庞蒂论自由

龐蒂論自由 01
Merleau-Ponty on Freedom
From The Phenomenology of Perception 感覺現象學 p.434
Again, it is clear that no causal relationship is conceivable between the subject and his body, his world or his society. Only at the cost of losing the basis of all my certainties can I question what is conveyed to me by my presence to myself.
再一次,顯而易見,我們無法想像,主體跟其身體、世界、或社會,有任何因果關係。只有以喪失我所有的穩定結構的基礎作為代價,我才可能會質疑到,我存在於自我世界,所被傳達的訊息。
Now the moment I turn to myself in order to describe myself, I have a glimpse of an anonymous flux, a comprehensive project in which there are so far no ‘states of consciousness’, nor, a fortiori, characteristics of any sort. For myself I am neither ‘ jealous,’ nor ‘inquisitive’, nor ‘ hunchbacked’, nor ‘ a civil servant’.
此時,我一轉身內省,以便描述自己,我瞥見一股無以名狀的流動,一種迄今尚無「意識狀態」,遑論有任何特徵的全面洪流。對我自己而言,人家說我妒嫉、好打聽、駝背、或公務員,皆非我內在屬性。
It is often a matter of surprise that the cripple or the invalid can put up with himself. The reason is such people are not for themselves deformed or at death’s door. Until the final coma, the dying man is inhabited by a consciousness, he is all that he sees, and enjoys this much of an outlet. Consciousness can never objectify itself into invalid-consciousness or cripple-consciousness, and even if the old man complains of his age or the cripple of his deformity, they can do so only by comparing themselves with others, that is, by taking a statistical and objective view of themselves, so that such complaints are never absolutely genuine: when he is back in the heart of his own consciousness, each one of us feels beyond his limitations and thereupon resigns himself to them. They are the price which we automatically pay for being in the world, a formality which we take for granted. Hence we may speak disparagingly of our looks and still not want to change our face for another.
我們時常驚奇,殘障人士跟病患為何能忍受他們自己的處境。道理很簡單,對他們自己而言,他們並沒有意識到自己是殘障或彌留病床。直到昏迷之前,逗留在垂死者心中的,只有一種意識,那就是他自己是他所看到的一切,對於這樣的逃避現實,他坦然心安。意識永遠無法客體化成為成為病患意識,或殘障意識。即使老人抱怨自己的年老體衰,殘障人士抱怨自己的殘疾不全,他們會如此抱怨,是因為跟別人互相的比較,或是透過別人眼光看待自己,換句話說,他們開始以量化及客觀的觀點看待自己,所以這種抱怨並非全然都是真誠發出。當他回到自己意識的核心,我們每個人都會感覺到,自己能超越自己局限性,因此對於他們也就不會那麼耿耿於懷。我們生存在世,必然要付出代價承接這樣的局限性,這是我們視為理所當然的條件。因此我們或許會對自己的容貌自慚形穢,可是依舊不願以自己的容貌跟別人交換。
No idiosyncrasy can, seeming, be attached to the insuperable generality of consciousness, nor can any limit be set to this immeasurable power of escape. In order to be determined ( in the two sense of the word) by an external factor, it is necessary that I should be a thing. Neither my freedom nor my universality can admit of any eclipse. It is inconceivable that I should be free in certain of my actions and determined in others: how should we understand a dormant freedom that gave full scope to determinism? And it is assumed that it is snuffed out when it is not in action, how could it be rekindled? If per impossibile I had once succeeded in making myself into a thing, how should I subsequently reconvert myself to consciousness?
似乎,意識這種無法客體化的普遍性,也不能將它歸咎於任何怪誕行徑,正如人有逃避現實的無窮能力,也無法受到任何限制。我若是要受外在因素所決定(決定論的雙重意涵),我必然會淪為物化的命運。可是,我的自由跟我的意識無法客體化的普遍性,卻不容許受到任何損害。我們無法想像,我的某些行為是自由行使,而在其它行為上卻是受到命運決定。我們怎麼可能理解:我們的自由會備而不用,卻讓決定論大行其道?有人假設自由不行使時,會像燭火熄滅,那請問要如何重新點燃?就算是我有朝一日真的成功地將自己物化(實際上不可能),我以後要怎麼將自己重新轉換回到意識?
Once I am free, I am not to be counted among things, and I must then be uninterruptedly free. Once my actions cease to be mine, I shall never recover them, and if I lose my hold on the world, it will never be restored to me. It is equally inconceivable that my liberty should be attenuated; one cannot be to some extent free, and if, as is often said, motives incline me in a certain direction, one of two things happens: either they are strong enough to force me to act, in which case there is no freedom, or else they are not strong enough, and then freedom is complete, and as great in the worst torments as in the peace of one’s home.
