语言的神秘 3

语言的神秘 3
Linguisteries

雅克慎论拉康
From Absolute Maste

In other words, the signification of a term is only the “summary” of its value19—that is, of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships between it and its surrounding terms (think of the dictionary, which enumerates words vertically according to their similarity and combines them horizontally with other words to specify their uses). Hence this conclusion: “In language, there are only differences without positive terms.”10

换句话说,一个术语的意义仅是它的价值的总结。也就是说,在它与它的周围的术语之间的语素变化与句法的关系的总结。(想想看,字典垂直地列举字词,依照它们的类同,并且水平地连接它们,跟其他字词,为了指明它们的用法)。因此,获得这个结论:「在语言,仅有一些没有积极术业的差异。」

It is easy to see that these two hypotheses are ultimately incompatible. Indeed, even when we admit that the theory of arbitrariness is not simply a new form of conventionalism,21 the fact remains that to speak of an “arbitrary” relation between the signifier and the signified is the same as to admit, if only negatively, that the first represents the second. By the same token, this inevitably means reviving the idea that there is a signified independent of the signifier that represents it, just when we are asserting that they form a unity as inseparable as the two sides of a sheet of paper.22
我们很容易看出,这两个假设最后是不和谐的。的确,即使当我们承认,任意性的理论不仅是一种新的形式的传统主义。这个事实始终存在,谈论到能指与所指之间的「任意性」关系,相当等于承认,即使是否面地承认,前者代表后者。同样地,这无可避免地意味着复活这个观念:有一个所指独立于代表它的能指之外。正当我们主张,它们形成一个一致性,就像一张纸的两边一样不可分离。

It is precisely this mirage—of a signified independent of the signifier—that the hypothesis of value dispels. Indeed, it is through pure abstraction that Saussure can say that the signified “beef” is here pronounced /bi:f/, there /boef/ or /oks/, as if this “concept” had existed before Babel, independently of the dispersion of national/maternal langues. In reality, for the speakers of a given langue, as Benveniste had already noted in 1939, there is no difference between the signifier /bi:f/ and the signified “beef”: “Between the signifier and the signified, the connection is not arbitrary; on the contrary, it is necessary. The concept (the ‘signified’) bceuf [beef] is perforce identical in my [French] consciousness with the sound sequence (the ‘signifier’) bof.. .. There is such a close symbiosis between them that the concept of bceuf is like the soul of the sound image bof”23 In other words, there is strict adherence between the signifier and the signified, and if this is so, it is because, in accord with the theory of value, they vary in concert within a linguistic system with which they are in solidarity (hence the despair of translators, who know only too well that /beef/ will never have exactly the same meaning as /bi:f/, even if they both refer to the same thing).

价值的假设驱散的确实就是这个幻景—独立于能指的所指的幻景。的确,通过这个浓缩,索绪尔能够说,所指的「牛肉」在此被发音为“bif”,在那里,被发音为“boef”或“oks”,好像这个观念在巴比塔之前就存在,独立于民族母语的扩散。事实上,对于特定语言的言说者,如同本温尼斯在1939年已经注意到,在能指“bif”与所指“beef”之间,并没有差异。在能指与所指之间,这个连接并非任意性;相反地,它是必然性。这个观念(所指boeuf (beef)在我的法国的意识里,必然跟声音的系列(能指bof)相一致。它们之间并有一个如此紧密的共生关系,以致boeuf的这个观念,就像是声音意象bof的灵魂。换句话说,能指与所指之间,有严格的坚持。假如情况是这样,那是因为跟价值的理论一致,它们会有所变化,以符合它们团结一致的语言的系统。(因此,翻译者的绝望,他清楚地知道,“beef”跟“bif”将不会拥有完全相同的意义,即使它们两者都提到相同的东西。

Signification, therefore, does not reside in the representation of a signified by a signifier, even an “arbitrary” one. If we follow the hypothesis of value, the meaning of a sign is always (to use Peirce’s vocabulary, quoted by Jakobson) in another sign that “interprets” the first: “The function of such an interpretant is performed by another sign or set of signs that occur together with a given sign, or might occur instead of it.”24 Even more precisely, the signified is inseparable from the signifier, whose differential destiny it shares. As Lacan says, there is no signified “day” before the signifying opposition that places day against the background of night’s absence, and vice versa (1981,169—170), no signified “man” without the signifying polarity that differentiates him from “woman” (1981,223-224, 282—283). And so it turns out that we can never lay our hands on the signified of a signifier except in another signifier, and so on. This is illustrated, in “The Agency of the Letter,” by the incongruous rewriting (1977a, 151/499) of the Saussurian schema of the sign:

意义因此并不是在于所指被能指所代表,即使是「任意的」代表。假如我们遵照价值的假设,符号的意义总是(使用皮尔斯的字彙,雅克慎引用)「诠释」前者的在另一个符号里:这样一个诠释的功能,由另外一个符号或一组符号来履行。它们跟一个特定的符号一起发生,或可能代替它发生。」更贴切地说,所指跟能指是不可分开的,所指分享能指的差异的命运。如同拉康说,并没有「白天」的所指,在能指化的对立之前。这种对立将白天放置于夜晚的缺席的背景里。反过来说,夜晚也是如此(1981,169-170)。必然先有能指化的两极,区分「男人」与「女人」,才会有「男人」这个所指。(1981,223-224,282-283)。所以,结果是,我们永远无法掌控一个能指的所指,除了在另外一个能指,等等。在「信息的代理」一文,有一个不协调的重新书写作为举例(1077a,151/499)索绪尔的符号的基模:

LADIES 女厕所

GENTLEMEN 男厕所

The two doors, indistinguishable in reality\ receive their imponderable “meaning”—”the imperative … of urinary segregation” (1977a, 151/500)—from the pure difference in places between the two signifiers “Ladies” and “Gentlemen.”

这两个门,实际上无法区别,接收它们难以掌握的「意义」–「排泄聚会所的命令」(1977a,151/500)–从「女厕所」与「男厕所」这两个能指之间的地点的纯粹的差异。

By the same token, if the signified of a signifier is itself a signifier, what can the distinction between signifier and signified (advanced by the Saussurian doctrine of arbitrariness) correspond to it? As Benveniste noted in 1939, this distinction is actually only the relic, within a theory allergic to it, of a representationalist problematic of the sign. Therefore, Benveniste amends, arbitrariness concerns only the relation of the sign to the thing designated, and not the relation of the signifier to the signified, which itself is necessary and indissoluble. The signifier is not the “arbitrary” representative of the signified, for the latter is nothing without the former, except through mirage or illusion. “Meaning” is “an internal component of linguistic form,”25 and therefore the signified is not to be sought anywhere but in the relations among signifiers.

同样地,假如能指的所指,本身是一个能指,能指与所指之间的区别(由索绪尔的任意性的信条所提出)能够对应什么?如同本温尼斯特在1939年注意到,这个区别实际上仅是符号的再现代表难题的这个遗物,在对它过敏的理论里。因此,本温尼斯特修正说,任意性仅是关系到符号与被指明的物象的关系。而不是关系到能指与所指的关系。后者本身是必要的而且不可解决。能指并不是所指的「任意性」代表。因为假如没有前者,后者是空无,除了通过幻景与幻觉。「意义」是语言形式的内在的成分,因此所指不应该在任何其他地方寻找,除了就是在能指之间的关系。

We can see what Benveniste’s rectification implies: it methodically reduces the theory of signification to a theory of value, and by the same token, as Jean-Claude Milner opportunely remarks, it justifies the notion “that in order to designate any system structured like a language [let us correct this Lacanian slippage: like a langue]y one adopts a single term—for example, ‘the signifier.’ “2*

我们能够看出,本温尼斯特的修正暗示着:它系统地将意义的理论,简化成为价值的理论。同样地,如同詹、克劳得 米纳贴切的评论,它证实这个观念:为了指明任何像语言一样结构的系统,(让我们改正拉康学派的口误:像语意一般的结构),我们採有单一的术语—譬如,「能指」。

Now, as we know, this is the side taken by Lacan, who on this point merely draws the strict conclusions of the theory of value. Indeed, if the sign represents nothing—neither the referent nor even the signified—then there is nothing to sink one’s teeth into but the signifier. Only the signifier survives the deluge (as Blanchot says) that swallows up every “signifiable” (1977, 288/692). As for the concept of the “sign,” it is totally abandoned; witness the double and significant destiny that it meets in Lacan. Either it is criticized as what the signifier is not—that is, “what represents something for someone” (1970, 65), a definition borrowed from Peirce but implicitly entailing that of the Saussurian sign—or it is simply identified with the concept of the signifier (“The signifier is a sign that refers to another sign”; 1981, 188).

现在,我们知道,这就是拉康採用的这一面。针对这点,拉康仅是获得价值的理论的严格的结论。的确,假如符号代表空无,既不是指称物,甚至也不是所指—那么,就没有什么东西我们能够掌握,除了就是能指。只有能指经历洪水之后还存活,(布朗肖的说法),洪水淹没了每个「可被能指的东西」(1977,288/692)。至于「符号」这个观念,它完全被放弃:请你们见证,符号在拉康那里遭遇的双重与能指意义的命运。符号要就是被批评,作为是能指不是的东西,换句话说,「对于某人代表某物的东西」(1970,65),从皮尔斯借用过来的定义,而且暗示地涵盖索绪尔的符号的定义。要不就是,符号仅是被认同是能指的观念(能指是提到另外一个符号的符号;1981,188)。

Therefore, the stakes are clear enough in this methodical reduction of sign to the signifier alone. For Lacan, it is a question of emptying the linguistic sign of every representative function, in order to invest it with the role previously imparted to speech: the role of producing (presenting) nothing, from nothing. There is, Lacan repeats after Levi-Strauss,27 an “autonomy” of the signifier relative to the signified (1981, 223; 1970, 55), in the sense that the signifier “does not depend on the signification . . . but is its source” (1981, 282). This formula summarizes very well the double demonstration to which Lacan yields whenever he presents his doctrine of the signifier (see, for example, the first section of “The Agency of the Letter,” which is entirely constructed on the following pattern):

因此,在系统地将符号化简成为仅是能指,赌注足够清楚。对于拉康,问题是要将语言的符号,掏空掉每个再现代表的功能。为了替它投注先前被分配给言说的角色:从空无,产生(呈现)空无的角色。拉康跟随在列文、史特劳斯之后重复,有一个能指的「自主权」,相对于所指(1081,223;1970,55)。这意味着,能指并没有依靠意义,而是能指就是意义的来源(1981,282)。这个公式非常清楚地总结拉康屈从的这个双重的展示,每当他呈现能指的信条(譬如,情参照「信息的代理」的第一部分。它完全以下面的模式作为建构:

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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