庞蒂论自由 510

庞蒂论自由 510

When I say that this rock is unclimbable, it is certain that this attribute,
like that of being big or little, straight and oblique, and indeed like
all attributes in general, can be conferred upon it only by the project of
climbing it, and by a human presence. It is, therefore, freedom which
brings into being the obstacles to freedom, so that the latter can be set
over against it as its bounds. However, it is clear that, one and the same
project being given, one rock will appear as an obstacle, and another,
being more negotiable, as a means.

当我说这块岩石是无法攀登时,确定的是这个属性,就像无论是大或小的属性,直或歪斜的属性,的确,就像通常的所有属性,仅有凭借攀登它的计划,凭借人的存在,才能赋予给它。因此,这是一种将自由的阻碍具有生命实存的自由。这样,后者才能重新调整对抗它,作为它的限制。可是,显而易见地,当相同的计划被给予时,一块岩石将会出现,作为一种阻碍。另外一块岩石,却是更加可以协商,作为一种工具。

My freedom, then, does not so
contrive it that this way there is an obstacle, and that way a way
through, it arranges for there to be obstacles and ways through
in general; it does not draw the particular outline of this world, but
merely lays down its general structures. It may be objected that there is
no difference; if my freedom conditions the structure of the ‘there is’,
that of the ‘here’ and the ‘there’, it is present wherever these structures
arise. We cannot distinguish the quality of ‘obstacle’ from the obstacle itself, and relate one to freedom and the other to the world in itself which, without freedom, would be merely an amorphous and
unnameable mass.

因此,我的自由并没有如设计它,阻碍存在的方式,通过的那种方式,它安排阻碍存在,以及通常的通过方式。它对这个世界并没有获得特别的轮廓,而仅是奠定它的一般结构。有人反对说,这并没有什么差异。假如我的自由制约「存在」的结构,「在此」与「在彼」的结构,每当这些结构产生时,它就存在。我们无法区别「阻碍」的特质跟阻碍本身会有什么不同。然后将前者跟自由挂钩,将后者跟世界的自身挂钩。假如没有自由,这世界自身将仅是无定形,无法命名的质块。

It is not, therefore, outside myself that I am able to
find a limit to my freedom. But do I not find it in myself? We must
indeed distinguish between my express intentions, for example the
plan I now make to climb those mountains, and general intentions
which evaluate the potentialities of my environment. Whether or not I
have decided to climb them, these mountains appear high to me,
because they exceed my body’s power to take them in its stride, and,
even if I have just read Micromegas, I cannot so contrive it that they are
small for me. Underlying myself as a thinking subject, who am able to
take my place at will on Sirius or on the earth’s surface, there is,
therefore, as it were a natural self which does not budge from its
terrestrial situation and which constantly adumbrates absolute valuations.

因为,并不是在我自身外面,我能够找到我的自由的限制。但是我难道不是在我自己自身发现自已的限制吗?我们确实必须区别我快速的意图与一般的意义,前者,譬如我现在做计划要攀登那些山,后者评估我的环境的潜在因素。无论我已经决定攀登那些山,那些山对于我而言似乎都是高。因为它们超过我的身体要克服它的力量。即使我刚刚阅读过Micromegas 时论双月刊,我无法如此设计它,让它们对于我而言变小。我作为思想主体的基础,我能够任意地处身于西奈,或地球的表面,因此,会存在着所谓的自然的自我,面对它的地球的情况时,没有退缩,并且不断地概括绝对的评估。

What is more, my projects as a thinking being are clearly modelled
on the latter; if I elect to see things from the point of view of
Sirius, it is still to my terrestrial experience that I must have recourse in
order to do so; I may say, for example, that the Alps are molehills. In so
far as I have hands, feet, a body, I sustain around me intentions which
are not dependent upon my decisions and which affect my surroundings
in a way which I do not choose.

而且,我的各种计划,作为思想的人,清楚地模仿后者。假如我选择从西奈的观点看待事情,为了这样做,我依旧必须诉诸于我的地球上的经验。譬如,我可能说,阿尔卑斯山是蚁丘,因为我有双手,双脚,身体,我环绕我自身许多并没有依靠我的决定的意图。这些意图影响我的环境,用我没有选择的方式。

These intentions are general in a
double sense: firstly in the sense that they constitute a system in which
all possible objects are simultaneously included; if the mountain
appears high and upright, the tree appears small and sloping; and
furthermore in the sense that they are not simply mine, they originate
from other than myself, and I am not surprised to find them in all
psycho-physical subjects organized as I am. Hence, as Gestalt psychology
has shown, there are for me certain shapes which are particularly
favoured, as they are for other men, and which are capable of giving
rise to a psychological science and rigorous laws.

