拉康论庄周梦蝶 Choang-tsu’s Butterfly:

Choang-tsu’s Butterfly:

Objects and the Subjective Function of Fantasy

庄子的蝴蝶

幻见的各种客体与主体性功能

 

Calum Neill

凯拉姆、内尔

 

In the sixth chapter of The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,

Lacan refers to the Taoist Choang-tsu’s well known parable of the

dream butterfly. Choang-tsu poses the question of how, after waking

from a dream of being a butterfly, he can tell whether he is Choang-tsu

who has woken from the dream of being a butterfly or whether he is the

butterfly now dreaming he is Choang-tsu. This article argues that Lacan’s

treatment of the parable allows us to discern two instances of fantasy;

the fantasy of being the butterfly and the fantasy of being Choangtsu.

These two instances help to demonstrate the centrality of the

process of identification to the function of fantasy and allow us to grasp

an ethical dimension entailed in one’s subjective relation to the object(s)

of fantasy.

 

在「精神分析的四个基本原则」的第六章,拉康提到道家庄子著名的蝴蝶梦的寓言。庄子提出这个问题:从作为蝴蝶的梦中醒来之后,他如何能够辨明,是否他就是从作为蝴蝶的梦中醒来的庄周,或是他是蝴蝶现在正梦见他是庄周。我的论文主张,拉康对于这个寓言的处理,让我们能够觉察两种幻见的例子:作为蝴蝶的幻见,与作为庄周的幻见。这两个例子有助于证明,认同幻见的功能的过程的中心思想,并且让我们能够理解,我们跟幻见到各种客体的主体性的关系的伦理学的维度。

From the mirror stage, we can understand the seeds of fantasy in the

subject’s self-relating as meconnaissance. That is to say, in mistaking

the wholeness perceived in the mirror as a wholeness attributable

to itself, the subject establishes the fantasy of itself as an image, or

what Lacan terms the ideal-ego. Central to this process of (mis)identification

is the mechanism of seeing and, inseparable from this, being seen. In

the terminology of later Lacan, this is elaborated under the concept of the

gaze. Through his discussion of the gaze as objet petit a in Seminar XI and,

in particular, through his treatment of Choang-tsu’s famous paradox of the

dream of the butterfly, Lacan allows us to apprehend what we might call the

properly subjective function of the fantasy.

 

从镜像阶段,我们能够理解幻见的各种种因,在主体的自我指涉,作为是误识。换句话说,当他误认在镜中感受到的整体,作为是归属于镜子本身的整体时,主体建立属于它自身的幻见,作为一种形象,或是拉康术语所谓的理想自我。作为认同(或误认)的这个过程的核心,是看见与被看见的心理机制。看见与被看见是不可分割的。用晚期拉康的术语来说,这个心理机制被建构在凝视的观念之下。通过在第11研讨班,凝视作为小客体的讨论,特别是,通过他处理庄子的著名的蝴蝶梦的悖论,拉康让我们理解,我们所谓的幻见的合适的主体性的功能是什么。

61

 

Waking from a dream in which he experienced himself as a butterfly,

Choang-tsu poses himself the question of how he can be certain that he is

now himself, Choang-tsu, and not the butterfly dreaming that he is Choangtsu.

 

当庄子从梦中醒来,他在梦里经验到自己作为蝴蝶,庄子跟自己提出这个问题:他如何能够确定,他现在是他自己,庄周,而不是蝴蝶正在梦见他是庄周。

 

Put simply, Choang-tsu’s dilemma can be phrased as that of how we can

know which self is the “real” or authentic self and which self is an illusory,

“invented,” dream version.

 

简言之,庄子的困境能够被诠释为这样的困境:我们如何能够知道哪一个自性是「实在的」或真诚的自性,那一个自性的幻觉的自性,是「被杜撰的」的梦的版本。

 

This should also, perhaps, remind us of the classical

Cartesian quandary as to how he, Descartes, can know he is not dreaming

when he is “in fact” awake (14). Where Descartes, to an extent, circumvents

this problem, leading to the conclusion that, even if he is the dream

version, this in itself is indicative of a real Descartes beyond the dream insofar

as the dream “copy” necessitates an original from which it is abstracted

(15), Lacan’s treatment is a little more involved. For Lacan, Choang-tsu

is correct to pose himself this question for two reasons.

