Archive for July, 2014

捉住欲望的尾巴 17

July 25, 2014

捉住欲望的尾巴 17
雅克慎论拉康

Thus we see, in this more than exemplary example, what the objet a of phantasy represents for Lacan: an “embodiment” of the non-objective object of desire, an “image” of the unimaginable castrated phallus, a “reflection” of the non-existent vacuity of the subject—in short, an impossible image, a sort of ultimate limit of identification, a self-portrait in which the subject will see himself as he cannot see himself, a vision of horror in which his own nullity appears to him. What am I for you? Shit; refuse. Who are you for me? That in which I mutilate you (1977b, 268/241)—which is to say that, in the imaginary, the objet a plays a role exactly analogous to the one played by the phallic signifier in the domain of the symbolic: that of embodying the absence of the subject. In reality, the same logic is at work in both realms, with just a slight difference of register. Just as the symbolic phallus was the object of the desire of the Other with which the subject must “not identify,” so at present the objet a of phantasy is the lost object of the Other with which the subject identifies, without being able to identify himself in it. Just as the phallus was the signifier of the enigma of what I am (not) for the desire of the Other, so at present the objet a is its image.

因此,我们看见,对于拉康,在这个非比寻常的例子,幻见的小客体代表的东西:欲望的非客体的「具体表现」,无法想像的被阉割的阳具的「镜像」,主体的非存在的认同的「反映」–总之,一个不可能的镜像,一种认同的最后的限制,主体将会在那里看见自己的自我肖像,作为他无法看见他自己,他自己的空无显示给他的这个恐怖的视像。对于你,我是什么?狗屎;废料。对于我,你是什么?我让你变成残缺的东西(1977b,268/241)–换句话说,在想像界,小客体扮演的角色,确实类同于阳具能指在象征界扮演的角色:具体表现主体的欠缺的角色。实际上,在两个领域里,相同的逻辑都在运作,仅是在铭记上稍有差别。正如象征的阳具是大他者的欲望的客体,主体一定「不要认同」于他,目前,幻见的小客体就是主体认同的大他者的失落的客体,但是它不能够在它里面认同他。正如阳具是对于大他者的欲望,我的生命实存(非生命实存)的谜团的能指。目前,小客体就是它的镜像。

Does this mean that Lacan, late in life, finally reworked the rigid opposition between the symbolic and the imaginary, recognizing in the latter the capacity to “reveal” the truth of the subject in its abyssal non-being? In a sense, yes, since Lacan reached the point of making the objet a the ultimate identification of the subject, beyond which there is simply nothing: a pure identification with the unidentifiable, a pure Being- there of an enigmatic void. And yet this profound reworking did not challenge the aim that had been supporting the distinction between the symbolic and the imaginary: the ever more stubbornly renewed aim of a total disidentification of the subject, tending toward the apocalyptic revelation of his nothingness. From this point of view, the objective of analysis did not change, for it was always a question, as far as Lacan was concerned, of bringing the subject to this point of disappearance, where it is revealed to him that he is nothing—nothing of what is, nothing but the pure desire of the pure desire of the Other. But how to reach this infinitely vanished point, if not by dropping the final screen: the objet a}

这难道是意味著,拉康在他晚年时,最后重新建构象征界与想像界的对立,从想像界体认出这个能力:「启蒙主体的真理,在它的深渊般的非-存在里」?是的,从某个意义言,拉康到达这个时刻:让小客体成为主体的最后的认同。超越这个主体的最后认同之外,仅是空无:这是一种对于无法被认同的东西的纯粹认同,在那里,是谜图的空无的一种纯粹的生命实存。可是,这个深刻的重新建构,并没有挑战这个目标,一直在支撑象征界与想像界之前的差别的目标。主体的完全无法认同的这个目标,越来越固执地被更新,倾向于朝向末日的启示,对于他的空无。从这个观点,精神分析的目标并没有改变,因为就拉康而言,将主体带到消失的那个时刻,总是一个问题。在消失时,主体受到启示:他是空无。生命实存的空无,仅是大他者的纯粹欲望的纯粹欲望。但是,如何到达这个无限的消失的时刻,难道不就是凭借将最后的帘幕垂下: 这个小客体。

Thus was Lacan’s incessantly separative project pursued, this time operating on the objet a itself. The analyst, Lacan finally acknowledged, cannot be content with being a pure symbolic Other, a silent answering machine perpetually returning to the patient the question of his desire: “It is not enough that the analyst should support the function of Tiresias. He must also, as Apollinaire tells us, have breasts” (1977b, 270/243)—which should be understood as meaning that he must, in the transference, embody the objet a of the phantasy. But this is only so that he can break this last identification, in which the subject fascinates himself—hypnotizes himself, Lacan says significantly (1977b, 273/245)—in and as the object that fulfills the desire of the Other. How does the analyst go about this? By separating the objet a from the identification, by literally making it jump, fall, drop from the self-image. So the subject has hypnotized himself in that mysterious “crystal-stopper,” the analyst’s gaze? Well, then, the analyst will throw away (lose) that stopper, to finally reveal the void that the mouth of the bottle had so lovingly embraced:

拉康的不断的分离的计划,就是这样地追寻。这次,以小客体的本身作为运作。拉康最后承认,精神分析家无法满足于成为一个纯粹象征界的大他者,一台沉默地答录机,永远将他的欲望的问题还给病人:「精神分析家应该支持预言家泰瑞西亚斯的功能,并不足够。他必须如同阿保里奈尔告诉我们的,要有乳房」(1977b,270/243)。精神分析家必须被理解作为意义,在移情时,他必须具体表现幻见的小客体。但是,仅有当他能够打破他最后的认同时,才会是这个情况。在他最后的认同里,主体想像他自己—催眠他自己,拉康语重心长地说(1977b,273/245)–在客体里,以及作为填满大他者的欲望的客体。精神分析家如何去从事这项工作?凭借将客体跟认同分离,凭借实质上让客体跳跃,掉落,从自我-镜像掉下。所以,主体催眠他自己,在这个神秘的「水晶塞子」,精神分析家的凝视?呵呵,精神分析家将会抛掉(失落)那个塞子,为了最后启蒙这个空无,瓶子的口如此喜爱拥抱的空无:

As everyone knows, it was by distinguishing itself from hypnosis that analysis became established. For the fundamental mainspring of the analytic operation is the maintenance of the distance between the I [the “idealizing capital I of identification”] and the a, . .. [The analyst] isolates the a, places it at the greatest possible distance from the I that he, the analyst, is called upon by the subject to embody. It is from this idealization that the analyst has to fall in order to be the support of the separating a [1977b, 273/245]-

众所周知,精神分析的建立,是凭借区别它自己,跟催眠的不同。精神分析运作的基本动力,就是维持这个距离,在这个「我」(将认同的大写字母 I「我「理想化),与这个小客体之间的距离。精神分析家孤立这个小客体,将它放置在跟这个「我」,保持尽可能大的距离,他,精神分析家被主体召唤来具体表现的「我」。精神分析家必须从这个理想化掉落,为了能够成为这个分开的小客体的支持(1977b,273/245)。

We thought we understood that the objet a was the ultimate identificatory object, what we identify with on the verge (au bord) of no longer being anything, in order to sustain ourselves awhile longer in our desire. But we were wrong. We still had to learn not to be that object, to tear ourselves away from it, to lose it definitively. We were nothing but a hole in the image; and now, our eyes gouged out, we must plunge into that hole.

我们认为,我们理解,小客体是最后可认同的客体,我们所认同的东西,在快要成为空无的边缘,为了在我们的欲望里,维持我们自己,稍微长久一点。但是,我们错误了。我们依旧必须学习不要成为那个客体,将我们从那个客体撕开来,明确地丧失它。在那个镜像里,我们仅是一个空洞;现在,我们的眼睛被挖出,我们必须投掷进入那个空洞。

Better never to have been born, for how can we ever separate from ourselves to the point of becoming, not even the lost object of the Other but, his lost object—not even his blank, impenetrable eyes, but the empty, bleeding sockets of his desire to see where there is no longer anything to see? How, we ask, can we survive this experience, which even Oedipus himself could not bear? “How can a subject who has traversed the radical phantasy live the drive?” (1977b, 273/246; my emphasis; translation modified). Let us listen one last time to Lacan’s response, oracular words, words of truth: “This crossing of the plane of identification is possible. Anyone who has lived through the analytic experience with me to the end of the training analysis knows that what I am saying is true” (1977b, 273/246).

当初我们最好就不应该诞生,因为我们如何能够跟我们自己分离,到成为,甚至不是大他者的失落的客体,而是他的失落的客体?甚至不是他的空白的,无法贯穿的眼睛,而是他的欲望看见的空洞,浴血的眼眶,在不再有任何东西可看见的地方?我们询问,我们如何能够经历这个经验还活著?即使伊狄浦斯自己都无法忍受的经验?「主体曾经经历过这个激烈的幻见,他如何能够活在冲动当中?」(1977b,273/246)。让我们最后一次倾听拉康的回应,侃侃而谈的话语,真理的话语:「认同的层次的跨越是可能的。任何曾经跟我一块经历精神分析经验的人,一直到训练的精神分析的结束的人,他会知道,我正在说的话语是真实的」(1977b,273/246)。

Actaeon, chasing the Goddess, found her at last. His dogs devoured him eagerly. “Some say that his specter long haunted the countryside; he would stone those who ventured out into the night, and who knows what other devilries he caused; since it was impossible to find his remains, the oracles decreed that a statue be erected to him on the hillside, its gaze fixed afar; thus he lies in wait for her still, as if fixed in that vision forever; he who refused the simulacrum had his love of truth immortalized in a simulacrum.”61

阿塔安,追求这位女神,他最后找到她。他的狗群饥饿地吞噬他。「有些人说,他的魅影长久流连在乡下,有谁胆敢进入这个夜晚,他会用石头打死他们。天晓得,他还引起怎样的恶行;因为要找到他的遗体是不可能的。各种预言都宣告,在山脚下,应该替他竖立一个雕像,雕像的凝视固著于远方;他就躺在那里,依旧等待她,好像永远被固定在那个幻象里。凡是拒绝虚拟幻境的人,都会让他对真理的爱,在那个虚拟幻境里成为永恒。」

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

捉住欲望尾巴 16

July 25, 2014

捉住欲望尾巴 16
雅克慎论拉康

In the gaze, on the contrary, I do not recognize myself. Why not? Because that eye, as Lacan says, returning to Sartre’s expression, “gazes at me” {me regarde57; 1977b, 95-96/89), in both senses of that expression.58 Indeed, that eye is no longer the visible object at which I gaze, it is the eye of another subject who gazes at (who concerns) me. This is a reversal of the perspective in which Sartre, as we know, situates the upsetting encounter with the other (as another “for-itself”) and in which Lacan sees instead the singular (and anxiety-producing) manifestation of the desire of the Other.