一但我是自由,我就不可能被認為是物化,我必須毫無阻礙地自由。一但我的行動不再屬於我自己的意志,我將身不由己。假如我失去對於世界的掌控,我將永遠無法恢復這種掌控世界的自由。我們也同樣無法想像,我的自由應該受到約束,因為我們不可能只是有限度的自由。就算是如俗話所說,動機會使我們必然走向某個方向,這時只有兩種可能:一種是動機足夠強烈,我不得不聽令行事,在這種情況,我無自由可言。另一種是動機不夠強烈,我的自由毫髮無傷,無論是接受苦刑拷打,或是在自己平靜的家裡,我都自由自在。
We ought, therefore, to reject not only the idea of causality, but also that of motivation. The alleged motive does not burden my decision; on the contrary my decision lends the motive its force. Everything that I ‘am’ in virtue of nature or history—hunchbacked, handsome or Jewish—I never am completely for myself, as we have just explained; and I may well be these things for other people, nevertheless I remain free to posit another person as a consciousness whose views strike through to my very being, or on the other hand merely as an object.
因此,我們不但應該拒絕因果的觀念,而且也要拒絕動機的觀念。別人所宣稱的動機,並沒有成為我決定的負擔,相反的,我的決定借助力量給動機。我因為天生或歷史遺傳的我的屬性,無論是駝背,帥俊,或猶太人血統,我都不是因為自己而擁有這些屬性,如我剛才所說,而是因為別人的看待才如此被物化。可是,我始終擁有自由選擇另外一個人一方面作為意識,這個意識的觀點直接襲擊到我存在核心,或者另一方面僅僅是當一個客體。
It is also true that this option is itself a form of constraint: if I am ugly, I have the choice between being an object of disapproval or disapproving of others. I am left free to be a masochist or a sadist, but not free to ignore others. But this dilemma, which is given as port of the human lot, is not one for me as pure consciousness: it is still I who makes another to be for me and makes each of us be as human beings.
沒錯,這種選擇本身也是一種受到約束的形式:假如我長得醜,我可以選擇成為別人不認同的對象,也可以選擇不認同別人的觀點。問題是,我有自由選擇成為受虐狂者或虐待狂者,卻沒有自由選擇不理會別人觀點。但是這個困境是人類的部份命運,我並不必要把它當著是我的純淨意識:創造另一種困境來充當我的存在,使我們兩個人各自擁有作為人的存在的,依舊是我。
Moreover, even if existence as a human being were imposed upon me, the manner alone being left to my choice, and considering this choice itself and ignoring the small number of forms it might take, it would still be a free choice. If it is said that my temperament inclines me particularly to either sadism or masochism, it is still merely a manner of speaking, for my temperament exists only for the second order knowledge that I gain about myself when I see myself as others see me, and in so far as I recognize it, confer value upon it, and in that sense, choose it.
而且,即使作為人的存在是上天賦予,聽任我選擇的方式只有一種,這依舊算是一種自由的選擇,假如我們考慮到這種選擇的本身的性質,並且不要去理會選澤的方式是多麼有限。即使我的性情據說會使我特別傾向於成為虐待狂,或受虐狂,那也是表達的問題,因為我的性情的存在,僅是我對於自己的次級的知識,也就是我依照別人看待我的方式看待自己,再依照我的認識,賦予價值在那個知識上,然後以那個意義選擇我的性情。
What misleads us on this, is that we often look for freedom in the voluntary deliberation which examines one motive after another and seems to opt for the weightiest or most convincing. In reality the deliberation follows the decision, and it is my secret decision which brings the motives to light, for it would be difficult to conceive what the force of a motive might be in the absence of a decision which it confirms or to which it runs counter.
在此誤導我們的是,我們往往在一廂情願的深思熟慮中尋求自由,將動機反覆審察,似乎總是選擇最沉重,或是最令人信服的。事實上,先有決定才跟著深思熟慮,而且是我的秘密決定使動機為人所知,因為動機所證實,所對立的決定若是不存在,我們很難想像動機的力量是什麼。
When I have abandoned a project, the motives which I thought held me to it suddenly lose their force and collapse. In order to resuscitate them, an effort is required on my part to reopen time and set me back to the moment preceding the making of the decision. Even while I am deliberating, already I find it an effort to suspend time’s flow, and to keep open a situation which I feel is closed by a decision which is already there and which I am holding off. That is why it so often happens that after giving up a plan I experience a feeling of relief: “ After all, I wasn’t all that involved’; the debate was purely a matter of form, and the deliberation a mere parody, for I had decided against from the start.
當我已經放棄一個計劃,原先讓我堅持以赴的動機,會突然失去力量而崩塌。為了復甦這些動機,我必需要努力重新開啟時間,讓我回到做決定前的那個時刻。即使在我深思熟慮的時刻,我發覺要費相當努力,才能將時間的流動懸置,並開放一個情境。這個情境被我認為是已經存在,而且我正在抗拒的決定所封閉。這就是為什麼在我放棄一個計劃之後,我往往會經驗到身心輕鬆的感覺:「畢竟,我還不至於那麼欲罷不能!」所爭議的純粹是形式的問題,深思熟慮充其量是扭捏作態,因為從一開頭,我就已經是決定反對。
雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
