Identification 75

Identification 75

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

17.1.62 VIII 1
Seminar 8: Wednesday 17 January 1962

7.3.62 XII 139

With what I have just told you, I have no need to put the accent
on the following: the fact is that this operates already before
(9) the subject knows how to count properly. In any case,
nothing implies that he has a need to count the circuits of what
he is repeating very far because he repeats it without knowing
it. It is no less true that the fact of repetition is rooted in
this original unary, which unary as such is tightly coupled to
and co-extensive with the very structure of the subject in so far
as it is thought of as repeating in the Freudian sense.


What I am going to show you today, through an example, and with a
model that I am going to introduce, what I am going to show you
today, is the following: it is that there is no need for him to
know how to count for one to be able to say and demonstrate the
constituting necessity of his function as subject that he should
make an error in the count. There is no need for him to know nor
even to try to count for this error of counting to be
constitutive of him as subject: as such it is error.


If things are as I am telling you, you can be sure that this
error may last a long time on such a basis, and this is quite
true. It is so true that it is not alone on the individual that
it brings its effect to bear. It brings its effect to bear on
the most radical characters of what is called Thinking.
Let us take for a moment the theme of Thinking, about which it
would be proper all the same to use some prudence; you know that
on this point I do not lack it, it is not all that sure that one
can validly refer to it in a fashion which may be considered as a
(10) properly speaking generic dimension.


Let us take it
nevertheless as such: the thinking of the human species.
It is quite clear that it is not for nothing that I have advanced
more than once, in an inevitable fashion, towards putting in
question here, since the beginning of my discourse this year, the
function of class and its relationship with the universal, to the
point even that it is in a way the reverse and the opposite of
all this discourse that I am trying to bring to a conclusion
before you.


In this connection, simply remember what I was trying to show you
in connection with the little exemplary dial on which I tried to
re-articulate before you the relationship of the universal to the
particular and of affirmative and negative propositions


Unity and totality appear here in the tradition as
solidary, and it is not by chance that I always come back to it
in order to shatter the fundamental category: unity and totality
at once solidary, linked to the other in this relationship that
one could call a relationship of inclusion, totality being
totality with respect to units, but unity being what founds
totality as such by drawing unity towards another meaning,
opposed to the one that I distinguish of it, of being the unity
of a whole.


It is around this that there is pursued this
misunderstanding in what is called the logic of classes, this
age-old misunderstanding of extension and intension which it
seems tradition effectively has always made more of, even if it
is true, taking things in the perspective for example of the
middle of the XlXth century, in the writings of a Hamilton, even
if it is true that it has only been clearly articulated from
(11) Descartes on and that the logic of Port-Royal, as you know,
is modelled on the teaching of Descartes.

环绕这个统合,所谓的分类的逻辑的东西的误解被追寻。长久以来,对于延伸与内含的误解。似乎,传统有效地总是拥有这样的误解,即使它是真实的,用19世纪中叶的观点作为例子来看待事情,在哈密尔顿的著作里,即使这是确实的,从笛卡尔开始,它仅是清楚地被表达。众所周知,波特 罗伊的延伸与内含的逻辑,就是模拟笛卡尔的教学。

What is more this is
not true; because this opposition between extension and
comprehension is there for a long time, since Aristotle himself.
What one can say, is that it causes for us, as regards the
handling of classes, difficulties which are always more
unresolved, hence all the efforts that logic has made to
transport the core of the problem elsewhere: into propositional
quantification for example.



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