Identification 106

Identification 106
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

28.3.62 XV 182
The scope for ambiguity that you can give to this formula – the
one who actively counts no doubt, but also the one who counts
quite simply in reality, the one who really counts, obviously is
going to take some time to find where he is in his count, exactly
the time that we will take to go through everything that I have
just designated for you here – will have for you its full meaning


Shackleton and his companions in the Antartic
several hundred kilometres from the
coast, explorers submitted to the
greatest frustration, one which resulted
not only from the lacks which were
more or less elucidated at the time –
because it is a text which is already
(11) about fifty years old – from the
more or less elucidated lacks in a
special food which was still being tested at that time, but who
one might say were disoriented in what I might call a still
virgin landscape, not yet inhabited by human imagination, tell us
in notes which are very peculiar to read, that they always
counted themselves as one more than they were, that they could
not make it out: “We were always asking ourselves where the
missing person had gone”, the missing person who was not missing
except because of the fact that their whole effort of counting
always suggested to them that there was one more, and therefore
one less.


You put your finger here on the appearance in its naked state of
the subject who is nothing more than that, than the possibility
of one more signifier, of an additional 1 thanks to which he
himself notes there is a one who is missing.
If I remind you of this it is simply to highlight in a dialectic
which includes the most extreme terms where we situate our path
and where you may believe and sometimes even ask yourselves if we
are not forgetting certain reference points. You may for example
even ask yourselves what relationship there is between the path
that I have made you travel and these two terms with which we
have had to deal, we have constantly to deal with but at
different moments, of the Other and the thing.


Of course, the subject himself in the final analysis is destined
for the thing, but his law, more exactly his faturn is this path
that he can only describe by passing through the Other in so far
(12) as the Other is marked by the signifier, and it is on this
side (en deca) of this necessary passage through the signifier
that desire and its object are constituted as such.


The appearance of this dimension of the Other and the emergence of
the subject, I cannot remind you too much of it in order to give
you properly the meaning of what is involved and whose paradox, I
think, ought to be sufficiently articulated for you in the fact
that desire – you should understand it in the most natural sense
– can and must constitute itself only in the tension created by
this relationship to the Other, which takes its origin from the
fact of the advent of the unary trait in so far as at first and
since it begins with the thing it always effaces this something
which is quite a different thing to this one which has always
been irreplaceable; and we find there from the first step – I
point this out to you in passing – the formula, here is where
Freud’s formula ends: there where the thing was I must come.


It should be replaced at the origin by: “Wo Es war, da durch den
Ein”, rather by “durch den Eins” there by the one qua one, the
unary trait, “werde Ich”, the “I” will come: the whole path is
completely traced out at every point of the path.

在原初的地方:“Wo Es war, da durch den Ein” ,这句话应该被替换为:”durch den Eins“在那里,被这个作为一的这个一,这个独异性特征,”werde Ich“,这个“我”必须来到:整个的途径完全地被追踪,在途径的每个时刻。


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