Ethics 7

Ethics 7
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Outline of the seminar
研讨纲要
THE ATTRACTION OF TRANSGRESSION
逾越的吸引力

FROM ARISTOTLE TO FREUD
从亚里斯多德到弗洛依德
THE REAL
实在界
THE THREE IDEALS
三个理想

Will it or will it not submit itself to the duty that it feels within like a
stranger, beyond, at another level? Should it or should it not submit itself to
the half-unconscious, paradoxical, and morbid command of the superego,
whose jurisdiction is moreover revealed increasingly as the analytical exploration
goes forward and the patient sees that he is committed to its path?

这个“我”会不会让自己承受这个责任？它内部感受到的责任，就像一位陌生人，来自超越界，在另外一个层面。这个“我”应该或不应该让自己承受超我的这个半意识，悖论的，病态的命令？而且，这位超我的统辖权逐渐被显示出来，随着精神分析的探险前进，病人看见，他专注于超我的统辖的途径？

If I may put it thus, isn’t its true duty to oppose that command? One finds
here something which belongs to the givens of our experience as well as to
the givens of preanalysis. It is enough to see how the experience of an obsessional
is structured at the beginning to know that the enigma concerning the
term “duty” as such is always already formulated even before he formulates
the demand for help, which is what he goes into analysis for.

因此请容许我这样表达。这难道不是真实的吗？这个“我”的真实的责任就是要反对那个命令？我们在此发现某件属于我们精神分析经验的特定的东西，以及前分析的特定的东西。我们只要看出就足够了，只要看出，一位妄想症者的经验开始时如何被架构，为了要知道这个关于“责任”自身的术语的谜团，总是已经被阐释，甚至在他阐释呼救的要求。那就是为什么他前去做分析.

In truth, although the response to the problem that we are proposing here
is obviously illustrated in the conflict of an obsessional, it nevertheless has a
universal validity; that is why there are different ethics and there is ethical
thought. It is not simply the philosopher’s thought alone that seeks to justify
duty, that duty on which we have shed a variety of light – genetical and
originary, for example. The justification of that which presents itself with an
immediate feeling of obligation, the justification of duty as such – not simply
in one or other of its commands, but in the form imposed – is at the heart of
an inquiry that is universal.

实际上，虽然对于这个难题的回应，我们在此正在建议的难题，显而易见地被阐述在妄想症者的冲突。它仍然具有普世的正确性。那就是为什么会有不同的伦理学，会有伦理学的思想。不光是有哲学家的思想尝试证明责任，对于这个责任，我们已经给予各色各样的启明—譬如，基因的责任，针对祖先的责任。呈现它自己具有当下的义务的感觉的理由，责任本身的理由—不仅是在它的其中一个命令，而且在被赋加的形态—它处于普世的研究的核心。

Are we analysts simply something that welcomes the suppliant then, something
that gives him a place of refuge? Are we simply, but it is already a lot,
something that must respond to a demand, to the demand not to suffer, at
least without understanding why? – in the hope that through understanding
the subject will be freed not only from his ignorance, but also from suffering
itself.

我们精神分析家难道仅是某件欢迎这个恳求者吗？给予恳求者一个避难所的东西吗？我们难道仅是必须回应要求的东西吗？但是这已经是很大的负担。我们难道仅是回应不要受苦的要求的东西吗？回应至少不要受苦而不理解为什么的东西吗？希望通过理解，这位主体将可以不但免除无知，而且免除痛苦的本身。

Isn’t it obvious that analytical ideals are normally to be found here? They
are certainly not lacking. They grow in abundance. The evaluation, location,
situation, and organization of values, as they say in a certain register of moral
thought, that we propose to our patients, and around which we organize the
assessments of their progress and the transformation of their way into a path,
is supposed to be pan of our work. For the moment I will mention three of
these ideals.

