分析家作为欲望的客体

THE ANALYST AS OBJECT OF DESIRE
分析家作为欲望的客体

Lacan’s rekindling of Freud’s ‘rule of abstinence’ as a symbolic,
intersubjective relationship between the subject of the analysand and the
analyst as Other subject subsisted until the late 1950s. It gave way to an
entirely different conception of the analyst’s position when Lacan realized
that the analyst’s functioning as Other subject is not a sufficient guarantee
for excluding the occurrence of identifications between analyst and
analysand, or for preventing the deterioration of the analytic treatment
into a reciprocal working alliance. The following passage from Seminar V
betrays Lacan’s mercurial self-criticism concerning the symbolic
relationship between the subject and the Other:

拉康重新启示弗洛伊德的“节制的规则”,作为是象征,互为主体性的关系,处于分析者的主体,与作为大他者主体的分析家之间的关系。这个重新启示一直维持到1950年代,才被取代,由分析家的地位的具有完全不同的观念取代。当拉康体会到,分析家的充当大他者主体的功能,并不是充分的保证,作为排除认同的发生,处于分析家与分析者之间的认同的发生。或作为阻止精神分析的关系的恶化成为互惠的运作的联盟。从第四研讨班的以下的段落,显露出拉康的敏捷的自我批判,关于主体与大他者之间的象征的关系。

[T]he distinction between the Other and himself [the subject] is
initially the most difficult distinction to make…These two modes
of ambiguity, these two limits—that which is situated on the
imaginary level and the one belonging to the symbolic order,
through which desire is founded in the speech of the Other—these
two modes of crossing which imply that the subject alienates
himself, do not coincide…Yet there is always the question as to
what happens when these subjects are two of a kind, that is to say,
when the subject is supporting itself in the presence of the Other.
(Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:357–358)

大他者与他自己(主体)之间的区别最初是最困难作的区别。这两个模糊嗳昧的模式,这两个限制—被定位在想像的层次与属于象征秩序的层次—这两个交会的模式暗示着,主体异化他自己,并没有巧合。可是,总是存在着这个问题,关于发生的事情,当这两个主体是属于相同种类的主体。换句话说,当主体正在支持它自己,在大他者的面前。

Here Lacan acknowledged that a relationship between two subjects,
despite one of them being in the position of Other, is as much open to
reciprocal solidarity as an imaginary bond between two egos. Although
the result may be a symbolic instead of an imaginary identification, it is
much the same problem.32 The issue is illustrated by a common experience
of analysts who insist that the patient comply with the rule of free
association.

在此,拉康承认,处于两个主体之间的关系,尽管其中一位处于大他者的立场。这个关系同样开发给互惠的团聚,如同想像的盟约,处于两个自我之间。虽然这个结果可能是象征,而不是想像的认同。这是相同的难体。这个问题由精神分析家的共同经验来说明。这位精神分析家坚持,病人应该同意自由联想的规则。

The more they demand that the patient comply with the
ground rule the more they encounter ‘resistance’, in the form of a
reciprocal demand of the patient that the analyst speak, or a general
unwillingness to cooperate.33 In Seminar V Lacan exemplified this by
referring to what happens when a mother (as Other subject) demands
something of her child (as subject). Before long, the child discovers that
its possession of what the Other is asking for equips it with the power to
return the question: You want me to give what I have, but I will only give
it to you if you are willing to give me what you have first. ‘On the level
of demand’, Lacan stated, ‘the subject and the Other are in a situation of
reciprocity’ (ibid.: 359). Seeking to overcome this deadlock, Lacan started
to insist on the crucial importance of the Other’s desire:

分析家越是要求病人应该同意这个基本规则,他们越是遭遇到“抗拒”,用病人的互惠的要求的形式,病人要求精神分析家言说,或病人通常不愿意合作。在第四研讨班,拉康提到一个发生的例子说明。当一位母亲(作为大者主体),要求某件属于小孩的东西(作为主体)。不久,小孩发现,它拥有大他者要求的东西,让它具有这个权力来回应这个问题:你要我给予我拥有的东西,但是我将仅是给出它,假如你愿意给予我,你首先拥有的东西。“在要求的层次”,拉康陈述,“主体与大他者处于互惠的情境”。当拉康尝试克服这个僵局时,他开始坚持大他者的欲望的这个关键的重要性。

What I would like to draw your attention to, is the function of this
desire of the Other, insofar as it makes it possible for the distinction
between the subject and the Other to establish itself once and for
all …What needs to be introduced and what is there from the start,
latent from the beginning, is that, beyond what the subject demands
and what the Other demands from the subject, there is the necessary
presence and dimension of what the Other desires.
(ibid.: 359, italics added)