 

或许,这应该让我们想起这个经典的笛卡尔的困境,关于笛卡尔,他如何知道,他并不是在作梦,当他「实际上」是清醒的时刻。笛卡尔有几分程度是规避这个难题,而导致这个结论:即使他是梦的版本,这本身也指示著一位超越梦之外的实在的笛卡尔。因为梦的「抄本」必须先要有原版。从原版那里,梦的抄本才能被抽离出来。拉康的处理则是稍微更加深入。就拉康而言,庄子是正确的,当他替自己提出这个问题。理由有两个:

 

First, taking such a

question seriously indicates that one has not fallen so under the sway of the

master signifier as to have foreclosed one’s own division; that is, one does

not assume that one is adequate to one’s perceptions of oneself. In fact, one

does not assume one is one: “When Choang-tsu wakes up, he may ask himself

whether it is not the butterfly who dreams that he is Choang-tsu. Indeed

he is right, and doubly so, first because it proves he is not mad, he does not

regard himself as absolutely identical with Choang-tsu” (Lacan, Four Fundamental

Concepts 76).

首先,将这个问题认真看待指示著:我们并没有完全受到主人能指的影响,以致于将自己的分裂除权弃绝。换句话说,我们并没有假设,我们对自己的各种感觉充分满意。事实上,我们并没有假设一就是一:「当庄周醒来时,他可能询问他自己,是否是蝴蝶梦见他是庄周。的确,有两个理由,他是正确的。首先是因为它证明:他没有疯狂,他没有认为他自己是绝对地认同庄周(拉康:精神分析的四个基本原则 第76页)

 

In addition to this, the question Choang-tsu poses to himself holds within

it a certain truth of Choang-tsu. In a sense, he is the butterfly. The butterfly,

in Lacan’s reading, cannot be reduced to some mere chimera, an arbitrary

construct of Choang-tsu’s dream-state. On the contrary, it is as dream

butterfly that Choang-tsu was able to grasp something of his own identity,

namely “that he was, and is, in his essence, that butterfly who paints himself

with his own colours” (76).

 

除此之外,庄子对自己提出的这个问题,在问题之内,包含着庄子的某种真理。从某个意义来说,他就是蝴蝶。拉康的阅读是,蝴蝶无法被还原成为是某种神话中的狮头,羊身,蛇尾的吐火女怪物,由庄子的梦中的状态的任意建造。相反地,作为梦中的蝴蝶,庄子才能够理解某件属于他自己身份的东西。也就是说,他以前是那只蝴蝶,现在的本质也是那只蝴蝶,用他自己的各种颜色彩绘他自己的那只蝴碟。

 

For Lacan, it is through this penetration of

the unconscious that something of Choang-tsu can emerge, as opposed to

some social construct or status known as Choang-tsu. This can be reformulated

in terms of the relation of the subject to the signifier. What we have in

the parable of Choang-tsu are two signifiers, “Choang-tsu” and “butterfly.”

 

对于拉康,就是通过这种无意识的贯穿,庄子的某件东西才会出现。作为相对于某种大名鼎鼎的庄子社会的建构,或 社会地位。

 

雄伯译

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

 

The subject, in the proper Lacanian sense, of the parable is that which is represented

between these two signifiers. Phrased otherwise, the subject of the

parable is placed under these two signifiers:

Choang-tsu butterfly

 

从恰当的拉康的意义而言,这个寓言的主体是有这两个能指之间所代表的东西。用不同方式来诠释,这个寓言的主体被放置在这两个能指之下:庄周-蝴蝶。

 

 

It is, however, actually only in the movement between them that the subject

proper emerges.

