Ethics 11

Ethics 11
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Outline of the seminar
研讨纲要
THE ATTRACTION OF TRANSGRESSION
逾越的吸引力

FROM ARISTOTLE TO FREUD
从亚里斯多德到弗洛依德
THE REAL
实在界
THE THREE IDEALS
三个理想

3
So as to emphasize what today’s premises are leading us toward, I will simply
note that although the topics on which I have attempted to open up different
perspectives are varied, I will try next time to start from a radical position.
In order to point out the originality of the Freuthan position in ethical matters,
I must underline a slippage or a change of attitude relative to the question
of morality as such.

为了强调今天的主题正在引导我们朝向的东西,我将仅是提醒,虽然我曾经尝试展开不同的观点的议题种类不同,我下次将尝试从一个强烈的立场开始。为了指出弗洛依德的立场的原创性,在伦理学的事物,我必须强调一个失误,或态度的改变,跟道德自身相关的态度。

In Aristotle the problem is that of a good, of a Sovereign Good. We will
have to consider why he emphasized the problem of pleasure, its function in
the mental economy of ethics from the beginning. It is something that we
cannot avoid, not least because it is the reference point of the Freuthan theory
concerning the two systems φ and ψ, the two psychical agencies that he called
the primary and secondary processes.

在亚里斯多德,这个难题是善的难题,统辖的善的难题。我们将必须考虑为什么从一开始,弗洛依德就强调快乐的难题,快乐的功能,在伦理学的精神的活力里。快乐是某将我们无法避免的东西。倒不是因为快乐是弗洛依德的理论的指称点,关于φ 与 ψ,的两个系统,这两个心灵的代理者,他称之为原初与次级的过程。

Is the same pleasure function at work in both of these articulations? It is
almost impossible to isolate this difference if we do not realize what took
place in the interval. Even if it is not my role and if the place I occupy here
doesn’t seem to make it obligatory, I will not, in fact, be able to avoid a
certain inquiry into historical progress.

相同的快乐发挥功能,运作在φ 与 ψ的这两个表达吗?我们几乎无法将这个差异孤立出来,假如我们并没有体会到在中间发生的事情。即使这并不是我的角色,即使我在此佔据的位置似乎并没有让它成为义务,事实上,我将不能够避免某种的探索,对于历史的进展。

It is at this point that I must refer to those guiding terms, those terms of
reference which I use, namely, the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real.
More than once at the time when I was discussing the symbolic and the
imaginary and their reciprocal interaction, some of you wondered what after
all was “the real.” Well, as odd as it may seem to that superficial opinion
which assumes any inquiry into ethics must concern the field of the ideal, if
not of the unreal, I, on the contrary, will proceed instead from the other
direction by going more deeply into the notion of the real. Insofar as Freud’s
position constitutes progress here, the question of ethics is to be articulated
from the point of view of the location of man in relation to the real. To
appreciate this, one has to look at what occurred in the interval between
Aristotle and Freud.

就在这个时刻,我必须提到那些引导的术语,我使用的那些指称的术语。也就是说,象征界,想像界,实在界。不仅一次,当我正在讨论象征界与想像界,与它们彼此的互动时,你们有些人们想要知道,毕竟什么是实在界。「呵呵,虽然听起来古怪,对于那个浅薄的意见,它假定任何对于伦理学的探讨必然会关注到理想的领域,即使不是关注到非实在的领域。相反地,我将替代地从另外一个方向前进,更加深入地探讨实在界的观念。因为弗洛依德的立场在此构成进步,伦理学的问题应该被表达,从人与实在界的关系的位置的观点来表达。为了评估这点,我们必须观看亚里斯多德与弗洛依德之间的这段期间,发生什么事。

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was the utilitarian conversion
or reversion. We can define this moment – one that was no doubt
fully conditioned historically – in terms of a radical decline of the function
of the master, a function that obviously governs all of Aristosle’s thought and
determines its persistence over the centuries. It is in Hegel that we find
expressed an extreme devalorization of the position of the master, since Hegel
turns him into the great dupe, the magnificent cuckold of historical development,
given that the virtue of progress passes by way of the vanquished,
which is to say, of the slave, and his work. Originally, when he existed in his
plenitude in Aristotle’s time, the master was something very different from
the Hegelian fiction, which is nothing more than his obverse, his negation,
the sign of his disappearance. It is shortly before that terminal moment that
in the wake of a certain revolution affecting interhuman relations, so-called
utilitarian thought arose, and it is far from being made up of the pure and
simple platitudes one imagines.

在19世纪开始,有功利主义的转变或倒转。我们能够定义这个时刻—无可置疑,这个时刻在历史上是充分地被制约—用主r的功能的强烈衰微的术语。主人的功能显而易见地统辖所有的亚里斯多德的思想并且决定它持续存在经过好几个世纪。就在黑格尔那里,我们发现一个极端的贬抑主人的立场被表达。因为黑格尔将主人转变成为伟大的木偶,历史发展的辉煌的通奸者。假如考虑到进展的品德凭借被征服者前进。换句话说,凭借奴隶与奴隶的工作前进。起初,在亚里斯多德的时代,当主人存在于他的丰富充足,主人是某件不同于黑格尔的想像。黑格尔的想像仅是主人的倒转,主人的否定,主人消失的迹象。就在那个终结的时刻之前,随着某个革命的来到,影响到人际之间的关系,所谓的功利主义的思想的興起。主人根本就不是由我们想像纯粹而单纯的丰富充足组成。

It is not just a matter of a thought that asks which goods are available on
the market to be distributed and the best way to effect the distribution. One
finds there an investigation of something of which Mr. Jakobson, who is here
today, first found the key, the little latch, in a hint he gave me concerning
the interest of a work of Jeremy Bentham’s that is ordinarily neglected in the
summary of his contribution traditionally given.

这不仅是思想的事情,这个思想询问有怎样的善在市场上可使用,能够被分配,以及从事这种分配的最佳方法。我们在那里发现某件东西的研究,杰克森先生今天在现场,他首先发现这个东西的解答,这个小小的门闩。在他给予我们的暗示,关于杰瑞米 边沁的著作感到興趣。边沁的著作通常被忽略,当总结传统给予他的贡献的评价。

This personage is far from meriting the discredit, indeed the ridicule, which
a certain critical philosophy might formulate concerning his role in the history
of the development of ethics. We will see that it is in relation to a critical
philosophy or, more properly, a linguistic one that his thought is developed.
It is impossible to measure so well anywhere else the emphasis given in the
course of this revolution to the term real, which in his thought is placed in
opposition to the English term “fictitious.”3

边沁这个人物可是毁誉交加。的确,那些嘲讽,某个批判断哲学可能形成这种嘲讽,关于边沁的角色,在伦理学的发展的历史的角色。我们将会看见,就在跟批判哲学的关系,或者,更加贴切地说,跟语言的哲学的关系,他的思想被发展。在别的地方,我们不可能如此清楚地测量这个被给予的强调,在“实在界”的这个术语的革命的过程。在边沁的思想里,“实在界”这个术语被放置在跟英文的“想像”的术语对立。

“Fictitious” does not mean illusory or decepdve as such. It is far from
being translatable into French by “ficdf,” although this is something that the
man who was the key to his success on the continent, Etienne Dumont, did
not fail to do – he was also responsible for popularizing Bentham’s thought.
“Ficddous” means “ficdf” but, as I have already explained to you, in the
sense that every truth has the structure of fiction.

“想像”并不意味着幻觉或欺骗的本身。“想像”根本就无法被翻译成为法文的“”ficdf”。虽然这是阿提尼 杜曼一定会这样翻译。他在欧洲大陆获得成功的这个人。他也负责让边沁的思想受到通俗欢迎。”Ficddous” 的意思是 “ficdf”,如同我已经跟你们解释的。从这个意义而言,每个真理都具有想像的结构。

Bentham’s effort is located in the dialectic of the relationship of language
to the real so as to situate the good – pleasure in this case, which, as we will
see, he articulates in a manner that is very different from Aristotle – on the
side of the real. And it is within this opposition between fiction and reality
that is to be found the rocking motion of Freuthan experience.

边沁的努力被定位在语言更实在界的关系的辩证法,为了定位善—在这个情况,快乐即善。我们将会看见,边沁表达这个善,用的方式不同于亚里斯多德。他在实在界的这边。就在幻想与现实之间的这个对立,弗洛依德的精神分析经验的摇晃动作,能够被找到。

Once the separation between the fictitious and the real has been effected,
things are no longer situated where one might expect. In Freud the characteristic
of pleasure, as that dimension which binds man, is to be found on the
side of the fictitious. The fictitious is not, in effect, in its essence that which
deceives, but is precisely what I call the symbolic.

一旦幻想与实在界之间的这个分隔被形成,事情就不再被定位在我们可以期望的地方。在弗洛依德,快乐的这个特性,作为约束人的那个维度,能够被找到,在幻想的这边。实际上,幻想在它的本质上并非是欺骗的东西,而确实是我所谓的象征界的东西。

That the unconscious is structured as a function of the symbolic, that it is
the return of a sign that the pleasure principle makes man seek out, that the
pleasurable element in that which directs man in his behavior without his
knowledge (namely, that which gives him pleasure, because it is a form of
euphony), that that which one seeks and finds again is the trace rather than
the trail – one has to appreciate the great importance of all of this in Freud’s
thought, if one is to understand the function of reality.

无意识作为象征界的功能来架构。无意识是快乐原则让人寻求的迹象的回转。令人快乐的因素,在引导人的行为而人却不知道的东西那里,(换句话说,给予他快乐的东西,因为它是一种委婉语的形式)。我们寻求并且再次找到的东西是痕迹,而不是轨迹—我们必须评估,在弗洛依德的思想里,所有这一切具有的重要性。假如我们想要理解现实的功能。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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