如何言说真理 10

如何言说真理 10

雅克慎论拉康

Let us concede for a moment that this may be so, and that the pact of speech precedes its violent and imaginary degradation. Will we have solved the problem of the difference between the two types of speech—from the perspective of truth} Not at all. In fact, whether death is avoided in speech because of the slave’s fear or, on the contrary, because a preexisting code of chivalry structures the fight, death is still avoided. And yet for Lacan this is precisely the ultimate criterion of truth, the one that should have allowed the two types of speech to be distinguished: Is death as such confronted? Yes or no? Does the nothingness of the subject’s desire reveal itself to him as “the deepest secret of his being”? Yes or no?

让我们暂时承认,情况可能是这样。言说的盟约早先存在于它的暴力与想像的堕落。我们将会已经解决两种言说的这个差异的难题吗?从真理的观点!根本就没有,事实上,死亡在言说里是否被避免,因为奴隶的恐惧,或相反地,因为对待女士的骑士风度先前存在的符码,作为战斗的结构,死亡依旧被避免。可是,对于拉康,这确实就是真理的最后标准,这个标准本来就应该让两种言说被区别出来:死亡本身被面对吗?是或不是?主体欲望的空无揭示它自己给他,作为是「他的生命实存的最深的秘密」?是或不是?

But this singular criterion, such as it is, does not allow us to separate the grain of truth from the chaff of error: Death will never reveal itself, except in its avoidance, in the speech that presents it while absenting it as desire. From this point of view (which is the vanishing point of truth), it needs no great genius to notice that so-called true speech and so-called imaginary speech are in the same boat. How, then, can Lacan claim to distinguish between them? Above all, how can he certify the difference between them, since the criterion of truth cannot be exhibited—since the truth about truth is that it shows itself only in its retreat? Indeed, we may grant that the subject fools himself, enviously seeking the truth of his desire in another (who, he believes, possesses it).

但是,这个独特性的标准,虽然是这样,并没有让我们能够区分真理的穀粒跟错误的糟糠。死亡将永远不会揭示它自己,除了避免死亡的状态,在呈现它的言说里。当言说让死亡缺席,作为欲望。从这个观点(这是真理的消失点),不需要伟大天才,也能注意到,所谓的真实界的言说与所谓的想像界的言说,是同在一条船上。因此,拉康如何宣称区别它们?尤其重要的是,他如何能够确认它们之间的差异?因为真理的标准无法被展示—因为关于真理的真理就是,真理仅有在它的撤退时,才显示它自己。的确,我们可以承认,主体在愚弄它自己,妒嫉地寻求他的欲望的真理,在另外一个主体那里(他相信,那个主体拥有它。)

Nevertheless, by Lacan’s own admission, only by fooling himself and the other can the subject, at best, be given the shattering revelation of that truth’s concealment. In other words, truth “reveals” itself at the same level as imaginary speech, in the same “miscognizing” speech. “Authenticity,” exactly as in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, is finally nothing but the paradoxical revelation of “inauthenticity”; therefore, strictly speaking, the two should not be ‘ opposable.

可是,拉康自己承认,仅有凭借愚弄他自己及他者,主体充其量才能够被给予那个真理的隐藏的这个令人震惊的启示。换句话说,真理「启示」它自己,在跟想像界的言说相同的层次,用相同的「误认」的言说。「真诚」,如同在海德格的「存在与时间」,最后仅是「不真诚」的悖论的启示。因此,严格地说,这两个不应该是「可以对立」。

Lacan, moreover, did not neglect to indicate this himself in the first seminar, where his approach, still rather open, attempts to capture the reality of analysis. Thus we read that the speech of revelation is “another side” of the speech of mediation (1988a, 48/59); and, a bit farther on, “Between these two extremes, a whole gamut of modes of realization of speech is deployed” (1988a, 50/61). It could not be clearer that the difference between these two “types of speech” is less a difference in nature than a difference in degree, within a single, fundamentally two-faced, enduringly ambiguous speech. Transference-resistance, the “swinging” of speech toward the other, its revealing stagger—all of this is inextricably the “approach” or, as Heidegger would say, the “de-severing” [Ent-fernung] toward truth: “The moment when the subject interrupts himself is usually the most significant moment in his approach toward the truth.

