精神病 286

精神病 286
雅克、拉康

2
The notion of Verwerfung indicates that there must already have been something
in the relation to the signifier previously lacking here in the initial introduction
to fundamental signifiers.

「弃绝」的这个观念指示著:当时一定有某件跟能指的关系的东西,在最初介绍到基本的能指时,已经就是欠缺。

This is, quite clearly, an absence undiscoverable by experimental research.
There is no way of grasping something that lacks at the time it lacks. In the
case of President Schreber this would have been the absence of the primordial
male signifier to which for years he was able to appear to be equal – he looked
as if he, like everyone else, were upholding his role as a man and of being
somebody. Virility does signify something for him, since it’s equally the object
of his very lively protestations at the time the delusion erupts, which initially
presents itself in the form of a question over his sex, an interpellation [appel]
that comes to him from outside, as in the fantasy – how nice it would be to be
a woman undergoing intercourse. The delusion’s development expresses the
fact that for him there is no other way of realizing himself, of affirming himself
as sexual, than through admitting he is a woman, transformed into a
woman. This is the axis of the delusion. For there are two planes to distinguish.

显然易见,这是一种抗拒被实验的研究发现的缺席。我们不可能在它欠缺的时刻,理解某件欠缺的东西。在许瑞伯庭长的个案,这本来是原初的男性能指的缺席。好几年来,他能够出现,为了胜任这个原初的男性能指。他看起来好像,他跟每个其他的人一样,正在支撑他作为男人及出人头地的角色。对他而言,生命精力确实意味着某件东西。因为在幻觉发作时,它同样是他生动的抗议的客体。这个客体最初呈现,以质疑性别的形式。从外面来的他这里的质问,如同在幻见里:「假如能够成为经历性交的女人,那该是多么美好!」这个幻觉的发展表达这个事实:对于他而言,没有其他方法可以实现他自己,肯定他自己,作为是性,除了凭借承认他是一位女人,被转变成为女人。这就是幻觉的轴心。因为有两个层次要区别。

On the one hand, the course of the delusion reveals the need to reconstruct
the cosmos, the world’s entire organization, around the fact that there is a
man who can only be the wife of a universal god. On the other hand, let’s
not forget that in his common discourse up to the critical period of his existence
this man appeared to know just like everyone else that he was a man,
and what he somewhere calls his manly honor cries out aloud when he happens
suddenly to be aroused a bit too strongly by the enigma of the absolute
Other entering into play, which emerges with the first signs of the delusion.
In short, we are led here to the distinction that is the thread running through
everything we have until now deduced from the very structuration of the
analytic situation – namely, what I have called the little other and the absolute
Other.

在一方面,幻觉的过程显示重建这个宇宙的需要,重建世界的整个的组织的需要。根据的事实是,仅有一个男人能成为普世的神的妻子。另一方面,让我们不要忘记,直到他存在的严重时期,在他的共同的辞说里,这个人似乎就像每个其人的人一样知道,他是个男人。他在某个地方称之为男子汉气概的东西,大声呐喊出来。突然地,进入运作的绝对大他者的谜团非常强烈地让他感到激动。总之,我们在此被引导到这个区别。这个区别穿梭迄今我们推论出来的每样事情的脉络,根据精神分析情境的结构。换句话说,我所谓的小他者与绝对的大他者。

The former, the other with a small o, is the imaginary other, the otherness
in a mirror image, which makes us dependent upon the form of our counterpart.
The latter, the absolute Other; is the one we address ourselves to beyond
this counterpart, the one we are forced to admit beyond the relation of mirage,
the one who accepts or is refused opposite us,5 the one who will on occasion
deceive us, the one of whom we will never know whether he is deceiving us,
the one to whom we always address ourselves. His existence is such that the
fact of addressing ourselves to him, of sharing something like language with
5 . . . celui qui accepte ouquise refuse en face de nous . . .him, is more important than anything that may be placed at stake between him and us.

前者,有一个小写字母o的小他者,在想象界的小他者,在镜子意象里的小他者。它让我们依赖我们的替身的形式。后者,这位绝对的大他者,是我们对谈的这位,超越这个替身。我们被迫要承认的替身,超于幻景的关系。在我们对面,接受或被拒绝的大他者。有时,他会欺骗我们,我们永远不知道他是否正在欺骗我们的这位大他者。我们总是跟他对谈的这位大他者。他的存在是如此真实,以致我们跟他对谈的这个事实,跟他分享像语言这样的东西的事实,是最紧要的事情,胜过于任何他与我们之间的岌岌可危的事情。

Misrecognizing the distinction between these two others in analysis, where
it’s present throughout, lies at the origin of all the false problems, and in
particular of the one that appears now that the primacy of the object relation
is being emphasized.

