论自恋 j

论自恋 j
Sigmund Freud

On Narcissism: an Introduction

It would not surprise us if we were to find a special psychical agency
which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic satisfaction from the ego ideal is ensured and which, with this end in view, constantly watches the actual ego and measures it by that ideal.2 If such an agency does exist, we cannot possibly come upon it as a discovery—we can only recognize it; for we may reflect that what we call our ‘conscience’ has the required characteristics. Recognition of this agency enables us to understand the so-called ‘delusions of being noticed’ or more correctly, of being watched3, which are such striking symptoms in the paranoid diseases and which may also occur as an isolated form of illness, or intercalated in a transference neurosis.


Patients of this sort complain that all their thoughts are known
and their actions watched and supervised; they are informed of the
functioning of this agency by voices which characteristically speak to them in the third person (‘Now she’s thinking of that again’, ‘now he’s going out’).


This complaint is justified; it describes the truth. A power of this kind,
watching, discovering and criticizing all our intentions, does really exist.
Indeed, it exists in every one of us in normal life.


Delusions of being watched present this power in a regressive form,
thus revealing its genesis and the reason why the patient is in revolt
against it. For what prompted the subject to form an ego ideal, on whose
behalf his conscience acts as watchman, arose from the critical influence of his parents (conveyed to him by the medium of the voice), to whom were added, as time went on, those who trained and taught him and the innumerable and indefinable host of all the other people in his environment —his fellow-men—and public opinion.


In this way large amounts of libido of an essentially homosexual kind
are drawn into the formation of the narcissistic ego ideal and find outlet
and satisfaction in maintaining it. The institution of conscience was at
bottom an embodiment, first of parental criticism, and subsequently of that of society—a process which is repeated in what takes place when a
tendency towards repression develops out of a prohibition or obstacle that came in the first instance from without.


The voices, as well as the undefined multitude, are brought into the foreground again by the disease, and so the evolution of conscience is reproduced regressively. But the revolt against this ‘censoring agency’ arises out of the subject’s desire (in accordance with the fundamental character of his illness) to liberate himself from all these influences, beginning with the parental one, and out of his withdrawal of homosexual libido from them. His conscience then confronts him in a regressive form as a hostile influence from without.


The complaints made by paranoics also show that at bottom the self criticism of conscience coincides with the self-observation on which it is
based. Thus the activity of the mind which has taken over the function of
conscience has also placed itself at the service of internal research, which furnishes philosophy with the material for its intellectual operations.


This may have some bearing on the characteristic tendency of paranoics to construct speculative systems.1


It will certainly be of importance to us if evidence of the activity of this critically observing agency—which becomes heightened into conscience and philosophic introspection—can be found in other fields as well. I will mention here what Herbert Silberer has called the ‘functional phenomenon’, one of the few indisputably valuable additions to the theory of dreams.

对于我们,这确实非常重要,假如这个关键的观察的代理的活动的证据,被强化成为良心与哲学的内省。它们在其他领域也能够被找到。我将在此提到赫伯特 西贝瑞所谓的「功能的现象」,对于梦到理论,是一篇价值连城的增添。

Silberer, as we know, has shown that in states between
sleeping and waking we can directly observe the translation of thoughts
into visual images, but that in these circumstances we frequently have a
representation, not of a thought-content, but of the actual state
(willingness, fatigue, etc.) of the person who is struggling against sleep.


Similarly, he has shown that the conclusions of some dreams or some
divisions in their content merely signify the dreamer’s own perception of his sleeping and waking. Silberer has thus demonstrated the part played by observation—in the sense of the paranoic’s delusions of being watched— in the formation of dreams. This part is not a constant one.


Probably the reason why I overlooked it is because it does not play any great part in my own dreams; in persons who are gifted philosophically and accustomed to introspection it may become very evident.1


We may here recall that we have found that the formation of dreams
takes place under the dominance of a censorship which compels distortion of the dream-thoughts. We did not, however, picture this censorship as a special power, but chose the term to designate one side of the repressive trends that govern the ego, namely the side which is turned towards the dream-thoughts.


If we enter further into the structure of the ego, we may
recognize in the ego ideal and in the dynamic utterances of conscience the dream-censor2 as well. If this censor is to some extent on the alert even during sleep, we can understand how it is that its suggested activity of self-observation and self-criticism—with such thoughts as, ‘now he is too sleepy to think’, ‘now he is waking up’—makes a contribution to the content of the dream.1


At this point we may attempt some discussion of the self-regarding
attitude in normal people and in neurotics.


In the first place self-regard appears to us to be an expression of the
size of the ego; what the various elements are which go to determine that size is irrelevant. Everything a person possesses or achieves, every
remnant of the primitive feeling of omnipotence which his experience has confirmed, helps to increase his self-regard.


Applying our distinction between sexual and ego-instincts, we must
recognize that self-regard has a specially intimate dependence on
narcissistic libido. Here we are supported by two fundamental facts: that in paraphrenics self-regard is increased, while in the transference neuroses it is diminished; and that in love-relations not being loved lowers the selfregarding feelings, while being loved raises them. As we have indicated, the aim and the satisfaction in a narcissistic object-choice is to be loved.2



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