雅克慎论拉康 8

雅克慎论拉康
Lacan TheAbsolute Master
拉康,绝对主人

What Is Called a Subject?
何谓主体?

It is an entirely different story if we examine the other thesis that, for Lacan, completes the thesis of the signifier’s autonomy: “The signifier represents a subject… (not a signified)—and for another signifier (which means: not for another subject)” (1970, 65). Indeed, it is one thing to say that the sign does not represent reality and that the signifier in turn does not represent but produces the signified; it is quite another to say that the signifier represents the subject for another signifier. As for structural linguistics, it never says anything of the kind, methodically excluding the subject in order to constitute itself as a science,45 and only reintroducing it as one of the purely formal markers of subjectivity (personal pronouns, tenses, and so on) that “shift” the statement (enonce) onto the subjective point of enunciation (enonciation) that supports it. As Benveniste bluntly puts it, “‘Ego* is he who says ‘ego,'”46 and that is as far as linguists permit themselves to go. Again, the ideal langue constructed by linguists is spoken by no one. It cannot, a fortiori, “represent” any given subject.

假如我们检视另外一个命题,那是完全不同的鼓声。对于拉康,另外一个命题完成能指的自主权的命题:「能指代表一位主体–(不是一个所指)–针对另外一个能指(这意味着:并不是针对另外一个主体)(1970, 65)。的确,说符号并没有代表现实,能指反过来没有代表,而是产生所指,这是一码事。另外一码事是说:能指代表主体,针对另外一个能指。至于结构语言学,它从来没有说任何这类的事情,方法上它排除这个主体,为了建构它自己,作为一门科学。仅有重新建造它,作为主体性的其中一个纯粹正式的标记(人称代名词,时态,等等)。它们「转换」这个陈述,进入支持它的表述的主体点。如同本温尼斯特坦率地表达它,「自我就是说自我的那个人」。那是就语言学家容许他们自己的程度而言。而且,语言学家建构的理想的语言,并没有任何人能说。更强烈的理由是,它无法「代表任何一个特定的主体」。

This, however, is precisely what Lacan maintains, just when he is insisting on language’s “preexistence” for the subject and the subject’s preinscription in discourse (1977a, 148/495). Admittedly, the Lacanian subject is the subject subjected to the signifier, the subject dispossessed of any meaning (vouloir-dire) or mastery of language, which speaks him more than he speaks it; but, inversely, the signifier represents nothing but the subject, by means of which it is reinvested with that function of representation that Lacan so stringently denies elsewhere—which, by the same token, helps us understand why Lacan felt the need to separate signifier and signified by a “bar that resists signification.”

可是,这确实是拉康的主张。正当他坚持语言的「先前存在」,对于主体,与在辞说里主体的重新铭记(1977a, 148/495)。尽管如此,拉康的主体是隶属于能指的的主体,被剥除掉任何意义的主体,或剥除语言的掌控的主体。语言言谈他,胜过于他言谈语言。但是反过来说,能指代表空无,但是主体帮忙我们理解,为什么拉康感觉这个需要,凭借抗拒意义的一条横杠,区隔能指与所指的需要。凭借着空无,主体重新被投注符号再现的功能。这是拉康在其他地方如此严峻地否认。

On one side of the question (the side we have just investigated), this thesis says the same thing as linguistics: the signifier represents nothing but another signifier. But on the other side (the one that really interests Lacan), this thesis can also be read as saying that the signifier represents nothing, and that the signifier (re)presents the nothing that the subject of desire “is.” Signifies do not mean to say anything (ne veulent rien dire\ by which Lacan understands that they all say the same thing—that is, the subject as nothing—and this is why they are perfectly equivalent in their very difference. Since they say anything at all (n’importe quoi)y they all say not what is identical but what is the same—the same “eclipse” of the subject as a “being of non-being” (etre de non-etant; 1977a, 300/801), the same “disappearing appearance” (1973b, 33) of that fxri ov . . . that brings to being an existent in spite of its non-advent” (1977b, 1×8-1×9/117).

在问题的一边(我们刚刚调查过的这边),这个命题说跟语言学相同的事情:能指仅仅代表另外一个能指。但是在另外一边(确实让拉康感到興趣的这边),这个命题也能够被阅读作为说:能指代表空无,能指(呈现)代表欲望的主体所在的空无。能指并没有意图要说任何事情。拉康根据这个理解到:能指所说相同的事情。换句话说,主体作为空无。这就是为什么它们尽管有差异,却又完全相等。因为它们说出任何事情,它们都说的,并不是一致性的事情,而是相同的事情—主体的相同的被遮蔽,作为「非存在的存在」(1977a, 300/801),相同的「逐渐消失的出现」(1973b, 33) ,尽管主体的没有来临,它让生命实存出现(1977b, 1×8-1×9/117)。

In this way, we finally see that the “signifier” inherits the function previously assigned to “full speech” (that of saying nothing), and that the subject, for his part, inherits the disappearing “place” of the signified. Just as the linguists’ signified arises only from the reference of one signifier to another, so the Lacanian subject appears/disappears only by making himself represented, through a signifier, to another signifier. Lacan himself is very clear about it: “This whole signifier can only operate, it may be said, if it is present in the subject. It is this objection that I answer by supposing that it has passed over to the level of the signified” (1977a, 155/504). And a bit later, with respect to the “crossing” of the S/s bar, he says, “This crossing expresses the condition of passage of the signifier into the signified that I [have already] pointed out, although provisionally confusing it with the place of the subject” (1977a, 164/516). Why does Lacan say “provisionally”? Because the signified is only a momentary and provisional “effect.”