相反地,在凝视里,我并没有体认出我自己。为什么没有呢?因为眼睛,如同拉康所说,回到萨特的表达,眼睛「凝视我」;19977b,95-96/89),从那个表达的两种意义而言)。的确,眼睛不再是我凝霜的可见的客体,那是另外一个主体的眼睛,他凝视我(关注我)。这是一种观点的倒转,我们知的,在那里,萨特定位跟他者的这个令人困扰的遭遇(作为另外一个「物自体」)。代替的,拉康在那里看出大他者的欲望的独异性展示(产生焦虑的展示)。

If the gaze “gazes at me,” it is also in the sense in which it “concerns me” as a subject. In it, as Sartre insists, I certainly become the object of the gaze of the other, as soon as he poses me as the “in-itself” that he himself is not: under the nihilating gaze of the other, Sartre asserts, I suddenly become a transcendent ego, I freeze myself in the identity of “voyeur” that I henceforth am for him, in the most total shame.59 But, Lacan adds, this is only the better to become the non-object, the “lost” and annihilated object of the desire of the Other.

假如凝视「凝视我」,它也意味着,它「关注我」,作为一个主体。在那里,如同萨特坚持是,我确实变成他者的凝视的客体,当他提出我,作为他自己伪装的「物自体」:在大者的毁灭性凝视下,萨特主张,我突然变成一个超验的自我,我冰冻我自己,在我因此对他而言是生命实存的「窥视」的认同,处理整体的羞愧当中。」但是,拉康补充说,这就仅是成为非-客体的较佳者,大他者的欲望的「失落」与被毁灭的客体。

Indeed, the Other gazes at (concerns) me beyond the visible eye (the object) that I am for him, as (according to Lacan) the very example of the “voyeur surprised” chosen by Sartre demonstrates: “Is it not clear that… it is not the nihilating subject, correlative of the world of objectivity, who feels himself surprised, but the subject sustaining himself in a function of desire?” (1977b, 84-85/80; translation modified); “the other surprises him, the subject, as entirely hidden gaze” (1977b, 182/166). What the other looks for in my voyeur’s eye, glued to the keyhole, is in fact my gaze—that is, precisely that “object” in which he cannot see himself: the enigma of what he himself is for my desire, which is the reason for his. In short, he seeks “himself” in it, as a non-object— that is (let us in turn object to Lacan), as a “nihilating subject.”

的确,大他者凝视(关注)我,超越对他而言,我生命实存的看见的眼睛(客体)。依照拉康,这就是萨特所选择的「感到惊奇的窥视」的例子所证明:「这难道不是很清楚吗?让他自己感到惊奇的,并不是这个令人毁灭的主体,相对于客体性世界,而是在欲望的功能里维持自己的主体(1977b,84-85/80)。「他者令他感到惊奇,主体,作为隐藏的凝视」(1977b,182/166)。他者在我的窥视的眼睛里寻找的东西,跟钥匙孔紧粘一块。事实上,它是我的凝视—换句话说,确实就是在那个「客体」里,他无法看见他自己:对于我的欲望,他自己的生命实存的谜团,我的欲望就是他的欲望的理由。总之,他在它那里,寻求「他自己」,作为非客体—换句话说(让我们反对一下拉康),作为一个「毁灭」的主体。」

The result is that I can no more see (identify, recognize) myself in the gaze of the Other than he can see himself in mine: “You never gaze at me from the place from which I see you” (1977b, 103/95). The gaze is an opaque mirror (an “underside of consciousness”; 1977b, 83/79) in which I can identify myself only as the closed, definitively enigmatic, lost “object” of the desire of the Other, and which nevertheless is seen, causing the disappearance that I “am” (as the subject of desire) to appear.

结果是,我无法在大他者的凝视里,看见(认同,体认)我自己,正如大他者无法在我的凝视里,看见他自己:「你从来没有从我看见你的那个位置凝视我」(1977b,103/95)。这个凝霜是一面倾斜的镜子(意识的内层;1977b,83/79)。在那里,我能够认同我自己,仅是作为大他者的欲望的这个封闭,确实是谜团的,失落的「客体」。可是,这个倾斜的镜子被看见,引起「我作为生命实存」(作为欲望的主体)的消失的出现。

Lacan clearly objects on these grounds to Sartre, who asserts, “The Other’s gaze is the disappearance of the Other’s eyes as objects which manifest the gaze.”60 Lacan replies, “Is this a correct phenomenological analysis? No. . . . The gaze is seen” (1977b, 84/79; translation modified), that “underside of consciousness” is phenomenalized. How? As an incongruous stain (1977b, 74/71) in the painting-mirror of the visible—not, therefore, as an eye in which I see myself see or see myself seen, but as an eye that gazes at (concerns) me all the more in that it does not see me, in that it stains the mirror: the pupils of a blind man, or a beauty mark that comes to disturb the perceptual “good form” (SX, 22 May 1963); the eye of an octopus, or the ocelli of animals (1977b, 73-74/70); brush strokes as they stain the canvas (1977b, 114-115/104-105).

根据这些理由,拉康清楚地反对萨特。萨特主张「大他者的凝视就是大他者的眼睛的消失,作为是展示凝视的客体。」拉康回答,「这是一个正确的现象学的分析吗?不、、、这个凝视被看见」(1977b,84/79)(11977b,84/79),那个「意识到底层」被表现成为现象。如何表现成为现象呢?作为一个不协调的「污点」(1977b,74/71)。在这个可见物的图画的镜子里。但是,更加是作为凝视(关注)1的眼睛,因为它并没有看见我,因为它污染这个镜子:「瞎子的瞳孔,或是一个美的记号,前来扰乱感官的「美好的形式」(1963,5,22,SX);蟑鱼的眼睛,或是动物的单孔眼睛(1977b,73-74/70);当它们污染画布的画笔的挥毫(1977b,114-115/104-105)。

Witness, deploying itself before Holbein’s Ambassadors, “this strange, suspended oblique [phallic] object” that bars the painting (1977b, 88/82). You see it, and yet you see nothing. You see nothing, and yet it gazes at (concerns) you in proportion to your not seeing a thing: “What do you want from me?” You are there, yourself, “in the picture” (in the phantasy), “out of place in the picture” (faisant “tache dans le tableau” \ 1977b, 96/89): the pure enigma that you are for the desire (of the painter? of the ambassadors?) that gazes at (concerns) you by giving you this painting to see (1977b, 101/93).

见证者,当它运作它自己在霍宾的「大使」时,「这个奇异地,被悬置的倾斜的(阳具的)客体」,将这幅图画划杠(1077b,,88/82)。你们看见它,可是,你们什么都没有看见:你们什么都没有看见,可是,它凝视(关注)凝,随着你们的什么都没有看见:「你到底想要从我这里得到什么?」你在那里,你自己,在「图画里」(在幻见里),「在图画里格格不入」(1977b,96/89):对于画家(或对于大使)的欲望,你的生命实存是个纯粹谜团,它凝视(关注)你,凭借给予你这个图画观看(1977b,101/93)。

Then you “begin by walking out of the room in which no doubt it [the painting] has long captivated you. It is then that, turning round as you leave—as the author of the Anamorphoses [Jiirgen Baltru-saitis] describes it—you apprehend in this form . .. what? A skull” (1977b, 88/83; translation modified). It was an anamorphosis, a refined variation of trompe Voeil. Seeing the painting before you, you could not see what you were in it. But now, no longer seeing it, seeing it from the side, you can finally see in it what you are— nothing, a hollow in the visible, an empty vanitas: “Holbein makes visible for us here something that is simply the subject as nihilated— nihilated in the form that is, strictly speaking, the imaged embodiment of the minus-phi [(-<p)] of castration. … It reflects our own nothingness, in the figure of the death's head" (1977b, 88—89, 92/83, 86; my emphasis; translation modified).

因此,你「开始走出这个房间,在那里,无可置疑地,它(图画)曾经让你著迷良久。就在那时,当你离开时转身—如同「歪像」的作者描述它—你从这个形式理解到、、、什么?理解到一个骷髅头」(1977b,88/83)。这是一个歪像,一幅精致的视觉陷阱的变种。当你们看见面前的这幅图画时,你们无法看见,你们在它里面。但是,现在,当你不再看见它,从旁边看见它,你们最好能够在它里面,看见你的生命实存—空无,可见物中的空洞,一个空洞的浮华anitas:「霍宾让我们看见某件东西,作为被毁灭的主体的东西—在形式上被毁灭,严格来说,这个形式就是这个阉割的「负面-阳具」的想像的具体显现。它反映出我们自己的空无,在死亡的头颅的形象里」(1977b,88-89,92/83,86)

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
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捉住欲望的尾巴 15

July 24, 2014

捉住欲望的尾巴 15
雅克慎论拉康

In other words, the corporeal gaps “mirror” the unimaginable cut of castration, and it is from these “erogenous zones” that the drive goes out to “drive round” (1977b, 168, 177-179/153, 161-163)” the lost objet a—that is, the hole: a rim conjunct with another rim, a disjunctive conjunction that is therefore “figured” in the Lacanian algorithm by the lozenge of fantasy that a-joins #, the castrated subject of the symbolic, and a> the real lost object (1977b, 209/190). Let us imagine this lozenge as a kiss embracing absence, like a mouth-to-mouth conjoining of two wounds: a rapport of non-rapport, a sexual (non-)rapport ([non-] rapport sexuel). As Lacan says, “Two lacks overlap here” (1977b, 204/186): in the lost organ, the subject will represent his very own loss, the “fundamentally lost object” that he is for the desire of the Other.

换句话说,肉体的空隙反映出阉割的无法想像的切割。冲动前往「到处驱动」,就是从这些「性感的地区」(1977b,168,177,179/153,161-163)–换句话说,这个空洞:一个边缘跟另外一个边缘的连接,在拉康的轨迹公式里,因此被「成形」的中断的连接,使用幻想的这个公式。小客体跟在象征界被阉割划杠的主体连接,小客体是实在界的失落的客体(1977b,209/190)。让我们想像这个公式,作为是拥抱缺席之吻,就像是两个伤痕的嘴对嘴的连接:非-关系的一种关系,性的(非)关系。如同拉康所说,「两个欠缺在此重叠」(1977b,204/186):在失落的器官,主体将会代表他的自己的失落,对于大他者的欲望,他是「基本的失落的客体」。

More precisely, in the lost organ he will make himself what he is not, by identifying himself with what the Other lacks and desiring himself in it as what the Other lacks. Fantasy, insofar as the subject identifies himself in it with the lost object of the Other (breast, feces, phallus, gaze, voice), puts the disappearance of the subject, his eclipse of/ from the scene, on stage (SX, 8 May 1963). The subject, always in the scene of the fantasy, is at the same time always excluded, elided, divided (beaten, sectioned, defecated, and so on) “in his relation to the object, which usually does not show its true face” (1977b, 185/168).

