如何言说真理 9

如何言说真理 9

雅克慎论拉康

And so verily (en verite), verily, I, truth (la verite), say unto you, it is in error, forgetting, slips of the tongue, bungled actions, deformation, and pretense that I reveal myself to you, you men who insist on pursuing me where I am not: “Our abortive actions are actions which succeed, those of our words which come to grief are words which own up. These acts, these words reveal a truth from behind” (1988a, 265/292). Such, according to Lacan, was the revelation made to Freud (“It is none other than Freud who had this revelation, and he called his discovery the unconscious”; 1977a, 159/509): faltering speech, false speech, is finally the true revelation, the only apokalupsis of desire—its Apocalypse, therefore, but in the precise sense that the Apocalypse takes place only in being avoided. Signor, Herr> the “absolute Master,” everything that an “apocalyptic wind” swept from Freud’s speech—none of it was true except as it was forgotten, covered over, transposed, failed, and there was nothing that could have been made conscious in order finally to unveil the unconscious desire.

所以,的确,的确,我,真理,跟你们言说。就在错误,遗忘,口误,搞砸的行动,畸形转变,伪装,我,真理,启示自己给你们,你们坚持在我并不存在的地方,追寻我:「我们半途而废的行动,是成功的行动,我们的话语的那些结果完全失败的行动,都是承认失败的行动。这些行动,这些话语从背后启示一项真理」(1988a,265/292)。依照拉康,弗洛依德获得的启示就是如此(「获得这个启示的人,确实就是弗洛依德,他称他的发现为无意识」;1977a,159/509)闪烁的言说,虚假的言说,最后成为真实的启示,欲望的唯一的启示录—因此,也是它的启示录。但是准确的意义是:启示录仅是发生在它被避免的地方。Signor, Herr, 「绝对的主人」,从弗洛依德那里,「启示录的风」横扫出来的一切。它们没有一样是真实的,除了它被遗忘,被掩饰,被调换,被挫败。而且,没有一样东西会让它意识到,为了最后揭露这个无意识的欲望。

On the contrary, it was in Freud’s mistake, in the ungraspable, fugitive moment of stammering, that the Apocalypse of desire had already taken place. In other words, the Apocalypse is not still to come; rather, it is we who, catastrophically, always come too late to receive it. The Apocalypse of desire is endless, as endless as the Word (Parole) in which it takes “place,” for repression is absolutely the Last Judgment of desire, and the resurrection of the flesh of truth therefore takes place only halfway (a mi-corps)—amputated, castrated, divided in speech. And so, verily, verily, I say unto you,

相反地,就在弗洛依德的错误里,就在结结巴巴的这个无法被掌握的逃离的时刻,欲望的启示理已经发生。换句话说,启示录并非依旧还没有来到;相反地,悲惨的是我们,总是来得太迟,来不及接受它。欲望的启示录是永无止境,像真理之道那样永无止境。启示录发生在真理之道那里,因为潜抑绝对是欲望的最后的审判。真理的肉身的复活因此仅发生在半途—在言说里被切除,被阉割,被分裂。所以,的确,的确,我跟你们说。

There is no error which does not present and promulgate itself as truth. In short, error is the habitual incarnation of the truth. And if we wanted to be entirely rigorous, we would say that, as long as the truth isn’t entirely revealed, that is to say in all probability until the end of time, its nature will be to propagate itself in the form of error. You don’t have to go much further to see in this a structure constitutive of the revelation of being as such [1988a, 263/289-290].

每个错误都呈现它自己,宣告它自己,作为是真理。总是,错误是真理的惯常的化身。假如我们想要完全地确实,我们将会说,只要真理并没有完全被启示,换句话说,很有可能,至到时间的结束,真理的特性将是以错误的形式来宣告它自己。你们无需捨近求远,就能在这里面看出,一个建构生命实存自身的启示的结构。

But here, by the same token, we are truly “burning”—and not only because the Revelation is written in letters of fire; as Lacan immediately objects, “How, from within speech, will error ever be discerned?” (1988a, 263/290) In fact, if the absolutely last revelation of being, of desire, and of the subject takes place in erroneous speech, what distinguishes it from that other “error”: the alienated and “miscognizing” speech of the imaginary ego} In other words, what distinguishes repression, as the revealing-absenting of desire in speech, from resistance, as the presenting-avoiding of desire in that same speech? Indeed, it is one thing to strictly separate the domain of the real (which is neither true nor false) from the domain of speech (which is simultaneously true and false); it is something completely different to separate, with equal precision, two types of speech—one of which, now baptized “symbolic,” is supposed to be more true than the other, which is reputedly “imaginary.”