而且,拉康在他的第一研讨班,自己并没有忽略地指出这一点。在那个研讨班,虽然他的探讨依旧相当开放,企图捕捉精神分析的现实。因此,我们阅读到,启示的言说是中介的言说的「另外一面」(1988a,48-59)。稍微深入一点,「在这两个极端之间,言说的实践的全面的模式被运作」(1988a,50/61)。这两种「言说」之间的差异,并不是特性的差异,而是程度的差异,持续模糊的言说的一体两面的程度的差异。这一点是再清楚不过了。移情-抗拒,言说朝向他者的「摇摆」,它的启示的摇晃—所有这一切无法挣脱地是这个「方法」,或者,如同海德格过去常说:朝向死亡的「除掉-分裂」:「当主体中断他自己的那个时刻,通常就是最重要的时刻,在他朝向真理的接近。

At this point we gain a sense of resistance in its pure state, which culminates in the feeling, often tinged with anxiety, of the analyst’s presence” (1988a, 52/63). And the analyst, correctively, is always simultaneously in the place of the imaginary alter ego and the symbolic Other—hence the “paradox of [his] position” (1988a, 51/61), since he cannot serve as a prop for the speech of the subject’s truth except at the price of simultaneously alienating him (1988a, 51/61-62). Between/among these two/four poles—subject/ego, other/Other—the interminable spiral of analytic speech is instituted (1988a, 283/312), where A is the subject, B is the analyst, O is the “unconscious notion of the ego,” and O’ is the “specularity of the image.” Between the poles, simultaneously separating and joining them, is a flat mirror. Finally, C is the arrow of speech that flies toward the imaginary other.

在这个时刻,我们获得抗拒的感觉,处于它的纯粹状态。抗拒在精神分析家在场的这种感觉里达到高潮,经常是充满焦虑)(1988a,52/63)。正确地说,精神分析家总是同时既是处于想像界的他-我的立场,又是象征界的大他者的立场。因此,「精神分析家的立场」的悖论(1988a,54/61)。因为他无法充当主体的真理的言说的支持,除了付出同时让他异化的代价(1988a,51-61-62)。在这两极或四极之间,主体/自我,小他者/大他者—精神分析言说的永无止境的旋涡被开启(1988a,283/312)。在那里,A是主体,B是精神分析家,O是「自我的无意识的观念」,O‘ 是「镜像的魅影理想」。在这两极之间,同时分开它们,又同时连接他们的是一个偏平的镜子。最后,C是言说的箭头,朝向想像界的他者飞去。

Propelled by what has never been said or recognized in O (the “imaginary fixations which were unassimilable to the symbolic development”), the arrow lodges itself in O’, the counterpart, where it repeats the same meconnaissance of desire: “What is on the side of O passes over to the side of O’. Everything which is profifered from A, from the side of the subject, makes itself heard in B, on the side of the analyst.” In other words, the subject speaks himself in the other, speaks the zero, O, of his desire in the double, O’, in whom he recognizes/”miscognizes” himself.

这个箭头受到在O点没有被说出,没有被体认的东西推动,(无法被吸收到象征的发展的想像界的固著)。这个箭头在O’点,这个类似物那里,固著它自己。在那里,它重复欲望的相同的误识:「在O的这一面的东西,通过到O’的那一面。从A点,从主体的这一面被提供的一切东西,在B点,在精神分析家的这一边,让它自己被听见。」换句话说,主体在他者那里言说他自己,言说他的欲望的这个零度,O,在双重者O’那里,他体认/误认他自己。