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龐蒂論自由 506
龐蒂論自由 02
We often see the weakness of the will brought forward as an argument against freedom. And indeed, although I can will myself to adopt a course of conduct and act the part of a warrior or a seducer, it is not within my power to be a warrior or a seducer with ease and in a way that ‘comes naturally’; really to be one, that is.
我們時常看到,意志的軟弱被提出來,作為反駁自由的論點。的確,雖然我有意願要從事某種行為,扮演鬥士或誘拐者的角色,我不見得就有那個能力輕而易舉成為鬥士或誘拐者,那樣天然渾成,換言之,我不是天生的鬥士或誘拐者。
But neither should we seek freedom in the act of will, which is, in its very meaning, something short of an act. We have recourse to an act of will only in order to go against our true decision, and, as it were, for the purpose of proving our powerlessness.
但是我們也不應該在意志的行動中尋找自由,因為意志的行動,就其意義而言,意志先行,行動未必履行。我們訴諸於意志的行動,只是要違背我們自己的真實決定,也就是所謂,為了證明自己的無可奈何。
If we had really and truly made the conduct of the warrior or the seducer our own, then we should be one or the other. Even what are called obstacles to freedom are in reality deployed by it.
假如我們真實道地將鬥士或誘拐者的行為,表現為我們自己的行為,那麼我們應該就是鬥士或是誘拐者。即使所謂的阻礙實際上已被清除。
An unclimbable rock face, a large or small, vertical or slanting rock, are things which have no meaning for anyone who is not intending to surmount them, for a subject whose projects do not carve out such determinate forms from the uniform mass of the in itself and cause an orientated world to arise—a significance in things.
一座高不可攀的岩層,無論大小,垂直或傾斜,對於無意去征服他們的人,不具有意義,因為他們並沒有計劃要從大自然的質樸表面從事決心的舉動,產生意義,展現有向度的世界。
There is, then, ultimately nothing that can set limits to freedom, except those limits that freedom itself has set in the form of its various initiatives, so that the subject has simply the external world that he gives himself.
因此,追根究底,自由沒有任何限制,除了自由本身因為具有各種創意而豎立的那些限制,所以主體只擁有他自己所給予的外在世界。
Since it is the latter who, on coming into being, brings to light significance and value in things, and since no thing can impinge upon it except through acquiring, thanks to it, significance and value, there is no action of things on the subject, but merely a signification ( in the active sense), a centrifugal Sinngebung.
既然是具有創意的人出現時,才會使事物的意義跟價值出現,既然自由不會受到任何侵犯,除非你因為自由的創意而獲得意義跟價值,主體本身並沒有事物的行動,僅僅是一種意義(主動的意義),一種離心的意義。
The choice would seem to lie between scientism’s conception of causality, which is incompatible with the consciousness which we have of ourselves, and the assertion of an absolute freedom divorced from the outside. It is impossible to decide beyond which point things cease to be εψμων. Either they all lie within our power, or none does.
有兩種選擇,一種是科學家的因果觀念,跟我們對於自己所擁有的意識不相和諧。另一種是絕對自由的主張,跟外在世界脫離。我們無法決定,超越哪一點事物就蕩然無存。事物要就是在我們的掌控力量之內,要不就全都無法操控。
The result, however, of this first reflection on freedom would appear to be to rule it out altogether. If indeed it is the case that our freedom is the same in all our actions, and even in our passions, if it is not to be measured in terms of our conduct, and if the slave displays freedom as much by living in fear as by breaking this chains, then it cannot be held that there is such a thing as free action, freedom being anterior to all actions.
可是,對於自由最初反省的結果常是將自由完全地排除掉。的確,假如我們的自由都一樣,不論在我們所有的行動,或在我們的激情,假如我們的自由不是以我們的行為的表現來衡量,假如奴隸生活於恐懼中的自由,跟打破鎖鏈的自由沒什麼兩樣,那麼我們很難相信有自由行動這樣的東西,早先於行動的自由。
In any case it will not be possible to declare: “ Here freedom makes its appearance”, since free action, in order to be discernible, has to stand out against a background of life from which it is entirely, or almost entirely, absent. We may say in this case that it is everywhere, but equally nowhere. In the name of freedom we reject the idea of acquisition, since freedom has become a primordial acquisition and, as it were, our state of nature.
無論如何,我們不可能宣稱:「自由出現在此」,因為自由行動要能被覺察出來,必先要有一個生活的背景作為對抗,而在那裡,自由完全,或近乎完全不存在。在此情形,我們可以說,人無處不自由,但同樣的也無處自由。以自由之名,我們排除獲得的觀念,因為自由已經變成原初的獲得,也就是我們的自然狀態。
Since we do not have to provide it, it is the gift granted to us of having no gift, it is the nature of consciousness which consists in having no nature, and in no case can it find external expression or a place in our life. The idea of action, therefore, disappears: nothing can pass from us to the world, since we are nothing that can be specified, and since the non-being which constitutes us could not possibly find its way into the world’s plenum.
既然自由不是我們必須提供,而是一種上天賦予我們的不是天賦的天賦,是一種不需要有任何特性的意識的特性,它無法在我們的生活中找到外在的表達或位置。行動的觀念因此消失,因為沒有一樣東西能從我們身上傳遞到世界,因為我們不是任何所被指定的東西,因為組成我們的空性,不可能在世界的空間找到一個安身立命之處。
There are merely intentions immediately followed by their effects, and we are very near to the Kantian idea of an intention which is tantamount to the act, which Scheler countered with the argument that the cripple who would like to be able to save a drowning man and the good swimmer who actually saves him do not have the same experience of autonomy.
緊跟隨他們的情意而來的僅僅是意向性。在此,我們跟康德的意向就是行動的觀念頗為接近。希勒曾經反駁說:想要拯救溺水的殘障者跟實際上救起他的游泳高手,他們的自主的經驗並不相同。
The very idea of choice vanishes, for to choose is to choose something in which freedom sees, at least for a moment, a symbol of itself. There is free choice only if freedom comes into play in its decision, and posits the situation chosen as a situation of freedom.
選擇的觀念消失不見,因為選擇是要選擇某件自由看得到本身的符號,至少有那麼一個時刻。只有自由在做決定時運作,並假設有一個情況,可以選擇來當自由的情況,這樣才有自由的選擇。
A freedom which has no need to be exercised because it is already acquired could not commit itself in this way: it knows that the following instant will find it, come way may, just as free and just as indeterminate. The very notion of freedom demands that our decision should plunge into the future, that something should have been done by it, that the subsequent instant should benefit from its predecessor and, though not necessitated, should be at least required by it.
一個已經擁有的自由,就不需要去運用,無法以這個方式呈現:它無時無刻不自由,無論發生何事,同樣自由,同樣任性。自由的觀念要求,我們的決定應該投入未來,自由本來應該有所作為,隨後的瞬間應該從前頭的瞬間得到益處,至少應該受到它所要求,雖然未必有此需要。
If freedom is doing, it is necessary that what it does should not be immediately undone by a new freedom.
假如自由正在運用,它所運用的不應該立刻被新的自由所破壞。
Each instant, therefore, must not be a closed world; one instant must be able to commit its successors and, a decision once taken and action once begun, I must have something acquired at my disposal, I must benefit from my impetus, I must be inclined to carry on, and there must be a bent or propensity of the mind.
因此,每個瞬間切不可是一個封閉的世界,一個瞬間必須能夠銜接前一個瞬間。一但下定決心,一但採取行動,我必須要有某件聽由我支配的東西,我必須要從我的動機得到益處。我必須要有執行的意向,我的心必須意志堅決。
It was Descartes who held that conservation demands a power as great as does creation; a view which implies a realistic notion of the instant. It is true that the instant is not a philosopher’s fiction. It is the point at which one project is brought to fruition and another begun—the point at which my gaze is transferred from one end to another, it is the Augen-Blick.
笛卡爾認為,保存所需要的力量跟創造一樣強烈。這個觀點暗示著瞬間有著實際的觀念。的確,瞬間並非是哲學家的幻想。它是一個計劃圓滿達成,另一個計劃開始的時刻。此時,我的眼光從一端轉移到另一端,這被稱為「創造瞬間」。
But this break in time cannot occur unless each of the two spans is of a piece. Consciousness, it is said, though not atomized into instants, at least haunted by the specter of the instant which it is obliged continually to exorcise by a free act.
但是這個時間的中斷不會發生,除非兩段時間有一段尾隨在後。據說,意識雖然不會分裂成為瞬間,至少會被瞬間所縈迴,因此它不得不用自由的行動,將瞬間驅除。
We shall soon see that we have indeed always the power to interrupt, but it implies in any case a power to begin, for there would be no severance unless freedom had taken up its abode somewhere and were preparing to move it.
我們不久將看到,我們總是有中斷的力量,但它意味著隨時都有開始的力量。因為除非自由曾經停駐,並且正準備離開,否則不會有分劣
Unless there are cycles of behavior , open situations requiring a certain completion and capable of constituting a background to either a confirmatory or transformatory decision, we never experience freedom.
除非有行為的循環及開放的情境,要求某種的完成,並且能夠形成可以驗證或轉移的決定的背景,我們永遠不會經驗到自由。
雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

