如何言说真理 2

如何言说真理 2

雅克慎论拉康

Therefore, something that Freud left unsaid brought on this complex play of displacements and substitutions. But what, exactly, was it? “Repressed thoughts,” Freud contents himself with saying—leaving us the trouble of guessing that they had to do with some guilty wish, irreconcilable with the conscious ego. A death wish regarding his patient, perhaps? Was he afraid that the phantom would return, revive—like the chosen ones in the fresco of Orvieto—to judge him? We will never know: Freud, in this auto-analytic fragment, ultimately unveils himself very little (unlike S/gnorelli, Sigmund does not leave us his self-portrait)/

因此,某件弗洛依德留下没有说出的东西,导致取代与替换的这个复杂的运作。但是,那确实是什么?「被潜抑的思想」,弗洛依德满足于这样说—留给我们必须猜测这个困扰:被潜抑的思想跟某个罪恶感的愿望必然息息相关,跟意识的自我无法和解的某个罪恶感。关于他的病人的死亡的愿望,或许?他当时害怕,这个魅影将会回来,会复活—就像在奥维阿特的壁画的被选择的那些魅影—会回来,复活,为了对他做最后审判?我们永远无法知道:弗洛依德,在这篇自我-分析的片段里,最后揭示他自己的东西并不多(不像Signorelli, 弗洛依德并没有留下他的自我-肖像给我们。

But at least we know that the repressed (Hell) is formed of “thoughts,” of Gedanken—in short, of cogitationes, of representations. This conforms to Freud’s established theory: repression is not carried out on the drive (Trieb), but only on the drive’s psychic “representatives” {Reprd$entanten)y “representations” (Vorstel-lungen)—”ideas,” “thoughts,” “phantasies,” “memories,” and so on. A drive as such (or “instinct,” as Strachey prefers to translate), Freud says in a famous passage, escapes from the opposition “conscious/unconscious”: “I am in fact of the opinion that the antithesis of conscious and unconscious is not applicable to instincts. An instinct can never become an object of consciousness (Objekt des Bewusstseins)—only the idea that represents it (die Vorstellung, die ihr reprdsentiert) can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented (reprdsentiert sein) otherwise than by an idea.”7 In other words, only the representation can be shown to or hidden from consciousness (in the manner of an object, Objekt), and that is why repression, according to Freud, has no other prey. Unable to repress the drive (or, if you will, the affect that is its non-objectal, non-representational “representative”), repression, for lack of anything better, falls back on the “thoughts” attached to the drive. In a word, repression is carried out on a “wish,” but in the sense that this Wunschy as Lacan insists, is a “wish” (voeu), a desire that is formulated (“conceived of,” “represented”) in the unconscious (1977a, 256/620 ff.).
但是,至少我们知道,这个被潜抑的(地狱)是由思想组成,总之,由再现表象组成。这符合弗洛依德建立的理论:潜抑并非是在冲动层面进行,而仅是在冲动的心理的「代表」,「再现表象」,「理念」,「思想」,「幻见」,「记忆」等等层面进行。弗洛依德在一篇著名的文章说,冲动的本身,(或本能本身,如史拉奇喜欢这样翻译),从「意识与无意识」的对立里逃离出来:「我事实上认为,意识与无意识的正反对立,并不适用于本能。本能永远不会成为意识的客体—仅有代表本能的理念才会成为意识的客体。而且,即使在无意识里,除了用理念代表以外,本能也无法被代表。换句话说,仅有再现表象能够被显示给意识,或隐藏不给意识知道(用客体的方式)。那就是为什么弗洛依德会说,潜抑并没有另外一个猎物。潜抑并无法潜抑冲动(或者,不妨说,并无法潜抑作为它的非-客体,非再现表象,非代表的情感),潜抑仅有依靠跟冲动依附的思想,因为它没有更好的东西可依靠。总之,潜抑依靠「愿望」在进行,但是如同拉康坚持的,这是一个愿望,在无意识里被诠释,(被「构想」,被「代表」)的欲望(1977a,256/629)。

Since the repressed wish belongs to the order of representation, we can see by the same token that its unconscious statement, as Freud often says, can be “translated” into a conscious representation. Thus, in our example, the “repressed thoughts” have actually been hidden/replaced by other representations (by the name Signorelli, and then by what Freud calls a “sequence of letters”).8 But nothing in Freud’s theory opposes the final unveiling of these thoughts to consciousness—once it is actually a question, “even in the unconscious,” of “thoughts.” In short, what has been silenced (the desire, the “thoughts-of-desire”) should be able to be spoken; and, according to Freud, this is exactly what happens in a successful analysis (or interpretation).

