言语道断 10

言语道断 10
雅克慎论拉康

Did Lacan know of Austin’s work? It seems that he did not, if only because, had he known of it, he would have been able to save himself (and us!) the painful task of formulating his hypothesis in the vocabulary of a structural linguistics bound to be allergic to it.42 But the fact remains that full speech as described by Lacan is, from the formal point of view, nothing but explicitly performative speech, in Austin’s sense. And, by the same token, haven’t we discovered what we were searching for—a finally positive characterization of full speech?

拉康知道奥斯丁的研究吗?他似乎不知道,因为他当时假如知道的话,他本来会能够替自己节省下这项痛苦的工作:说明他的假设,用必然会跟它过敏的结构语言学的词汇。但是,这个事实依旧在,拉康所描述的充实的言说,从正式的观点,仅仅就是奥斯丁意涵的明确地履行的言说。同样地,我们难道不是发现我们正在寻找的东西?充分言说的最后积极的特征?
Full and/or performative speech, under this hypothesis, would be the speech that, by contrast to empty and/or constative speech, represents no reality before its enunciation and is thus all the more “true” for manifesting the subject in his pure and null “reality of discourse.” Analytic speech, by returning speech to its performative essence, therefore brings about the paradoxical “realization of the subject1′ (1977a, 40/247): it creates him ex nihilo, by bringing that nothing into existence solely through the power of the Word {Parole). As Lacan says, refuting Goethe’s interpretation of the first verse of the Gospel according to John, “It was certainly the Word (verbe) that was in the beginning” (1977a, 61/271)—the Word, certainly, but as an act of speech, as a creative “speech act.” The true and authentic Word {Parole) of revelation is the Word that creates nothing (except) by speaking, thus unveiling its own “emptiness.”43

充分与/或履行言说,在这个假设下,将是对照于空虚与/或履行言说,并没有代表任何现实界,在它的表述之前,因此更加地「真实」,作为展示主体在他的纯粹与无效的「辞说的现实」里。精神分析的辞说,凭借将言说回归到它的履行的本质,因此导致悖论的「主体的实现」(1977a,40/247):它从空无中创造它,凭借将那个空无获得生命实存,仅是凭借「字」作为道的力量。如同拉康所说,当他反驳歌德对于依照约翰福音篇的第一首诗的诠释,「太初确实是有道」(1977a,61/271)–确实有「道」,但是作为言说的行动,作为创造的「言说的行动」。启示的真实与真诚的「道」,就是凭借言说创造空无的「道」,因此,揭发它自己的「空虚」。

In reality, however, this only perplexes us more. In the end, we really must ask whether such speech ever exists in a pure state and whether analysis can seriously propose to bring it to light as such. Does Lacan really mean that analysis ends with explicitly performative speech? Such a hope courts grave disappointment. Indeed, Lacan himself recognizes that true speech is extremely rare: “This speech, which constitutes the subject in his truth, is nevertheless always forbidden to him except for those rare moments of his existence when he tries, however confusedly, to grasp it in sworn fealty” (1966, 353). If this is the case, it is because “true [that is, performative] speech” tends to be irresistibly confused with “true [that is, constative] discourse”: “Each of the two truths distinguished here is altered through its intersection with the other in its path,” in the form of an “intermediate discourse” (1966, 351-352).

可是,在现实上,这仅是让我们更加困惑。最后,我们确实必须询问,这样的言说是否曾经存在于纯净的状态,精神分析是否能够严肃地建议将它作为启明本身。拉康难道确实意味着,精神分析用明确是履行的言说来作为中止?这样的希望召致巨大的失望。的确,拉康自己承认,真实的言说是极端罕见:「这个言说,构成主体在他的真理里,可是总是被禁止给他,除了他的生命实存的那些罕见的时刻,当他尝试用宣誓的信念理解它,无论多么混淆」(1066,353)。假如情况是这样,那是因为「真实,履行的言说」倾向于无可抗拒地混淆,跟「真实,也就是履行的言说」混淆“「在此被区别出来的两个真理的每一个,由于它跟他者的互相交会而在它的途径上被改变」,形式上是「一个中间的辞说」(1966,351-352)。

This is another way of saying that the difference between the two types of speech may once more be revealed to be perfectly imperceptible. Indeed, as Lacan explains, just as “true discourse” can produce nothing but a simple sign as proof of its adequacy to the real (therefore invoking the performative “good faith”), so does the purest promise still refer to a state of the world, even if it is non-“constatable” at the moment of enunciation. “I promise to marry you” also means “We shall be married in two months”: “True discourse, if we extract from the given word what is given in the promise, makes [the promise] appear a lie, since it engages the future, which, as they say, belongs to no one” (1966, 351-352).

这是另外一种方式说,两种言说之间的差异,可能再次被启示,成为完全无法感知。的确,依照拉康解释,正如「真实辞说」能够产生仅是一个简单的讯息,作为它充足于实在界的证据(因此召唤履行的「美好信仰」,即使是最纯净的承诺也依旧提到世界的状态,即使那是「非履行的状态」,在表述的时刻。「我承诺跟你结婚」,也意味着,「我们将在两个月内结婚」:「真实的辞说,假如我们从这特定的字,抽取出在承诺里被给予的东西,会让这个承诺看起来是谎言。因为它牵涉到未来,而未来,如俗语所说的,并不属于任何人」。

Isn’t this the same as admitting (as Austin also had to do) that the distinction between performative and constative is not nearly so well decided, so clear-cut, as we might have believed at first? As we know, this was the problem that led Austin to substitute a second distinction for this first one between two types of utterance, a much more encompassing distinction (and therefore much more vague as well, for which Benveniste reproaches him)44 between the “locutionary” and “illocutionary” dimension of all utterances. Indeed, as Austin remarks, not only are performative utterances often formulated in the constative mode (“The meeting will begin,” “You are fired,” and so on), every constative utterance also (and inversely) has an implicit or “primary” performative dimension. The assertion “s is p,” for example, always implies an ” J assert that s is />,” which defines the “illocutionary force” or “value” of the utterance: “Statements do “take effect9 just as much as ‘namings’, say: if I have stated something, then that commits me to other statements.”45

这难道不是等同于承认(如同奥斯丁也必须这样承认),履行与实践之间的区别,根本就没有清楚地被决定,如此清楚的切割,如同我们起初所认为的?众所周知,就是这个难题引导奥斯丁用第二个区别,替换两种表述之间的第一个区别。这是更加涵盖的区别(因此也更加模糊,本温尼斯谴责他这一点),各种表达的「专属」与「非专属」维度之间的区别。的确,如同奥斯丁评论,履行的表达不但经常在实现的模式里被诠释(「会议将开始」,「你被开除」,等等),而且反过来,它也具有暗示或「初级」的履行的维度。譬如,「s 就是p 」的主张,总是暗示着「我主张,s就是p」。这定义著表述的「非专属的力量」或「价值」:「陈述确实产生效果,如同命名一样」,换句话说:假如我陈述某件事情,那么那让我承诺其它的陈述。」

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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