语言的奥秘 9

语言的奥秘 9
Linguisteries

雅克慎论拉康

What is called a Subject?
何谓主体?

“Meaning,” in other words, is not to be sought in what language says (in the statement) but in the fact of its being said (in the enunciation, in speech). And this meaning, constituted in interlocutive speech and nowhere else, this “signified = x” is the subject insofar as he “wants to speak” (veut dire), insofar as he ex-presses himself to the intention of another. Language is first of all speech, and thus it says nothing—nothing but the subject, to the extent that he wants to speak (himself) (veut [se] dire).

换句话说,意义不应该在语言言说(在陈述)的东西里寻找,而是要在语言正在被言说(在表述,在话说)的这个事实里寻找。在对谈的话语里构成的这个意义,而不是别的地方,这个等于x未知数的「所指」,它就是主体。因为他「想要言说」,因为他表达(逼迫)他自己,针对另外一个所指的意图。语言首先就是话语,因此它什么都没说—除了就是主体。甚至他想要言说(他自己)。

We see what these (still very phenomenological48) early formulations of Lacan already presuppose: the whole critique of the “language-sign” that will be carried out under the auspices of “full speech” and, later, of the “signifier.” In this passage, we are witnessing an actual bracketing off (or “reduction”) of every realist reference, for the sake of an entirely autoenunciative and self-referential (because “subjective”) model of language. This language is essentially speech that speaks itself, in the very precise sense of a subject’s intentionally expressing himself within it, manifesting himself in exteriority by passing through the mediation of the other—in short, in the sense of the subject’s speaking himself, performing an autorepresentation.

我们看出,拉康的这些(依旧非常现象学)的早期的诠释,已经预先假定:对于「语言-符号」的整个的批判,将会在「充实言说」的吉兆之下被执行。在这个过程,我们正见证到,他将每个现实主义的指称,实际地放进括弧(或化简),为了让语言的模式可以自动-表述与自我-指涉(因为这是「主体的」模式)。这个语言基本上是言说它自己的话语,确实的意义就是,主体意图在它里面表达他自己,在外在性里展示他自己,凭借经历他者的中介—总之,以主体言说他自己的意义,履行一个自动再现表象。

This is why speech, for Lacan, is not a question of reality but, as we have been confirming, of truth. We must understand by this that the subject grasps himself through a subjective certitude, which is what Lacan says again in this passage from the first seminar, which we have already cited: “What is at stake [in psychoanalysis] is the realization of the truth of the subject, like a dimension peculiar to it which must be detached in its distinctiveness [originalite] in relation to the very notion of reality” (1988a, 21/29).

这就是为什么对于拉康而言,话语并不是现实的问题,而是真理的问题,如同我们已经证实的。我们必须根据这个理解,主体通过主观的确定性来掌握他自己。这是拉康再次所说的东西,从第一个研讨班的这个段落,我们已经引述过:「精神分析岌岌可危的地方,就是主体的真理的实现。就像一个对于主体是特殊的维度,这个维度必须在它清晰的状不保持隔离,相关于现实的这个观念」(1988a, 21/29)。

And we certainly recognize this “peculiar dimension”: it is that of the Cartesian cogito, here reformulated by Lacan in terms of “speech.” The subject of speech, like the subject of the cogito, grasps himself in his truth by negating (“reducing,” questioning) objective reality, for the sake of an autorepresentation by which he poses himself “before” himself through a Vor-stellung:49 his objects (or, what amount to the same thing in this context, his representations) are henceforth his own. In this sense, the progress of an analysis follows the course of the first two Cartesian meditations. It proceeds from language, which says “something” or represents objects, to speech, in which the subject (of the enunciation) speaks himself in everything that he says (in all his statements): dico, sum. Lacan later makes this very dear: “Let us say that it is by taking its place at the level of the enunciation that the cogito acquires its certainty” (1977b, 140/129). In other words, it would be impossible that, saying something (no matter how nonsensical), I would not “be” at the very moment when I spoke (made the statement).

我们确实体认出这个「特殊的维度」:那就是笛卡尔的「我思故我在」。在此由拉康用「话语」重新诠释。话语的主体,就像我思故我在的主体,凭借否定(化简,询问)客观的现实,在他的真理里掌握他自己。为了这个自动再现表象,他凭借来在他自己面前,通过一种「表象」,摆弄姿态:他的客体(也就是,相等于是这个内文的相同东西,体的再现表象),因此就是他自己的客体。从这个意义,精神分析的进展遵循笛卡尔的前两个沉思录的途径。它从语言开始前进,语言对话语言说「某件东西」,或是代表各种客体。在话语里,这个表述的主体言说他自己,在每样他说的东西里(在他所有的陈述里):拉康后来清楚地表达这一点:「让我们说,我思故我在获得它的确定性,就是在表述的层面,取代它的位置」(1977b, 140/129)。换句话说,当我说出某件事情时(不管是多么的没有意义),就在当我言说的这个时刻(表达这个陈述时),我不可能没有「获得生命实存」。

