庞蒂论自由 526

庞蒂论自由 526
What then is freedom? To be born is both to be born of the world
and to be born into the world. The world is already constituted, but
also never completely constituted; in the first case we are acted upon, in
the second we are open to an infinite number of possibilities. But this
analysis is still abstract, for we exist in both ways at once.

那么,自由是什么?诞生既是从世界诞生,也是诞生进入世界。世界已经被形成,但是也是永远没有被形成。就前者而言,我们被採取行动,就后者而言,我们开放给无限数目的可能性。但是这种分析的依旧是抽象,因为我们同时以两种方式生存。

There is, therefore, never determinism and never absolute choice, I am never a
thing and never bare consciousness. In fact, even our own pieces of
initiative, even the situations which we have chosen, bear us on, once
they have been entered upon by virtue of a state rather than an act.

因此,从来没有决定论,从来没有绝对的选择。我从来就不是一个物,从来就不仅是意识。事实上,即使是我们自己的一些创议,甚至我们已经选择的情境,都跟我们有关,一旦它们已经被从事,凭借状态,而不是凭借行动。

The generality of the ‘role’ and of the situation comes to the aid of decision,
and in this exchange between the situation and the person who
takes it up, it is impossible to determine precisely the ‘share contributed
by the situation’ and the ‘share contributed by freedom’.

这个「角色」与情境的一般性前来帮助决定。在情境与从事它的这个人之间的交换,我们不可能确实决定「由情境贡献的分享」以及「由自由贡献的分享」。

Let us suppose that a man is tortured to make him talk. If he refuses to give
the names and addresses which it is desired to extract from him, this
does not arise from a solitary and unsupported decision: the man still
feels himself to be with his comrades, and, being still involved in the
common struggle, he is as it were incapable of talking.

让我们假定,一个人被苦刑拷打,为了要让他说话。假如他拒绝给出人家要他那里得出的名字与地址,这并不是产生自孤独与没有受到支撑的决定。这个人依旧感觉自己跟他的同志同在。因为依旧牵涉到共同的奋斗,他实际上不能够说出。

Or else, for months or years, he has, in his mind, faced this test and staked his
whole life upon it. Or finally, he wants to prove, by coming through it,
what he has always thought and said about freedom. These motives do
not cancel out freedom, but at least ensure that it does not go unbuttressed
in being.

或者,经过好几个月或好几年,在他心里,他曾经面临这个考验,并且赌注他整个的一生在它身上。或者,最后,凭借经历它,他想要证明关于自由他总是思维的与说过的东西。这些动机并没有取消自由,但是至少保证,它在生命实存里,并非没有受到保护。

What withstands pain is not, in short, a bare consciousness,
but the prisoner with his comrades or with those he loves
and under whose gaze he lives; or else the awareness of his proudly
willed solitude, which again is a certain mode of the Mit-Sein. And
probably the individual in his prison daily reawakens these phantoms,
which give back to him the strength he gave to them. But conversely, in
so far as he has committed himself to this action, formed a bond with
his comrades or adopted this morality, it is because the historical situation,
the comrades, the world around him seemed to him to expect
that conduct from him.

总之,抵挡痛苦的东西,并不仅是意识,而是囚犯跟他的同志,或跟那些他爱的人们。他活在在他们的凝视之下,或是在他骄傲地作为意志的孤独。而且,这种作意志的孤独就是「同在的生命实存Mit-sein」 的某种模式。

The analysis could be pursued endlessly in this
way. We choose our world and the world chooses us. What is certain,
in any case, is that we can at no time set aside within ourselves a
redoubt to which being does not find its way through, without seeing this freedom, immediately and by the very fact of being a living
experience, figure as being and become a motive and a buttress.

这种分析能够用这种方式无止境地追求。我们选择我们的世界,世界选择我们。无论如何,所能确定的是,我们在我们自身之内,根本没有划出一个濠沟,每当生命实存前进这个濠沟时,它总是看见这个自由,立即地,并且凭借这个事实,作为一个生活的经验,充当生命实存,成为意义与庇护的人物。

Taken
concretely, freedom is always a meeting of the inner and the outer—
even the prehuman and prehistoric freedom with which we began—
and it shrinks without ever disappearing altogether in direct proportion
to the lessening of the tolerance allowed by the bodily and institutional
data of our lives.

自由若是具体地被看待,它总是内部与外部的会合,即使我们刚开始的前人类与史前的自由。它虽然退缩,但是从来没有完全消失,跟我们生命的身体与体制的资料所容许的容忍的减少,成直接比例。

There is, as Husserl says, on the one hand a
‘field of freedom’ and on the other a ‘conditioned freedom’;7 not that
freedom is absolute within the limits of this field and non-existent
outside it (like the perceptual field, this one has no traceable boundaries),
but because I enjoy immediate and remote possibilities. Our
commitments sustain our power and there is no freedom without
some power.

如胡赛尔所言,一方面有「自由的领域」,另一方面有「被制约的自由」。倒不是因为自由的绝对的,在这个领域的限制之内,与在领域之外,自由并不存在(如同知觉的领域,这个领域并没有可被追踪的边界)。而是因为我享受当下与遥远的各种可能性。我们的奉献维持我们的力量,有自由,就有力量。

Our freedom, it is said, is either total or non-existent. This
dilemma belongs to objective thought and its stable-companion, analytical
reflection. If indeed we place ourselves within being, it must
necessarily be the case that our actions must have their origin outside
us, and if we revert to constituting consciousness, they must originate
within.

据说,我们的自由要就是完整的,要不就是不存在。这种两难属于客观性的思维及其稳定的同伴,分析的反思。的确,我们将自己放置在生命实存之内,它必然是这种情况,我们的行动必须要起源于我们的外在。假如我们回转到身体形成的意识,它们必须起源于内在。

But we have learnt precisely to recognize the order of phenomena.
We are involved in the world and with others in an inextricable
tangle. The idea of situation rules out absolute freedom at the source of
our commitments, and equally, indeed, at their terminus. No commitment,
not even commitment in the Hegelian State, can make me
leave behind all differences and free me for anything. This universality
itself, from the mere fact of its being experienced, would stand out as a
particularity against the world’s background, for existence both generalizes
and particularizes everything at which it aims, and cannot ever be
finally complete.

但是我们确实学会体认出各种现象的秩序。我们牵涉于这个世界与别人,在无法分开的纠缠当中。情境的观念排除绝对的自由,在我们奉献的来源。同样地,它确实在它们的终端。无论再多的奉献,即使在黑格尔国家的奉献,都无法强迫我抛开所有的差异,解放我的任何东西。这个普世的自身,仅是根据被经验到的事实,会突显出来,作为是一个特殊性,以世界作为背景。因为生命实存让它目标的一切,既是一般化,又是特殊化。它永远无法形成最后的完整。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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