在精神分析里,这两个他者无所不在,误认这两个他者的区别,就是所有的虚假的问题的起源。特别是,客体关系的原初性正在被强调,出现的这个他者。

Indeed, there is an obvious discrepancy between the Freudian position
according to which the newborn, on entering the world, is in a so-called
autoerotic relation, that is, a relation in which the object doesn’t exist, and
the clinical observation that from the beginning of life we undoubtedly have
every indication that all sorts of objects exist for the newborn. The solution
to this difficulty can only be found by distinguishing between the imaginary
other insofar as he is structurally the originary form of the field in which a
multiplicity of objects is structured for the human newborn, and the absolute
Other, the Other with a big O, which is surely what Freud was driving at –
and which analysts have subsequently neglected – when speaking of the nonexistence,
originally, of any Other.

的确,有一个明显的差异,在弗洛依德的立场,与临床的观察之间。依照这个弗洛依德的立场,新生婴孩一进入这个世界,就处于所谓的自动性欲的关系,也就是,客体并不存在其中的关系,而依照临床观察,从生命的开始,我们无可置疑地,获得充分的指示:对于婴孩,各种的客体都存在。对于这个困难的解决,仅能凭借区别想象的他者与绝对的大他者,才能够被找到。想象的他者,结构上,对于新生的婴孩而言,是客体的多重性被建构的领域的最初的形式。而带有大写O的大他者,确实是弗洛依德要探究的东西,当他谈论到任何大者原初的不存在,而精神分析随后却忽略他。

There is a good reason for this, which is that this Other lies entirely within
itself, Freud says, but at the same time entirely outside itself.
The ecstatic relation to the Other is an issue that didn’t arise yesterday,
but because it has been left in the background for several centuries it’s worth
our while, for we analysts who are constantly dealing with it, to reexamine
it.

这种忽略理由充分。弗洛依德说,这位大他者完全位于它自身之内,但是又同时完全在它自身之外。跟大他者的这种狂喜的关系,并不是昨天才出现的问题。而是因为好几世纪意料,这个关系一直就存在于背景那里,它值得我们探究。因为我们精神分析家正在不断地处理它,为了重新检视它。

In the Middle Ages a distinction was drawn between what was called the
physical theory and the ecstatic theory of love. This is the way the question
of the subject’s relation to the absolute Other was raised. Let’s say that in
order to understand the psychoses we have to make the love relation with the
Other qua radically Other, and the mirror situation, everything of the order
of the imaginary, animus and antnta, which is located according to the sexes
at one or other of the places, overlap in our little schema.

在中世纪,在所谓的爱的生理的理论与狂喜的理论之间,有个区别。那就是主体跟绝对的大他者的关系的问题被提出的方式。我们不妨这样说,为了要理解精神病,我们必须让跟大他者的爱的关系,作为强烈的大他者。让镜子的情境,每样属于想象界的秩序的东西,阿尼玛斯与阿尼玛,在我们的小基模里互相重叠,因为阿尼玛斯与阿尼玛的位置,是依照在这些位置的某个性别而定。

Where does the difference between someone who is psychotic and someone
who isn’t come from? It comes from the fact that for the psychotic a love
relation that abolishes him as subject is possible insofar as it allows a radical
heterogeneity of the Other. But this love is also a dead love.

某位精神病的人,与某个并不是精神病的人,他们的这个差异来自哪里?这个差异来自这个事实:对于精神病,爱的关系是可能的,尽管爱的关系会让他丧失。因为爱的关系容许大他者具有强烈的多样性。但是这种爱也是致命的爱。

It may seem to you that it’s a curious and unusual detour to resort to a
medieval theory of love in order to introduce the question of psychosis. It is,
however, impossible to conceive the nature of madness otherwise.
Think about, sociologically, the forms of enamoration, of falling in love, attested in culture.

你们可能觉得,为了介绍精神病的问题,诉诸于中世纪的爱的理论,是奇怪而且不寻常的迂回。可是,要用其他方式来构想疯狂的这个特质是不可能的。请你们从社会的角度,想想看,在文化展现的,迷恋的各种形式,恋爱的各种形式,

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s


%d bloggers like this: