分裂症者被错误地被认为是神经症者的特质),将会不公平地被接纳看诊。

Compared to Freud’s dual opposition of neurosis and psychosis,
Lacan’s nosological framework is slightly more sophisticated and its
categories more mutually exclusive. Whereas Freud also designated the
psychoses as narcissistic neuroses (and the neuroses proper as
transference neuroses) (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:420), Lacan defined
neurosis and psychosis as fundamentally different psychic structures with
separate causalities.

跟弗洛伊德将神经症与精神病的双重对立比较起来,拉康的疾病分类架构就稍微更加精细。这个疾病分类的范畴更加将两种疾病互相排除。虽然弗洛伊德也将精神病者指明作为是自恋的神经症者(并且将神经者的本身作为是移情的神经症者),拉康则是定义神经症与精神病,作为是基本上不同的心灵的结构,具有差异的因果关系。

To the Freudian neurosis/psychosis dualism he also
added the distinct psychic structure of perversion, which Freud chiefly
addressed on a purely phenomenological level—as sadism, masochism,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, etc. Indeed, Freud never sharply discriminated
between psychosis and perversion, and his only formal distinction
between perversion and neurosis resides in his thesis that the latter is the
negative of the former, which he defended for example in ‘Three Essays
on the Theory of Sexuality’ (1905d:165). Lacan rationalized and
systematized Freud’s diagnostic categories, ultimately constructing the
triptych of neurosis, psychosis and perversion, in which each of the terms
represents a separate clinical entity.

在弗洛伊德的神经症与精神病的双重区分之上,拉康补充倒错症,作为明显的心灵的结构。弗洛伊德则是依据纯粹现象学的层面,来处理倒错症的心灵结构,作为是虐待狂,受虐狂,暴露狂,窥视狂,等等。的确,弗洛伊德从来没有明显区别精神病与倒错症的不同。他对于倒错症与神经症的唯一的正式的区别在于他的那个主要论述:神经症是倒错症的否定。他辩护这个主要论述,譬如,在“性学三论”。拉康则是将弗洛伊德的诊断的范畴合理化与系统化。他最后建构神经症,精神病,与倒错症的三个连环。在这三个连环里,每一个术语都代表分开的临床实体。

Furthermore, the clinical impact of these categories within Lacanian
analysis no longer concerns the patient’s possible entry to the treatment,
but rather the analyst’s prescribed position within the treatment and his
preferable handling of transference. Unlike Freud, Lacan did not regard
psychotics as unsuitable candidates for analysis. This does not imply
that for Lacan the Freudian dispositions remain valid under all
circumstances, but that the clinical premises of Freudian psychoanalysis
can and should be modified, without therefore losing their vigour, to
accommodate different types of patients.

而且,在拉康的精神分析里,这些范畴对于临床的影响,不再是关注于病人是否可能进入治疗。而是关注于精神分析家在治疗里被指定的立场,以及他较为有利地处理移情。不像弗洛伊德,拉康并没有将精神病视为是精神分析的不合适的对象。这并没有意味着,对于拉康,弗洛伊德的性情无论在什么情况始都是正确。而是意味著,弗洛伊德的精神分析的临床的假设能够,而且应该被修正。但是不要因此就丧失这些假设的力量,这是为了接纳不同种类的病人。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
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From an other to the Other 68

October 8, 2015

From an other to the Other 68

从他者到大他者

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康
5.2.69

(123) After all, since nothing forces us to precipitate any movement, because it is
precisely in these/precipitations that errors are produced, we can indeed abstain from
justifying this zero in a way that is symmetrical to what is involved in the other.
Because we have something that appears sufficiently in the discussion that the
philosophers have had about Pascal’s montage.

毕竟,因为没有东西强迫我们突然发动任何行动,因为确实就是在这些突然发动行动中,错误被产生。我们确实能够抑制不要证明这个零的理由,用跟大他者所被牵涉的东西均称的方式。因为我们拥有某件东西充分出现在这个讨论里,关于巴斯卡的面面观,哲学家们曾经有过的讨论。

Namely, that it appears in effect that
the zero represents not the constitutive loss of the bet but, at least in the dialogue
between Pascal and Mere which is not unimportant for the way Pascal writes and at
the same time leads us astray – it is never, of course, without our collaboration –
about the interest of the montage itself.