但是,同样地,我们确实是正在「燃烧」–不仅是启示录被书写在火的信息里,如同拉康马上反驳说,「错误如何从言说内部被觉察出来?」(1988a,263/290)。事实上,假如生命实存,欲望,与主体的绝对是最后的启示,发生在错误的言说里,是什么东西区别它跟那个另外的「错误」不同:想像界的自我的异化与「误认」的言说。换句话说,是什么区别潜抑跟抗拒的不同?潜抑作为言说里的欲望的启示/缺席,抗拒则是作为在相同的言说里,欲望的呈现/避免?的确,要严格分开实在界的领域与言说的领域是一回事,因为前者既非真实,也非虚假,而后者则是同时既是真实,又是虚假;完全不同的另外一回事是,要同等地准确地分开两种的言说—其中一种现在被命名为「象征界」,被认为是比另外一种被命名为「想像界」更加真实。

This famous distinction between the symbolic and the imaginary cuts across the domain of speech, and thus we cannot be content with simply relegating the imaginary to the domain of specular vision: as we have seen, Lacan actually does describe the resistance of the imaginary ego in terms of alienated speech, just as, inversely, it is actually in terms of alienation that Lacan continues to describe true and revealing symbolic speech: “Speech is founded in the existence of the Other [capital O]” (1988b, 244/286), particularly when this speech lies, since then it “speculates on faith in testimony” (1977a, 43/252), on “the Other witness,” which permits it to “present itself as Truth” (1977a, 305/807). In short, truth still speaks itself through the mediation of the Other.

象征界与想像界之间的这个著名的区别,横切过言说的领域。因此,我们无法仅是满意于仅是将想像界分配给魅影-幻想的领域:如同我们已经看出,拉康实际上确实描述想像界的自我的抗拒,用被异化的术语。正如相反地,拉康继续描述真实而启示的象征界的言说,确实是用异化的术语:「言说以大他者「大写的O」的存在作为基础(1988b,244/286),特别是当这个言说说谎,因为它因此「以对证词的信心作为猜测」(1077a,43/252),「以大他者的见证作为猜测」,这让它能够「呈现它自己作为真理」(1977a,305/807)。总之,真理依旧言说它自己,通过大他者的中介。

From that point on, from the perspective of truth, what difference is there between these two types of speech (speech of alienation, speech of mediation): between the speech of imaginary resistance, in which the subject avoids his desire by calling on the other (small o) “to bear witness,” and the speech of symbolic revelation, in which he manifests his desire in its absence by lying to “the Other [capital O] witness”? For instance, what is the difference between well-mannered speech, which permits Freud to forget the “absolute Master” (thanks to the alibi provided by his interlocutor), and apocalyptic speech, in which death reveals itself to him in his forgetting? Isn’t it the same speech in either case, still just as deceitful, still just as true? And is it enough, in this respect, to invoke the insidious violence of imaginary speech as opposed to the contract supposedly instituted by symbolic speech?

从那个时刻开始,从真理的观点开始,在这两种言说之间(异化的言说与中介的言说之间),有怎样的差异?在想像界的抗菌的言说,与象征界的启示的言说之间?在前者,主体避免他的欲望,以召唤他者(小他者)作为见证;在后者,主体在它的缺席里,展示他的欲望,对大他者(大写字母O)的见证说谎。譬如,井井有条的言说,与启示录的言说之间的差异是什么?前者让弗洛依德能够忘记「绝对的主人」(由于他的对谈者提供藉口);在后者,由于他的遗忘,死亡对他揭示它自己?无论是哪一种情况,这难道不是相同的言说吗?依旧同样欺骗,依旧同样真实?在这方面,仅是召唤想像界的言说的潜在暴力,作为跟象征界的言说构成的约定成俗对立,这难道还不足够吗?