更贴切地说,在这个失落的客体,他将会让自己成为他的伪装存在。凭借认同于大他者欠缺的东西,并在在它那里欲望他自己,作为大他者欠缺的东西。因为主体在幻见里认同大他者的失落的客体,(乳房,粪便,阳具,凝视,声音),幻见将主体的消失,主体从场景消隐,放置在舞台上(1963,5,8,SX)。主体总是处于幻见到场景,同时总是被排除,被闪躲,被分裂(被鞭打,被区隔,被蝡动,等等),「在他跟客体的关系,通常并没有显示它的真实脸孔」(1977b,185/168)。

Therefore, according to Lacan, fantasy functions less as an image or painting of the subject than as a frame (SX, 12 June 1963): a window, a bull’s-eye surrounding the objet a, a slit cutting the rim of his enigmatic appearance/disappearance, a keyhole serving as a prop to the fading of the subject in the scene where he sees himself. In a word, the objet a of the fantasy causes to appear/ disappear in(to) the imaginary the subject’s unimaginable appearance/disappearance into the signifier, the fading of the object that he is not for the desire of the Other: “The objet a … serves as a symbol of the lack, that is to say, of the phallus (1977b, 103/95)— that is to say, of the subject. The objet a of phantasy portrays the subject on the verge (au bord; literally, “on the rim”) of disappearing, suspended (and thus “propping up”his desire) on the verge of castration: “the enclosure of the teeth” nibbling the nipple, lips encircling the glans, the anal sphincter severing the fecal or penile column, the eye glued to the keyhole, an anorexic mouth closed on nothing. Let us imagine this (1977b, 178/163):

因此,依照拉康,幻见充当的功能,并不是作为主体的意象或图画,而是作为一个框架(1063,7,12,SX):一个窗户,环绕小客厅的靶心,充当主体的消隐的支持的的钥匙孔,在他看见他自己的这个场景里。总之,幻见的的小客体,引起主体的无法想像的出现/消失,进入想像界,进入能指,作为对于大他者的欲望,他伪装存在的客体的消隐:「小客体充当欠缺的象征,换句话说,充当阳具的象征(1977b,103/95)–换句话是,充当主体的象征。幻见的小客体描绘处于边缘的主体;实质上处于消失的边缘,被悬置在阉割的边缘(因此支撑它的欲望):「牙齿的封闭」,乳头的轻咬,环绕龟头的唇口,分开粪便或阴茎的肛门洞口,紧附于钥匙孔的眼睛,什么都不吃的厌食症的嘴巴。让我们想像这个(1977b,178/163):

Lacan illustrates this structure of drive and fantasy in many (often obscure) ways, but the example to which he most often returns is that of the scopic objet a: the gaze, by which the subject wishes to be seen. This is obviously no accident. The phantasy (Lacan, at least, does not doubt this) is indeed essentially spatial and visual (SX, 12 June 1963), and vision is in turn the true domain of the imaginary. In space, as Lacan emphasizes, nothing is ever separated, and this is why the body always appears in it as total, as a “good form,” one and identical (SX, 22 May 1963). Under these conditions, we can see that the scopic phantasy is the phantasy par excellence, under the aspect of the “stopgap” (bouche-trou), of the filling in of loss and castration: “The scopic drive . . . most completely eludes . . . castration” (1977b, 78/74). How, then, does the subject appear there in his disappearance, as the lost object of the desire of the Other?

拉康用很多方式(往往是模糊的方式),说明冲动与幻见到结构,但是他经常回转的一个例子,是视觉小客体的例子:主体希望凭借 凝视被看见。这显然并非意味。幻见基本上确实是空间与视觉(拉康至少不怀疑这点),(1963,7,12,SV)。反过来,视觉上想像界的真实的领域。拉康强调,在空间,没有一样东西永远被分开。这就是为什么身体总是在空间里,作为整体性,作为一个「美好的形态」,一个认同的形态(1063,5,22,SX)。在这些情况下,我们能够看见,视觉的幻见是最佳的幻见,在失落与阉割的填补的「阻塞」的这个层面:「视觉的冲动、、、非常完整地逃避、、、阉割」(1077b,78/74)。因此,主体如何以消失的姿态出现那里,作为大他者的欲望的失落的客体呢?

As a gaze—a gaze, not an eye. Lacan strongly insists on this point, taking up a distinction already made by Sartre:53 the gaze, as the gaze of the Other (of “autrui” as Sartre prefers to say),54 cannot be seen as the eye, the organ of vision. More precisely, it cannot “see itself”55: “What one looks at [the gaze of the Other, who “gazes at you”] cannot be seen [cannot see itself]” (1977b, 182/166). There is a “split” between eye and gaze (1977b, 73/70). Indeed, the eye is always an eye-object in that I see the eyes of another person or see my own eyes in a mirror. I cannot ever see myself from the place where I gaze (1977b, 144/132), since I could do so only on condition of seeing myself “before” myself. In this sense, the eye actually is a separated organ—namely, my own lost, objectivized gaze. And yet it is also the object in which, by virtue of the very structure of vision, I appear fully to find myself: the specular illusion of Valery’s “I saw myself seeing myself,” which Lacan rigorously equates with the illusion of the cogito (understood as self-consciousness; 1977b, 80-81/76-77) and, more generally, with the primacy of vision in the philosophic tradition (1977a, 71/68).5′ The eye is the imaginary object par excellence, the objet “petit autre” in which I separate myself from myself the better to recognize myself.

作为凝视—凝视,而不是眼睛,拉康强烈地坚持这一点,从事萨特已经做过的区别:「凝视,作为大他者的凝视,萨特喜欢说,无法作为眼睛这个视觉的器官而被看见。更加贴切地说,眼睛无法「看见它自己」:「我们所看见的东西(大他者的凝视,大他者凝视你)无法被看见(无法看见它自己)」(1977b,73/70)。的确,眼睛总是眼睛-客体,因为我看见另外一个人的眼睛,或在镜子里看见我自己的眼睛。我永远无法看见我自己,从我凝视的地方(1977b,144/132)。因为仅有当我看见我自己,在我自己「面前」,我才能够这样做。从这个意义来说,眼睛确实是一个被分开的器官,凭借视觉的这个结构,我充分地出现,为了找到我自己:梵乐瑞的的魅影理想的幻觉:「我看见我自己看见我自己」。拉康费力地将它等于是「我思故我在」的幻觉(被理解作为自我意识;1977b,80-81/76-77)。更通俗地说,用哲学的传统的视觉的优先性(1977a,71/68)。眼睛是最佳的想像的客体,在这个小客体,我将我自己跟自己隔开,这样我较能体认出我自己。」

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

捉住欲望的尾巴 14

July 23, 2014

捉住欲望的尾巴 14
雅克慎论拉康

Now, it is quite obviously this ambiguity, this drifting between imaginary continuity and real separation, that primarily interests Lacan. On the one hand, in fact, these “parts” or “organs” are eminently suitable for representing the subject himself, insofar as they arise from an autopartition. Hence Lacan makes them objectiviza-tions of the subject, “small other” objects in which the subject images, embodies, and identifies himself. On the other hand, these objects are really lost (the objet a, says Lacan, is “what represents the S[ubject] in his irreducible reality”; SX, 6 March 1963); their loss is not only irrecuperable but also constitutive of the subject as such (here, Lacan cites the maternal breast, or the placenta, which “certainly represents that part of himself that the individual loses at birth”; 1977b, 198/180).

现在,相当显而易见地,这个模糊暧昧,想像界的继续与实在界的分开之间的漂荡,最初让拉康感到興趣。在一方面,事实上,这些「部分」与「器官」,显然非常适合于代表主体他自己,因为它们起源于一种自动区隔。因此,拉康让它们成为主体的客体化,这些「小他者」客体,主体在那里表现形象,具体显现,并且认同他自己。在另一方面,这些客体确实是失落的客体,(拉康说,这个小客体「代表主体,处于无法还原状态」;(1963,3,6,SX);小客体的失落不仅无法弥补,而且形成主体的自身(在此,拉康引述母亲的乳房,或胎盘,它「确实代表他自己的那个部分,个人在诞生时丧失的部分」;1977b,198/180)

The subject is therefore not at liberty to identify with it, since he can engender himself (se parere) as an individual totality only on condition of separating himself from it (separare): “It is from his partition that the subject proceeds to his parturition” (1966, 843)—with the result that the objet a, a part without a whole, does not enter into the specular image (1977a, 316/818), since, on the contrary, it is from its “cut” that the total image of the body is engendered. The subject can see “himself” in it only as a heterogeneous, odd part or, again, as a hole of which he himself is the rim (a structure that, as we know, Lacan illustrated with a great many paradoxical topological figures, such as the Moebius strip and the Klein bottle). Hence “the phallus, that is, the image of the penis, is negativated {negative) in its place in the specular image … as a part lacking in the desired image” (1977a, 319-320/822; translation modified): (—

Lacan tells us, is analogous to the loss (the disappearance) of himself that the subject submits to by virtue of the signifier, and that is why it holds such importance in the strictly libidinal economy of the drives. The lost organ, a part of the real body, non-sexual in itself, comes to portray that “hole in the real,” the subject of the signifier, the subject of desire:

这个小客体因此拥有一个显著的特性:供应主体的镜像。因为主体在那个镜像里是欠缺的:一个神奇的破碎的镜子,肮脏而模糊。在那里,主体能够看见他自己,作为并不是那个样子。仅有在他认同的欠缺时,主体才能够认同那个镜像:一个神奇的美杜莎的头,主体的神奇的真灵显现。因此,我们能够理解,对于拉康,这个悖论的「镜像」,本来就会引起这个巨大的興趣。拉康最后拥有想像主体的可能性(主体,而不是自我),凭借让他的欲望具体成形(这次,这个身体不再是身体的镜像)。在那里,更加贴切地,拉康能够拥有一种「非-魅影理想的想像」,这个想像特别适合于描述那个无法被描述的象征的阉割。的确,拉康告诉我们,小客的这个失落,类同主体自身的失落(消失),以致于主体凭借能指,屈服于这个失落。那就是为什么它具有如此的重要性,在冲动的严格是力比多的活力里。这个失落的客体,是实在界身体的部分,它的本身并没有性别化,它逐渐描绘「实在界的那个空洞」,能指的主体,欲望的主体:

I have been able to articulate the unconscious for you as being situated in the gaps that the distribution of the signifying investments sets up in the subject, and which figure in the algorithm in the form of a lozenge [0], which I place at the center of any relation of the unconscious between reality and the subject. Well! It is insofar as something in the apparatus of the body is structured in the same way, it is because of the topological unity of the gaps in play, that the drive assumes its role in the functioning of the unconscious [1977b, 181/165; my emphasis].