This reformulation of the cogito presupposes, of course, the assimilation of the “I think” to an “I speak (myself)”50 and, therefore, in accord with Heidegger’s interpretation, to an “I represent (myself),” which already implies all the distance between the subject of the enunciation and the statement that represents him: this subject, in the act of enunciation, is related to himself only on condition of projecting himself “outside” himself in the utterance of the statement where he (re)presents himself. Let us pause here a moment, for this point is extremely important: if the subject of speech and/or of the signifier is none other than the Cartesian subject, as Lacan asserts later (1977b, 36/36; 1966, 856, 858), it is only as a subject of representation (and not of an immediate certitude—that of affect, for example).

这个重新诠释「我思故我在」,当然是预先假设:这个「我思」被吸收成为「我言说我自己」。因此,为了跟海德格的诠释一致,它被吸收成为「我代表我自己」。这已经暗示着所有的这个距离,处于表述的主体,与代表主体的陈述之间的距离:在表述的行动里,这个主体跟他自己息息相关,仅是根据这个条件:在他代表(呈现)他自己的陈述的表达里,他投射他自己,在他自己的「外面」。让我们在此稍微停顿一下,因为这一点极端重要:假如话语的主体,与(或)能指的主体,实实在在就是笛卡尔的主体,如同拉康后来主张的(1977b, 36/36; 1966, 856, 858),那仅是作为再现表象的主体(而不是作为当下确定性的主体—譬如,情感的主体。)

Confirmation, if any were needed, could be found in the Hegelianism of Lacan’s first formulations on language and speech. Whereas one could say that the cogito is a monologue, Lacan describes a dialogue, but only because he was reformulating, in the i94o’s and i95o’s, the cogito in Hegelian terms: only by speaking to the other, by alienating/exteriorizing himself in a communal language, can the subject represent himself “in front of” himself and thus arrive at self-consciousness. In other words, he can manifest himself in his truth only by passing through the mediation of the other, by making himself recognized by the other. Thus the Lacanian cogito is from the very start a linguistic, social, and intersubjective cogito, a cogito in the first person plural (1977a, 86/299).

从拉康第一次对于黑格尔思想探讨语言与话语的诠释,我们能够获得证实(假如需要证实的话)。虽然我们说,「我思故我在」是个独白,拉康描述的是对话。但是那仅是因为在1940与1950年代,拉康重新诠释黑格尔术语的「我思故我在」:仅是凭借对他者言说,凭借异化他自己,让他自己处于外在,在共通社区的语言里,主体才能代表他自己,在他自己「面前」,因此获得自我意识。换句话说,他能够展示他自己,在他的真理里,仅是凭借通过他者的中介,仅是凭借让他自己被他者体认。因此,拉康的我思故我在,从一开始,就是一个语言,社会,与互为主体性的我思故我在,以第一人称复数的「我们思故我们在」(1977a, 86/299)。

But this changes nothing of its structure as cogito, understood as the structure of the subject of representation. The subject of speech, for the Hegelian who was the young Lacan, continues to speak himself’in the other to whom he speaks, for the good reason that the subject makes himself recognized by the other only by recognizing himself simultaneously in that alter ego. Thus, as we have seen, unfolds the efficacy of the analytic cure, as Lacan conceived of it until the end of the 1940’s: here, the subject speaks to an alienated image of himself until the analyst, that image’s specular prop, returns it to the subject, who finally recognizes himself in it. This accords, obviously, with the structure of the cogito, since now there is an identity (a dialectical one this time) between the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the statement: the “subject” who speaks is the same as the “ego” of whom, with whom, he speaks.

但是,这并没有改变任何它的结构,作为「我思故我在」。它被理解作为再现表象的主体的结构。年轻时的拉康是黑格尔主义者,话语的这个主体,继续言说他自己,针对他言说对象的他者。理由非常充分:主体让他自己被他者体认,仅是凭借同时体认他自己,在那个他者-自我。因此,我们已经看出,精神分析治疗的有效性就此展开,如同拉康构想它,直到1940年代的末期:在此,主体跟他自己的异化的形象言说,直到精神分析家,作为那个形象的魅影理想的支撑,将它还给主体。主体最后才在它里面体认出他自己。显而易见地,这符合「我思故我在」的结构。因为现在,在表述的主体与陈述的主体之间,已经有一个认同(这次是辩证法的认同):言说的「主体」,跟他谈论的这个「自我」,与之谈论的这个「自我」,是相同的。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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