我想要吸引你们注意的东西是,大他者的欲望的这个功能。因为它让这个区别成为可能,主体与大他者之间的区别,为了一劳永逸地建立它自己。所需要被介绍的东西,与从一开始就存在那里的东西,从一开始就潜在的东西是:超越主体的要求的东西,与大他者从主体要求东东西,必然存在着大他者欲望的东西的维度。

In Lacan’s theory of the late 1950s, desire originated in the human
being’s incapability to express its vital, biological needs through the
linguistic function of demand. Because human beings grow up in a
symbolic world, they are pushed to employ language as a means for
conveying their needs to others. A child does not simply act upon its
bodily processes when it is hungry, it makes its need clear to an Other by
demanding food—whether intentionally and independently, or primarily
through the Other’s reading of the child’s conduct. The same holds for
the Other, who does not merely supply the food the child is asking for,
but who demands that the child allow itself to be fed (Lacan 1991b[1960–
61]:238).

在拉康1950年代晚期的理论,欲望起源于人类的没有能力表达它的生命的生物的需要,凭借要求的语言的功能。因为人们成长于象征的世界里,他们被迫运用语言,作为工具,来传达他们的需要给别人。小孩并不仅根据它的身体的过程来行动,当它饥饿时。小孩让它的需要让大他者知道,凭借要求食物—无论是意图地与独立地,或是主要是经由大他者阅读小孩的行为。相同的道理适用于大他者。大他者并不仅是供应小孩正在要求的食物,而且大他者要求,小孩应该容许它自己被餵食。

Yet when a subject raises its biological need to the level of
demand, the need cannot be articulated fully in the signifiers of the
subject’s language, for language can only inappropriately represent that
which is essentially beyond it. Lacan put this discordance between need
and demand on a par with Freud’s concept of primal repression (Freud
1915d) arguing, in accordance with Freud’s idea of the dynamic
unconscious, that the repressed inarticulate part of the need will put out
a new sprout (rejeton), which ‘presents itself in man as desire’ (Lacan
1977j[1958]:286). Hence, desire is what stems from the leftover need
after it has been articulated in the signifiers of a demand.34

可是,当主体将它的生物的需要提升到要求的层次,这个需要无法充分地被表达,用主体的语言的能指。因为语言仅能够不合适地代表基本上是超越它的东西。拉康将需要与要求之间的不协调,跟弗洛伊德的原初的压抑的主张相提并论。以符合弗洛伊德的动力结构的无意识。需要的被压抑的无法表达的部分将产生一个新的奔放。这个新的奔放呈现它自己,在人的身上,作为欲望。因此,欲望就是起源于这个残存的需要,在需要已经被表达之后,在要求的能指里。

As if this explanation proved unsatisfactory, Lacan revealed yet another
source of desire.35 Probing further into the nature of human demand,
Lacan arrived at the conclusion that a vital need is not the only factor
triggering it.

好像这个解释证明并不令人满意,拉康揭露欲望的另外一个来源。当拉康更加深入地探索人类要求的特性时,他获得这个结论:生命的需要并不是触动需要的唯一的因素。

Apart from specific objects which can satisfy their primary
physiological necessities, people also demand something much more
insubstantial, which can be called ‘love’. In this case, the object becomes
less important than the Other’s act of giving it, which the subject perceives
as an indication of the Other’s affection. When demanding something, a
subject is thus not only pressing for the satisfaction of its needs, it is also
questioning the love of the Other, even to the extent that the subject will
be happy to accept anything as long as it testifies to the Other’s loving
concern. In this way the subject’s demand for what the Other possesses,
an object that is capable of satisfying the subject’s needs, is transformed
into a demand for what the Other does not possess as an exchangeable
object.36

除了能够满足他们的原初的生理的需求的明确的客体之外,人们也要求某件更加是抽象的东西,它可以被称为是”爱“。在这个情况,客体变得不像大他者的给予它的行动那么重要。主体感知大他者给予它的行动,作为是大他者的情感的指示。当主体要求大他者时,主体因此不但强迫要求它的欲望的满足,它也询问大他者的爱。甚至,主体将会快乐地接受任何东西,只有它证实是大他者的爱的关心。用这个方式,主体要求大他者所拥有的东西,能够满足这主体的需要的的客体,被转化成为是要求大他者并没有拥有的东西,作为是可以被交换的客体。