我已经能够跟你们表达这个无意识,作为是被定位在这个空隙,能指化的投主的分配在主体建立的空隙。它以的这个符号,作为运算公式的图形。我将它放置在现实与主体之间的无意识的任何关系的中央。呵呵!因为在身体的这个仪器里的某件东西,以相同的方式作为结构。那是因为在运作时的这些空隙具有拓扑图形的一致性。冲动扮演它的角色,在无意识的功用里(1977b,181/165)。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

捉住欲望的尾巴 13

July 22, 2014

捉住欲望的尾巴 13
雅克慎论拉康

Moreover, Lacan asserts this quite clearly in his seminar on anxiety: the objet a “is what resists that assimilation to the function of signifier,… what, in the sphere of the signifier,.. . always presents itself as lost…. Now, it is just this scrap (dechet), this off-cut (chute), this thing that resists ‘significantization,’ that comes to find itself constituting, as such, the foundation of the desiring subject” (SX, 13 March 1963). In short, the objet a is the object of phantasy—namely, that stopgap object (objet bouche-trou; 1977b, 269-270/242) that the subject “substitutes for the 0” (1977a, 320/823) by identifying with what the Other lacks (with the “lost object,” as Freud said—to which Lacan adds, “[The] a, the object of identification … is what one no longer has” [ce qu’on n’a plus]; SX, 23 January 1963).

而且,拉康相当清楚地主张这个,在他论焦虑的研讨班:小客体就是抗拒被吸收到能指的功能、、、在能指的领域,总是呈现它自己做为失落的东西、、、现在,就是这个残渣,这个切断,这个抗拒「能指意义」的东西,「逐渐发现它自己本身,就是构成这位欲望的主体的基础」(1963,3,13,SV)。总之,小客体就是幻见的客体—换句话说,那种阻塞的客体(1977b,269-270/242),主体用它来替换这个O」(1977a,320/823),凭借认同大他者所欠缺的东西(具有这个「失落的客体」,如同弗洛依德所说—拉康补充说,「这个小客体,认同的客体、、、就是我们不再拥有的东西」(1963,1,23,SX)。

In this fascinating and opaque object, the subject becomes the turd, the breast, or the “phallus (imaginary object)” (1977a, 315/817) lost by the other by virtue of the signifier— that is, the “object that cannot be swallowed . . . which remains stuck in the gullet of the signifier” (1977b, 270/243) because no signifier can (or should, in the case of the phallus) signify it definitively: “indices of an absolute signification,” Lacan writes (1977a, 314/816). In phantasy, in other words, the subject imagines himself as the object that could fulfill the desire of the Other, as that infinitely precious and absolutely unique object that would finally respond to the enigma of desire: “Che vuoiV* “What do you want from me?” “Who am I for you?”

在这个令人著迷与模糊的客体里,主体变成粪便,乳房,或「阳具(想像的客体)」(1077a,315/817)。这是他者藉由能指而失落的想像的客体—换句话说,「无法被吞下的客体、、、始终被卡在能指的喉道」(1977b,270/243),因为没有能指能够或(应该,在阳具的情况)明确地意指它:「绝对能指意义的索引」,拉康写道(1977a,314/816)。换句话说,在幻见里,主体想像他自己,作为是能够填补大他者的欲望的客体,作为那个无限珍贵,绝对独特的客体,最后会回应欲望之谜的客体:「大他者,你想要我什么?」「对于大他者,你,我是什么?」

And yet we must be very exacting here, for to read the foregoing may give the impression that the objet a is really a new rehashing of the imaginary object—namely, the very one that the “object” (or, what amounts to the same thing, the subject) of desire cannot be in any case. And indeed, in the evolution of Lacan’s thought, the symbol a actually does refer to the imaginary “small other” (“petit autre”) regularly denounced by Lacan as the cause of the meconnaissance of desire (cf. the “schema L” of the 1950’$).

可是,我们在此必须要求精确,因为阅读以上的东西,可能产生这个印象:小客体确实是想像的客体的重温—换句话说,无论如何,欲望的「客体」无法成为的这个客体,或相当等于是欲望的主体无法成为的客体。的确,在拉康思想的进程,a 这个符号实际上提到想像界的「小它者」。拉康经常抨击它,作为是欲望的错误认识的原因(1950年代的「L基模」)。

Therefore, it is all the more urgent to emphasize that the objet a> although actually remaining imaginary in Lacan, is not altogether imaginary. More precisely, let us say that it is only partially imaginary, in its capacity as “part-object,” unintegrable into the total image of the body; and, as such, it “cannot be grasped in the mirror” (1977a, 315-316/817-818). Far from being merely the imaginary object that “fills the gap constituted by the inaugural division of the subject” (1977b, 270/243), the objet a is just as much what manifests that gap at the very moment when it seals it. It is, Lacan says, the “presence of a hollow” (1977b, 180/164); and this does not mean that, as signifier, it represents the absent subject to another signifier, but rather that it embodies and ultimately images the division of the subject, the break in the image, the cut of castration: Oedipus’s bloody eyes rolling on the ground, the severed breasts of Saint Agatha of Zurbaran, phallic vanitas floating before Holbein’s Ambassadors.

因此,更加迫切要强调的是,这个小客体,在拉康那里虽然实际上始终是想像的,它并不完全是想像。更加精确地说,不妨说说,它仅是部分想像,因为它具有能力,作为「部分客体」,无法被合并进入身体的完整意象。作为这样的部分客体,它「无法在镜像里被掌握」(1977a,315-316/8170818)。小客体不仅仅是想像的客体,「填补主体的的开启形成的这个裂缝」(1977b,270,243)。小客体同样是是证实这个裂缝的东西,就在它封住这个裂缝的时刻。拉康说,它就是「一个空洞的存在」(1977不80/164)。这并不意味着,作为能指,它代表这个缺席的主体,对于另外一个能指。相反地,它具体表现,最后给予主体的分裂的镜像。镜像那里的中断,阉割的切割:伊狄浦斯的浴血的眼球在地上滚动,圣阿加萨的被切断的乳房,漂浮在霍宾的「大使」面前的阳具的「静物绘画」。

The objet <z, by Lacan's habitual definition, is a "morsel of the body" (SX, 30 January 1963), a detachable/detached "pound of flesh": "The objet a is something from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ" (1977a,

Desire Caught by the Tail 231 103/95). Let us understand this first in the most literal sense: the living being, as Lacan recalls, never stops separating himself from "parts" of himself (placenta, feces, urine, sperm, and so on). But he also separates himself from the breast "superimposed" on the body of the mother that he himself is (1977b, 195/178), from the erectile organ at the moment of detumescence following orgasm (SX, 15 May 1963), from the eye (which sees without seeing itself; SX, 15 May 1963), and even from the voice (which can hear itself only on condition of being externally emitted; SX, zz May 1963).

根据拉康的习惯的定义,这个小客体是「身体的一小部分」(1963,1,30,SX),一个能够被隔离/已被隔离的「一磅肉」:「小客体是某件主体用来隔开它自己,作为器官的东西,为了形成它自己」(1977a,231-103/95)。让我们首先用最实质的意义理解这个:拉康提醒,活著的生物从来没有停止将他自己跟他自己的「部分」分开(胎盘,粪便,尿,精致,等等)。但是他也将他自己跟「凌驾」在母亲的身体的乳房分开,虽然他自己是那个身体的部分(1977b,195/178),跟挺起的器官分开,在射精之后的萎缩的时刻(1963,5,15,SX)。跟眼睛分开(眼睛看见,但是看不见它自己;1963,5,15,SX),甚至跟声音分开(声音仅是在从外部发出时,才听见它自己;1963,5,22,SX)。

As we can see, these "separations" are extremely diverse, but they have in common that they are separations from oneself, "internal" separations (SX, 15 May 1963). In them, the body sacrifices parts of itself, so to speak, by "cutting" itself along "a margin or border—lips, 'the enclosure of the teeth,' the rim of the anus, the tip of the penis, the vagina, the slit formed by the eyelids, even the horn-shaped aperture of the ear" (1977a, 314—315/817). Hence the ambiguity of the "parts" thus separated from the body, since in relation to it they are both the same and other, both similar and dissimilar.

如同我们能够看出,这些「分开」在外表上各式各样,但是它们的共同之处是,它们跟主体自己分开,「内部的分开」(1963,5,15,SX)。在它们那里,身体牺性它自己的各个部分,也就是,凭借「切割它自己」的边缘或边界—嘴唇,「牙齿的封闭,肛门的边缘,阳具的尖端,阴户,眼皮形成的裂缝,甚至耳朵的角形的形状的开口」(1977a,314-315/817)。因此,跟身体分开的「部分」的模糊,因为关于它,它们既是相同,又是它者,既是类似,又是不相同。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

捉住欲望的尾巴 13

July 21, 2014

捉住欲望的尾巴 13
雅克慎论拉康

The Crystal Stopper
水晶塞子

A few more words on the theory of the “objet a”49—indeed, the exposition of Lacanian doctrine would be incomplete if we did not mention, at least briefly, that ultimate avatar of the “object” of desire. Not that the theory of the objet a actually modifies the doctrine of castration; as we shall see, it really only furnishes that doctrine with a clothing, in the sense in which Lacan says, for example, “It is only the clothing of the self-image that comes to envelop the object cause of desire, which most often supports… the objectal relation. The affinity of a with its envelope is one of the major articulations to have been advanced by psychoanalysis” (1975c, 85). But the fact that Lacan felt the need thus to “clothe” the hole of castration is not in itself a matter for indifference. In reality, this imaginary clothing corresponds, in Lacan, to a question that is difficult to avoid, one that the doctrine of castration left entirely open—gaping, we could even say: the question, once again, of the “object” of desire.

对于「小客体」,我再补充一些。的确,假如我们没有提到,至少简短地提到,欲望的「客体」的最后阿凡达(天神化身),拉康信条的说明将是不充足。倒不是因为小客体的理论确实修改阉割的信条;我们将会看出,它确实替那个信条装饰外衣。譬如,拉康以那种意义说:「自我-形象的外衣逐渐涵盖欲望的客体的原因。欲望的这个原因经常支持客体的关系。小客体跟它的涵盖物的亲密性,是精神分析曾经提倡的其中一个主要的表达。(1975c,85)。但是,拉康叙述要替阉割的空洞「装扮」的这个需要的这个事实,本身并不是一件可以漠视的事情。实际上,这个想像的装扮,在拉康这里,对应着一个难以避免的问题。阉割的信条将它完全摊开的问题,我们甚至能够说,裂开:再重复一遍,那是欲望的「客体」的问题。

The phallus, as we have already confirmed, is precisely no object, no self-image, since it is, properly speaking, the negation of object and self-image under the condition of “the Law.” But the problem is that desire nevertheless must have an object; otherwise, it would desire nothing at all. As Alain Juranville quite justly notes, “There must, all the same, be some object.

我们已经证实,这个阳具确实并不是客体,不是自我-形象,因为恰当地说,它是客体与自我-形象的否定,在「法则」的情况下。但是这个难题是,欲望仍然必须要有一个客体;否则,它什么也不会欲望。如同亚伦、朱兰威相当公允地注意到,「仍然必须要有某个客体。」

Not the object of desire, since its failing is radical. But an object that is tied to desire, let us say, an object ‘for desire.'”50 Human desire, being a finite desire (1977b, 31/32)—a finite transcendence—necessarily embodies itself, appears to itself in an ob-ject, if only to negate it immediately. This, again, is Actaeon’s problem: Actaeon would not desire the Goddess if she did not take on body in his gaze, if she did not throw him the infinitely deceptive simulacrum of her buttocks and her breasts, in which she herself sees and desires herself. In other words, the phantasy (the simulacrum, the image) is necessary to the perpetuation of desire, even from Lacan’s point of view (we could say, from the point of view, period). Indeed, the subject must identify in some way with the object of the desire of the Other in order to desire himself in it, failing which he would be nothing but a pure desire of the pure desire of the Other-that is, nothing: an absolute void in “the purity of Non-Being.”

