From an other to the Other 25

From an other to the Other 25

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康


Now, there is no subject at
the precise point where it interests us, except the subject of an assertion
(dire). If I posit these two references, that to the Real and that to the
assertion, it is to clearly mark that here that you may still vacillate and
pose the question, for example, whether this is not what was always
imagined about the subject. It is moreover also there that you have to
grasp what the term subject states in so far as it is the effect, the
dependent (la dependance) of this assertion.


There is no subject except
of an assertion, this is what we have to correctly circumscribe in order
never to detach the subject from it.


To say moreover that the Real is the impossible, is also to state that it
is only the most extreme circumscribing of the assertion in so far as it
is the possible that it introduces and not simply that it states. The flaw
remains no doubt, for some people, that this subject would then be, in a
way, a subject taking its worth from this discourse.


That it would only
be the deployment, a canker crossing in the middle of the world where
the junction takes place that, all the same, brings this subject to life.
It is not just anything in things that makes a subject. This is where it is
important to take things up again at the point where we do not tip over
into confusion in what we are saying – the confusion that would allow
there to be restored this subject as thinking subject, any pathos
whatsoever — about the signifier, I mean, through the signifier, does not
of itself make a subject of this pathos. What this pathos defines is in
every case, quite simply, what is called a ffat.


And it is here that there
is situated the distance in which we have to question what our
experience produces. Something different that goes much further than
the being that speaks in so far as it is man that is at stake. More than
one thing can suffer from the effect of the signifier, everything in the
world that does not properly become a fact (fait) unless its signifier is
articulated. Not ever, never, does any subject come unless the fact is


Between these two frontiers is where we have to work. What
cannot be said about the feet is designated in the assertion, by its lack,
and that is the truth. That is why the truth always insinuates itself, but
can be inscribed also in a perfectly calculated way where it simply has
its place, between the lines. The substance of the truth is precisely
what suffers from the signifier. That goes very far. What suffers from
it in its nature. Let us say, when I say that this goes very far, this
/ precisely goes very far in nature.


For a long time people seemed to accept what is called the spirit. It is
an idea that got across in some little way. Moreover, nothing ever gets
across as much as people think. In any case it got across a little
because of the feet that it proves that there is never anything else at
stake under the name of spirit than the signifier itself. Which
obviously puts a lot of metaphysics out of sync.


As regards the
relationships of our effort to metaphysics, as regards what is involved
in a putting in question that tends not to lose all the benefit of the
(51) experience of metaphysics, something of it remains.


Namely, the
following which is indeed in a certain number of points, of areas more
varied and better equipped than one might think at first approach and
of very different qualities, it is a matter of knowing what
‘structuralism’ has to bring about. The question is raised in a
collection that has just appeared, I got the first fruits of it, I do not
know whether it is in circulation: “What is structuralism?” which we
owe to the summons addressed to some people by our friend Francis

换句话说,以下确实某些的点,某些的地区,更加变化,装备更加齐全,比起我们第一次接近可能认为的,并且属于不同的性质。问题是要知道“结构主义”必须导引出什么。这个问题被提出,在刚刚出现的文集。我获得它的最初的成果。我并不知道,这个文件是否发行当中:「结构主义是什么?」我们将这个问题归功于我们的朋友法朗西斯 瓦尔,针对某些人们的召唤。

I advise you not to miss it, it brings a certain number of
questions up to date. But undoubtedly this means that it is rather
important to mark our distinction from metaphysics. In truth, we have,
on this point, marked something that it is not useless to state, that one
must not believe too much in what advertises itself as disillusion. The
disillusion of the spirit is not a complete triumph if elsewhere it
sustains the superstition that would designate in an idealness of matter
this very substance that one first puts into the spirit as impassible.


I am calling it superstition because after all we know its genealogy. There
is a tradition, the Jewish tradition curiously, in which one can indeed
highlight what a certain transcendence of matter may be able to sketch
out. What is stated in the scriptures, singularly unnoticed of course,
but quite clear concerning the corporeality of God.


These are things
that we cannot develop today. It was a chapter of my seminar on The
name o f the father, which as you know [the sign of a cross in the air] I
have definitively renounced, make no mistake. But in any case, this
superstition described as materialist – one may well add popular, that
changes nothing at all — deserves the share of love that everyone has
for it, because it is indeed what has been most tolerant up to now of
scientific thinking. But you must not believe that this will always last.
It would be enough for scientific thinking to make people suffer a little
in this quarter — and it is not unthinkable — for the tolerance in question
not to last!



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