言语道断 9

言语道断 9
雅克慎论拉康

To Perform Nothing?
什么都不履行?

At this point, the reader will no doubt be unable to fend off a disquieting feeling of deja vu, and with good reason: Is what Lacan here calls “full speech” really anything other than what Austin, at about the same time, called “performative” speech, the speech that “does things with words”?29 Moreover, didn’t Austin enlist the same example of marriage to illustrate his thesis? Readers can judge for themselves:

在这个时候,读者无可置疑地不能够防卫「似曾相识」的不安的感觉。而且理由充分:拉康在此所谓的「充实的言说」,实实在在就是奥斯丁,在几乎是同时,所谓的「履行的」言说,用文字来做事情的言说?而且,奥斯丁难道没有征召相同的婚姻的例子,用来说明他的主题?读者能够替他们自己判断:

One of our examples was, for instance, the utterance “I do” (take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife), as uttered in the course of a marriage ceremony. Here we should say that in saying these words we are doing something—namely, marrying, rather than reporting something, namely that we are marrying. And the act of marrying, like, say, the act of betting, is at least preferably (though still not accurately) to be described as saying certain words, rather than as performing a different, inward and spiritual, action of which these words are merely the outward and audible sign.30

譬如,其中一个例子是「我愿意」的表达(接受这位女人当我合法的妻子),在婚姻典礼的过程被表达。在此,我们应该说,当我们说这些字词时,我们正在做某件事情—换句话说,结婚,而不是报导我们正要结婚的事情。结婚的行动,就像打赌的行动,至少偏爱地被描述,作为说出某些话又,(虽然不是很正确地),而不是履行一个差异,内向与精神的行程。这些话语仅是这个外向与可听见的符号。

Isn’t this exactly what Lacan also says? In fact, it does not take long to perceive that Lacanian “full speech” has all the essential characteristics of Austinian “performative” speech:

这难道不就是拉康所说的东西吗?事实上,我们不久就会感知,拉康的「充实的言说」,拥有奥斯丁的「履行」言说的所有基本特征:

1. It is a non-“constative” speech, in Austin’s sense, one that does not represent or describe or report anything that would predate its utterance, whether concerning a state of affairs or an interior event (“Our word,* Austin writes, “is our bond”).31 It is therefore opposed to empty speech and to language, exactly as the performative utterance, in Austin, is opposed to the affirmative statement of the constative type.

这是一个「非履行」言说,以奥斯丁的意涵,这个言说并没有代表或描述,或报导任何早先于它的表达之前的东西,无论是关于事情的状态,或内部的事件(「我们的字」,奥斯丁写道,「就是我们的契约」。它因此事跟空虚的言说与语言对立,确实作为是履行的表达。在奥斯丁的用法,它跟可履行的肯定的陈述对立。

2. It is, by virtue of this very fact, neither true nor false—at least if we understand these terms, as Austin does, in the sense of a statement that “corresponds with the facts”32 (of “adequacy” and “exactitude,” as Lacan would say). In this respect, Austin attacks the “‘descriptive’ fallacy”33 (which consists in analyzing all statements in terms of truth or falsity) no less than Lacan denounces the “mistaken notion of ‘language as sign'” (which purports to be the adequate or inadequate representation of some thing). The I do of marriage, for example, has nothing to do with the alternatives “true/false,” but rather with the purely pragmatic ones of “happiness” or “unhappiness,” “felicity” or “infelicity.”

凭借这个事实,既不是真实,也不是虚假—至少假如我们理解这些术语,如同奥斯丁那样,陈述的意义跟事实对应(拉康的经常用词是,「充足」与「确定」。在这方面,奥斯丁攻击「描述的谬误」(它在于分析所有的陈述,用真理或虚假的术语),如同拉康抨击「作为讯息的语言」的「错误的观念」。(它企图成为某件东西的充足或不充足的再现)。譬如,婚姻的这个「我愿意」,跟选择性的「真与假」根本没有关系。相反地,而是跟「快乐」或「不快乐」,「幸福」或「幸福」的纯粹实用的选择有关系。

3. Lacanian full speech commits, acts, institutes, and transforms, just as Austinian performative speech performs an action in the simple fact of its utterance.