因为这个被潜抑的愿望属于再现表象的秩序,我们同样能够看见,它的无意识的陈述,如同弗洛依德经常说的,能够被「翻译」成为意识的再现表象。因此,在我们的例子里,这些「被潜抑的思想」,实际上被隐藏,被取代,被其他的再现表象(被Signorelli这个名字,因此,被弗洛依德所谓的「字母的顺序」)。但是在弗洛依德的理论里,没有一样东西将这些思想最后被揭示给意识—一旦「即使在无意识」,那实质上是「这些思想的」问题。总之,曾经被沉默下来的东西,(欲望,「欲望-的-思想」),应该能够被说出。依照弗洛依德,这确实是成功的精神分析(或解释),所发生的情况。

Is it the same in Lacan’s theory of desire? Not at all. Not, of course, that Lacan questions Freud’s having made the connection between desire and representation (or, if you will, between the unconscious and discourse); on the contrary—in Lacan, this connection excludes all others. Whereas Freud, in spite of everything, did not neglect to leave room for a non-representational unconscious (“unconscious feelings” or a non-repressed “Id,” for example), Lacan settles the matter more roughly: there is no drive that is not always already represented, no desire that is not always already articulated in Vorstellungsreprasentanten—that is (the equivalence is invariable in Lacan), in statements, in “signifiers” (1966, 714). In Lacan, however (and this changes everything), this articulation in discourse is also the very thing that makes desire “inarticulable” and “inexpressible” (1977a, 253/616). In contrast to what happens in Freud, desire is now what can never be (wn)said—necessarily so, because to speak is to speak (of) death—that is, of what “negates discourse” (1966, 379).

在拉康的欲望的理论,这是相同的吗?不,根本不相同。当然不相同。拉康质疑弗洛德从事欲望与再现表象之间的连接(或是不妨说,从事无意识与辞说之间的连接)。相反地,在拉康那里,这个连接将所有的其他连接都排除。虽然弗洛依德无论如何并没有忽略要留下空间,给非-再现表象的无意识(譬如,「无意识的感觉」,或非潜抑的「本我」)。拉康则是更加粗略地解决这个问题:每个冲动总是已经被代表,每个欲望总是已经被表达,在Vorstellungsreprasentante那里。换句话说,在各种陈述,各种「能指」那里,(在拉康那里,有不同变化的相等语)(1966,714)。可是,在拉康那里,(这会改变一切),在辞说的表达,也就是让欲望「无法表达」,与「无法表述」的这个东西(19077a,253/616)。对照于在弗洛依德所发生的情况,欲望现在既是无法被说出,又是无法不被说出的东西—它必然是如此,因为言说就是等于言说死亡。换句话说,就是言说「否定辞说」的东西(1966,379)。

Indeed, this is the interpretation of Freud’s forgetting that Lacan proposes in the first seminar (1977b) and elsewhere: the last word of Freud’s desire is death, and thus there is no last word of desire, any more than there is a definitive interpretation or final unveiling of truth. What does Freud repress by forgetting the name Signorelli? “Signor along with Herry the absolute Master, is sucked up and repressed by the apocalyptic wind that arises in Freud’s unconscious, on the echo of the conversation he is having: the disturbance… of a theme that has just emerged by way of an earlier theme—which, indeed, is that of accepted death” (1966, 447; see also 1977b, 27/29).

