如何言说真理 6

如何言说真理 6

雅克慎论拉康

Therefore, this truth says, “/, truth, speak”—and not (a statement more in agreement with Heidegger) “Logos is aletheia” We know the famous prosopopoeia in which truth, through Lacan’s voice (1966, 866-867), “speaks of herself” (of herself and all alone [d’elle-meme]) “in Freud’s mouth” (1977a, 121/408):

因此,这个真理说,「我,真理,在言说」–而不是「逻各斯是真理」(这个陈述比较跟海德格一致)。我们知道这个著名的这个化身,在化身那里,真理通过拉康,「借弗洛依德的嘴巴」,「言说她自己」(仅有言说她自己)(1977a,121/408)。

So for you I am the enigma of her who vanishes as soon as she appears, men who try so hard to hide me under the tawdry finery of your proprieties! But I am prepared to believe that your embarrassment is sincere, for even when you take it upon yourselves to serve as my heralds, you place no greater value on wearing my colors than your own, which are like you yourselves, phantoms that you are. Where, then, will I pass into you? Where was I before I entered you? Perhaps one day I will tell you? But so that you will find me where I am, I will teach you by what sign you will recognize me. Men, listen, I am giving you the secret. I, truth, speak [1977a, 121/408—409].

所以,对于你,我是她的这个谜团,当她一出现,就消失的她的谜团。如此努力要隐藏我,在你们的装潢的俗丽饰品底下的人们!但是,我准备要相信,你的尴尬是诚恳的,因为当你们自己承担起充当我的先锋,穿戴我的颜色标志,就是你们最大的价值。你们自己的颜色标志就像你们自己,虽然你们是魅影理想。那么,我将从那里进入你们?在我进入你们之前,我在哪里?
或许,有一天,我将告诉你们?但是为了让你们在我所在的地方找到我,我将教导你们,凭借你们将认出我的标志。人们,请倾听,我正在给予你们这个秘密。我,真理,在言说(1977a。
121/408)。

This is a fabulous statement, which we must certainly not construe in the sense of its presenting a determined subject (Freud and/ or Lacan) who speaks the “thing itself” and thus is himself (the same as) the truth. As Lacan writes, in an obvious allusion to Klossowski’s he Bain de Diane (Diana’s Bath),21 truth is “akin to death… Diana perhaps” (1977a, 145/436), and so no subject can claim to possess her. Actaeon will never rejoin the Virgin Hunter in the place where she is Her-Self, before the event of her mortal and impure appearance, and this means that the identity between subject and truth (between speaker and statement) is radically forbidden, impossible—as is the “real,” where they would be at the “same place” (1977b, 49/49). Thus the “real,” as Kojeve taught, is abolished as soon as spoken, and this is equally (and even especially) true of the reality of whoever speaks himself in discourse. No one, in reality, can speak “those intolerable words: ‘I, truth, speak.. .'” (1966, 867): “To hear those words as they should be spoken—in horror—think of the unnameable thing that, by being able to speak them, would reach the being of language” (1966, 867). It would be a sacred horror indeed, for this “thing,” if it could speak itself in reality, would say, “I am dead” (as in Poe’s “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar,” discussed by Lacan in 1988b, 231/270, and in 1966, 486). But this thing without a name (the torn flesh that Actaeon became in the teeth of Diana’s dogs, the foul carcass of Poe’s mesmerized character): Just how could it say “I”?

这是一个令人愉悦的陈述,我们一定不要用它呈现一个决心的主体的意义诠释它。不要将弗洛依德与(或)拉康,当成决心的主体,言说「物自体」,因此他自己就等同是真理。如同拉康所写的,当他明显提到克罗索斯基的「黛安娜的沐浴」,「真理类同于死亡、、、或许类同于黛安娜」(1977a,145/436)。所以,没有主体能够宣称拥有她。阿塔安将永远不会跟这位处女猎人重新结合,在她作为她的自性的地方,在她具有人的肉身与不纯洁的表象的事件面前。这意味着,在主体与真理之间的认同(在言说者与陈述之间的认同),强烈地被禁止,成为不可能—如同「实在界」的不可能,在那里,他们将会处于相同的地方(1977b,49/49)。因此,如科耶夫教导的,这个「实在界」一被谈到,就被禁止。就凡是用辞说言说自己的人们的现实而言,这个情况同样可以适用,甚至特别可以适用。实际上,没有人能够言说「那些无法被容忍的字词」:「我,真理,在言说」(1966,867):「怀着恐惧,听到那些话语,如同它们应该被说出的方式—思维那个无法命名的物象,由于能够言说它们,这个物象将会到达语言的生命实存」(1966,367)。的确,这将是一个神圣的恐惧,因为这个「物象」,假如它能够在现实言说它自己,它将会说:「我死了」(如同拉康讨论的爱伦坡的「瓦德玛的情境」,1988b,231/270;1966,486)但是,这个没有名字的物象:它如何能够说「我」!(在黛安娜的狗群的牙齿,阿塔安被撕裂,爱伦坡的被催眠的人物的污秽身体)。

Thus the statement “I, truth, speak,” rather than saying what it seems to say, signifies just the opposite—that is, its essential and radical inadequacy—to the one who speaks it. The “I” in the statement is not the same as the “he” who, speaking himself in it, absents himself in the statement by presenting himself in it. The truth, she who says “I, truth, speak,” speaks the truth—which is precisely that she can only be spoken (hence Lacan’s rejection of any metalanguage claiming to speak the truth about truth: “No language can speak the truth about truth, since truth establishes herself by speaking, and by having no other means to do so” 1966,867-868). And so she speaks herself mischievously—fictionally, mythically— because she “hides herself” as soon as she is spoken (“as soon as she has appeared”) and because this is the only possible truth, separated from any reality that would come to vouch for her. Where will Actaeon ever see dedy the Goddess,22 in her splendid nudity, if not in the fable (“Diana’s Bath,” “The Freudian Thing”) where he speaks her impossible theophany and tells her untellable revelation?