不是欲望的客体,因为它的失败是显著的。而是跟欲望连接的客体,我们不妨说,「给予欲望」的客体。人的欲望,是一个有限的欲望(1977b,31/32)–一种有限的超验—必然具体代表它自己,以客体的状态呈现给它自己。即使仅是立即否定它。而且,这是阿塔安的问体:阿塔安本来不会欲望这位女神,假如她没有在他的凝视里具有身体,假如她没有将他投掷她的屁股,她的乳房的这个无限欺骗的虚拟幻境。在那里,她自己看见而且欲望她自己。换句话说,这个幻见(这个虚拟幻景,这个意象)是需要的,对于欲望的持续存在,即使是从拉康的观的(我们能够说,从那个时期的观点)。的确,主体必须以某种方式认同大他者的欲望的客体,为了在它里面欲望他自己。假如失败于这样做,他将仅是大他者的纯粹欲望的一个纯粹欲望—换句话说,空无:一个绝对的空无,在「非存在的纯粹里」。

In a certain way, it was this very difficulty that the doctrine of castration was initially supposed to resolve, since the phallus was precisely that object of the desire of the Other with which the subject must simultaneously identify and not identify. But it is also this same doctrine that Lacan, in the early 1960’s, felt the need to complete with his theory of the objet a> as if he were not totally satisfied with it.

以某种的方式,阉割的信条最初被认为解决这个困难,因为阳具确实是大他者的欲望的那个客体,主体必须认同,而又同时不要认同。但是,拉康,在1960年代早期,感觉到有必要用小客体的理论,完成这个相同的信条,好像他对它并不完全满意。

Why? Essentially, it seems, because the phallus had been so well defined as a signifier that it no longer allowed the slightest identification on the subject’s part: a much too “iconoclastic” theory, as Klossowski would have said, and which must therefore necessarily find its limit, or even its punishment. In fact, as Lacan often explains, the phallus, 4>, “signifier of signifier,” is never anything but the “signifier of a lack in the Other” (1977a, 316/818), in the sense of its being the signifier of the lack of every signifier that could signify to me what the Other desires and, by the same token, what I am for him. To the question “What does he want?”—which is, identically, a “What does he want from me?” (1977a, 312/815), understood as a “How does he want me?” (SX, 14 November 1962)—there is no response from the Other except perhaps a signifier that represents me in my absence for another signifier, and so forth. Nothing, in other words, permits me to identify myself in the signifiers furnished by the Other, and that is what the phallus signifies. It is the S(0), the signifier of the barred Other that, in return, signifies to me my own ek-sistence as barred subject, divided and separated from myself: #(0), vanished subject, in aphanisi$y perpetually “fading” (1977b, 207-208/189) in the signifiers that manifest me as what I am not.

为什么?似乎,基本上因为阳具曾经如此清楚被定义,作为一个能指,以致于它不再容许对于主体的部分,有丝毫的认同:一个过于「毁灭偶像」的理论,如同克罗索斯基本来会这样说,这个理论必然会发现它的极限,或甚至它的惩罚。事实上,如同拉康经常解释的,阳具φ,「能指的能指」,它仅仅就是「大他者的欠缺的能指」。(1977a,316,818)。这意味着,它是每个能指的欠缺的能指,能够跟我意指著大他者欲望的东西的每个能指。同样地,能够跟我意指著对他而言,我的生命本质的能指。对于「他想要什么」的这个问题,等同于是「他从我这里想要什么?」(1977a,312/815), 它被理解作为「他如何想要我?」(1962,11,14,SX)。从大他者并没有回应,除了或许是一个代表我的能指,对于另外一个能指,等等。换句话说,没有一样东西让我能够认同我自己,在由大他者供应的能指里。这就是,阳具意指的东西。就是这个S(φ),被划杠的大他者的能指,轮过来,跟我意指著我自己的「生命实存」,作为一个跟我被划杠,被分裂,被分开的主体:S(0),这个消失的主体,在主体消失里,永远地「隐退」(1977b,207-208/189),在那些展示我,作为我并不存在的能指里。

It is easy to see how Lacan, under these conditions, would have felt the need to lend a bit of “stuff” (1977a, 314, 315/816, 818) to that ungraspable subject of the signifier and, by the same token, a bit of body and objectivity to his desire. In the end, do human beings copulate with signifiers? Do they seek only symbols of their desire (and that of the other) in their partners? As Lacan ends up conceding, rather brusquely, desire, “in the final analysis, always remains the desire of the body, desire of the body of the other and nothing but desire of his body” (SX, 8 May 1963). Besides, how can we explain the singular fixity of the phantasy, which securely fastens the subject’s desire onto this particular object, this particular imaginary scenario in which he plays, for example, the part of an object that is beaten, sucked, defecated, gazed at by the other? Isn’t this a sort of ultimate identification of the subject, irreducible to the perpetual vicariance of signifiers? “This subject… is no more than such an object. Ask the writer about the anxiety that he experiences when faced by the blank sheet of paper, and he will tell you who is the turd of his phantasy” (1977a, 315/818).

很容易看出,在这些条件之下,拉康本来会感觉有这个必要,借用一点「东西」(1977a,314,315/816,818),给那个无法掌握的能指的主体。同样地,借用一点身体与客体,给他的欲望。最后,人跟能指能交媾吗?他们仅是在他们的伴侣,寻求他们的欲望的象征(大者的象征)吗?最后,拉康相当怪诞地坦承,追根究底,欲望总是身体的欲望,大者的身体的欲望,仅就是他的身体的欲望)(1963,5,8,SX)。除外,我们如何能够解释幻见到独异性固著。它将主体的欲望跟特殊的客体绑在一块,这个特殊的想像的戏码。譬如,他在那里扮演被他者鞭打,被吸吮,被排粪,被凝视的客体的部分?这难道不是一种主体的最后的认同,无法还原成为能指点永远的替代?「这个主体仅仅就是这样一个客体。假如你们询问这位作家,关于他经验到的这个焦虑,当他面临空白的稿纸,他将会告诉你们,他的幻见的这个粪便是谁」(1977a,315/818)。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

捉住欲望的尾巴 12

July 21, 2014

捉住欲望的尾巴 12
雅克慎论拉康

If we now ask how this symbolic identification is a non-identification, how this phallus-signifier is so different from the imaginary phallus that it metaphorizes (for, after all, according to Lacan’s own admission, the boy must identify himself with it in order “not to be it”), the only answer we get is Zazie’s:47 because “zatzeewayitiz” (cekotnqa), because the symbolic phallus must not be the imaginary phallus that it nevertheless really is, and such is the fundamental Law of the Oedipus, enjoining Man (homo, but especially vir) “»o*-to-identify with,” “nof-to-be,” the phallus. Lacan, unlike Freud, never questions the origin or the genesis of that universal prohibition of identification, for he knows only too well that it would then be necessary for him to seek the “solution” on the side of that same identification (the identification with the father and/or phallus with whom one must not identify, and so on).

假如我们询问,这个象征的认同如何是一个非认同,阳具-能指如何是如此差异,跟想像的阳具,以致于它作为隐喻(毕竟,依照拉康自己的承认,男孩必须认同于阳具,为了「不要成为它」,我们获得的唯一的答案是Zazie的答案:因为zatzeewayitiz,因为象征的阳具一定不要说想像的阳具,可是它确实是想像的阳具。伊狄浦斯的基本法则是这样,它指示「人」「要认他」,但是「不要成为」阳具。不像弗洛依德,拉康从来没有质疑认同的普世的禁忌的起源或创世纪。因为他知道得太清楚,他有必要去寻求「解答」,在相同认同的这一边(认同父亲,与/或我们一定不要认同的阳具,等等)。

The result is that the difference between these two types of identification is purely and simply postulated as “the Law,” without our even being allowed to ask why the phallus of symbolic identification is not the phallus of imaginary identification, or why that symbolic identification is not an identification. That question is literally forbidden, for what would become of us if we doubted the Law and the Word of the Father? Psychosis, neurosis, and perversion would await us at every turn. Thus the whole Lacanian system encloses and barricades itself in the a priori of the “no,” interpreted as the universal Law of humanity: “Do not identify”; “Do not be what you are”; “Desire yourself beyond every object”; “Be nothing.”

结果是,这两种认同之间的差异,纯粹地仅是被假设,作为「法则」,我们自己不被容许去询问,为什么象征认同的这个阳具,并不是想像认同的阳具,或是为什么那个象征的认同并不是认他。那个问题实质上是被禁止的,因为假如我们怀疑父亲的这个法则,与真理,将会发生什么事?精神病,神经症,与变态随时随地等著我们。因此,整个的拉康的系统封闭而且封锁它自己,在这个「否定」的演绎里,被解释作为人性的普世的法则:「不要认他」;「不要成为你现在的样子」,「欲望你自己超越每个客体」;「不要成为任何东西」。

Obviously, Lacan’s whole complex reformulation of the Oedipus complex ultimately rests on the rigid “dualist ontology” of Kojeve: man is what he is (a desiring subject, an ek-static transcendence) only by not being what he is (a transcendent object, a given identity). If the phallus, in Lacan, is posed as the universal “object” of desire, this is because it eminently embodies the identical-and-objective-being of the imaginary ego—that is, what the human subject, if he wishes to live up to his vocation, must perpetually negate, overcome, transcend, and desire. In it, the subject desires himself as the object he is not, as the non-object he has to be. As for the recourse to the Levi-Straussian theory of the “elementary structures of kinship,” in sum, it only dresses up that profound ontological appeal by furnishing it with a sort of “scientific” guarantee.

显而易见,拉康的整个复杂的重新诠释伊狄浦斯情结,最后依靠科耶夫的这个严谨的「双重主义本体论」:人仅有凭借不成为他现在的样子(一个超验的客体,一个特定的认同),他才能成为他现在的样子(一个欲望的主体,一个非-静止的超验)。在拉康那里,假如阳具被提出,作为欲望的普世「客体」,那是因为它杰出地具体代表想像的自我的「认同与客体」的存在。换句话是,人的主体必须永远否的,克服,超验,与欲望的东西,假如他希望实践他的职责的话。在它那里,主体欲望他自己,作为并非他生命实存的客体,作为他必须成为的这个非-客体。至于诉诸于列文、史特劳斯的理论「亲属的基本结构」,总之,它仅是装扮那个深奥的本体论的诉求,替它装潢一种「科学」的保证。

If the symbolic father enjoins the mother “not to reintegrate her product” (much more than he forbids the child to possess the mother, as in Freud), this is first of all because it is necessary for the child not to identify with the object-phallus that he is, so as to desire himself beyond himself. In this sense, the Law is an ontological law (or a “mis-ontological” one, since it is a matter of negative ontology): it does not forbid one’s having an object of pleasure or enjoyment (jouissance), it forbids one’s being that object.