这难道不是显而易见？精神分析的理想正常应该在这里被找到。它们确实并不欠缺。它们大量地增长。各种价值的这个评估，位置，情况，与组织，如同人们所说，在道德思想的某个铭记。我们对我们的病人建议的道德思想的铭记，环绕这些铭记，我们组织我们的评估，对于他们进展与他们进入途径的转化的评估。这被认为是我们的工作的范围。目前，我将提到三个的这些理想。

The first is the ideal of human love.
第一个理想是人类爱的理想。

Do I need to emphasize the role that we attribute to a certain idea of “love
fulfilled”? That is an expression you must have learned to recognize and not
only here, since, in truth, there is hardly an analyst who writes who has not
drawn attention to it. And you know that I have often taken aim at the
approximative and vague character, so tainted with an optimistic moralism,
which marks the original articulations taking the form of the genitalization
of desire. That is the ideal of genital love – a love that is supposed to be itself
alone the model of a satisfying object relation: doctor-love, I would say if I
wanted to emphasize in a comical way the tone of this ideology; love as hygiene,
I would say, to suggest what analytical ambition seems to be limited to here.

我需要强调这个角色吗？我们归属于某种的“爱的实践”的观念？你们一定已经学习到那个表达，为了体认，而且不仅在此体认，因为事实上，凡是会写作的精神分析家没有不提醒注意这个“爱的实践”的观念。你们知道，我经常针对那个近似而模糊的特性，它如此沾染乐观的道德主义。这个乐观的道德主义标识著原初的表达，採用欲望的性器官化的形式。那就是性器官之爱的理想。这一个爱光是本身就被认为是令人满足的客体关系的模式：医生之爱。我不妨说，假如我想要用滑稽的方式强调，这个意识形态的品味，作为健康的爱，我不妨说，因为它暗示着精神分析的企图心在此似乎受到限制的东西。

It is a problem that I will not expand on indefinitely, since I have not
stopped making you think about it since this seminar began. But so as to give
it a more marked emphasis, I will point out that analytical thought seems to
shirk its task when faced with the convergent character of our experience.

这一个难题，我将不会不明确地扩充。因为我从未停止要求你们继续思维它，自从这个研讨班开始。但是为了给与它一个更加明显的强调。我将指出，精神分析的思想似乎逃避它的工作，当它面临我们精神分析经验的汇集到特性。

This character is certainly not deniable, but the analyst seems to find in it a
limit beyond which it is difficult for him to go. To say that the problems of
moral experience are entirely resolved as far as monogamous union is concerned
would be a formulation that is imprudent, excessive, and inadequate.

这个特性确实无法被否认，但是精神分析家似乎在它里面发现一个限制，他很困难要超越这个限制。说道德经验的难题完全被解救，就一夫一妻制的婚姻而言，那等于是一个不谨慎，过分与不足个的阐述。

Analysis has brought a very important change of perspective on love by
placing it at the center of ethical experience; it has also brought an original
note, which was certainly different from the way in which love had previously
been viewed by the moralistes and the philosophers in the economy of interhuman relations
Why then has analysis not gone further in the direction of
the investigation of what should properly be called an erotics? That is something
that deserves reflection.

针对爱，精神分析曾经带来重要的观点的改变。精神分析将爱放置在伦理经验的中心。它也带来一个原创的语调。这个原创的语言确实不同于爱先前曾经被看待的方式，被道德家与哲学家看待的方式，在人际关系的活动里。那么，为什么精神分析家朝着这个研究的方向深入探索？贴切而言，那应该是所谓的性爱的方向？那是某件值得我们深思的东西。

In this connection the topic I have placed on the agenda of our forthcoming
conference, namely, feminine sexuality, is one of the clearest of signs in the
development of analysis of the lack I am referring to with regard to such an
investigation. It is hardly necessary to recall what Jones learned from a source
that to my mind is not especially qualified, but which, believe it or not, is
nevertheless supposed at the very least to have transmitted in his exact words
what it heard from Freud’s own mouth. Jones tells us that this person told
him confidentially that one day Freud said something like “After some thirty
years of experience and thought, there is still one question to which I am still
unable to find an answer; it is ‘Was will das Weib?’ ” What does woman
want? Or more precisely, “What does she desire?” The term “will” in this
expression may have that meaning in German.