以这种方式,我们最后看见,这个「能指」继承先前指定给「充实言说」的功能(什么都没说的功能)。主体就本身而言,继承所指定这个逐渐消失的「位置」。正如语言学家的所指,仅是从一个能指针对另外一个能指的关系而产生,拉康的主体出现/消失,也仅是凭借让他自己被代表,通过一个能指,针对另外一个能指。对于这点,拉康自己是如此地清楚:「整个的能指仅能运作,它可能被说,假如它出现在主体那里。我回答这个反对,凭借假设,它已经通过到所指定层面」(1977a, 155/504)。后来,关于S/s的这条横杠的「跨越」,拉康说:「这个跨越表达能指通过进入所指的情况,我已经指出这个所指,虽然暂时将它跟主体的位置混淆」(1977a, 164/516)。为什么拉康说「暂时」?因为所指仅是瞬间与暂时的「效应」。

If the signifier, as Lacan says, “represents a subject,” and “not a signified,” it is not because the subject has nothing to do with the signified but only because the subject is distinguished from the traditional “fixed” signified: the subject is now the elusive signified of all signifiers, what they all represent in his absence; but he is none the less their signified, to which their references refer. As Lyotard aptly remarks, “When he says ‘signified* Lacan thinks ‘subject.’ Lacan’s whole theory of the metaphor is a theory of the metaphor of the subject [indeed, this is the title of a text reproduced in the appendix to Ecrits; 1966,889-892]: this subject can grasp himself only through metaphor—that is to say, by missing himself—precisely because he is signified by a signifier.”4* As for the metonymy that is forever putting the signified off till doomsday, it too is a metonymy of desire—that is, once again, a metonymy of the subject.

如同拉康所说,假如能指「代表主体」,而不是「所指」。那并不是因为主体跟所指毫无关系。而是因为主体跟传统的「固定」的所指,有所区别:主体现在是所有能指的闪躲的所指,在他缺席的状态,他们所代表的东西。但是他仍然是他们的所指。他们的指称提到的他们的所指。如同李欧塔贴切地评论:「当他说「所指」时,拉康想的是「主体」。拉康的隐喻的整个理论,是主体的隐喻的理论(的确,这就是精神分析论文集(1966,889-892)附录的复制到文章的标题):主体仅有凭借隐喻,才能理解他自己—换句话说,凭借让他自己迷失—这确实是因为他的能指的所指」。至于永远将所指拖延到死亡之日的换喻,那也是一种欲望的换喻—也就是说,它再次是主体的换喻。

And so we must ask what this abrupt reintroduction of the subject—and its inevitable correlative, representation—can mean in a discourse that, in principle, should be absolutely inhospitable to it. The hypothesis here (and it will certainly come as no surprise to any reader with the laudable courage to have persevered this far) is that the subject’s reintroduction corresponds to the linguistic model’s massive overdetermination by the philosophical problematic of the subject of representation, a problematic Cartesian in origin, of which Lacan provides an ultramodern version inspired by Kojeve’s commentary on Hegel.

所以,我们必须询问,突然重新介绍这个主体,以及跟它无可避免相关的再现表象,在辞说里,能够意味着什么?原则上,这个辞说对于主体,绝对不怀好意。在此的假设是(这确实没有什么好大惊小怪,对于足够勇敢一直坚持到现在的读者),主体的重新介绍,对应于语言学的模式的巨大过分决定,受到再现表象的主体的哲学的难题所过分决定,起源上是笛卡尔的我思故我在的难题。拉康供应给它一个超现代的版本,受到科耶夫对于黑格尔的评注所启发。

In this respect, we recall that Lacan, almost from the beginning, links the problem of language to the problem of the subject. For example, let us reread what he has to say in “Beyond the Reality Principle”:

在这方面,我们回想到,拉康,几乎从业开始,将将语言的难题,跟主体的难题联接一块。譬如,让我们重新阅读他必须说的东西,在「超现实原则」:

Language, before signifying something, signifies for someone. By the single fact that he [the analyst] is present and is listening, the man who speaks [the patient] addresses himself to him, and since he imposes upon his discourse a not wanting to say anything (de ne rien vouloir dire)9 what remains is that he wants to speak to him (veut lui dire). What he says may indeed make no sense; what he says to him receives a meaning [1966, 82-83].

语言在意指某件东西之前,是针对某人从事意指。凭借这个事实:精神分析家在场,并且倾听,言说的这个人(病人),对着分析家言说他自己。因为他在他的辞说上赋加「不想要说出任何东西」。剩下来的问题是:他想要跟他言说。他所说的内容的确没有意义;他对他言说的内容,接收到意义[1966, 82-83]。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
http://springhero.wordpress.com

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