 

可是,主体的本体的出现,确实并不是仅是在这两个能指之间。

 

The difference here, for Lacan, between the dream and “reality” is attested to by the mechanism of representation. In the dream the subject is represented

as a butterfly, thus confirming something of his subjective apperception.

 

对于拉康而言,在此,梦与现实界之间的差异,由再现表象的机制来测试。在梦中,主体再现作为蝴蝶,因此证实他的主体的过去经验感觉的某件东西。

 

Outside the dream, the subject is represented as Choang-tsu but

feels it necessary to question this representation. This logic of uncertainty is

in itself what points towards the subjective truth of the situation. As a butterfly,

the subject does not pose the same question as when he is awake:

“when I am not this dream butterfly, when I am awake, am I actually this

dream butterfly?”

 

在梦的外贸,主体由庄周来再现,但是感觉到有必要质疑这个再现。不确定的这个逻辑的本身就是指向情境的主体性。作为蝴蝶,主体并没有像他在清醒时提出这个问题:「当我不是这个梦的蝴蝶,当我清醒时,我是否确实就是这只蝴蝶?」

 

Lacan’s explanation here and thus his conclusion is that,

as dream butterfly, the subject is but his own representation whereas as

Choang-tsu, he is a social representation:

 

拉康在此的解释,因此他的结论是:作为梦中蝴蝶,主体仅是他的再现表象,而作为庄周,他的社会的再现表象。

 

when he is the butterfly, the idea does not occur to him to wonder

whether, when he is Choang-tsu awake, he is not the butterfly that he

is dreaming of being. This is because, when dreaming of being the

butterfly, he will no doubt have to bear witness later that he represented

himself as a butterfly. But this does not mean that he is captivated

by the butterfly – he is a captive butterfly, but captured by nothing,

for, in the dream, he is a butterfly for nobody. It is when he is

awake that he is Choang-tsu for others, and is caught in their butterfly

net. (76)

 

当他是蝴蝶时,他并没有想到这个观念,想要知道,当他是清醒时的庄周,他是否并不是他梦见生命实存的蝴蝶。这是因为,当他梦见成为蝴蝶时,他无可置疑地后来必须见证,他再现他自己的表象,作为蝴蝶。但是,这并不意味着,他被蝴蝶著迷—他成为蝴蝶的俘虏,而是他被空无补获,因为他在梦中,他是针对无人的蝴蝶。当他清醒时,他是庄周,那是针对其他人而言,而且他被他们的蝴蝶的网网住。

 

The point we can extract from Lacan’s reading of this parable is that the subject,

∃, cannot be reduced to either instance; neither butterfly nor Choangtsu.

Neither, however, is the subject properly some entity outwith the two

instances. The subject is not the property of, a pure effect of, the symbolic

order – here that which is fixed under the signifier Choang-tsu – nor can

the subject be reduced to a pure effect of itself (beyond or outwith the

signifying realm).

 

我们能够从拉康对于这个寓言的阅读抽离出这一点是,主体无法被简化成为任何一个例子,他既不是蝴蝶,也不是庄周。可是,在这两个例子之外,主体既不是恰当的某个实体。主体并不是象征界秩序的的特性,纯粹的结果—在此,被固定在庄子这个能指之下的东西。主体也不会被化简成为它的本身的纯粹的结果(超越或外在于能指的领域之外。)

雄伯译

 

In this sense, following IiIek (46), we could understand the dream (and

its content) as the fantasy of the subject wherein the butterfly constitutes the

(representative of the) object: (∃& butterfly). IiIek writes, “In the symbolic

reality he was Zhuang Zi [Choang-tsu], but in the real of his desire he was

a butterfly. Being a butterfly was the whole of his positive being outside the

symbolic network” (46).

 

从这个意义言,跟随着李列克,我们能够理解这个梦及其内容,作为是主体的幻见。在那里,蝴蝶形成客体的再现表象:李列克写的,「在象征的现实界,他说庄周,但是在他的欲望的实在界,他是蝴蝶。成为蝴蝶是在象征的网络之外的他的强烈生命实存的整体。」

 

What IiIek’s interpretation occludes is the fact

that, despite the impossibility of inverting the terms of the dream/fantasy to

which IiIek correctly attests, the parable does contain two instances of fantasy.

 

李列克的诠释阻塞的东西是这个事实:尽管不可能倒转李列克正确地测试的梦与幻见的这些术语,这个寓言确实包含两个幻见的例子。

 

While only one instance can, as Lacan confirms, be understood as a

dream, fantasy is not reducible to dream states – we fantasize when awake

and the unconscious continues to pulsate when awake.

 

依照拉康的证实,虽然仅有一个例子能够被理解,作为梦。幻见并没有被化简成为就是梦的状态。我们清醒时,会有幻见。当我们清醒时,无意识继续悸动。

 

While clearly, in accordance

with IiIek’s reading, the butterfly is a fantasized representation of

the subject such that it can be represented as ∃& butterfly, the parable also

contains the fantasy of being Choang-tsu; ∃& Choang-tsu.

 

遵照李列克的阅读,蝴蝶显而易见是主体的幻见的再现表象,以致于它能够被再现作为庄周与蝴蝶,这个寓言也包含成为庄周的幻见。

 

 

What is significant

in the parable in terms of the light it casts on the notion of fantasy is

that by raising and posing the question of his own identity and, in Lacan’s

words, in “not fully understand[ing] how right he is” (Four Fundamental

Concepts 76), Choang-tsu points us towards the impossibility of the subject

in either position. The subject is that aphanisic point of its own departure;

the subject is nothing but its own division.

 

用它投射在幻见的光的术语来说,寓言的重要的内容是,凭据提出他自己的认同的这个问题,用拉康的术语说,凭借并没有充分理解他正确的什么程度,庄子跟我们指向主体不可能处于任何的一个立场。主体是它自己离开的主体消失的点;主体仅是它自己的分裂。

 

In this sense the fantasy embodies a relation to some thing or image

which functions as the objet petit a and thus protects the subject from the

(im)possibility of the traumatic encounter with the Real by masking or obfuscating

the site of the lack in the symbolic order. At the same time, and in

a sense it is but a different perspective on the same function, the fantasy

serves to protect the subject from the jouissance of the Real by providing a

surrogate, fantasized, sense of unity.

 

从这个意义言,幻见具体表现跟某个物象或意象的关系。它们充当这个小客体,因此保护主体免于跟实在界遭遇的这个可能或不可能。因为它们遮蔽或阻碍在象征的秩序的欠缺的这个地点。同时,幻见充当保护主体免于实在界的这种欢爽,凭借提供一种代理,幻见的一致性的意义。

 

Through the mode of fantasy we can perceive the mechanism of desire

at work. The objet petit a, as that which causes desire, can be understood to

stand in for the unity we would wish to achieve. In both scenarios posed in

the parable, as we have seen, there is something of an imagined sense of unity

at work; I am the butterfly or I am Choang-tsu. In a sense, the psychoanalytic

“reality” is both attested to and negated in both versions – I am neither

the butterfly nor Choang-tsu but I am positioned in response to my conceptualization

of myself as the butterfly and Choang-tsu.

 

经由幻见的模式,我们感觉欲望运作的机制。小客体,作为是引起欲望的东西,能够被理解是代表我们希望获得的一致性。在这个寓言提出的两个剧本,如同我们曾经看见的,有某件被想象的一致性在运作的意义。我「是」蝴蝶,或我「是」庄子。从某个意义来说,精神分析的「现实界」在这两个版本里,既被测试,也被否定。我既不是蝴蝶,也不是庄周。但是我的立场是要回应我对我自己的概念化,作为是蝴蝶与庄周。

 

The truth of the

subject is the mark of desire inscribed in both fantasies. The Lacanian point

here would thus not be that the dream can be equated to fantasy and the waking

state could not, but rather that both dream and waking state attest to the

same fundamental fantasy, albeit in necessarily different modes.

 

主体的真理是,欲望被铭记在两种幻见的标记。拉康在此的观点,因此将不会是:梦有时相等于是幻见,而清醒的状态不能够等于是幻见。相反地,拉康的观点是:梦与清醒的时刻都测试相同的基本的幻见,虽然用必须是不同的方式。

 

As noted above, the fact that the Other is lacking points to the necessary

or constitutive lack in the subject. In encountering the Other as lacking,

the subject should be seen as not so much encountering the void of the Real,

but rather that point on the signifying chain which is indicative of the existence

of this void.

 

如上面注意到的,大他者欠缺的这个事实,指向主体的必然欠缺或构成本质的欠缺。当主体遭遇作为欠缺的大他者时,主体应该被看待,作为并不是遭遇到实在界的空无,相反地,而是遭遇到能指化锁链的那个点,能指化的锁链指示著这个空无的存在。

 

This allows us to understand the subject as resorting to

or finding support in fantasy as a veil for this lacking both in the Other, the

symbolic field, and in the subject itself. It is as such that the object of fantasy,

that in relation to which the subject places itself in fantasy, constitutes

the cause of subjective desire and thus constitutes the subject proper as subject

of desire. Without the function of fantasy the subject would fail to mobilize

itself.

 

这让我们能够理解主体,作为是诉诸于,或找到幻见的支撑,作为是遮蔽在大他者,象征界,与主体自身的这个欠缺。作为这样的欠缺,幻见的客体,就形成主体欲望的原因,因此形成主体的本体,作为是欲望的主体。主体将自己放置于幻见,作为是跟客体的幻见相关。假如没有幻见到这个功能,主体将没有办法动员自己。

 

That is to say, it would not properly be (a) subject: “in its fundamental

use, the fantasy is the means by which the subject maintains him-

self at the level of his vanishing desire, vanishing inasmuch as the very satisfaction

of demand deprives him of his object” (Lacan, “Direction of the

Treatment” 532).

 

换句话说,合宜地说,这并不是一个主体:「在体基本地使用,幻见是这个工具,主体凭借用来维持他自己,处于逐渐消失的欲望的层次,逐渐消失,因为要求的这个满意,让他丧失他的客体。」(拉康:治疗的方向,532页)

 

The castration of the subject, the dividing and alienating

effect of the symbolic order as it functions at one and the same time to allow

the possibility of the subject and to deny the subject the coherence it

might (impossibly) have otherwise enjoyed, is attested to in the intercession

of Demand. The desire which then arises as one effect of this intercession is

caused, set in motion, by the object of fantasy.

 

主体的阉割,象征秩序的区分与异化的结果,当它同时地发挥功能,让主体有存在的可能,并且拒绝给予主体,它否则可能(或不可能)享受到的一致性。主体的阉割被证实,

在「要求界」的介入时。因此而产生的欲望,作为是这个介入的一个结果,被幻见到客体所引起,所触动。

 

But this object, attesting as it

does to the state before castration, before the intercession of demand, is

never actually available to be attained. Fantasy is thus the mode whereby the

subject can “flirt” with the (semblance of the) object in a relatively secure

manner. In this sense, fantasy can be understood as the provision of a surrogate

jouissance which, as surrogate, serves to guard the subject against Real

jouissance by masking the lacking point in the symbolic network which is

indicative of the (possibility) of the emergence of the Real.

 

但是这个客体,因为它证实阉割之前的状态,在要求界的介入之前的状态,这个客体从来没有确实地可利用来获得。幻见因此是这个模式,主体凭借幻见,来跟客体的类似无「调情」,用比较安全的方式。幻见能够被理解,作为是提供一个代理欢爽。作为代理欢爽,它充当用来防护主体,对抗实在界的欢爽,凭借遮蔽在象征网络的这个欠缺点,。它指示著实在界的出现的这个可能性。

 

雄伯译

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

https://springhero.wordpress.com

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