关于这个方向，我已经将这个议题放在我们即将举行的议程。换句话说，女性的性，是其中最清楚的指标，在我正提到的欠缺的精神分析的发展，关于这一个研究。我们几乎不需要提醒，琼斯所学习到的东西，从一个来源，我认为并没有具有特质的来源。但是，无论你相信与否，这个来源仍然被认为至少是用他确实的词语曾经传递它从弗洛依德的嘴中听到的东西。琼斯告诉我们说，这个人私下秘密地告诉他，有一天，弗洛依德说了某件像是「经过差不多30年的经验与思想之后，依旧有一个问题，我仍然无法找到答案。那就是“女人想要什么？“或者更加确实地说，”女人欲望什么？“在这个表达里，”想要“这个术语具有德文的“欲望”的意义。

Have we gone much further on that subject? It will not be a waste of time
if I show you the kind of avoidance that the progress of research in analysis
has practiced in answering a question that cannot be said to have been invented
by it. Let us just say that analysis, and the thought of Freud in particular, is
connected to a time that articulated this question with a special emphasis.

针对那个主体，我们更加深入些吗？这会不会是浪费时间？假如我跟你们显示精神分析的研究的进展曾经实践的那种避免，当它回答一个询问。虽然这个询问不能够说是精神分析自己杜撰。让我们仅是说，精神分析，特别是弗洛依德的思想，跟这样一个时代息息相关。这个时代用特别的强调表达这个询问。

The Ibsenian context of the end of the nineteenth century in which Freud’s
thought matured cannot be overlooked here. And it is, in brief, very strange
that analytical experience has if anything stifled, silenced, and evaded those
areas of the problem of sexuality which relate to the point of view of feminine
demand.

十九世纪末代易卜生的文本，是让弗洛依德的思想成熟之书，在此不能够被忽视。总之，耐人寻问的是，精神分析经验曾经让性的难题的那些领域，保持窒闷，沉默不语而且被逃避，而性的那些难题却是跟女性的要求的观点息息相关。

The second ideal, which is equally as remarkable in analytical experience,
is what I shall call the ideal of authenticity.

第二个理想，在精神分析经验同样引人注意。那就是，我将所谓的”真诚“的理想。

I do not think I need to emphasize it particularly. It will not have escaped
you that if psychoanalysis is a technique of unmasking, it presupposes such
a point of view. But, in fact, it goes further than that.

我并不认为我需要特别强调它。你们将无法逃避这个“真诚“的理想，假如精神分析是一个揭发虚假面具的技术。它预先假设这样的一个观点。但是，实际上，它将探索得比那个真诚更加深入。

It is not simply as a path, stage, or measure of progress that authenticity
suggests itself to us; it is also quite simply as a certain norm for the finished
product, as something desirable and, therefore, as a value. It is an ideal, but
one on which we are led to impose clinical norms that are very precise.

“真诚“不仅作为一个途径，舞台，或进步的衡量。”真诚“对于我们暗示它自己。”真诚“也确实作为某个已经完成的产品的名称，作为某件被欲望的东西，因此，作为一种价值。”真诚“是一种理想，但是我们被引导将非常明确的临床的名称，赋加在这个理想之上，

I will
illustrate the point in the very subtle observations of Helene Deutsch concerning
a type of character and of personality that one cannot describe as
maladjusted or as failing to meet any of the norms demanded by social relations,
but whose whole attitude and behavior are visible in the recognition –
of whom? – of the other, of others, as if marked by that note that she calls in
English “as if,” and which in German is “als ob.” I am touching here on the
Point that a certain register – which is not defined and is not simple and
cannot be situated other than from a moral perspective – is present, controling, insisted on in all our experience, and that it is necessary to calculate to
what extent we are adequate to it.

我将阐述这个观点，用海伦尼　杜奇的非常微妙的观察，关于一种性格与人格，我们无法描述它，作为适应不良，或无法满足社会关系要求的名称。但是它整个的态度与行为在这个体认当中看得见。什么的体认当中？他者的体认，别人的体认，好像它被那个语调标识著。在英文里，她称之为“好像“，在德文里，它的意思是”似乎“。我在此探讨这个观点，某个铭记―它并没有被定义，并不是单纯，而且无法被定位在并非是从道德的观点来看，它存在，控制，在我们所有的经验里被坚持。有必要评估一下，我们能够胜任处理它到什么程度。

That something harmonious, that full presence whose lack we as clinicians
can so precisely gauge – doesn’t our technique stop half-way toward what is
required to achieve it, the technique that I have christened “unmasking”?
Wouldn’t it be interesting to wonder about the significance of our absence
from the field of what might be called a science of virtues, a practical reason,
the sphere of common sense? For in truth one cannot say that we ever intervene
in the field of any virtue. We clear ways and paths, and we hope that
what is called virtue will take root there.

某件和谐的东西，充分存在的欠缺，我们作为临床医生能够如此确实地衡量的欠缺－我们的精神分析技术难道不是正处于半途，朝向为了获得它而被要求的东西？我已经将这个技术命名为“揭发虚假面具“？这难道不是耐人寻味吗？当我们想要知道，我们的缺席的意义，对于所谓的品德的科学的领域缺席，那是实用的理由，共同常识的领域？实际上，我们无法说，我们曾经介入于任何品德的领域。我们清理道路与途径，我们希望，所谓的品德将会在那里生根。

Similarly, we have recently forged a third ideal, which I am not sure belongs
to the original space of analytical experience, the ideal of non-dependence or,
more precisely, of a kind of prophylaxis of dependence.

同样地，我们最近铸造第三个理想。我并不确实，这第三个理想属于精神分析经验的原初的空间。“非－依赖“的理想，更加明确地说，是预防依赖的理想。

Isn’t there a limit there, too, a fine boundary, which separates what we
indicate to an adult subject as desirable in this register and the means we
accord ourselves in our interventions so that he achieves it?

在那里，难道不是有一个限制？一个清楚的边界？它分开我们指示灯东西，对于一位成年人的主体，作为可被欲望，处于我们给予我们自己的这个铭记与工具，在我们的介入当中。这样，他才获得这个“非－依赖“。

It is enough to remember the fundamental, constitutive reservations of the
Freuｄｉan position concerning education in the broad sense. There is no doubt
that all of us, and child analysts in particular, are led to encroach on this
domain, to practice in the space of what I have called elsewhere an orthopedics
in its etymological sense.

我们只有记得这个基本的结构本质的保留就足够了。弗洛依德关于教育的立场，广义来说。无可置疑地，我们所有的人，特别是针对小孩的精神分析家，都被引导要侵入这个领域，要实践在我在别的地方称之为整形外科的东西的空间，以它的字源学的意义。

But it is nevertheless striking that both in the
means we employ and in the theoretical competence we insist on, the ethics
of analysis – for there is one – involves effacement, setting aside, withdrawal,
indeed, the absence of a dimension that one only has to mention in order to
realize how much separates us from all ethical thought that preceded us. I
mean the dimension of habits, good and bad habits.

但是仍然引人注意的是，在我们使用的工具，与我们坚持的理论的胜任，精神分析伦理学――因为存在一个精神分析伦理学――它牵涉到抹除，摆放一边，撤退，的确，欠钱某个维度。我们只要提到的这个谓度的欠缺，为了体会到，它如何地将我们精神分析区隔开来，跟存在于我们之前的所有的伦理学的思想区隔开来。我指的是习惯的维度，好的习惯与坏的习惯的维度。

It is something we refer to very little because psychoanalytic thought defines
itself in very different terms, in terms of traumas and their persistence. We
have obviously learned to decompose a given trauma, impression, or mark,
but the very essence of the unconscious is defined in a different register from
the one which Aristotle emphasizes in the Ethics in a play on words,ίθος /ήθος

这是我们很少提到东西。因为精神分析的思想定义它自己，用非常不同的术语。用创伤与创伤的持续的术语。我们显而易见地学习如何瓦解某个特定的创伤，印象或标记。但是无意识的本质被定义，用不同的铭杰，跟亚里斯多德强调的这个铭记，在“伦理学“，在探讨文字的运作。

There are extremely subtle distinctions that may be centered on the notion
of character. Ethics for Aristotle is a science of character: the building of
character, the dynamics of habits and, even more, action with relation to
habits, training, education. You must take a look at his exemplary work, if
only to understand the difference between our modes of thought and those
of one of the most eminent forms of ethical thought.

有好几个极端微妙的区别，可以专注于人格的这个观念。对于亚里斯多德，“伦理学“是一门人格的科学：人格的培养，习惯的动力结构，甚至，有关习惯，训练与教育的行动。你们必须阅读一下他的典范的著作。即使仅是为了理解那些差异，处于我们的思想的模式，与其中最著名的伦理学的思想的形式之间的差异。

雄伯译
３２ｈｓｉｕｎｇ＠pchome.com.tw
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