^ Indeed, Lacan alleges that imaginary speech avoids (the fight to the) death only at the price of an envious submission to the little master in whom the subject alienates his desire, and the peace that this seems to institute is therefore always pregnant with an “implicit violence,” a “degradation… of speech” (1988a, 51/62). Symbolic speech, by contrast, seals a pact with the other—a pact that Lacan calls “symbolic” because the subject, by agreeing to exchange speech, agrees to break the “sword” and transform it into a sign of recognition, a symbolic tessera, a sumbolon. Through speech, I recognize the Other (who is not me) as the very locus of truth (and of my truth), since it is actually necessary for me to call on him to witness the truth of my speech, even if I do this to lie to him and fool him. In other words, the game of truth presupposes a law, a rule of the game—and that, as Lacan clarifies in an astonishing rereading of the dialectic of master and slave, is why mortal violence is avoided here. Why does the slave accept submission to the master? From fear of death, according to Hegel; and yet, Lacan adds,

的确,拉康宣称,想像界的言说避免(奋斗)至死,仅是以妒忌地顺服于这位小主子作为代价,在这位小主子那里,主体异化他自己的欲望。这在表面上开启的和平,因此总是孕育着「暗含的暴力」,「言说的堕落」(1988a,51/62)。对照起来,象征界的言说,跟大他者签订盟约—拉康称这种盟约为「象征界的盟约」。因为由于同意交换言说,主体同意折断这把「剑」,然后将它转移成为承认的信息,一种象征的瓷砖。通过言说,我体认(并非是我的)大他者,作为是真理的轨迹(我的真理的轨迹)。因为我确实有必要召唤他见证我的言说的真理。即使我这样做,是为了跟他说谎,是要愚弄他。换句话说,真理的遊戏预先假设一个法则,遊戏的规则—如同拉康澄清说,当他令人惊奇地重新阅读主人与奴隶的辩证法。那就是为什么在此,人会死亡的暴力被避免。奴隶为什么接受顺服于主任?依照黑格尔的说法是:由于对于死亡的恐惧。可是,拉康补充说:

It is not sufficient for him to plead for mercy, he has to go to work. And when you go to work, there are rules, hours—we enter into the domain of the symbolic. If you look at it closely, this domain of the symbolic does not have a simple relation of succession to the imaginary domain whose pivot is the fatal intersubjective relation. We do not pass from one to the other in one jump from the anterior to the posterior, once the pact and the symbol are established. In fact, the [Hegelian] myth itself can only be conceived of as already bounded by the register of the symbolic. … In the Hegelian myth, death is not even structured like a fear, it is structured like a risk, and, in a word, like a stake. From the beginning, between the master and the slave, there’s a rule of the game [1988a, 223/248-249].

他仅是请求饶命并不足够,他必须工作。当你工作时,会有些规则,会有些时刻—我们进入象征界的领域。假如你们仔细观看它,象征界的这个领域并没有一个简单的接续关系,跟想像界的领域。想像界的领域的轴心是致命的互为主体性的关系。我们并没有一步跳跃,从前者通过到后者,从前庭跳跃到后院。一旦约定俗成与象征被建立。事实上,黑格尔的神话的本身,仅能够被构想,作为已经是受到象征界的铭记所约束、、、在黑格尔的神话,死亡甚至并不是像恐惧一样被作为结构,死亡的结构像是冒险。总之,像是赌注。从一开始,在主人与奴隶之间,就有这个遊戏的规则(1988a,223-249)。

The origin of truth, in other words, is not imaginary violence but the symbolic contract (which also means that this origin, for Lacan, is no genesis: from the real to the symbolic, the imaginary inference is no good, for we get from one to the other only by way of a leap— the pact of truth—which hollows out the abyss that it straddles).28

换句话说,真理的起源并不是想像界的暴力,而是象征界的契约(这也意味着,对于拉康而言,这个起源并不是创世纪:从实在界到象征界,想像界的推论并没有什么帮助。因为我们仅是凭借跳跃,从实在界跳跃到象征界,获得真理的这个盟约—它掏空它横跨的这个深渊。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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