如何言说真理 3

如何言说真理 3

雅克慎论拉康

Repression = Return of the Repressed
潜抑=被潜抑者的回来

So far, so good. Freud, we could say, forgot his desire in the other, repressed in him the “truthful” point of his speech—and this is why, instead of the sovereign Signor, he has only the debris of desire, halves of words: bo . . . , elli. . ., traffio. … In Hegelian terms, the slave defers and alienates his desire by entering into the mediation of labor and is thereby reduced to picking up the master’s crumbs. In Freudian terms, desire, once social censorship has been internalized, can express itself only through “formations of compromise”—symptoms, slips of the tongue, forgetting, and bungled actions.

直到现在,一切还好。我们可以说,弗洛依德忘记他这他者的欲望。在他身上,他的言说的「真理的」的观点被潜抑。这就是为什么他仅拥有欲望的残骸,字词的半边,而不是统辖的Signor:bo . . . , elli. . ., traffio. …用黑格尔的术语,奴隶拖延并且异化他的欲望,凭借进入劳动的中介,因此被沦于检拾主人的残渣。用弗洛依德的术语,一旦社会的审查已经被内化,欲望仅能够经由「妥协的形成」来表达它自己—病征,口误,遗忘,与搞砸的行动。

There is just one problem: Could the desire in question have been expressed before its repression? Above all, “can we content ourselves here with speaking of repression,” as Lacan immediately asks himself (1966, 379)? A very interesting question indeed, and the answer is no less interesting: yes and no.

只是会有一个难题:受到质疑的这个欲望,在它被潜抑之前,本来能够被表达吗?尤其重要的是,我们能够在此满足于潜抑的言说吗?如同拉康立即询问自己(1966,379)这确实是一个有趣的问题,答案也是同样有趣:既是能够,又是不能够。

Yes, Lacan begins, this forgetting of the “Lord” (Seigneur) is a true repression, in the sense that repression is equivalent to not (being capable of) speaking the truth: “We can certainly affirm that [repression] is there, simply by Freud’s overdeterminations of the phenomenon. We can also, by the actuality of its circumstances, confirm the range of what I want you to understand in the formula: the unconscious is the discourse of the Other. The man who, in the act of speaking, breaks the bread of truth with his counterpart, shares the lie” (1966, 379).

是的,拉康开始说,「先生」(Seigneur)的这个遗忘,是一个真实的潜抑。这意味着,潜抑相等于是不言说(不能够言说)真相:「我们能够确实肯定,(潜抑)在那里,仅是由于弗洛依德对于这个现象的过分决定。由于这个现象的情况的实际,我们也能够肯定我想要你们理解的这个范围,在这个公式:无意识是大他者的辞说。正在言说的时,跟他的伙伴撕开真理的面包,分享谎言」(1966,379)。

Indeed, to speak to the other is first of all to defer desire, to not say it, and therefore to not be able to say it: thus it becomes unavailable to the subject, “unconscious,” “repressed” as it is in that Other (capital O) which is the discourse addressed to the other (small o). To speak, in this first sense, is equivalent to not speaking the truth: it is to break the sword of speech, come to terms with the “counterpart” instead of fighting with him; therefore, in its sharing of bread rather than death with him, it is to lie, to hide the nocturnal truth of desire. Every society, insofar as it rests on such a symbolic exchange, Lacan says (1977a, 61—62/ 272 ff.) following Levi-Strauss, presupposes the “breaking” that transforms the sword into a tessera, into a sumbolon (1966,380)— and, by the same token, it presupposes the “sharing of the lie” that is repression and the forgetting of desire.

的确,跟他者言说,首先就是拖延欲望,不要说出欲望,因此想要不能够说出欲望:因此,欲望并无法让主体利用,作为「无意识」,「潜抑」的主体,在那个大他者(大写的O)那里,辞说针对小他者(小写的o)对谈。从这个最初的意义言,言说相等于是没有说出真相:言说是要断裂话语的这把剑,要跟「伙伴」达成妥协,而不是跟他战斗;因此,是跟「伙伴」分享面包,而不是分享死亡。那就是要说谎,要隐藏夜间的欲望的真理。 每个社会都依靠诸如其类的象征的交换,拉康说(1977a,61-62/272)。 遵循列文、史特劳斯,拉康预先假定这个「断裂」,将这把剑转变成为瓷砖,成为马赛克瓷砖(1966,380)。同样地,它预先假定「谎言的分享」,那就是欲望的潜抑与分享。

But, Lacan says, no—repression is still something other than lying, and forgetting is not simply a mistake. As for “the speech omitted here, how could it not be extinguished in the presence of being-toward-death?” (1966, 379). The truth of desire cannot actually be spoken, since it is precisely what cuts off speech. Consequently, repression can no longer be reduced to a lying by omission, a “not saying the truth.” On the contrary, it must now be conceded that this lie is the truths insofar as truth is literally unspeakable. Indeed, repression represses and forgets nothings thus, strictly speaking, there is no longer any question of a dissimulating veil behind which desire could hide.

但是拉康说,不是的—潜抑依旧是某件并非是谎言的东西,遗忘不仅仅是错误。至于「在此被省略的言说,在朝向死亡的生命实存的面前,它如何能够不被消灭?(1966,379)。欲望的真理无法实际被言说,因为它确实是隔绝言说的东西。结果,潜抑不再能够被沦为是被省略的谎言,一种「不说出真相」。相反地,我们现在必须承认,这个谎言就是那些真相,因为真理实质上是无法言说的。的确,潜抑因此并没有潜抑与遗忘任何东西,严格地说,不再有让欲望能够隐藏那里的遮蔽的面纱的可能。

Desire, Kojeve says, is the nothing (the negation) of everything that is. Thus, Lacan concludes, repression (which negates, denies, reneges, and so on) constitutes its paradoxical “presentation,” for (as he writes here, in extremely condensed formulations) death, which is certainly “what negates discourse,” is also what “introduces negation” into discourse (an allusion to Kojeve’s theses about the roots of discursive negativity in human finitude).10 “The negativity of discourse” (or of the “symbolic order,” as Lacan still says) is thus its “manifestation,” in the sense that it “causes to be what is not” (1966, 379—380).

科耶夫说,欲望就是每样具有生命实存者的这个空无(否定)。因此,拉康下结论地说,潜抑(否定,否认,失信,等等)形成它的悖论的「呈现」。因为死亡,(拉康在此用极端精炼的诠释写著),确实「否定辞说的东西」,也是「介绍否定成为辞说」的东西」(提到科耶夫的论题,关于人类的有限性里,辞说的否定的根源)。「辞说的否定」(或是象征的秩序,拉康依旧这样说),因此是它的「征明」,因为它意味着,它「导致成为并非是生命实存的东西」(1966,379-380)

Indeed, how could desire—the “revealed nothingness” of which Kojeve speaks—”reveal” itself, if not by negating everything that could present it, incarnate it, realize it, and satisfy it? Thus, for Lacan, desire “reveals” itself always and only through Verneinung, through the negation that makes a thing present by its absence. “That is not my mother,” Freud’s patient says about the content of a dream, thus presenting the void of his desire in the absence of his mother.11 “Go away!” (“Fort?*) says the little boy to the reel as he throws it away—and his desire is “there” (“Da!”) in the distancing of its object.12 “Botticelli? Boltraffio? No> that’s not it,” Freud says to himself—and there it is, death is “present” (1988a, 48/59) in its repression, in its forgetting.

因此,对于拉康,欲望「显示」它自己,总是而且仅是凭借Verneinung否定,凭借物象的缺席来让物象存在的否定。弗洛依德的病人谈到关于梦的内容说,「那并不是我的母亲」。他因此在母亲的缺席里,将他的欲望的空无呈现出来。「走开!」(Fort),小男孩说,当他将线轴抛开—他的欲望就是在「那里」(Da),跟它的客体拉开距离。弗洛依德跟他自己说:Botticelli?Boltraffio?不,那并是不它。」就在那里,死亡「出现」,在它的潜抑里,在它的遗忘里(1988a,48/59)

In other words, repression is the “revelation” of that non-being: desire. “Repression and the return of the repressed,” Lacan repeats after Freud,13 “are merely the inside and the outside of the same thing” (1981,21,94; 1988a, 191/216), and for him this means that repression is the truth of desire, its one and only (re)presentation. To repress is undoubtedly to lie, to not speak the truth of desire (the “veridical speech” that Freud should have spoken, instead of saying something else to his traveling companion); but to repress is also to speak the truth—the empty, deadly truth that can only be (not) said, “half-said” (mi-dite), since all adequacy of discourse to the “thing itself” of desire is radically forbidden (interdite). It follows, in the strange “logic” established here, that there is only a lying truth, only repressed desire. The forgetting of the name Signorelli, far from being an “error of memory,” is the very truth of Freud’s desire.

换句话说,潜抑就是那个非-存在的「启示」:欲望。拉康重复弗洛依德的话说:「潜抑与潜抑者的回来,仅仅就是同样物象的内在与外在」(1981,21,94;1988a,191/216)。对于他,这意味着,潜抑就是欲望的真理,欲望的仅有的呈现(再现)。潜抑无可置疑地是说谎,没有说出欲望的真相(「跟现实巧合的言说」,这是弗洛依德本来应该谈论的,而不是对他的同车乘客说出某件其他东西)。但是,潜抑也等于是说出真相—那个空洞的,致命的,仅能够被说一半,「半说」的真相。因为辞说想要完全充足「物自体」,这是强烈被禁止的。根据在此建立的奇怪的「逻辑」,我们推论,仅存在着说谎的真相,仅有被潜抑的欲望。Signorelli这个名字的被遗忘,根本就不是「记忆的错误」,它是弗洛依德的欲望的这个真相。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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