换句话说,实际上看起来,这个零代表的并不是赌注的输掉,而是关于这个面面观的自身的興趣,至少在巴斯卡与弥尔的对谈之间,这对于巴斯卡所写的方式来说并不重要,同时也引导我们迷失。

Namely, that what dominates, is in effect that
this zero can be the inscription of one of the choices that are offered which is not to sit
down at this table. This is what is done by the person who, in this not simply ideal
but effective dialogue, the one to whom there is addressed this schema o f the wager.
The zero does not mean the constitutive loss of the bet, but inscribes on the table the
“no bet”, namely, the one who does not sit down at the gaming table.
3 aac oo
0 — ‘JCA’O

换句话说,重要的是,作为支配的东西,实际上是,这个零有时是被提供的这些选择的其中一个选择的铭记。这个铭记不应该放置在这个空格里。这就是这个人所做的事情,在这个不仅是理想而且是有效的对谈里,当面对谈的这个人,赌注的0的这个基模被提出。

5.2.69
It is starting from there that we have to question what is produced in the second
matrix to see how, in it, there can be divided up what is involved in the game. In
effect, I already indicated the last time the representations that can be given in the text
of our practice. In truth, I was able to indicate it as rapidly as I did because already a
certain graph of it had been constructed with what I recalled earlier at the beginning of my articulation.

从那里开始,我们必须质疑所被产生东西,在第二个基模里,为了看见,在它里面,游戏所被牵涉到东西被区分。实际上,我上次已经指示这些表象,在我们的实践能够被给予的这些表象。实际上,我能够指示它,如同我以前一样的快速。因为有关它的某个图形已经被建构起来,用我早先所提醒的东西,在我的表达的开始。

Namely, not the hypothesis, but what can be inscribed and hence the
tangible. This means that o itself may well be only the effect of the entry of the life of
man into the game. Pascal warns us about it in these terms no doubt not explicitly
formulated, I mean in the very one that I am going to state: “You are engaged”, he
tells us, and it is true. It does not seem necessary to him, because he grounds himself
on the word, on the word that for him of course is that of the Church.

换句话说,并不是这个假设,而是所能够被铭记,因此也是具体的东西。这意味着,0的本身很有理由仅是人的生命进入这个游戏的结果。巴斯卡警告我们关于它。他用的这些术语无可置疑地并没有明确地被阐释。我指ds我将要陈述的这个术语:「你已经参与其中!」他告诉我们,这是真实的。对他而言,这似乎并不必要,因为他将他自己定位在真理。当然,对于他而言,这个真理就是教会的真理。

It is curious that
he does not distinguish from it what — this is the blind point of centuries that were not
for all that obscurantist — nevertheless provides him with a lot. It is assuredly because of the uneliminatable character of Holy Scripture throughout centuries of thought, that the most radical writing that, for us, appears in it in filigree is not really
distinguished.

耐人寻味的,他并没有跟它区别出来,仍然供应给他的许多东西。这是几世纪的盲点,那几世纪并不赞同所有那个蒙昧主义。这确实是因为圣经具有无法删减的特性,在那几世纪的思想里。即使是最激进的写作,对于我们而言,以精雕细琢的方式出现在它里面,并没有确实地被区别出来。

But if I go looking for the weave of this writing in mathematical logic,
this leaves my position homologous to his, except that, for us, we can no longer avoid
(124) posing the question whether the stake itself is not as such essentially dependent
on this function of writing. Let us observe yet another difference, the one that I put as
an exergue in the first phase of my statements this year and which can be expressed,
since it is not the exact formula, as simply: what I prefer, is a discourse without
words, which means nothing other than this discourse that writing supports.

但是,假如我前往寻找这个写作的编织,用数学的逻辑,那会让我跟他处于类似的立场。除了就我们而言,我们不再能够避免提出这个问题:赌注本身是否也是依靠写作的这个功能。让我们观察另外一个差异,我提出的这个差异,作为是今年我的陈述的第一个部分的题词。因为它并不是确实的公式,它能够被表达作为仅是:我宁可要的东西是没有文字的辞说。这个辞说指的实实在在是书写支持的这个辞说。
Here a little time to measure the import, the line, the absolutely solidary character of
what I am stating at this point this year, with everything that I began to announce
under the triad of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real. Note carefully, and this
is something that should be insisted on, the difference between philosophical
discourse, whatever it may be, and what we are introduced to by this nothing other
that is distinguished by starting from repetition.

