Ethics 35

Ethics 35
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

III
Rereading the Entwurf
第三章 重新阅读“规划”

AN ETHICS NOT A PSYCHOLOGY
伦理学,而非心理学
HOW REALITY IS CONSTITUTED
现实如何被构造
A TOPOLOGY OF SUBJECTIVITY
主体的拓扑学

I have up till now taken account of a number of points in Freud’s work. And
last time you saw how I was led in particular to refer to that curiously situated
work, the Entwurf.

迄今,我曾经考虑到弗洛依德著作里的许多观点。上次,你们看见我如何被引导,特别地提到那个耐人寻味地被定义的著作们“规划”。

You are aware of the reservations that one might have relative to the correspondence
with Fliess. It is not a work as such; the text we have isn’t
complete. But it is certainly extremely valuable, and especially its supplementary
material, among which the Entwurf has a special place.

你们知道我们可能会有所保留,关于弗洛伊德跟弗利斯的通信。这并不是著作本身,而是我们拥有的文本并不完整。但是这确实极端有价值的。特别是它的补充的材料。其中,“规划”具有特别的地位。

1
The Entwurf is very revealing of a kind of substructure of Freud’s thought.
Its obvious relationship to all the formulations of his experience that Freud
was led to offer subsequently makes it especially precious.

在弗洛依德的思想的同类的的次级结构,“规划”非其具有启示作用。它更弗洛依德随后被引导提供的他的经验的所有的阐述,具有明显的关系。这让它特别珍贵。

What I had to say about it last time expressed well enough the way in
which it will appear in my commentary this year. Contrary to received opinion,
I believe that the opposition between the pleasure principle and the reality
principle or between the primary process and the secondary process concerns
not so much the sphere of psychology as that of ethics properly speaking.

上次,我必须谈论到它,足够清楚地表达这个方式,它在我今年的评论出现的方式。跟通俗的意见恰恰相反,我相信,快乐原则与现实原则之间的对立,或原初过程与次级过程之间的对立,牵涉到的并不是心理学的领域,恰当而言,而是伦理学的领域。

There was in Freud the perception of the proper dimension in which human
action unfolds. And in the appearance of an ideal of mechanistic reduction
acknowledged in the Entwurf, one should simply see a compensatory movement
or the other face of Freud’s discovery of the fact of neurosis, which is
from the beginning seen in that ethical dimension where it is, in effect, situated.

在弗洛依德,存在着恰当维的的感知,在那里,人类的行动展开。在“规划”一书里,被承认的简化成为机械的理想的出现。我们应该仅是看见一个补偿的运动,或是另外一个脸孔,当弗洛依德发现神经症的事实。从一开始,神经症就被看待,从伦理学的维度。实际上,神经症就被定位在伦理学的维度。

The proof of this is in the fact that conflict is in the foreground, and
that from the outset this conflict concerns the moral order in what we might
call a massive way.

这个论点的证据在于这个事实:冲突在于前景。从一开始,这个冲突就牵涉到道德秩序,用我们所谓的巨大的方式。

That’s not such a novelty. Every builder of an ethics has had to face the
same problem. It is, in fact, in this connection that it is interesting to write a
history, or a genealogy, of morals. Not in Nietzsche’s sense, but as a series
of ethical systems, i.e., of theoretical reflection on moral experience. That
way one understands the central significance of problems that have been posed
since the beginning and that have been pursued with a notable constancy.

那并不足以如此新奇。伦理学的每位建构者都曾经必须面对相同的难题。实际上,就是关于这一点,书写道德的历史,或系谱学,是多么有趣。不是尼采所谓的“道德系谱学”,而是一系列的伦理学的系统。譬如,理论的反思道德的经验。以那种方式,我们理解到从一开始曾经被提出的那些难题的中心的意义。这些难题曾经被探寻,特别是持续不断地。

After all, why is it necessary that thinkers in the field of ethics always
return to the ethical problem of the relation of pleasure to the final good,
whenever the guidance of human action from a moral point of view is concerned?
Why do they always return to this same theme of pleasure?

毕竟,为什么这是必要的?在伦理学的领域的思想家总是回转到伦理学的难题,对于快乐跟最后的善的关系。每当人类行动的引导被牵涉到,从道德的观点。为什么他们总是回转到快乐的相同的主题?

How
does one explain that internal demand which constrains the ethical philosopher
to try to reduce the antimonies associated with this theme? – from the
fact that pleasure appears in many cases to be the end which is in opposition
to moral effort, but that the latter has nevertheless to locate its ultimate point
of reference there, a point of reference to which the good that is supposed to
orient human action is finally reduced.

我们如何解释,内部的要求限制伦理学的哲学家去尝试简化跟这个主题息息相关的对立?根据这个事实,快乐出现在许多状况里,成为跟道德对立的东西。但是道德的努力却仍然必须定位它的最后的指称点的位置在快乐那里。被认为是定向人类的行动的善,最后还是简化成为一个快乐的指称点。

That’s an example, and by no means
the only one, of the kind of knot which one comes upon in solutions to the
problem. It is instructive for us to see the constancy with which the problem
of conflict is posed within every discussion of morals.

那是这种环结的一个例子,而且决非是唯一的例子。我们遭遇的这种环结,当我们解决这个难题时。让我们看出这个经常次数具有启发性,冲突的这个难题经常次数地被提出,在道德的每次的讨论里。

Freud in this respect appears as no more than a descendent. Yet he contributes
something unmatched in significance, something that has changed
the problems of the ethical perspective for us to a degree that we are not yet
aware of. That is why we need reference points, and I have already alluded
to some of those that we will need to take account of this year.

从这个观点,弗洛依德出现,作为仅是一位传承者。可是,他贡献某件在重要性无与伦比的东西,这个东西改变我们对于伦理学的观点的难题,甚至,我们还没有知道的程度。那就是为什么我们需要许多指称点。我已经提到有一些的指称点,我们今年将需要考虑到的指称点。

One has to choose, since I don’t intend to highlight all those writers who
have discussed morals. I have discussed Aristotle because I believe that the
Nicomachean Ethics is properly speaking the first book to be organized around
the problem of an ethics. As you know, there are plenty of others around,
before, after, and in Aristotle’s work itself, who focus primarily on the problemn
of pleasure. I will not be referring to Epictetus or Seneca here, but I
will be discussing utilitarian theory insofar as it is significant for the new
direction which culminated in Freud.

我们必须选择,因为我并没有意图要强调所有那些曾经讨论过道德的作者。我曾经讨论过亚里斯多德,因为我相信,“亚里斯多德伦理学”恰当而言,是环绕伦理学的难题组织的第一本书。你们知道,以前或以后,还有许多其他的书环绕伦理学的这个难题。在亚里斯多德的著作本身,他最初专注于快乐的难题。我在此将不提到伊壁鸠鲁或西尼卡。但是我将讨论的功利主义的理论,因为这是非常重要的,对于在弗洛依德那里登峰造极的方向。

I will indicate today the interest of the analysis I will be giving of certain
works in the same terms that Freud used in the Entwurf, when he designated
something which, to my mind at least, is close to the language that I have
taught you over the years to pay attention to in the functioning of the primary
process, namely, Bahnung or facilitation.

今天,我将指示分析的这个興趣,我将给予某些著作的分析,用跟弗洛依德在“规划”里使用的相同的术语,当他指明某件东西。至少依照我的想法,这个东西靠近我过去几年来我曾经教导你们要密切注意的语言。在原初的过程的功能,换句话说,实用性或方便性。

As far as the statement of the problem of ethics is concerned, Freud’s
discourse facilitates something that allows us to go further than anyone has
gone before in a domain that is essential to the problems of morality. That
will be the inspiration for our discussion this year; it is around the term
reality in the true meaning of the word – a term we always use in such a
careless way – that the power of Freud’s conception is situated. And it is a
power that one can measure through the persistence of Freud’s name in the
development of our analytical activity.

