精神病 167

精神病 167
2
These premises alone cast doubt on a theory of analytic treatment that with
ever-increasing insistence is reduced to a relation of two. It’s henceforth captivated
in the relationship between the subject’s ego and the ideal ego, between
the ego and the other, an other whose qualities may no doubt vary, but who
will always be – experience proves it – the one unique other of the imaginary
relation.

光是这些假设就对精神分析治疗的理论,投于怀疑。随着越来越增加的坚持,精神分析治疗的理论被简化成为两者的关系。它因此著迷于主体的自我与理想的自我之间的关系,自我与他者之间的关系。这个他者的性质,无可置疑,会有不同变化。但是,这个他者将总是—精神分析经验证明它—想象的关系的这个独特的他者。

As for the supposed object relation that is to be rehabilitated, the subject
is reduced to a curious experience that could be called the Kleinian substructure
of the imaginary, namely, the oral complex. Of course, in a subject who
isn’t inclined towards alienation of his own accord this can only persist on
the basis of a misunderstanding constituted by a sort of imaginary incorporation
or devouring which, given that the analytic relation is a relation of
speech, can only be an incorporation of the analyst’s discourse. On this deviant
conception analysis can’t be anything other than the incorporation of the
suggested, even supposed, discourse of the analyst – that is, the exact contrary
of analysis.

至于这个应该被重新复健的被认为的客体关系,主体被简化成为一个奇怪的经验。这个经验能够被称为所想象的次级结构。换句话说,在主体没有自动自发地倾向于异化时,它是口腔情结。这种口腔情结,仅是根据一种想象的合并,或吞食,形1的误解作为基础。假如考虑到,精神分析的关系是言说的关系,这种想象的合并或吞食,仅是精神分析家的辞说的合并。对于这个偏离的观念,精神分析实实在在不是别的,而是精神分析家的被建议,甚至是被假设的辞说的合并。也就是,跟精神分恰恰背道而驰。

On the rejection of a primordial signifier 147

I’m lighting my lantern and I shall therefore tell you my thesis. I’m going
to tell it to you the wrong way round – that is, by situating it on this genetic
level that seems to be so necessary for you to feel at ease. I shall tell you
afterwards that this isn’t it, but still, let’s begin by saying that if this were it
then it would be as I’m about to say it is.

我正在点亮我的灯笼。因此,我将告诉你们我的主题。我将以迂回的方式告诉你们。也就是说,凭借定位它在起源的层次。为了让你们感到自在,这似乎是如此的必要。我随后将告诉你们,这并不是我的主题。可是,让我们开始这样说,假如这就是我的主题,那么它将就是如同我即将说它就是我的主题。

It’s a question of a thesis involving the entire psychical economy, which is
important for an understanding of the confused debates still going on over
the Kleinian fantasmatic, for the refutation of certain objections made against it, and also for better situating what it can truly or fruitfully contribute to an
understanding of the precocity of the repressions it implies. As a matter of
fact, contrary to what Freud says, that there is no repression properly so called
before the decline of the Oedipus complex, the Kleinian theory on the
other hand entails the claim that repression exists right from the earliest preoedipal
stages.

主题的问题牵涉到整个的心理的生命活力。这个生命活力是重要的,因为对于这些混淆的辩论的理解,依旧还在进行当中,对于克莱恩的幻见理论,对于它的某种反对意见的反驳,以及对于更加精确地定位,它确实有成果地促成理解,它所建议的各种潜抑的早熟。事实上,跟弗洛依德所说恰恰相反,在伊狄浦斯情结衰微之前,并没有适当地所谓的潜抑。在另一方面,克莱恩的理论涵盖这个宣称:潜抑从最早期的前伊狄浦斯阶段,就存在。

168

My thesis may equally throw light on a contradiction concerning autoerotism
that appears insoluble in Freud himself. On the one hand he talks about
the primitive object of the first mother-child relation. On the other he formulates
the notion of primordial autoerotism, that is to say, of a stage, however
short we suppose it to be, in which there is no external world for the
child.3

我的主题同样地启明一个关于自动性爱化的悖论。在弗洛依德的自身,这个悖论似乎没有解决。在一方面,他谈论到最早母亲与小孩的关系的原初的客体。在另一方面,他说没原初的自动性爱的观念。换句话说,无论我们认为这个阶段是如何简短,在这个阶段里,对于小孩而言,并没有外在的世界/

The question is that of the human being’s primordial access to his reality
insofar as we assume that there is a reality correlative to him – an assumption
always implied at the outset of this theme, but which we also know that we
shall have in part to abandon, because there would be no question about this
reality were it itself not constantly being called into question. Is there anything
in man that has this both enveloping and coapted character which causes
us to invent the notion of Umwelt for animals?

这个问题是人类的原初接近他的现实界的问题。我们假设,有一个跟他相关的现实界—这种假设总是暗示着这个主题的开始。但是我们也知道,我们将必须部分放弃这个假设。因为将不可能有这个现实界,假如它自身没有不断地受到置疑;在人身上,有没有任何东西拥有既涵盖,又缝合的特性,让我们替动物发明「无意识」的这个观念?

I point out to you in passing that we make use of this hypothesis concerning
animals to the extent that an animal is for us an object and that there are
conditions that are in fact strictly indispensable to its existence. We’re happy
to investigate how an animal functions so as always to be in harmony with
these primordial conditions, and this is what we call an instinct, an instinc-
tual cycle or instinctual behavior – if there are things that aren’t in there, one
has to assume that we can’t see them, and since we can’t see them we’re
happy, and in fact why shouldn’t we be?

我顺便跟你们指出,我们使用关于动物的这个假设,甚至,对于我们而言,动物是一种客体,事实上,它的存在会有些绝对不可免除的情况。我们很乐意研究,动物如何发挥功能,为了总是跟这些原初的情况和谐。这就是我们所谓的本能,本能的迴圈,或本能的行为。假如有些东西并不存在那里,我们必须假定:我们无法看见它们。而且,因为我们无法看见它们,我们很乐意。事实上,有何不可呢?

It’s very clear that this is inadequate where man is concerned. The open
and proliferating nature of his world prevents us from making it into his
biological correlate. This is where I try, because it seems coherent and useful
for me to do so, to differentiate for you between the three orders of the
symbolic, the imaginary, and the real. It’s abundantly clear that everything
that our analytic experience shows us can be satisfactorily classified into these
three orders of relationships, the question being at what moment each of
these relationships is established.

显而易见地,就人类而言,这是不足够的。人的世界具有开放而且繁殖的特性,让我们不可能就将它当作是人的生物的相关因素。这就是我尝试要跟你们区别的地方,象征界,想象界,与实在界的这三个秩序之间,因为我一贯而且有用地如此做。这是非常显见的,我们精神分析经验跟我们显示的东西,能够令人满意地分类为这三个关系的秩序。问题是,在什么时刻,这三个关系的每一个被建立。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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