Similar to the residue produced by the transformation of a need into a
demand, Lacan believed that the transition from the demand for a material
object to the demand for love generates a rest. In the demand for love the
particularity of the object is annihilated, but the object itself does not
disappear.37 When the demand for an object becomes a demand for love
(and, in a sense, demand always already includes this dimension), the object
is no longer appreciated for its intrinsic qualities or its use value, but acquires
a higher status, incorporating a surplus value.38 The object in an exchange
governed by a demand for love might be something completely useless,
indeed it can be ‘a piece of shit’, but for the partners involved this essentially
worthless object will be invaluable as a proof of love. Whereas the demand
for love appears to relinquish the objects that feature prominently in the
demand for the satisfaction of a need, the former is not a pure negation of
the latter, but rather an obliteration (ibid.: 287). According to Lacan, the
residue of the object, after the annulment of its particularity by the demand
for love, constituted the ‘absolute condition’ for desire:

类似于这个残渣,需要转化成为要求所产生的残渣,拉康相信:从要求物质的客体,转换成为爱的要求,产生一个停顿。在对爱的要求里,客体的特殊性被毁灭。但是客体的自身并没有消失。当对于客体的要求变成熟对爱的要求(从某个意义言,要求总是已经包含这个维度)。客体不再是被欣赏,因为它的内在的品质,或是它的使用价值。客体获得更高的地位,合并一个剩余价值。在交换里被爱的要求统辖的客体,可能是某件完全没有用途的东西。的确,它可能是一件“无拥之物”,但是对于被牵涉的伴侣,这个基本上没有价值的客体,将是无价之宝,作为是爱的证明。虽然爱的要求似乎放弃这些客体,主要是作为特征的客体,在要求需求的满足。前者并不是纯粹否定后者。相反地,前者抹除后者。依照拉康,客体的残渣,经过它的特殊性的宣告无效,被爱的要求,则是组成对于欲望的“绝对的条件”。

[T]his condition indeed brings to a denouement the aversion which
the proof of love has to the satisfaction of a need. Thus desire is
neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but
the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the
second, the phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung).
(ibid.: 287, translation modified)

这个绝对条件确实造成这样的结局:爱的证据厌恶需要的满足。因此,欲望既不是对于满足的欲望,也不是对于爱的要求。而是从欲望的满足,扣除爱的要求的差异,欲望的满足与爱的要求之间的分裂的现象。

The crucial point of this paragraph is that desire, unlike need and demand,
never balances towards an object, whether a concrete object of satisfaction
or the ‘anything and nothing’ of love. Contrary to need and demand, desire
derives its power from the priceless remainder of an object after it has been
accommodated within the symbolic register. In the context of Seminar V
(1998b[1957–58]), Lacan expressed the same idea when he said that desire
is born from the (object of) jouissance that is lost through symbolic
castration.39 Objects functioning in the realms of need and demand have an
assuaging, quenching effect, whilst objects in the realm of desire only serve
to sustain it. With this conceptualization of desire, as a power beyond need
and demand, Lacan revised his original schema of analytic intersubjectivity,
newly designating the relationship between patient and analyst as a ‘subjective
disparity’ which revolves around the desire of the analyst.

这个段落的关键重点是,不像需要与要求,欲望从来不是朝向客体的平衡。无论是满足的具体的客体,或是爱的任何东西与爱的空无。跟需要与要求恰恰相反,欲望获得它的力量,从客体的珍贵的残余物,在欲望欲望已经被接纳在象征的铭记内部之后。在第四研讨班,拉康表达相同的观念,当他说,欲望诞生于欢爽的这个客体,由于象征的阉割而失落的欢爽的客体。在需要与要求的领域发挥功能的那些客体,具有舒缓,止渴的效果。而在欲望的领域的那些客体,仅是充当维持欲望的功能。拉康将欲望如此构成观念,作为是超越需要与要求的力量时,他重新订正他的原先的”互为主体性“的基型。他重新指明病人与精神分析家之间的关系,作为是”主体的不一致“。这个主体的不一致环绕精神分析家的欲望旋转。

Lacan’s promotion of ‘subjective disparity’ within analytic treatment
coincided with his discussion of transference in Seminar VIII. In the
opening lesson of this Seminar he explained his decision to introduce
the notion of ‘subjective disparity’ by disclosing his eagerness to find a
proper term to describe the opposite of intersubjectivity. Although he
himself had advocated intersubjectivity time and again as the only way
forward in psychoanalysis, now he could only see the drawbacks of his
former prodigy (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:20–22, 233).