这些意图通常具有双重意义:首先,它们形成一种系统,所有可能的客体同时被包括在里面的系统。假如山似乎高而矗立,树似乎小而倾斜。而且,它们不仅属于我,它们起源于我之外的东西,我若是在所有跟我一样组织的具有心理与生理的主体身上发现它们,我并不会惊讶。因此,如同格式塔心理学所显示,对于我而言,有某些的形状特别地被喜爱,如同它们对于其他人而言。这些形状能够产生心理的科学与严谨的法则。

The grouping of dots
. . . . . . .. . . ..
is always perceived as six pairs of dots with two millimetres between
each pair, while one figure is always perceived as a cube, and another as
a plane mosaic.5 It is as if, on the hither side of our judgement and our freedom, someone were assigning such and such a significance to such
and such a given grouping. It is indeed true that perceptual structures
do not always force themselves upon the observer; there are some
which are ambiguous.

、、、、、、小数点的汇集总是被感知作为六个小数点的配对,每个配对之间有两个公喱。而一个图形总是被感知,作为一个立方体,另外一个,作为平面的马赛克。好像在我们的判断与我们的自由的那一边,某个人总是指定某某的意义,给某某的特点的汇集。的确,感知的结构未必强加它们自己在观察者身上。有些感知的结构是暧昧的。

But these reveal even more effectively the presence
within us of spontaneous evaluation: for they are elusive shapes
which suggest constantly changing meanings to us. Now a pure consciousness
is capable of anything except being ignorant of its intentions,
and an absolute freedom cannot choose itself as hesitant, since
that amounts to allowing itself to be drawn in several directions, and
since, the possibilities being ex hypothesi indebted to freedom for all the
strength they have, the weight that freedom gives to one is thereby
withdrawn from the rest.

但是这些结构甚至更加有效地显示在我们内部具有自动自发的评估存在。因为它们是闪躲不定的形状,对于我们,暗示着不断改变的意义。现在,纯粹的意识能够做任何事情,除了就是无知于它的意图。绝对的自由无法选择它自身,作为犹豫,因为那相等于是容许它自己朝好几个方向被拉扯。因为各种可能性就是「从假设诞生」,这归功于他们拥有的力量的自由。因此,自由给予一个人的重量,因此从其余的重量隐退。

We can break up a shape by looking at it awry,
but this too is because freedom uses the gaze along with its spontaneous
evaluations. Without the latter, we would not have a world, that
is, a collection of things which emerge from a background of formlessness
by presenting themselves to our body as ‘to be touched’, ‘to be
taken’, ‘to be climbed over’.

我们能够分解一个形状,凭借歪扭地看待它。但是这也是因为自己使用凝视,以及它的自动自发的评估。假如没有后者,我们将不会有一个世界。换句话说,从没有形状的背景出现的物象的汇集,凭借呈现它们给我们的身体,作为「能够被碰触」,「能够被接纳」,「能够被攀登」。

We should never be aware of adjusting
ourselves to things and reaching them where they are, beyond us, but
would be conscious only of restricting our thoughts to the immanent
objects of our intentions, and we should not be in the world, ourselves
implicated in the spectacle and, so to speak, intermingled with things,
we should simply enjoy the spectacle of a universe. It is, therefore, true
that there are no obstacles in themselves, but the self which qualifies
them as such is not some acosmic subject; it runs ahead of itself in
relation to things in order to confer upon them the form of things.

我们将不知道,我们适应于各种物象,并且在它们所在之处,超越我们之处,抵达它们。我们仅是意识到限制我们的思想于我们各种意图的内在性的客体。我们将不是在世界里,我们自己被牵涉到景象里。所谓的跟各种物象混杂一块。我们仅是享受宇宙的景象。因此,各种物象自身确实并没有阻碍,但是作为它们的特质的自身,并不是某个非宇宙的主体,它运作在跟物象相关的它自身前头,为了要赋予它们物象的形式。

There is an autochthonous significance of the world which is constituted
in the dealings which our incarnate existence has with it, and
which provides the ground of every deliberate Sinngebung.

在我们肉身的存在跟它的这些来往中被形成的世界,具有原生的意义。这个世界供应每个刻意的「赋予意义Sinngebung」的场域。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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