就伦理学的难题的陈述而言,弗洛依德的辞说让某件东西成为方便,这个东西让我们能够更加深入,比起先前曾经进入的任何人,这个领域基本上是道德的难题。那将会是我们今年的讨论的启发。就是环绕“现实”的这个术语,在这个字词的真实的意义—我们总是用粗心的方式使用这一个术语—弗洛依德的观念的力量被定位在那里。我们能够测量这一个力量,凭借弗洛依德的名字持续存在于我们精神分析活动的发展里。

It is obvious that it is not the poor little contribution to a physiology of
fantasy involved, which explains the passionate interest we might take in
reading the Entwurf.

显而易见,并不是这个可怜的小贡献,对于牵涉到的幻想的生理学的贡献,解释这个激情的興趣,我们对于阅读“规划”的产生的興趣。

You will no doubt be told that this text is difficult, but it is also exciting.
Not so much in French as in German, for the French translation is extraordinarily
awkward. It is wanting in precision, emphasis, and resonance
throughout. In brief, I am obliged to evoke or to provoke at this point the
sense of regret some of you may have that you don’t know German.

你们无可置疑地将会被告上,这个文本是困难的,但是这个文本也令人興趣盎然。不是法文版,而是德文版。因为法文版的翻译特别笨拙。从头到尾欠缺准确性,强调与共鸣。总之,我不得不在这一点召唤,或提醒遗憾的感觉,你们有些人们可能会有的遗憾,你们不懂德文。

In German
it is a brilliant, pure text; it suggests a virgin source and is altogether
remarkable. The outlines of the French translation obliterate that and make
it grey. Make the effort to read it and you will realize how true my comment
is that one finds there something very different from a work constructed of
hypotheses. It is Freud’s first skirmish with that hyperbole of reality he had
to deal with in his patients.

在德文版,这是辉煌,纯粹的文本。它暗示一个原初的来源,它完全引人注意。法文版的翻译的钢要抹除那种辉煌,让它黯然无光。假如你们努力阅读它,你们将会体会到我的评论是多么真实。我们在那里发现某件非常不同的东西,跟用假设建构的著作。这是弗洛依德的首次伏击,用现实的那个夸张,他在病人身上必须要处理的现实的夸张。

There we have it; around forty years old he
discovers the true dimensions, the profoundly meaningful life, of that reality.
It is not out of a vain concern to refer you to a text that I draw your
attention to the Entwurf. Yet why not, after all? You all know that on occasion
I know how to take liberties with Freud’s texts and affirm my distance.

在那里,我们拥有它。大约四十岁时,弗洛依德发现这个真实的维度,深刻具有意义的生活,那个现实的生活。我跟你们提到一个文本,动机并不是出于徒劳的关心,我提醒你们注意“规划”这个文本。可是,有何不可呢?毕竟?你们都知道,有时,我知道如何大胆使用弗洛依德的文本,并且肯定我的距离。

If for example I have taught you the doctrine of the dominance of a signifier
in a subject’s unconscious chain, it is so as to emphasize certain characteristics
of our experience. By virtue of a distinction that I don’t fully agree with,
a distinction that does nevertheless express something, the paper we heard
last night called the above “the experience of the content.” And it affirmed
in opposition to it the scaffolding of concepts. Well now, this year I am proposing
not simply to be faithful to the text of Freud and to be its exegete, as
if it were the source of an unchanging truth that was the model, mold and
dress code to be imposed on all our experience.