在精神分析的治疗,拉康的提倡“主体的不一致“,恰合于在第八研讨班,他对于移情的讨论。在这个研讨班的开始的几堂,拉康解释他的决定,要介绍”主体的不一致“的观念。他显露他的渴望,要找到一个合适的术语,来描述互为主体性的这个对立。虽然拉康自己经常主张互为主体性,作为是唯一前进的途径,在精神分析里。现在,拉康则仅是看出他先前的宏观的挫折。

As described on
p. 70, Lacan had already broached the pitfalls of intersubjectivity in
Seminar V within the context of a critical discussion on reciprocity. Now,
in Seminar VIII, he added that transference itself runs counter to
intersubjectivity, inasmuch as the position of those involved in a
transference relationship is by no means equivalent (ibid.: 233).40 In the
‘pseudo-situation’ of the analytic treatment—as Lacan described it in
Seminar VIII—subjective disparity reigns because the patient’s demand
(for help, advice, happiness, etc.) does not meet a reciprocal demand
(for letting oneself be cured) in the analyst. The analyst’s policy does
not hinge on a demand, but on a specific desire.

如同在第10页所描述的,拉康已经将第四研讨班时的互为主体性的陷阱粗略描绘,在批判地讨论互为主体性的内文里。现在,在第八研讨班,他补充说:移情的本身跟互为主体性并行不悖。因为牵涉到移情关系里的那些人们的立场,绝非是平等的。在精神分析治疗的“虚假-情境”—如同拉康在第八研讨班描述它—主体的不一致统辖一切,因为病人的要求(帮助,劝告,快乐,等等),并没有满足在精神分析家身上的互惠的要求(要求让自己被治疗)。精神分析家的政策并没有悬置在要求,而是悬置在明确的欲望。

The concept of the desire of the analyst appeared for the first time in
‘The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power’
(1977i[1958]:252), one of Lacan’s most clinically informed writings from
the 1950s. Fulminating, yet again, against the deplorable clinical conduct
of his contemporaries, Lacan underscored that analysts should be
concerned with the direction of the treatment and not with the direction
of their patients (ibid.: 227).

精神分析家的欲望的观念,首次出现在“治疗的方向与治疗的力量的原则”。那是一篇最具有临床资讯的著作,从1950年代开始。拉康再次猛烈抨击他的当代的精神分析家的令人悲叹的临床行径。拉康强调,精神分析家应该关注治疗的引导,而不是关注他们的病人的引导。

Directing the treatment implied that besides
the patient, the analyst too has to pay for what is happening, notably in a
triple fashion. First of all, the analyst has to pay the analysand with words
taking the form of analytic interpretations.41 Second, analysts must tolerate
their being invested by analysands with all the strengths and weaknesses
of the significant others in the analysand’s experience. This is what Freud
described in ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ (1912b) as the libidinal
cathexis of the analyst by the analysand, through which the analyst is
inscribed, qua form and contents, within one of the analysand’s psychic
series.

治疗的引导暗示着,除了病人之外,精神分析家也必须付出代价,对于正在发生的事情。特别是用三重的形式。首先,精神分析家必须付给分析者,使用精神分析的解释的形态。其次,精神分析家必须容忍他们自己被分析者投注所有的力量与弱点,在分析者的经验里,她的重要的他人的力量与弱点。这就是弗洛伊德所描述的,在“移情的动力结构”,作为是精神分析家的生命的力比多受到分析者的倾注。经有这个力比多的倾注,精神分析家被铭记,作为形式与内容,被铭记在分析者的心灵的感觉内部。

In Lacan’s terminology, it meant that an analysand’s transference
dispossesses the analyst of his identity, and that the analyst’s proper
handling of the transference entails that he is willing to pay for analysis
with his person. Finally, and most significantly, Lacan was also convinced
that analysts have to pay with a judgement on the nature of their action,
all the more so that to them the precise nature of analytic effectiveness
generally remains a mystery too. In ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ he
explained that whereas the first two payments relate to what the analyst
says and does, the third corresponds to what the analyst is, i.e. to the
analyst’s being (Lacan 1977i[1958]:227–228, 250–256).

使用拉康的术语来说,这个力比多的倾注意味著,分析者的移情,替精神分析家剥除他的身份。精神分析家的合适的处理移情意味著,精神分析家愿意用他的个人生命付出精神分析的代价。最后,而且最重要地,拉康也相信,精神分析家必须付出代价,用对于他们的行动的特性的判断。更加是如此的状况,这样,对于他们,精神分析的有效性的明确的特性,通常始终也保持是神秘。在“治疗的引导”一文,拉康解释,虽然前两个付出,跟精神分析家的所说所为息息相关,第三个付出,则是对应于精神分析家的生命实存,也就是,对应于精神分析家的生命的本质。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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