假如象征的父亲指示母亲「不要重新合并她的产物」(而不仅是禁止小孩拥有母亲,如同在弗洛依德)。这首先是因为这是必要的,让小孩认同客体的阳具,为了欲望他自己,超越他自己。从这个意义,这个法则就是一个本体论的法则(或是「非-本体论」的法则,因为它是否定的本体论的事情:它没有禁止一个人拥有快乐或享乐的客体,它禁止一个人成为那个客体。

In short, it forbids identification in all its forms, by prescribing that the subject conform to nothing: “Act in conformity with your desire” (1986, 362,). It is not a question here of a description of the Oedipus, but rather of a prescription that constitutes the stakes of what Lacan calls the “ethics of psychoanalysis”: “Desire!” “Do not give in to your desire!” (1986, 368). As far as the reality of the modern Oedipus (the Freudian Oedipus) is concerned, Lacan was the first to know that it hardly conforms to that sort of symbolic initiation to desire. On the contrary, the crisis of the symbolic is spread all over: the “deficiency” of the paternal function, the “foreclosure” of the Name-of-the-Father, the perpetual calling into question of the “Law” and the symbolic “pact,” the confusion of lineages and the generalized competition of the generations, the battle of the sexes, the loss of familial landmarks. In other words, the crisis of symbolic identification is everywhere, and it becomes impossible to separate it, as Lacan would have liked to do, from so-called imaginary identification.

总之,它禁止以各种形式的认同,凭借指明,主体并没有遵照跟任何东西:「遵照你的欲望去行动」(1986,362)。在此的问题,并不是伊狄浦斯的描述。相反地,这一种描述形成拉康所谓的「精神分析伦理学」的赌注:「去欲望吧!」「不要妥协你的欲望!」(1986,368)。就现代伊狄浦斯的现实而言,(弗洛依德的伊狄浦斯),拉康是第一位知道,它几乎没有遵照那种象征的欲望的创议。相反地,象征界的危机到处扩展:父亲功能的「欠缺」,以父之名的「除权弃绝」,对于「法则」与象征的「盟约」的永远的质疑,世代之间的传承与普遍競争的混乱,两性之间的争斗,家庭路标的失落。换句话是,象征的认同的危机无所不在。依照拉康想要的说法,要将象征的认同,跟所谓的想像的认同分隔开来,是不可能的。

Thus, the call to a “symbolic Law,” so obviously obsolete, must be understood in Lacan as a sort of analytic myth intended to serve as a prop for an onto-ethics of human desire. The Lacanian Oedipus is not the Oedipus as it is; it is the Oedipus as it must be. It is the anti-mimetic Oedipus, the identificatory anti-model to which the analyst, through his silence, enjoins the analy-sand to conform: “Identify with my desire”; “(Do not) be like me”; “Imitate the inimitable.” Besides, this is why Lacan’s “model” was not Oedipus Rex, the neurotic Oedipus who “submit[s] to the interdiction” (1986, 354) while simultaneously rivalizing with it, but rather Oedipus at Colonus, the Oedipus who “incur[s] castration” (1986, 854), who voluntarily tears out his eyes and rails, unreconciled, against the curse of existence: “The last speech of Oedipus, as you know, was . . . fir) . . . . firj (pvvai means—rather, not to be. This is the preference on which a human life must end … the triumph of being-toward-death, formulated in the fxr) <pvvat of Oedipus, in which we find the nrj9 the negation identical to the entry of the subject, in the support of the signifier" (1986, 353, 361-362).4*

因此,诉诸于「象征的法则」,它显而易见是过时的,在拉康这里,它必须被理解为一种的精神分析的神话。这个神话被用来充当人的欲望的本体论-伦理学的支持。拉康的伊狄浦斯并不是实质上的伊狄浦斯,而是它必须成为的伊狄浦斯。这是一种反对-模拟的伊狄浦斯,认同的负面-榜样。精神分析家,通过他的沉默,指示分析者要遵照:「认同你的欲望」;(「不好」像我这样),「去模仿无法模仿的东西」。除外,这就是为什么拉康的「榜样」,并不是「伊狄浦斯王」,这位神经症者,他「屈服于这个权威禁令」(1986,354)。虽然他同时地跟这个权威禁令为敌。而是「伊狄浦斯在科隆那斯」,这位「召致阉割的」的伊狄浦斯(1986,854)。他自愿地挖出他的双眼,哀嚎着,无法抚慰地,对抗生命存在的诅咒:「众所周知,伊狄浦斯的最后的话语:最好不要出生。」人的生命必需以这个偏爱作为结束。朝向死亡的生命实存的胜利。在伊狄浦斯的悲剧里被诠释。在那里,我们发现这个否定,认同于主体的进入的否定,在能指的支持)(1986,353,361-362)。

As for the analysis (or the "pass") that leads the subject to that absolute "disbeing" (1968, 26), "nuptials with destruction, considered as the culmination of his vow" (1986, 357), Lacan may very well assert, while implicitly criticizing Freud, that analysis "is not the rite of the Oedipus" (1977a, 316/818). But this is because he had made it the rite of symbolic castration: the harsh initiation of the "harsh desire of.. . desiring" (1986, 357), the tragic schooling of the tearing away from self and total disidentification, the infinitely painful access to that "place from which a voice is heard clamoring 'the universe is a defect in the purity of Non-Being*" (1977a, 317, 819).

至于引导主体到那个绝对的「非-存在」的精神分析(1968,26),「跟毁灭的婚礼,被认为是他的誓言的高潮」(1986,357)。拉康很有理由主张,虽然他含蓄地批评弗洛依德,精神分析「并不是伊狄浦斯的仪式」1977a,316/818)。但是这是因为他已经将它当成是象征的阉割的仪式:欲望的严厉的欲望的严厉的引入)(1986,357),跟自性与非认同的撕裂的悲剧的教训,无限痛苦地进入那个「地方,从那里,有声音被听见宣告这个宇宙是一个瑕疵,在非存在的纯净里」(1977a,317,819)。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

捉住欲望的尾巴 11

July 20, 2014

捉住欲望的尾巴 11
雅克慎论拉康

How, then, can the boy get out of the double bind that simultaneously enjoins him to be and not to be the phallus, to identify and not to identify with the phallic father? We recognize here the problem that Lacan had already stumbled on in his article on the family complexes:45 if the Oedipal father simultaneously says, “Be like me” (a man) and “Do not be like me” (in regard to the mother), how is it possible henceforth to prevent the normative (“secondary”) identification with the father from being confused with the
rivalrous (“primary”) identification with this same father? Therefore, we are not surprised to see Lacan returning to a solution analogous to the one he advocated in that article, in 1938. Just as he proposed then to distinguish between rivalrous identification with the “superegoic” father and normalizing identification with the function of the “ego-ideal,” here he proposes to distinguish between identification with the imaginary phallus and identification with the symbolic phallus—that is, with the same imaginary phallus, insofar as one must not identify oneself with it.

那么,男孩如何挣脱双重者的约束?这个约束同时指令他成为或不成为阳具, 认同或不认同那个父亲?我们在此体认出这个问题,拉康在他探讨家庭情结的文章已经遇到的难题。假如伊狄浦斯的父亲同时说,「要像我这样当个男子汉」,以及「不要像我这样碰触母亲」,因此如何可能阻止这个正常化(次级)的认同父亲,不要混淆,跟敌意的(初级)的认同相同的父亲?因此,我们并不感惊奇,当我们看见拉康回答这个解决,类同于他在1938年那篇文章主张的这个解决。正如他当时建议,为了区别敌意的认同这位「超我」的父亲,并且正常化「自我-理想」的功能的认同。在此,他建议区别跟想像的阳具认同,与跟象征的阳具的认同。换句话说,区别认同于相同的想像的阳具,因为我们一定不要认同于它。

Indeed, this is the third phase of the Oedipus, according to Lacan. The child (or, more precisely, the boy) must realize that the father has the phallus, not inasmuch as he is the phallus of the mother (that is, a “rival object”) but inasmuch as he possesses it legitimately, and that the mother, by the same token, cannot have it in any case: “Inasmuch as he [the father] intervenes as the one who has the phallus, and not as the one who is the phallus, something can happen to reinstate the agency of the phallus as the object desired by the mother” (SV, 22 January 1958; my emphasis). This will happen only if the mother, instead of making the child her little phallic double, returns him to the father as to the one who legally possesses the phallus. In short, it is necessary that she play the game of the symbolic pact/exchange, by referring to the word and the law of the father as to her own law, as to a “given word” that she intends to respect (when this is not the case, we get the whole gamut of neuroses, psychoses, and perversions). The pivotal moment of the Oedipus is not, as in Freud, the threat of castration by the rival-father; it is the castration of the mother insofar as she recognizes it symbolically: “I do not have (the right to have) the phallus, and therefore you cannot be it, unless you yourself become a father, by receiving/giving in your turn the symbolic phallus that you are not.”

的确,依照拉康,这就是伊狄浦斯的第三时期。小孩,(或更贴切地说,男孩)必须体会到,父亲拥有这个阳具,不是因为他合法地拥有它。同样地,母亲无论如何无法拥有阳具,「因为父亲介入,作为拥有阳具的这个人,而不是作为就是阳具的这个人,某件事情将会发送,恢复阳具的代理,作为被母亲欲望的客体」(1958,1,22,SV)。会发生这样的事情,仅有当母亲将他还给父亲,而是让小孩成为她的小阳具的双重者,作为合法拥有阳具的这个人。总之,这是必要的,母亲玩弄象征盟约/交换的遊戏,凭借提到父亲这个字与法则,作为提到她自己的法则,作为提到她意图尊敬的这个「特定的字」,(当情况不是这样时,我们就会遇到整个的神经症,精神病,与变态狂)。如同在弗洛依德那里,伊狄浦斯的枢纽时刻,并不是敌意-父亲给予的阉割的威胁,而是母亲的阉割,因为她象征上体认它。「我并没有拥有阳具,拥有阳具的权力,因此,你无法拥有它,除非你自己成为父亲,凭借轮到你接收/给予这个象征的阳具,虽然你并非阳具」。

What happens then, according to Lacan, is that the child (more precisely, the boy)y instead of identifying with the father who is the imaginary phallus of the mother, identifies with the father who has the phallus symbolically (which the girl, as we have seen, does not need to do): “The identification with the father occurs at this third phase, the phase in which he intervenes as him who ‘has* it. This identification is called the ego-ideal (SV, 22 January 1958). Lacan expresses this once again by saying that the boy “metaphorically” identifies with the father, by identifying with his symbolic phallus (as a “title of virility”) instead of identifying with the imaginary phallus of the mother: he becomes “his own metaphor” (SV, 22 January 1958). The Oedipus is resolved, Lacan assures us, through a “paternal metaphor” that substitutes the signifier of the “Name of the Father” for the signifier of the “Desire of the Mother.” Hence the following formula (1977a, 200/557):

依照拉康,因此发生的事情就是,小孩(更贴切地说,男孩),没有认同作为母亲的想像的阳具的父亲,而是认同象征上拥有阳具的父亲(如同我们已经看出,女孩并没有需要这样做):「对于父亲的认同发生在第三阶段,在这个阶段,父亲介入,作为「拥有」阳具的这个人。这个认同被称为自我-理想(1058,1,22,SV)。拉康再一次表达这个,凭借说,男孩「象征地」认同父亲,凭借认同他的象征的阳具(作为「精力的头衔」),而不是认同母亲的想像的阳具:他成为「他自己的隐喻」(1958,1,22,SV)。拉康告诉我们,伊狄浦斯被解决,通过「父权的隐喻」,以「以父亲之名」的能指,来替换「母亲的欲望」的能指。因此,产生以下的公式(1077a,200/557):

Name-of-the-Father Desire of the Mother
Desire of the Mother Signified to the subject
—» Name-of-the-Father 0/█(phallus@)

It is read in this way: the metaphorical function of the Name-of-the-Father is to put an Other in the place of the phallus.

这个公式的阅读方式是:以父亲之名的隐喻的功能,应该放置一位大他者在阳具的位置上。

It can be reformulated, perhaps slightly less “algorithmically,” by saying that the child (the boy) becomes a virile man (at least potentially) by identifying with the phallus with which he must not identify. Lacan, in fact, is speaking of the substitution of one signifier for another, but in reality it is a question (from the point of view of the child himself) of a sort of transmutation of the identification, which mysteriously passes from positive to negative. From this perspective, we are irresistibly drawn back to the mechanism of the Umwendung of identification already cited by Freud to explain the “exit” from the Oedipus complex.

这个公式能够重新说明,或许稍微不那么「数学公式」地说:小孩(男孩)成为一位具有精力的男人(至少在潜力方面),凭借认同他一定不要认同的阳具。事实上,拉康正在谈论到一个能指替换另外一个能指。但是实际上,这是一个认同的调换的问题(从小孩他自己的观点)。这种认同的调换神秘地从正面到负面。从这个观点,我们无法抗拒地被带回到认同的Umuvendung的心理机制。弗洛依德已经引用过它,来解释从伊狄浦斯情结的「退场」。

46 The child (the boy) really does continue to be the phallus insofar as he identifies with the one who has it. The only difference is that now he is it “by not being it,” insofar as he identifies not with the object but with the signifier of the desire of the mother—namely, with the object negated by the paternal “no” (SV, 29 January 1958). In short, he is a “no”-object; in other words, a subject: he desires himself beyond himself, such as he is not. At present, the phallus is the signifier of his desire—that is, of the non-object that he is (or, what amounts to the same thing, of the object that he is not) for the desire of the other. Or, again, the phallus is the signifier of the subject, insofar as the subject identifies himself in it (“represents his identity” in it) under erasure, in the mode of a forbidden, barred, repressed identification: the subject is the phallus insofar as he is not it, insofar as he “metaphorizes” himself in it and defers his own identity in it.

「小孩(男孩)确实继续成为阳具,因为他认同拥有阳具的这个人。唯一的差异是,现在,他就是阳具,凭借他并不等于是阳具」。因为他认同的并不是这个客体,而是认同这母亲的欲望的这个能指。换句话是,他认同被父亲的「不」否定的客体(1958,1,29,SV)。总之,他并不是「客体」;换句话说,他是主体:他欲望他自己,超越他自己,作为他并非现在的样子。目前,阳具就是他的欲望的能指,为了欲望他者—换句话说,他的生命实存的非-客体的能指,(或相当等于是说,并非他现在的样子的客体的能指)。或者,阳具就是主体的能指,因为主体在它那里认同他自己,(在它那里代表他自己的认同),在抹除之下,以被禁止,被禁制,被压抑的认同的模式:主体就是这个阳具,因为他并不是它,因为他在它那里「隐喻」他自己,并在在它那里拖延他自己的认同。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

捉住欲望的尾巴 10

July 20, 2014

捉住欲望的尾巴 10
雅克慎论拉康

But from all of this (which, as we shall see, is the operation of the “paternal metaphor”), “the child catches only the result” (SV, 22 January 1958)—namely, the “signified.” The x that the mother’s whole conduct signifies to him (since she obviously desires “something”) is what he will wish to be, in order to be what the mother desires. In short, he will fall into the inevitable and disastrous error of confusing the signifier with the signified, the symbolic phallus with the imaginary phallus. Confronted with the alternative to be or not to be the “object” of the desire of the other, he will imagine himself to be just that object (that ego, that phallic double) of the mother that he is not (since he is only its signifier). This is the first stage of the Lacanian Oedipus, its strictly identificatory stage:

但是从所有的这一切(我们将会看出,那就是「父权隐喻的运作」,「小孩仅是捕捉到结果」(1958,1,22,SV)–换句话是,「所指」。母亲的整个行为跟他意指的这个x未知的东西,(因为她明显地欲望「某件东西」,就是他希望成为的东西,为了成为母亲欲望的东西。总之,他将会犯下这个无可避免而灾难的错误,将能指与所指混淆,将象征界的阳具与想像界的阳具混淆。当他面临这个替代选择,要成为,或不成为,「他者的欲望」的客体,他将会想像他自己就是成为母亲的那个客体(自我,那个双重者),虽然他实质上并非是母亲的客体,(因为他仅是它的能指)。这就是拉康的伊狄浦斯的第一阶段,它的严格的可认同的阶段。

What the child seeks is. .. “to be or not to be” [English in the original] the object of the desire of the mother… the point that corresponds with what is ego and what, here, is his other ego, that with which he identifies, the “something other” that he will seek to be. . .. As if in a mirror, the subject identifies with the object of desire of the mother…. To please the mother … it is necessary and sufficient to be the phallus [SV, 22 January 1958].

小孩所寻求的东西、、、「成为或不成为」母亲的欲望的客体、、、这个时刻对应于属于自我的东西,与他的他-我的东西,这是他认同的东西,他将尝试成为的这个「某件它者」。好像在镜像里,主体认同母亲的欲望的客体、、、为了讨好母亲、、、成为阳具上必要而且足够(1958,1,22,SV)。

The child’s first identificatory model, then, is not, as Freud thought, the father of “the early history of the Oedipus complex”42 or even the breast of the oral phase. It is the imaginary phallus, in which the ego freezes himself into an object (and, by the same token, “fixes” himself to the all-powerful mother, of whom he becomes, so to speak, the “first weapon”).

小孩的最初的认同的榜样,因此不是如同弗洛依德所认为的,并不是「伊狄浦斯情结的早期历史」的父亲,或是口腔期的乳房。就是在这个想像的阳具里,自我冰冻他自己,成为一个客体(同样地,将他自己「依附」于全能的母亲,他成为所谓的母亲的「最早的武器」).

According to Lacan, it is only in a second phase that the Oedipus takes on the form we know in Freud: that of a rivalrous identification with the father. Realizing that the mother does not have the phallus (and that he himself, by the same token, is not it), the child begins by interpreting that castration, which by rights is a symbolic and legal castration, as a real privation: the father is the one who has the phallus, since he violently deprives the mother (and hence also the child) of it. There follows a no less violent rivalry with the depriving father, which Lacan presents as a rivalry for an object (“to have or not to have the phallus”), but which is obviously a purely identificatory rivalry, since it is once more a question of “to be or not to be” the phallus of the mother. As in Freud, Oedipal hostility toward the father is conflated with identification with the father, except that the stakes in this rivalry are not the maternal object that the child would like to have, but rather the phallic “object” that he would like to be, in his capacity as ego. Here, the Oedipal conflict is very clearly (much more clearly than in Freud, anyway) a “struggle for pure prestige.”

依照拉康,仅是在第二个部分,伊狄浦斯具有我们在弗洛依德知道的形式:敌意地认同父亲的形式。当小孩体会到,母亲并没有拥有阳具(同样地,他自己并不是那个阳具),小孩开始解释那个阉割。从各种条件看,那个阉割是象征与立法的阉割,作为实在的剥夺:父亲是拥有阳具的这个人,因为他暴力地剥夺母亲(因此,也是小孩)的阳具。跟随而来的是同样暴力的敌意,对这位剥夺者的父亲的敌意。拉康将它呈现作为是对客体的敌意(「拥有或不拥有这个阳具」),但是,显而易见,这是一个纯粹是认同的敌意,因为它再次是「成为或不成为母亲的阳具」的问题。如同在弗洛依德那里,伊狄浦斯的对于父亲的敌意,跟对于父亲的认同混淆一块,除了,在这个敌意里的赌注,并不是小孩想要拥有的母亲的客体。相反地,而是他想要成为的阳具的客体,因为他具有自我的能力。在此,伊狄浦斯情结的冲突,显而易见地为了「纯粹尊严的奋斗」(无论如何,比在弗洛依德那里明显)。

The result is that the problem of the Oedipus in Lacan (even more than in Freud) becomes that of the “decline” of the identificatory rivalry for the phallus, especially in the boy. The girl, in reality, does not have the phallus (she “is without having it? says Lacan43), and she is thus much more naturally inclined to leave it to the father who has it, in order to receive it from him as a woman (in coitus) and/or as a mother (in the form of a child): “For her, it is
much simpler: she does not have to make this identification [with the legal father, as we shall see], nor does she need to keep it as a title to virility: she knows where it is, . . . where she must go to get it; it is on the father’s side, [she must go] toward him who has it” (SV, 22 January 1958; my emphasis). In other words, the fact of not having a real penis makes her access to symbolic castration, which enjoins her not to be the imaginary phallus, almost natural. (This solution may actually be found to be a little too “simple,” even from Lacan’s own point of view, for isn’t this a surreptitious resurgence of the reference to the reality of the difference between the sexes, to the reality of the “hole” that the girl hastens to fill through an imaginary identification with the phallus?)

结果是,在拉康这里(比起在弗洛依德那里),伊狄浦斯的难题变成是对阳具的认同的敌意的「衰微」的难题,特别是在男孩。实际上,女孩并没有拥有阳具(拉康说:「她没有拥有它」)。女孩因此更加自然地倾向于将阳具留给父亲,因为父亲拥有阳具,这样她可以从他那里接收它,作为女人(拥有阴户),以及(或)作为母亲(以小孩的形态):「对于她,问题更加简单:她并不需要从事跟合法的父亲的认同,如同我们将会看出」,她也不需要保持它,作为精力的头衔:她知道它在哪里、、、她必须去哪里寻找它;它就在父亲这边。她必须去到拥有它的他那里)(1958,1,22,SV)。换句话是,没有拥有一个实在的阴茎,让她接近象征的阉割。这个象征的阉割指示她不要成为想像界的阳具,这几乎是自然的。(这个解决实际上可能被发现稍微过于「简单」,即使是从拉康自己的观点。因为,这难道不是两性之间的差异的现实,秘密地重新复辟?女孩凭借想像地认同阳具,而匆促填补「空洞」的现实?)

