如何言说真理 7

如何言说真理 7

雅克慎论拉康

Since truth, as unveiling/veiling of Being in beings, has been reinterpreted once and for all as an unveiling/veiling of the subject in his “auto”enunciation (or “auto”representation), the result is that truth, under Lacan’s pen, reveals itself in lies, mistakes, deceptions, and fiction. This is the second important modification that Lacan brings to Heidegger’s aletheia: its total (and, from a strictly Hei-deggerian point of view, aberrant) reformulation in terms of adequacy/inadequacy to the thing and/or to itself. Indeed, to the extent that Lacan continues (in the tradition “of Kojeve) to circulate in the problematic of (auto)enunciation (of logos as “discourse,” “judgment,” “reason,” “concept,” “representation,” and so on), he is brought by the same token to reinscribe the unfathomable “logic” of aletheia into logic pure and simple, even if he must therefore constantly (and complacently) use paradoxes, aporias, and auto-destructive “formalizations.”

因为真理,作为生命实存的揭露/遮蔽,曾经一劳永逸地被全新诠释,作为是主体的揭露-遮蔽,在他的「自动」表述(或「自动」再现)。结果是,在拉康笔下,真理揭示它自己,在谎言,欺骗,与幻想里。这是拉康带给海德格的真理的第二个重要的修正,对真理的完整的重新诠释(从严紧海德格的观点,是偏离的重新诠释),用的术语是:物象/物自体的充足/不充足。的确,在科耶夫的传统里,拉康甚至继续流通「自动——表述的这个难题(逻各斯的表述,作为「辞说」,「判断」,「理性」,「观念」,「再现表象」,等等),他同样被迫重新铭记真理的深不可测的「逻辑」,成为纯粹而单纯的逻辑,即使他因此必须不断地,(而且自负地)使用悖论,疑置法,与自动-毁灭的「形式主义」。

Thus, whereas Heidegger spoke of an initial “errancy” of truth, attempting to indicate a “truth” prior to the alternatives “true”/”false,” Lacan, for his part, said that “error is the habitual incarnation of truth,” that truth “emerges in the most ctearcut representative of the mistake” (1988a, 263/289, 265/292), and that truth has a “fictional organization” or “structure” (1977a, 306/808; 1966,17,451,742). Moreover, whereas Heidegger wrote that “das Ding dingt” patiently kneading language to make it say the truth of “the thing,” outside any problematic of adequacy or inadequacy of discourse to res,23 Lacan abruptly announced that “the thing speaks of itself.” Whereas Heidegger attempted to think of truth beyond any “representation” of a “reality,”24 Lacan would immediately translate, saying that truth distinguishes itself from reality (1977a, 306/808; 1966, 740)—indeed, it sets itself against reality (1966, 351). And whereas Heidegger proposed understanding truth as a retracted gift of Being, Lacan quite simply said that the truth is spoken in cheating, trickery, and lying.

因此,虽然海德格言说真理的最初的「错误」,企图指示一个早先于选择性的「真/假」的「真理」,就拉康而言,他说,「错误是真理的惯常的化身」,「真理出现,作为错误的最清晰的代表」(1988a,263/289,265/292)。真理拥有「幻想的组织」或「结构」(1977a,306/808;1966,17,451,742)。而且,虽然海德格写道,「生命实存」耐心地揉搓语言,让语言说出「生命实存」的真理,外在于辞说的充足/不充足之外。拉康突然地宣告,「物象言说它自己」。虽然海德格企图将真理认为是超越「现实」的「再现表象」之外。拉康则是马上翻译说,真理区别它自己跟现实不同(1977a,306/808;1966,740)–的确,真理竖立它自己,对抗现实(1955,351)。虽然海德格建议理解真理,作为生命实存的被限制的天赋,拉康则仅是说,真理在欺骗,诡计,与谎言中被说出。

What does Truth—Woman and Diana that she is—say in the fabulous and fabling mouth of Freud-Actaeon-Lacan? She says that she is the “great cheater” (the “great show-off,” as Klossowski wrote25): If the cunning of reason, no matter how disdainful of you, stayed open to your faith, I—truth—would be . . . the great deceiver, since it is not only through duplicity that my ways pass but also through the crack too narrow to find without dissembling and through the inaccessible cloud of dreams, through the pointless fascination of the mediocre and the seductive impasse of absurdity. Seek, dogs that you become upon hearing me…. Enroll to my call, and howl at my voice. There you are, lost already, I give way, I defy you, 1 slip away: you say that I defend myself” (1966, 411).

假如真理是女人,是黛安娜,那么,在弗洛依德-阿塔安-拉康的匪夷所思的寓意的嘴巴里说出什么?真理这位女人说,她是「大欺骗者」(大炫耀者,如同克罗索斯基所写的):假如理性的狡狯,始终开放给你的信仰,无论她多么地藐视你,真理将是这位大欺骗者。因为我的途径不但通过欺骗,而且通过必须伪装才能找到的罅隙,通过不可靠近的梦的云层,通过无意义的著迷于平庸与诱拐的荒谬的僵局。去寻求吧!当你们一听见我,你们就变成狗群、、、遵照我的呼唤滚动,对着我的声音吠叫。你们在那里,已经迷失,我让步,我挑衅你们,我溜走:你们说,我替我自己辩护)(1966,411)。