譬如,我曾经教导你们,在主体的无意识的锁链,能指作为统辖的信条。那是为了强调我们的精神分析经验的某些的特性。凭借这个区别,我并不完全同意的区别。可是,这一个区别确实表达某件东西。昨天晚上,我们听见的那篇论文称呼以上的东西为“内容的经验”。跟它对立地,它肯定观念的基架。呵呵,今年,我正在建议,不仅是要忠实于弗洛依德的文本,而且要忠实于它的正版诠释。好像那是永远不会改变的真理的来源,作为榜样,模式与服装尺码,应该被赋加于我们所有的经验上。

What are we going to do? We are going to look for the phylum and the
development of the concepts in Freud – in the Entwurf, in Chapter VII of
the Traumdeutung – where he publishes for the first time the opposition between
the primary and the secondary processes, and his conception of the relationship
between the conscious, the preconscious and the unconscious – in the
introduction of narcissism into this economy; then in what is called the second
topic, with its emphasis on the reciprocal functioning of the ego, the
superego and the outside world, which gives a complete expression to things
that we may have glimpsed as new shoots in the Entwurf; and finally in the
later texts that are still centered around the same theme, “How is reality
constituted for man?”, namely, in the 1925 article on Vemeinung, which we
will look at again together, and in Civilization and Its Discontents, the discontents
of man’s situation in the world. The German term is Kultur, and we
will perhaps have to try to define its exact meaning in Freud’s writings. He
never takes over concepts in a neutral, conventional sense; a concept has
always for him a fully assumed significance.

我们将要如何做?我们将要寻找弗洛依德的观念的相关来源与发展。在“规划”,在“梦的解析”的第七章—在那里,弗洛依德首次出版原初与次级过程的对立,以及意识,前意识,与无意识之间的关系的观念。他将自恋介绍进入这种经济活力。然后,在所谓的第二个议题,它强调自我,超我,与外在世界的互惠的功能。这给予完整地表达那些事情,我们曾经瞥见的事情,作为是“规划”一书的新的观念。最后在后来的文本,依旧专注于相同的主题。「对于人,现实如何被构成?」换句话说,在1925年论“否定”的文章,我们将再次阅读那篇文章。然后在“文明及其不满”,人对于世界的情况的不满。德文的版本是Kultur 。我们或许将必须尝试定义它的确实的意义,在弗洛依德的著作里。他从来没有接管这些观念,用中立,传统的意义。这一个观念对于他而言,总是拥有意义。

It turns out then that if we are following so closely the development of
Freud’s metapsychology this year, it is in order to uncover the traces of a
theory that reflects an ethical thought. The latter is, in fact, at the center of
our work as analysts, however difficult it may be to realize it fully, and it is
also the latter which holds together all those who constitute the analytic community
– that dispersion, which often gives the impression of being a mere
scattering, of a fundamental intuition that is taken up by each one of us from
one perspective or another.

因此,结果证明是,假如我们今年,正在如此仔细地追寻弗洛依德的形上心理学的发展。那是为了挖掘反映伦理学的思想的痕迹。实际上,后者处于我们作为精神分析家的工作的核心,无论要彻底实现它是多么的困难。也是后者将所有那些人们聚集一块,那些形成精神分析社团的那些人们。那种扩散经常给予这个印象,仅是散开的印象,基本的直觉的印象,被我们每个人从事的基本的直觉,被我们每个人,从某个观点。

If we always return to Freud, it is because he started out with an initial,
central intuition, which is ethical in kind. I believe it essential to emphasize
that, if we are to understand our experience and animate it, and if we are not
to lose our way and allow it to be degraded. That’s the reason why I am
tackling this subject this year.

假如我们总是回答弗洛依德,那是因为他开始具有一个最初,中心的直觉,属于伦理学的直觉。我相信这是非常重于的,要强调那一点,假如我们想要理解我们的精神分析经验,并且激发它的生命力。假如我们并不想要迷失我们的途径,并且让它堕落下去。那就是这个理由,为什么今年我正在克服这个主题。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s


%d bloggers like this: