Identification 91

Identification 91

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

14.3.62 XIII
If there is, as you know, something which as one might say the
neurotic allows himself to be caught by from the start, it is
this trap; and he will try to make what is the object of his
desire pass into the demand, to obtain from the Other, not the
satisfaction of his need, for which the demand is made, but the
satisfaction of his desire, namely to have its object, namely
precisely what cannot be demanded – and this is at the origin of
what is called dependency in the relationships of the subject to
the Other – just as he will try more paradoxically still to
give satisfaction by conforming his desire to the demand of the
Other; and there is no other meaning, of correctly articulated
meaning I mean, to what is the discovery of analysis and of
Freud, to the existence of the super-ego as such. There is no
other correct definition, I mean no other one which allows us to
escape from confusing slippages.


I think without going any further, that the practical, day-to-day
concrete resonances, namely the impasse of the neurotic, is at
first and above all the problem of the impasses of his desire,
this impasse which is tangible at every moment, massively
tangible, and against which you always see him stumbling. This
is what I would summarily express by saying that for his desire
(19) he has to have the sanction of a demand. What do you refuse
him, if not what he is waiting for you to demand of him – to
desire appropriately? Without going into what he expects from
his spouse, from his parents, from his offspring and from all the
conformities which surround him. What does this allow us to
construct and to perceive?


If it is the case that demand is renewed in accordance with the
circuits that have been made, in accordance with the full circles
all around and the successive returns which the return of need,
but encompassed by the loops of demand, necessitates, if it is a
fact that, as I gave you to understand through each of these
returns, which allows us to say that the elided circle, the
circle which I simply called the empty circle in order that you
should see what I mean with respect to the torus, comes here to
materialise the metonymyical object beneath all these demands.


A topological construction is imaginable of another torus which has
the property of allowing us to imagine the application of the
object of desire, the internal empty circle of the first torus,
onto the full circle of the second which establishes a buckle,
one of these irreducible loops.


(20) Inversely the circle of a demand on the first torus is here
superimposed on the other torus. The torus here a support of the
Other, the imaginary Other of frustration, is superimposed on the
empty circle of this torus, namely fulfils the function of
showing this inversion: desire in one, demand in the other,
demand of the one, desire of the other, which is the knot in
which there is trapped the whole dialectic of frustration. This
possible dependency of two topologies, that of one torus on that
of the other, expresses in short nothing other than what is the
goal of our schema in so far as we support it by the torus.


The fact is that if the space of Kantian intuition ought, I might
say, thanks to the new schema that we are introducing here, be
put in parenthesis, cancelled out, aufgehoben, as illusory
because the topological extension of the torus allows us to
consider only the properties of the surface, we are sure of the
permanence, of the solidity, as I might say, of the volume of the
system without having to have recourse to the intuition of depth.
What this images, as you see, is that by maintaining ourselves,
in the whole measure that our intuitive habits allow us, within
these limits, what results is that since all that is involved
between these two surfaces is a substitution by a bi-univocal
application, even though it is inverted, namely that once it is
cut out this will be in this direction on one of the surfaces and
in this other direction on the other.




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