Truth says, in short, “I am lying” (the well-known “liar’s paradox”), which, strictly understood, in no way means that truth is an error (a bit earlier, Lacan has been railing against “the shoddy Nietzschean notion of the lie of life”; 1977a, 118/405); it means that truth, as truth, speaks itself and reveals itself in its own concealment. This would bring us back once more to aletheia except for Lacan’s intentionally “logical” formulation and, especially, for his insistence on lying and cheating. Here, we see, truth is all the more true for being false and deceptive. There is in Lacan a sort of privileging of the lie, and this is because the lie, being inadequate to the thing it speaks about, is better able to reveal the truth of the subject as “speaking thing” (or as res cogitans, since Lacan also explicitly compares the “I lie” to the “I think”; cf. 1977b, 140-141/ 128-129). Indeed, by lying, the subject speaks his truth “most truly” (1966, 21), which is to be precisely nothing, no reality. “An adequate thought, [as a] thought,” Lacan says, “always avoids . . . the same thing. Here, the real is what always comes back to the same place—to the place where the subject, as thinker (res cogitans), does not meet it” (1977b, 49/49; my emphasis).

总之,真理说,「我正在说谎」(这个著名的「谎言的悖论」)。这句话严谨地理解,丝毫并不意味着,真理是一个错误(早期,拉康曾经抨击尼采的生命的谎言这个低俗观念)(1977a,118/405)。这意味着,作为真理,真理言说它自己,并且启示它自己,在它自己的隐藏里。这将会带我们再次回到「真理」aletheia,除了拉康意图「逻辑」方式的诠释。特别是当他坚持谎言与欺骗。在此,我们看出,真理正因为是虚假与欺骗而更加成为真实。在拉康,谎言具有某种的特权。这是因为谎言,由于不能胜任它言说的物象,更加能够揭露主体的真理,作为是「言说的物象」,(或者,作为「我思故我在」,因为拉康明确将「我说谎」跟「我思想」相提并论;1877b,140-141),128-129)。的确,凭借谎言,主体「非常确实地」言说他的真理(1966,21),那确实是空无,并不是现实。拉康说:「一个充足的思想,作为思想,总是避免相同的事情。在此,实在界就是总是回到相同的地方的东西—回到主体作为思想者,没有遇见它的地方」(1977b,49/49)

Once we concede, with Kojeve, that the subject cannot speak himself (or think himself) in his truth except by abolishing himself as reality (which is exactly what happens to the Cartesian subject at the moment of the hypothesis of the Evil Demon), it goes without saying that truth will define itself as inadequate to reality, and that it will therefore be (this is Lacan’s imperturbably logical conclusion) all the more true and “adequate” insofar as it is inadequate. Since the “thing” (the res) is irretrievably lost as soon as it “speaks of itself,” then (according to a sort of “logic of the worst,” which brings to mind certain Gnostic—or Klossowskian—schemas) the lie, the masquerade, and the simulacrum will, paradoxically, conform more closely to it than
the accurate (conforming) discourse will: “Speech appears all the more truly to be speech the less its truth is founded on what is called adequacy to the thing; thus, true speech, paradoxically, is opposed to true discourse” (1966,351). Truth, when it reveals itself, is forced to say, “I lie,” because that is the only way to speak the truth in a fallen world (that of language) where inadequacy is the rule. So here it is:

一旦我们跟科耶夫一起承认,主体无法在他的真理当中,言说他自己(或思想他自己),除了废除他自己作为现实(这确实是笛卡尔的主体发生的状况,假设邪恶恶魔的时刻)。自不待言的是,真理将会定义它自己,作为不能胜任现实。真理因此将会正因为它的不能胜任,将会更加地真实,更加地「胜任」,(这是拉康的冷静的逻辑的结论)。因为这个「物象」无法赎回地失落,当它一开始「言说它自己」。因此,依照「最遭糕状况的逻辑」,这个「物象」让人想起某个诺斯教派(或克罗索斯基的基模),谎言,伪装,与虚拟幻境,将会悖论地更加密切的符合真理,比起正确(符合)的辞说:「言说越是不要以所谓的胜任物象作为基础,它越是更加真确地出现在言说那里。因此,悖论地,真实的言说跟真实的辞说恰恰背道而驰(1966
,351)。当真理启示它自己时,真理被迫说:「我说谎」,因为在堕落的世界(语言的世界),这就是唯一的方式说出真理,在那里,不能胜任就是常规。
所以,就是这么一回事:

Two Jews met in a railway carriage at a station in Galicia. “Where are you going?” asked one. “To Cracow,” was the answer. “What a liar you are!” broke out the other. “If you say you’re going to Cracow, you want me to believe you’re going to Lemberg. But I know that in fact you’re going to Cracow. So why are you lying to me?26

两个犹太人在高立西的火车站的火车车厢里相遇。「你要去哪里?」其中一位问。「去加利西亚」,对方回答。「你是说谎者!」另一位喊叫起来。「假如你要去加利西亚,你想要我相信,你是去雷伯格。但是我知道,事实上,你是去加利西亚。所以,你为什么跟我说谎?」

Because it’s the truth, of course! All Galicians, in the memory of Central European Jews, have been inveterate liars, and so in this universe where trains and words circulate indiscriminately in all directions, there is no other means of speaking the truth than to lie truly.

因为这是真理,当然!在中欧的犹太人的记忆里,所有加利西亚人都是根深蒂固的说谎者。所以在这个宇宙里,火车与话语都朝四面八方不分皂白地流散。没有其它方法来言说真理,除了确实地说谎。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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