拉康的充实言说,承诺,行动,开启,并转移,正如奥斯丁的履行的言说,在它的表达的简单的事实里履行一项行动。

4. More precisely, Lacanian full speech engages a subject, and this corresponds to Austin’s remarks on the necessarily “subjective” character of the performative: “The T who is doing the action does thus come essentially into the picture,”34 since “there is something which is at the moment of uttering being done by the person utter-ing”iS (Austin thus explains his initial—and, as he adds, by contrast to Benveniste, finally unjustified—preference for examples of performative speech formulated in the first person singular of the present indicative active).

更加确实地说,拉康的充足言说牵涉到主体。这对应于奥斯丁的谈论可履行语的这个必要的「主观性」特征:「正在做这个行动的这个「我」,这样做,因此基本上进入画面」,因为「有某件东西正在表达的时刻,受到正在表达的这个人所做」(奥斯丁因此解释他的最初的偏好—如同他补充说,对照于本温尼斯特,他最后无法自圆其说。譬如,用现在时式-指述的主动-第一人称单数,诠释的履行的言说的偏好)。

5. Full speech presupposes and “calls for a reply,” which in turn defines it, just as the effect of performative speech (called “illocutionary” by Austin, since it is produced in speaking) presupposes its being grasped (its “uptake”) by the addressee.36 The / do of marriage can be performed “happily,” as Austin says, only if the woman responds I do,37 just as speech, according to Lacan, remains “held up” (en souffrance; 1966,19-30) for lack of “a happy punctuation that gives meaning to the discourse of the subject” (1977a, 44/251, my emphasis; translation modified; see also 1977a, 95-99/310-314).

充足言说预先假设并且「呼吁回答」,作为回头定义它。正如履行的言说的影响(奥斯丁称为「非意义的言说」,因为它在言说中被产生)预先假设它的被人理解(它的「摄取」)被对谈者。婚姻的这个「我愿意」能够「快乐地」被履行,如同奥斯丁说,只要这个女人回答「我愿意」。正如拉康认为,言说始终被「拦截」,因为欠缺「快乐的标点给予主体的辞说赋予意义」(1977a,44/310-314)。
6.
Finally, the efficiency or effectiveness of full speech is purely symbolic, just as in Austin the illocutionary effect of performative speech is purely “conventional”38 (contrary to the so-called perlocutionary effect of an utterance, which for its part is unpredictable and uncodable). As Austin writes, the “happiness” of performative speech requires, among other essential conditions, the existence of “an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.”39

最后,充实言说的有效性与实用性,纯粹是象征的。正如在奥斯丁,履行言说的非意义的影响,纯粹是「俗成的」(跟表达到所谓意义影响恰恰相反,就它本身而言,那是无法预测,无法成为符码)。如同奥斯丁写到,履行的言说的「快乐」,除了其他基本的俗成的影响,还要求被接纳的俗成的程序的这个存在,它具有某种俗成的效果。那个程序包括在某些情况,由某些人某些字词的表达。

Now, this code is not ‘ the strictly linguistic one used by locutors in order to convey their “messages”; it is the extralinguistic one, Austin seems to say (but, in reality, “linguistic” in the larger sense, as Lacan asserts, inspired by Levi-Strauss40), that rules the utterance or enunciation of certain statements by conventionally determining the locutors in their “symbolic” or “pragmatic” interrelations. Full and/or performative speech is a “speech act” because to the regulating code of the statement is added the code regulating utterance or enunciation; the very fact of speaking institutes ipso facto such and such a condition of discourse: an order necessarily entails the obedience (or disobedience) of the interlocutor, a question necessarily calls for a response (or silence), a request is necessarily gratified (or frustrated), and so on.41

现在,这个符码并不是由表达者使用的严格的语言学的符码,为了传达它们的「讯息」。那是语言外部的符码,奥斯丁似乎是说(但是,事实上,那是广义的语言学,拉康这样主张,受到列文、史特劳斯的启发)。语言外部的符码规范著某些陈述的表达或表述,俗成地决定那些言谈者,在他们的「象征」或「实用」的相互关系。充分与(或)履行的言说,是一种「言说行为」,因为规范表达或表述的符码,被增添到陈述的规范符码。言说事实上启发如此这般的辞说的这个事实:命令必然会涵盖着对谈者的服从(或不服从)。询问必然要求回答(或沉默回应),要求必然被满足(或拒绝),等等。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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