庞蒂论自由 544
Choice of an intelligible
sort is excluded, not only because there is no time anterior to time, but
because choice presupposes a prior commitment and because the idea
of an initial choice involves a contradiction. If freedom is to have room*
in which to move, if it is to be describable as freedom, there must be
something to hold it away from its objectives, it must have a field, which
means that there must be for it special possibilities, or realities which
tend to cling to being.

属于明智的选择被排除。不但是因为没有时间之前的时间,而且因为选择预先假设一个先前的奉献,因为最初的选择牵涉到悖论。假如自由是要拥有能够运动的空间,假如它应该可被描述为自由,就必须要有某件东西保留它,避开它的各种目标,它必须要有一个「领域」。这意味着,必须要有特别的可能性给自由。或倾向于坚持生命实存的现实。

As J. P. Sartre himself observes, dreaming is
incompatible with freedom because, in the realm of imagination, we
have no sooner taken a certain significance as our goal than we already
believe that we have intuitively brought it into being, in short, because
there is no obstacle and nothing to do.4 It is established that freedom is
not to be confused with those abstract decisions of will at grips with
motives or passions, for the classical conception of deliberation is relevant
only to a freedom ‘in bad faith’ which secretly harbours antagonistic
motives without being prepared to act on them, and so itself
manufactures the alleged proofs of its impotence.

如同萨特自己观察到,梦跟自由并不和谐。因为在想像的国度,我们才刚拥有某个意义作为我们的目标,我们就已经相信,我们已经直觉地让这个意义存在。总之,因为没有阻碍,没有事情好做。有人证明,自由不应该跟意志的那些抽象的决定混淆,因为它们正在跟动机与激情互相博斗。因为使用心计的古典观念跟自由相关的仅是「恶念」。这种「恶念」秘密地怀抱著敌意的动机,却没有凖备根据它们採取行动。所以,恶念自身制造的是它的无能为力的宣告的证明。

3 J. P. Sartre, L’Etre et le Neant, p. 544

We can see, beneath
these noisy debates and these fruitless efforts to ‘construct’ ourselves,
the tacit decisions whereby we have marked out round ourselves the
field of possibility, and it is true that nothing is done as long as we
cling to these fixed points, and everything is easy as soon as we have
weighed anchor. This is why our freedom is not to be sought in spurious
discussion on the conflict between a style of life which we have no
wish to reappraise and circumstances suggestive of another: the real
choice is that of whole character and our manner of being in the world.

从吵杂的争论及这些徒劳的努力要「建构」我们自己底下,我们能够看出那些沉默的决定。在那里,我们已经标记出可能性的领域,环绕我们自己。的确,只要我们坚持这些固定的点,就没有什么可做,只要我们已经下定锚点,一切都容易。这就是为什么我们的自由不应该在似是而非的讨论中寻找,讨论生活方式与环境的冲突。对于前者,我们并没有意愿重新评估;而后者暗示着另外一种生活方式。真实的选择是整体性格,以及在世界中的存在方式的选择。

But either this total choice is never uttered, since it is the silent upsurge
of our being in the world, in which case it is not clear in what sense it
could be said to be ours, since this freedom glides over itself and is the
equivalent of a fate—or else our choice of ourselves is truly a choice, a
conversion involving our whole existence.

但是,这个整体的选择永远没有被表达,因为我们存在于世界是沉默的涌出。在那种情况,实在很难清楚,它在怎样的意义能够说是属于我们。因为自由的自身在滑动,自由相等于就是命运。否则我们对于自己的选择确实是选择,牵涉到我们整个的生命的存在的转换。

In this case, however, there is presupposed a previous acquisition which the choice sets out to
modify and it founds a new tradition: this leads us to ask whether the
perpetual severance in terms of which we initially defined freedom is
not simply the negative aspect of our universal commitment to a
world, and whether our indifference to each determinate thing does
not express merely our involvement in all; whether the ready-made
freedom from which we started is not reducible to a power of initiative,
which cannot be transformed into doing without taking up some
proposition of the world, and whether, in short, concrete and actual
freedom is not indeed to be found in this exchange.

在这种情况,有一个先前的习得被预先假设,选择出发改正这种习得,它作为新的传统的基础。这引导我们寻问,使用永久的割裂这个术语,我们定义自由,这个永久的割裂,是否不仅是我们普遍性地献身一个世界的负面,我们对于每个决定的事情的漠视,是否表达的不仅是我们牵涉到整体。我们开头用现成的自由,这个现成的自由,能否被还原成为创意的力量。这个力量被转换成为行为时,必然会从事世界的某个主张。总之,具体与实际的自由确实不应该在这个交换里被找到。

It is true that
nothing has significance and value for anyone but me and through anyone
but me, but this proposition remains indeterminate and is still indistinguishable
from the Kantian idea of a consciousness which ‘finds in
things only what it has put into them’, and from the idealist refutation
of realism, as long as we fail to make clear how we understand significance
and the self.

的确,对于除了我以外的任何人,通过除了我以为的任何人,没有一样东西具有意义与价值。但是,这个主张始终是不确定的,并且依旧无法跟康德的意识的观念被区别。康德认为,意识在物象里仅是找到它已经放进它的东西。并且依旧无法跟写实主义对理念的反驳区别,只要我们没有澄清我们是如何理解意义及自性。

By defining ourselves as a universal power of Sinn-
Gebung, we have reverted to the method of the ‘thing without which’
and to the analytical reflection of the traditional type, which seeks the
conditions of possibility without concerning itself with the conditions
of reality. We must therefore resume the analysis of the Sinngebung, and
show how it can be both centrifugal and centripetal, since it has been
established that there is no freedom without a field.

凭借定义我们自己,作为是「被赋予意义」 Sinn Getung 的普遍性力量。我们转移到「没有的物象」thing without which ,并且转移到传统种类的分析的反思。这种反思寻找可能性的情况,却并不关怀现实的情况。我们因此必须重新开始分析「被赋予的意义」Sinn Getung ,然后显示它如何有时离心力,有时又是向心力。因为已经被证实的是,自由必然会有场域。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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