The boy, on the contrary, must actually identify with the father who has the phallus, in order to come to a virile position; and this, as Lacan remarks, is the cause of the weakness, with respect to perversion, of the male sex (1977a, 320/823): the boy must simultaneously identify with the father (so as to have the phallus and to become masculine) and not identify with him (so as not to be his rival, so as not to be the phallus of the mother). As Lacan says once again, he “is not without having” the phallus,44 so that it will be very difficult for him not to confuse the symbolic phallus that he must have without being it, and the imaginary phallus that he is by the fact of having it. Hence it is only too easy for him to remain “fixed” in rivalrous identification with the phallus of the mother, violently refusing its privation by the father: a transvestite identifying with the phallus hidden beneath the clothing of the mother, a homosexual identifying with the mother who has the masculine phallus “at hand,” a fetishist who identifies with the mother insofar as she gives herself the phallus in the form of equivalents (boots, corsets, and so on) (SV, 22 and 29 January 1958).

相反地,男孩必须确实认同拥有阳具的父亲,为了获得精力的立场。拉康说,这是男性软弱的原因,关于变态,(1977a,320/823):男孩必须认同父亲(为了拥有阳具,并且成为男性),同时又一定不要认同他(为了不要成为他的敌人,为了不要成为母亲的阳具)。如同拉康再次强调,他「并非没有拥有」阳具,这样他很难不混淆象征界的阳具与想像界的阳具,前者,他必须拥有它,但是不成为它;后者,他凭借拥有它,而成为它。因此,他非常容易始终「固著」于对母亲的阳具的敌意的认同,猛烈地拒绝被父亲所剥夺。一种异性装扮癖的认同阳具,隐藏在母亲的服装底下的阳具。这是一种同性恋的认同母亲,因为母亲拥有男性的阳具「可使用」,一种认同于母亲的恋物癖,因为母亲给予她自己这个阳具,以相等物的形态(鞋子,内衣,等等)(1958,1,29,SV)。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
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捉住欲望的尾巴 9

July 19, 2014

捉住欲望的尾巴 9
雅克慎论拉康

Oedipus Revisited

重访伊狄浦斯

It remains for us to understand what predestines the phallus to its promotion to major signifier of human desire. In truth, we can ask why it is the erected form of the phallus that furnishes the signifier with “its first weapons,” as Lacan enigmatically asserts, just as we may ask what authorizes Lacan to conflate so nimbly the predominance of the phallic image with that of a symbol. Who, after all—apart from Lacan—says that “the first signifier is the notch” (1977b, 141/129), the “single stroke” (trait unaire) of the “1,” the “vertical stick” (SIX, 6 December 1961) that resembles the phallus? Why must the signifier be a scepter, a “bar which . . . strikes the signified” (1977a, 288/692) and which “petrifies the subject” (1966, 840), or a whip (SV, 5 February 1958)? Nothing in the theory of the signifier seems to authorize this surreptitious analogism, which, however, is habitual in Lacan. If the signifier is “arbitrary”-diacritical, there is no reason for its form to have the least “attachment,” as Saussure said, to any content whatsoever, even if this content were an ideal and prevalent form of the imaginary body.

有待我们去理解的是,将阳具注定于它的提升到人的欲望的主要的能指。实际上,我们能够询问,为什么阳具的这个竖立的形式,供应给能指,作为「它的最初的武器」,如同拉康谜团地主张。正如我们可能询问,是什么授权拉康如此敏捷地增添阳具意象的佔优势,用象征的佔优势。毕竟,除了拉康外,有谁会说,类似阳具的「第一个能指就是这个刻痕」((1977b,141/129),这个「我」的这个「单一笔划」,「这个垂直的棍子」(1961,12,6,SIX)?为什么这个能指必须是一个权杖,一道「打击到所指的横杆」(1977a,288/692),「让主体成为雕像的这个横杆」(1966,840)。或是一条鞭子(1958,2,5,SV)?在能指的理论里,没有一样东西似乎授权这个秘密的类比。可是,在拉康那里,这个类比是习惯性。假如能指是「任意」的,可区别的,没有理由让它的形式拥有丝毫的「依附」,如同索绪尔所说,依附于任何的内容。即使这个内容是想像的身体的理想而盛行的形式。

Thus we really must understand that the privilege of the imaginary phallus is an entirely negative one. In a word, the signifier in Lacan is all the more phallic in that it must not be phallic. If the imaginary phallus constitutes the symbolized par excellence (if it is what is “borrowed” from the signified by the signifier), it is because it is this very thing that must be annulled/raised—we could almost say extirpated, exterminated, castigated—in the symbol. In fact, the imaginary phallus is what embodies the identity of man, and therefore it is precisely what man, if he is truly human, can only desire, by negating it. The phallus is certainly what man wants to be (an ego of bronze, an object without lack or “hole,” a beautiful totality closed on itself); but it is also, and by the same token, what man wants to be, in the very precise sense of his not being it, of his not being any object “in-itself,” no transcendent ego. Man, as subject, cannot be the phallus except by transcending it and transcending himself in it. And this, in the Lacanian system, is why he must not be the phallus. The law of castration, which enjoins every human to lose the phallus by annulling/raising it to the function of signifier, only expresses that ontological prescription inherited from Kojeve and Sartre: the human being is not what he is and he is what he is not, and therefore he cannot conform to what he is except through nonconformity. In short, he cannot (and must not) identify with himself except through non-identification.

因此,我们确实必须理解,想像的阳具的特权是一个完全是负面的特权。总之,在拉康,能指更加是阳具的能指,因为它一定不要是阳具。假如想像界的阳具组成这个象征化的最佳阳具(假如那是能指从所指那里「借用」过来的东西),那是因为就是这个东西必须被宣告无效/ 被提升—我们几乎要说是被彻底毁灭,被消灭,被严厉谴责—在象征里。事实上,想像界的阳具就是具体代表人的认同,因此,它确实是人仅是凭借否定它,才能够欲望的东西,假如他确实是人的话。阳具确实是人想要成为的东西,(铜像的自我,没有欠缺或空洞的客体,一个自我封闭的美丽的整体性);但是同样地,阳具也是人想要成为的东西,确实的意义就是,他并等于是它,他并不是任何的客体「本身」,并不是超验的自我。人,作为主体,无法是阳具,除了凭借超验它,并且在它里面超验他自己。在拉康的系统,这就是为什么他一定不要就是那个阳具。阉割的法则,指示每个人丧失这个阳具,凭借宣告它无效/提升它到能指的功能。阉割的法则仅是表达,从科耶夫与萨特那里遗传过来的本体论的指令:人并不是他现在的样子,人的生命实存,并不是他现在的样子。因此,人不能够跟他现在的样子保持一致,除了通过非一致性。总之,人无法(也一定不要)认同他自己,除了通过非-认同。

This can be translated as follows: the human being (man or woman) must identify with the phallus, but as a signifier—that is, as that with which he or she cannot and must not identify. “Identify without identifying”; “Be the phallus without being it.” The law of symbolic castration enjoins us to substitute for the imaginary phallus the symbolic phallus—namely, the imaginary phallus negated: “In fact, what must be recognized is the function of the phallus, not as object, but as signifier of desire…. The solution to the problem of castration does not arise from the dilemma to have or not to have it; the subject must first recognize that he is not it.”41

这个能被翻译如下:人类(无论是男人或女人),必须认同阳具,但是作为能指—换句话说,作为他或她无法,也一定不要认同的东西:「不认同的认同」;「不是阳具而成为阳具」。象征阉割的法则指示我们用象征界的阳具,取代想像界的阳具—换句话是,想像界的阳具被否定:「事实上,必然被承认的东西,就是阳具的功能,不是作为客体,而是作为欲望的能指、、、阉割的难题的解决方法,并不是从拥有它或不拥有它的困境里产生;主体首先必须承认,他并不是它。

Let us see, then, how this ontological prescription/prohibition is tested in empirical description—that is, in the description of the Oedipus; and to do this, let us return to the point where we left the infant not long ago, when he wanted “to be the phallus” of the mother. Why “to be”? Because human desire, as we know, is fundamentally a desire to be a subject, not a desire to have an object. As a result, the mother, contrary to the official version of the Freudian Oedipus, is not desired in her capacity as object of love (as object chosen according to the “anaclitic” type) but in her capacity as desiring subject. The child demands to be loved—that is, he demands, beyond all the gratifications that reduce him to the status of “object of love,” to be desired as a subject: “The child’s desire asserts itself … in that it is the desire of the desire of the mother” (SV, 22 January 1958). Even more simply, he desires to be.

因此,让我们看出,这个本体论的指令/禁令用经验的描述被测试。换句话说,用伊狄浦斯的描述。为了做这个,让我们回到我们不久之前离开婴孩的那个地方,当他想要「成为母亲的阳具」。为什么想要「成为母亲的阳具」?因为人的欲望,据我们所知,基本上是欲望成为主体,而不是欲望拥有客体。结果,跟弗洛依德的伊狄浦斯的官方版本恰恰相反,母亲被欲望,并不是因为她具有充当爱的客体的能力,(依照「依赖」方式被选择的客体),而是因为她作为欲望的主体的能力。小孩要求被爱—换句话说,他要求被欲望,作为主体,超越所有让他沦落成为「爱的客体」的地位的满足:「小孩的欲望主张它自己、、、因为那是母亲的欲望的欲望」(1958,1,22,SV)。更加贴切地说,小孩欲望生命实存。

But the desire of the mother—such is the a priori of the Lacanian Oedipus—”is the phallus.” Why? Because the mother bathes in the symbolic, and because that “third”—the father—forbids her to desire herself in her child by making it her little phallic “double.” “Thou shalt not reintegrate thy product” (SV, 29 January 1958): the father enjoins the mother to desire “something other than” the child—namely, the imaginary phallus that she herself had to give up, in order to receive it in the form of its symbolic equivalent, the child-phallus. Therefore, the child is the phallus of the mother only insofar as he is not it: he is her symbolic phallus—that is, the sig-nifier of her desire, the substitute for the x that she desires (in which she desires herself) “beyond” him.

但是母亲的欲望就是「阳具」–这就是拉康的伊狄浦斯的演绎。为什么?因为母亲沐浴在象征界,因为那个「第三者」–父亲—禁止她在她的小孩欲望她自己,凭借让它成为她的小阳具的「双重者」。「汝不可重新合并汝产品」(1958,1,29,SV):父亲指令母亲欲望除了小孩以为的某件东西—换句话说,欲望她自己必须放弃的想像界的阳具,为了接收它,以它的象征界的相等物的形式,小孩的阳具。因此,小孩就是母亲的阳具,因为因为他并不是阳具。他的她的象征界的阳具。换句话说,她的欲望的能指,她欲望的这个未知的东西x 的替代品(在那里,她欲望她自己)「超越」他。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com