因此,「我,真理,在言说」的这个陈述,并不说出它表明说的东西。它的意涵恰恰相反—换句话说,对于言说它的这个真理,它本质上强烈地不适任。在陈述中的这个「我」,跟这个「他」并不相同。这个「他」在它那里言说他自己,他在陈述里,作为缺席,凭借呈现他自己在陈述里。真理,这位说出「我,真理,在言说」的这个她,言说真理。这确实是真理她,仅能够被说出的方式,(因此,拉康拒绝任何的形上语言,宣称言说有关真理的真理:「没有语言能够言说有关真理的真理,因为真理凭借言说,凭借没有其他方法能够这样做,来建立她自己。」(1966,867-868)。所以,她恶意地言说她自己—幻想地,神秘地—因为她「隐藏她自己」,当她被言说时(当她一出现)。因为这是唯一可能的真理,跟任何前来保证她的的现实分开。阿塔安将会在哪里看见这位女神处于辉煌的裸身?难道不就是在寓言里(「黛安娜的沐浴」,「弗洛依德的物象」?)在那里,阿塔安言说黛安娜的不可能的可见化身,然后告诉她无法说出的启示?

With these details clarified, the fact remains that this truth, when she reveals herself “in Freud’s mouth” and through Lacan’s “voice,” says,” J, truth, speak.” Like it or not, the Word that reveals only itself is the word of a subject who speaks himself in his truth; witness the shifter “I,” which designates him in the statement. (What would become of Lacan’s demonstration if the “I” were to disappear?) Even if this word is no one’s word, it is still the word and the truth of (no) one—of the silent mouth of Freud-Actaeon, for example, through which it reveals itself in so fabulously loquacious a manner. In the fable of Diana, it is truly himself (the secret of his desire) that Actaeon seeks in the Goddess, just as it is the Freudian thing that (un)veils itself in the truth-who-speaks “in Freud’s mouth.” Here, aletheia is in reality (if one can use that phrase) the “nothing” (the “hole in the real”; 1988a, 271/297) that the inexpressible subject of the enunciation (or of “discourse,” as Kojeve would prefer to say) becomes at the very moment when he speaks himself. Abolished in his reality, he emerges into it in the truth of his Being, which is to be precisely nothing (nothing “real”), as Lacan says elsewhere, in one of his many commentaries on Freud’s Wo Es war, soil Ich werden:

虽然这些细节被澄清,这个事实依旧在,这个真理,当她揭示她自己,「借弗洛依德的嘴巴」,通过拉康的「声音」说,「我,真理,在言说」。无论你喜欢与否,仅有启示它自己的这个「真理」是主体在他的真理里言说他自己的真理。请你们见证「我」这个转接词,它在陈述里指明他。 万一这个「我」消失,拉康的展示将会是怎样的情况?即使这个真理并不是任何人的真理,它依旧是真理,是一个人(没有人)的真理,属于弗洛依德-阿塔安的沉默的嘴巴的真理。譬若,通过这个真理,它启示它自己,用如此侃侃的方式。在黛安娜的寓言里,阿塔安在女神那里寻求的,确实就是他自己,(他的欲望的秘密)。正如弗洛依德的物象,遮蔽(揭露)它自己,在作为言说的真理里,用弗洛依德的嘴巴。在此,真理实际上是空无(假如我们能够使用那个字眼,实在界的空洞)。(1988a,271/197。这位表述的无法被表达的主体(或者这位辞说的主体,依照科耶夫的说法),就是他言说他自己的时刻,变成空无。当他在他的现实里被废除,他出现进入它,以他的生命实存的真理。依照拉康在别处的说法,这个生命实存的真理确实就是空无(实在界的空无),在其中一篇评论,关于弗洛依德的「本我所在,自我必然回归」。

There where it was just now, there where it was for a while, between an extinction which is still glowing and a birth that is retarded, “I” can come into being and disappear from what I say. An enunciation that denounces itself, a statement that renounces itself … what remains here if not the trace of what must be in order to fall from Being? … Being of non-Being, that is how / as subject comes on the scene [1977a, 300/801 -802].

就是刚才那里,有一阵子在那里,处于依旧闪耀的消灭与迟缓的诞生之间,「我」能够从我所说的东西,出现,并且消失。抨击它自己的表述,放弃它自己的陈述、、、在此剩余的东西,难道不就是必须存在的这个痕迹,为了从生命实存掉落?非-存在的生命实存,那就是作为主体的「我」,如何来到现场(1077a,300/801-802)。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s


%d bloggers like this: