庞帝论自由 521

庞帝论自由 521
We therefore recognize, around our initiatives and around that
strictly individual project which is on self, a zone of generalized existence
and of projects already formed, significances which trail between
ourselves and things and which confer upon us the quality of man,
bourgeois or worker.


Already generality intervenes, already our presence
to ourselves is mediated by it and we cease to be pure consciousness,
as soon as the natural or social constellation ceases to be an
unformulated this and crystallizes into a situation, as soon as it has a
meaning—in short, as soon as we exist.


Every thing appears to us
through a medium to which it lends its own fundamental quality; this
piece of wood is neither a collection of colours and tactile data, not
even their total Gestalt, but something from which there emanates a
woody essence; these ‘sensory givens’ modulate a certain theme or
illustrate a certain style which is the wood itself, and which creates,
round this piece of wood and the perception I have of it, a horizon of
significance. The natural world, as we have seen, is nothing other than
the place of all possible themes and styles.


It is indissolubly an
unmatched individual and a significance. Correspondingly, the generality
and the individuality of the subject, subjectivity qualified and
pure, the anonymity of the One and the anonymity of consciousness
are not two conceptions of the subject between which philosophy has
to choose, but two stages of a unique structure which is the concrete


Let us consider, for example, sense experience. I lose myself in this red which is before me, without in any way qualifying it, and it
seems that this experience brings me into contact with a pre-human
subject. Who perceives this red? It is nobody who can be named and
placed among other perceiving subjects.


For, between this experience
of red which I have, and that about which other people speak to me, no
direct comparison will ever be possible. I am here in my own point of
view, and since all experience, in so far as it derives from impression, is
in the same way strictly my own, it seems that a unique and unduplicated
subject enfolds them all.


Suppose I formulate a thought, the God
of Spinoza, for example; this thought as it is in my living experience is
a certain landscape to which no one will ever have access, even if,
moreover, I manage to enter into a discussion with a friend on the
subject of Spinoza’s God. However, the very individuality of these
experiences is not quite unadulterated.


For the thickness of this red, its
thisness, the power it has of reaching me and saturating me, are attributable
to the fact that it requires and obtains from my gaze a certain
vibration, and imply that I am familiar with a world of colours of
which this one is a particular variation. The concrete colour red, therefore,
stands out against a background of generality, and this is why,
even without transferring myself to another’s point of view, I grasp
myself in perception as a perceiving subject, and not as unclassifiable

因为这个红的厚度,它的「这个」,它拥有到达我,饱满我的这个力量,它们都可归属于这个事实: 它从我的凝视,要求并且获得某种的震动,并且暗示,我熟悉于一个颜色的世界。这个世界是它的特殊的变化的世界。因此,这个具体的红的颜色,以一般性的背景作为衬托。这就是为什么,即使没有将我自己转移到另一个人的观点,我在感知里理解为自己,作为一位感知的主体,而不是作为一位没有被分类的意识。

I feel, all round my perception of red, all the regions of
my being unaffected by it, and that region set aside for colours,
‘vision’, through which the perception finds its way into me. Similarly
my thought about the God of Spinoza is only apparently a strictly
unique experience, for it is the concretion of a certain cultural world,
the Spinozist philosophy, or of a certain philosophic style in which I
immediately recognize a ‘Spinozist’ idea.


There is therefore no occasion
to ask ourselves why the thinking subject or consciousness perceives
itself as a man, or an incarnate or historical subject, nor must we
treat this apperception as a second order operation which it somehow
performs starting from its absolute existence: the absolute flow takes
shape beneath its own gaze as ‘a consciousness’, or a man, or an incarnate
subject, because it is a field of presence—to itself, to others and to
the world—and because this presence throws it into the natural and
cultural world from which it arrives at an understanding of itself. We
must not envisage this flux as absolute contact with oneself, as an absolute density with no internal fault, but on the contrary as a being
which is in pursuit of itself outside.


If the subject made a constant and
at all times peculiar choice of himself, one might wonder why his
experience always ties up with itself and presents him with objects and
definite historical phases, why we have a general notion of time valid
through all times, and why finally the experience of each one of us
links up with that of others. But it is the question itself which must be
questioned: for what is given, is not one fragment of time followed by
another, one individual flux, then another; it is the taking up of each
subjectivity by itself, and of subjectivities by each other in the generality
of a single nature, the cohesion of an intersubjective life and a


The present mediates between the For Oneself and the For
Others, between individuality and generality. True reflection presents
me to myself not as idle and inaccessible subjectivity, but as identical
with my presence in the world and to others, as I am now realizing it: I
am all that I see, I am an intersubjective field, not despite my body and
historical situation, but, on the contrary, by being this body and this
situation, and through them, all the rest.



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