Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller




The Object Relation 1956-1957

客体关系 1956-1957












I Introduction导论

II The three forms of object lack客体欠缺的三种形式

III The signifier and the Holy Spirit能指与神圣精神

IV The dialectic of frustration挫折的辩证法

V  On bundling as analysis, and its consequences






VI  The primacy of the phallus and the young homosexual girl


VII 1.:, A Child is Being Beaten and the young homosexual girl


VIII WS Dora and the young homosexual girl






DC The function of the veil


X Identification with the phallus


XI  The phallus and the unsatiated mother









The Z-shaped schema.



The object, lost and refound.




The object, anxiety, the hole.



The fetish and the phobic object.



This year we shall speak on a topic to which the historical evolution of

psychoanalysis, or what is thus named, might give a central position in

theory and in practice, whether in a way that is explicit or not.




This topic is the object relation.




Why did I not choose that when we began these seminars, since it was

already current, primary, critical? Precisely for the reason which motivates

the second part of my title — and Freudian structures.




This topic could be treated, in effect, only after a certain distance had

been taken on the question. We had first to consider the structures in

which Freud has shown us that analysis takes place and operates,

especially the .complex structure of the relation between the two subjects

present in analysis, the analysand, and the analyst. It is to this that our

three years of commentary and criticism of Freud’s texts have been

dedicated, as I shall recall for you briefly.





The first year dealt with the very elements of the technical management

of the cure, that is, with the ideas of transference and resistance. The

second year was concerned with the foundation of the Freudian experience

and discovery, namely, the idea of the unconscious, which I believe I have

sufficiently shown to be what obliged Freud to introduce the principles,

literally paradoxical on the dialectical plane, which figure in Beyond thePleasure Principle. Finally, during the course of the third year, I gave you aclear example of the absolute necessity of isolating that essential

articulation of symbolism which is called the signifier, in order to

understand anything at all, analytically speaking, of the strictly paranoiacfield of the psychoses.






At the end of these three years of criticism, we are thus armed with a

certain number of terms and schemas. The spatiality of the latter is not to

be taken in the intuitive sense of the term schema, but in another perfectlylegitimate, sense, which is topological — it is not a matter of

localizations, but of the relations between places, interposition,

for example, or succession, sequence. Our elaboration culminates in a

schema that we can call the schema, which is the following –





[Diagram, p. 12.]

(Es) S . . o’ other

(Ego) o . . 0 Other





This schema initially provides a notation of the relation of the subject

to the Other. As it is constituted at the beginning of analysis, it is a

relation, of virtual speech by  which he subject receives his own message

from the Other, in the form of speech which is unconscious.






message is, forbidden him, it is profoundly misconstrued [

meconnu] it is deformed, arrested, intercepted, because of the

interception of the imaginary relation


between o and o’, between the ego and the other, which is its typical

object. The imaginary relation, which is essentially an alienated relation,

interrupts, slows down, inhibits, usually inverts, and profoundly

misconstrues the speech relation between the subject and the Other, the

great Other, in so far as this is another subject, a subject par excellence

capable of deceiving.


这个讯息,由于被禁止给他,深深地被错误解释。这个讯息受到扭曲,组碍,拦截,因为在o o’之间,在自我与他者之间的想像的关系受到拦截,因为他者是自我的客体。想像的关系基本上是异化的关系。这个关系会干涉,缓慢,潜抑,通常还会逆转,深深地错误解释主体与大他者,这位伟大的大他者之间的言说关系。因为这是另外一个主体,能够欺骗的无与伦比的主体。





It is not in vain to have introduced this schema into analytic experience,

seeing how that is formulated today by an ever increasing number of

analysts, who give prevalence in analytic theory to the object

without, however, sufficiently commenting on it.




They recenter the

dialectic of the pleasure principle and the reality principle upon it, and

they found analytic progress upon a rectification of the subject’s relation to

the object, considered as a dual relation, which is, they then say, in

speaking of the analytic situation, extremely simple. This relation of

subject to object, which tends more and more to occupy the center of

analytic theory, is precisely what we shall put to test.





Once the object relation considered as dual is seen to correspond

precisely to line o-o’ of our schema, can one thus construct a

satisfactory whole from the phenomena offered to observation in analytic

experience? Does this instrument all by itself allow us to reply to the

facts? Can the more complex schema that we have suggested be put aside,

indeed, must it be discarded?




That the object relation has become, at least in appearance, the principal

theoretical element in analytical explanation, is something that I can

demonstrate to you from a recently published Collective work, to which, infact, the term collective applies particularly well.’ I cannot say that I am

inviting you to delve into it. You will see object relations overvalued and

promoted from one end to the other in a way that is not always very

satisfying in its articulation, but whose monotony and uniformity are

surely striking. You will see the object relation promoted in art article

entitled Evolution de la psychanalyse, and, as the final term in this

evolution, you will see in the article, La Clinique psychanalytique, a

presentation of clinical work which centers it entirely upon the object

relation. Perhaps I might give you some idea of where such a presentation

can lead.






Taken as a whole, the collection is quite striking. One sees analytic

practitioners try to organize their thinking and the understanding they

might have of their own experience around the object relation, without its

seeming to give them full and complete satisfaction, but, on the other

hand, not without its orienting their practice and penetrating it most

profoundly. One cannot say that the fact that they conceive their

experience in these terms is without consequence in their modes of

intervention, in the orientation given to the analysis, and also its results.




That is what one cannot possibly fail to recognize [meconnaitre], in simply

reading them. Analytic theory and practice, it has always been said, cannot

be dissociated, and from the moment that one conceptualizes the

experience in a particular way, it is inevitable that it will also be directed in

that way. Certainly, the practical results can only be partially glimpsed.





To introduce the question of the object relation, and more precisely the

question whether or not it is legitimate and sound to give it a central place

in analytic theory, I shall remind you at least briefly of what this concept

owes, or does not owe, to Freud himself. I shall do so because for us

starting with a commentary on Freud is a sort of guide, and almost a

technical limitation that we have imposed upon ourselves.




Moreover, this year I have sensed in you some questions, if not

disquiet, as to whether I would or would not start off with Freudian texts.

And no doubt it is very difficult, with regard to the object relation, to start

from Freud’s texts themselves, because the object relation is not in them. I

am of course speaking of what is here very strictly taken to be a deviation

in analytic theory. I must therefore start with recent texts and at the same

time, with a critique of their positions. On the other hand, there is no

doubt that we must ultimately refer to the Freudian position, and, at the

same time, we cannot avoid dealing, even if very rapidly, with what

revolves around the very notion of the object in the fundamental themes

that are strictly Freudian.






We cannot do that at the beginning in a way that is fully spelled out. It

is precisely at the end that we shall come back to it, and that we shall be

able to articulate it.




I want, therefore, simply to make a brief reminder that this would not

even be conceivable if there were not behind us three years of

collaboration in textual analysis, and if we had not already encountered

the theme of the object in its various forms.





Freud, of course, speaks of the object. The final part of Three Essays on

the Theory of Sexuality is called precisely “The Finding of an Object”, “Die

Objektfindung”. One is implicitly speaking of the object each time that the

notion of reality comes into play.






One speaks of it in yet a third waywhenever the ambivalence of certain fundamental relations is brought

into play — namely, the fact that the subject makes himself an object for the

other, the fact that there is a particular type of relation in which reciprocity

with regard to an object is patent, and is even a constituent fact.






I would like to put the strongest emphasis on the three modes in which

notions relative to the object before us appear. If you look at Chapter Three

of the Three Essays, you will see something which was already there at the

time that Freud wrote the Entwurf, a text which, I remind you, was only

published by a sort of historical accident, for not only did Freud prefer not

to publish it, but one might say that it was published against his will. Still,

in looking at this first sketch of his psychology, we find the same formula

with regard to the object.






Freud insists that for man, every means to

finding the object is, and is ever, only the pursuit of a drive [tendance] in

which what is at stake is a lost object, an object to be refound.




It is not at all a matter of the object considered in modern theory as

being the fully satisfying object, the typical object, the object par excellence,

the harmonious object, the object that founds man in an adequate reality,

in the reality which gives proof of maturity — the famous genital object.






is striking to see that at the moment when he fabricates the theory of

instinctual development as it was revealed in the earliest analytic

experiences, Freud indicates that the object is grasped by means of a search

for the lost object. The object that corresponds to an advanced state of

instinctual maturation is an object found again, the refound object of early

weaning, the object that first formed the point of attachment in the child’s

earliest satisfactions.




It is clear that a discordance is established by the mere fact of this

repetition. A nostalgia binds the subject to a lost object, and directs the

entire effort of the search. It marks the newly found object

with the sign of

an impossible repitition since this is precisely not the same object — it could

never be.







The primacy of this dialectic puts a fundamental tension at the

center of the subject-object relation, which means that what is sought is

not sought in the same way as what will be found.




It isthe search for a satisfaction past and outgrown that the new object is

sought and it is found and embraced elsewhere it was sought.




There is a fundamental distance introduced by the essentially conflictual

element which all search for the object entails. This is the first form in

which the relation to the object appears in Freud.








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