的确。这就是弗洛依德的遗忘的解释。拉康在第一研讨班(1977b),以及别的地方建议:弗洛依德的欲望的最后话语是死亡。因此,欲望没有最后的话语,正如真理的最后的揭示,并没有一个明确的诠释。弗洛依德遗忘Signorelli这个名字时,他潜抑的东西是什么?「Signor,以及Herr,这位绝对的主人,它们被吸收,被潜抑,被弗洛依德的无意识里升起的那阵末日启示录的风。在他正在进行的对谈到回声里:一个经由早先的主题,刚刚出现的主题的扰乱。这个早先的主题就是死亡的主题」。

“Absolute Master,” “accepted death”: the “return to Freud,” as we see, once again takes place through Kojeve and the “fight to the death for pure prestige.” The truth of Freud’s forgetting is certainly a desire, but this desire in turn has no truth other than suicide and the sovereign acceptance of death. If Fteud is guilty, it is not (as we might have expected, following Freudian doctrine) because of some unspeakable “Oedipal” death-wish, but rather because he “gave up on his desire” (1986, 368)—his desire of nothingness.

我们看出,「绝对主人」,「被接受的死亡」,「回归弗洛依德」,通过科耶夫与「为了纯粹自尊奋斗至死」,再次发生。弗洛依德的遗忘的真理,确实是一个欲望,但是这个欲望这边除了自杀与接受死亡作为统辖外,并没有其他真理。假如弗洛依德具有罪恶感,那并不是因为某件无法言说的「伊狄浦斯」死亡-愿望(若是遵循弗洛依德的信条,那是我们本来会预期的)。相反地,而是因为他「对于他的欲望却步退让」(1986,368)–他对于空无的欲望。

What Freud had to say, and did not say, was speech9 at the level of death, a “veridical speech” that would speak his desire and the “deepest secret of [his] being”: “God knows that it can reverberate a great deal, this veridical speech. What is at issue?—if not the absolute, namely death, which is present in it, and which Freud tells us that he preferred .. . not to confront .. . too closely” (1988a, 48/59). And so he alienates his desire in the other, by identifying with his companion and with what he imagines the other’s desire to be. Rather than carry death in speech, he keeps silent for propriety’s sake (What will he think of me?):

弗洛依德必须说出,没有说出的东西,就是在死亡的层次的言说。这是一个「最后审判的言说」,它将会言说出他的欲望,以及「他的生命实存的最深处的秘密」:「天晓得,它会迴响隆隆,这个最后审判的话语!受到争议的是什么?难道不就是这个绝对,也就是,这个死亡?这个绝对,这个死亡出现在最后审判的话语里,弗洛依德告诉我们,他宁可不要面对,不要太过靠近地面对」(1988a,48/59)。所以,他将他的欲望在大他者的欲望那里异化,凭借认同他的同车乘客,认同他想像的大他者的欲望的生命实存的东西。弗洛依德并没有在言说理实践死亡,他保持沉默,为了礼貌得体缘故(人家对我会怎么看?):

The impossibility in which Freud finds himself, the impossibility of citing the name Signorelli in the dialogue he is pursuing with his colleague (in this case, his fellow traveler), is due to the fact that by censoring, in his prior conversation with the other, everything that the latter’s words suggested (as much by their content as by the memories that they trailed along with them) about the relation of man and doctor with death, and thus with the absolute Master, Herr> signor—by censoring all this, Freud literally left behind in his partner (and thus cut off from himself) the broken half (let this be understood in the most material sense of the term) of the sword of speech; and for a time, precisely the time during which he continued addressing his partner, he could no longer use that term as signifying material, because it remained attached to the repressed signification [1966, 379].

弗洛依德发现他处于这个不可能的处境,不可能引述Signorelli的这个名字,在他跟同事正在进行的这个对话里,(在这个情况,他的同车的乘客)。这是由于这个事实:凭借审查,在他跟他者的先前对话,他者的话语所暗示的每样事情(根据他们的对话内容,也根据他们的回溯话语的记忆),关于人与医生跟死亡的关系,因此也同样跟绝对主人,Herr,signor的关系。凭借审查所有这一切,弗洛依德实质上,在他的同车乘客那里(因此跟他自己隔离),留下言说的这把剑的断裂的一半。有段时间, 确实就是在这段时间,他继续跟他的同车乘客进行对话,他不再使用那个术语,作为能指意义的材料,因为它始终跟这个被潜抑的意义依附依块。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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