在此,我们要一些时间来测量这个意义,这个线条,这个绝对团结的特性,对于我今年的这个时刻正在陈述的东西。用没样我开始宣告的东西,在象征界,想像界与实在界的三角模式。请你们仔细注意,这是某件应该被件被坚持的东西,在无论是哪一种的哲学的辞说,与我们被介绍的东西之间,被这个实实在在就是被区别出来东西,从重复开始的东西。

Philosophical discourse, whatever it may be, always ends up by detaching itself from
what it nevertheless brandishes as a system in the material of language. The whole
philosophical tradition comes up against the refutation by Kant of the ontological
argument; in the name of what? Of the fact that the forms of pure reason, the
transcendental analytic, fall under the influence of an imaginary suspicion, and this
moreover is what constitutes the single objection, it is philosophical, to Pascal’s
wager.

哲学的辞说,无论是什么哲学辞说,结果总是将它自己隔离出来,跟它仍然挥舞作为系统的东西,在语言的材料里。整个的哲学的传统遭遇康德的反驳,有关本体论的论点。以什么的名义呢?有关这个事实:纯粹理性的形式,超验的分析,都遭受想像的怀疑的影响。而且,这是组成单一反对巴斯卡的赌注的东西。那是哲学的反对。

“This God whose existence you may conceive to be necessary, says Kant, it
nevertheless remains that you only conceive o f him in the framework o f a thinking that is only based on the prior suspense from which there comes the aesthetic” qualified on this occasion as transcendental. This means nothing other than: you cannot state anything, state anything in words, except in the time and in the space whose existence, by philosophical convention, we put in suspense in so far as it is supposed to be radical.

「康德说,你们构想是必要的上帝的存在。这个问题仍然是,你们仅是构想他,在思想的架构里,这个思想仅是以先前段悬置作为基础,美学就来自这个先前的悬置。」在这个场合,这个美学的特质作为是超验的美学。这指的实实在在就是,你们能够陈述任何事情,用文字陈述任何事情,除了在这个时刻,在这个空间,根据哲学的传统,它的存在,我们反置在悬置当中,因为它被认为是激进的。

Only there is a problem, and this is what gives Pascal’s wager its interest. That is why
I will permit myself, whatever people may think about having recourse to outworn
ideas, to find in it an exemplary turning point. The fact is that in no case is the God of
Pascal to be put in question on the imaginary plane because it is not the God of
philosophers; it is not even the God of any knowledge. We do not know, writes
Pascal, either what he is, of course, or even if he is. This indeed is why there is no
way of leaving Him in abeyance by means of any philosophy, because it is not
philosophy that grounds him.

只是有个难题在那里,这就是为什么巴斯卡的赌注会引起它的興趣。那就是为什么我容许自己在它那里找到一个典范的转捩点。事实是,巴斯卡的上帝绝对无法被质疑,在想像的层次,因为它并非是哲学家们的上帝,它甚至不是任何知识的上帝。巴斯卡写道,我们并不知道,上帝是什么,当然,要不然就是即使上帝存在,我们也不知道。这确实是为什么我们不可能将上帝留在搁置当中,凭借任何哲学。因为作为上帝的基础并非是哲学。

Now what is at stake and what my discourse in particular means, when I take up again
that of Freud, is very precisely that in grounding myself on what this discourse has
opened up, it is essentially distinguished from philosophical discourse, in the fact that
it is not detached from what we are caught up and engaged in, as Pascal says. But
tha^ rather than making use of a discourse, when all is said and done, to fix its law to
the world, its norms to history or inversely, it puts itself at this place where first of all
(125) the thinking subject perceives that he can only recognise himself as an effect of
language. In other words that before being thinking, to go quickly, to pinpoint in the
shortest possible way what I am in the process of saying, once you set up the gaming
table, and God knows if it has already been set up, he is first of all o. And it is
afterwards that the question is posed of harmonising with it the fact that he thinks.

现在岌岌可危的是,特别是我的辞说的意义,当我再次探讨弗洛伊德的辞说。那确实是,当我将我自己定位在这个辞说所展开的东西,它基本上被区别出来,跟哲学的辞说区别出来。事实上,它并没有跟我们被套陷与参与的东西隔离开来,如同巴斯卡所说的。但是,它非但没有利用一个辞说,当一切都说都做了,为了将它的法则固定到这个世界,将它的名称固定到历史,或是颠倒过来固定。它将它自己放置在这个地方:首先,思想的主体感知,他仅能够体认它自己,作为是语言的结果。换句话说,在生命实存之前,思想,很快地进行,用尽肯简短的方式,强调我的生命的意义,在言说的过程。一旦你建立起游戏的表格,上帝知道,它是否已经被建立。上帝就是首先的这个0。后来,要将上帝会思维的这个事实相和谐的这个问题才被提出,

雄伯译
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