And sure enough, when the analyst approaches O’, “a critical phenomenon takes place … resistance in the most acute form in which it manifests itself—silence” (1988a, 284/312-313). A critical moment indeed, since by trying to push through this resistance—as if the silence hid something—the analyst would actually only reinforce it (as Lacan says elsewhere, “In analysis, the only resistance is the analyst’s”; 1966, 377). But the analyst also returns this revealing silence to the subject, since the subject speaks himself through the analyst. “Everything proffered by A . . . makes itself heard in B,” and the arrow goes flying back again:

的确,当精神分析家靠近O’点时,一个危险的现象发生、、、最激烈的形态的抗拒,展现它自己—沉默(1988a,284/312-313)。的确是一个危机的时刻,因为凭借尝试强行通过这个抗—好像这个沉默隐藏某件东西—精神分析家实际上仅是强化它(如同拉康在别处所说,「在精神分析里,唯一的抗拒是精神分析家的抗拒」(1966,377)。但是精神分析家也将这个启示的沉默还给主体,因为主体通过精神分析家言说他自己。被A点提供的每样东西,让它自己在B点被听见」,这个箭头再次飞回来:

The analyst hears it, but, in return, so does the subject. The echo of his discourse is symmetrical to the specularity of the image. This revolving dialectic, which I represent on the schema by a spiral, binds O’ and O more and more tightly. The progress of the subject in his being must finally bring him to O, via a series of points spaced between A and O. On this line, the subject, settling down to his labor, over and over again . . . makes progress into the order of fundamental symbolic relations in which he has to find the time, resolving the halts and the inhibitions which make up the super-ego [that is, the imaginary master]. You need time for that” [1988a, 284/312; translation modified].

精神分析家听见它,但是,回转地,主体也听见它。他自己的辞说的回声,跟镜像的魅影理想,给予均称化。这个旋转的辩证法,我用这个基模代表的辩证法,凭借一个旋涡,连接O’dian与O点,越来越紧密。主体在他的生命实存的这个进展,最后必须带他到O点,经由布置在A点与O点之间的一系列的点。在这条线上,主体,反复地满意于他的努力,进展进入基本的象征关系的秩序。在那里,他必须找到时间,来解决组成超我(也就是,想像界的主人)的这个阻隔与压抑。你需要时间这样做)(1988a,284/312)。

And so it really is one and the same speech, simultaneously imaginary and symbolic, turning and returning around the empty center of desire, opening “the subject to [that] fertile mistake through which genuine speech joins up once again with the discourse of error” (1988a, 282-283/311). Joins up with it—by catching up with it, joining itself to it, and certainly not by passing it, for, if “you need time for that,” it is really because the arrow of speech never arrives at its target, O—except by missing it, in the O’, where it breaks (hence the broken line of the diagram).

所以,这确实完全相同的言说,同时既是想像界,又是象征界,一再地绕着欲望的空洞的中心旋转,将主体展开于那个肥沃的错误。通过这个错误,真正的言说再次跟错误的辞说连接一块。(1988a,282-283/311)。跟它连接一块—凭借追赶上它,将自己连接上它,确实并不是通过它,因为,「假如你需要时间这样做」,那确实是因为言说的箭头从来没有到达它的目标,O—除了凭借错过它,在O’点。在那里,它中断(因此,图形的这个中断的线)。

Anyway, why O and O’? Lacan answers this question by referring to an early presentation of this diagram: “A little girl.. . one day came up with this pretty phrase—Oh, you mustn’t think Vll spend my whole life in O and O’. Poor thing! Of course you’ll spend your life in O and O’, the same as everyone else” (1988a, 165/187; translation modified

无论如何,为什么是O与O’点?拉康回答这个问题,凭借提到这个图形的早期的呈现:「有一位小女孩带着这个漂亮的词语前来—哦,你一定不要认为,我将会度过我全部的一生在O与O’点。可怜的傢伙!当然,你将会度过你全部的一生,在O与O’点,就像每个其他人一样」(1988a,165/187;)。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s


%d bloggers like this: