荣格:无意识的结构

484 With regard to individual psychology, however, science must
waive its claims. To speak of a science of individual psychology is already a contradiction in terms. It is only the collective ele¬ment in the psychology of an individual that constitutes an ob¬ject for science; for the individual is by definition something unique that cannot be compared with anything else. A psychol¬ogist who professes a “scientific” individual psychology is simply denying individual psychology. He exposes his individual psy-chology to the legitimate suspicion of being merely his own psy¬chology. The psychology of every individual would need its own manual, for the general manual can deal only with collective psychology.

可是,关于个人心理学,科学必须放弃它的宣称。谈论到个人心理学的科学,在术语方面,就已经是一种矛盾。它仅是个人的心理学的集体因素,这种个人组成科学的对象。因为个人在定义上,是某件独特的东西,无法跟任何其他东西相比较。宣称是科学的个人的心理学家,仅是在否认个人心理学。他暴露他的个人心理学,承受那仅是他自己的心理学的合理的怀疑。每一位个人的心理学将需要它自己的手册,因为一般性的手册仅能够处理集体心理。

485 These remarks are intended as a prelude to what I have to
say about the handling of the aforesaid problem. The funda¬mental error of both procedures consists in identifying the sub¬ject with one side or the other of his psychology. His psychology is as much individual as collective, but not in the sense that the individual ought to merge himself in the collective, nor the col¬lective in the individual. We must rigorously separate the con¬cept of the individual from that of the persona, for the persona can be entirely dissolved in the collective. But the individual is precisely that which can never be merged with the collective and is never identical with it. That is why identification with the collective and voluntary segregation from it are alike synony¬mous with disease.

这些谈论被用来作为是一种序言,对于我所必需谈论关于前述问题的处理。两种程序的基本错误在于将主体认同于他的心理学的某一边。他的心理学既是个人,也是集体。但是意义上并不是,个人应该将他自己融入集体,也不是集体融入个人。我们必须严格地将个人的观念,跟人格面具的观念分开。因为人格面具完全瓦解于集体当中。但是个人确实是永远无法被融入集体当中,并且永远无法认同它。那就是为什么认同集体,并且自愿跟它分离,两者都是疾病的同义字。

486 It is simply impossible to effect a clear division of the indi-
vidual from the collective, and even if it were possible it would be quite pointless and valueless for our purpose. It is sufficient to know that the human psyche is both individual and collec¬tive, and that its well-being depends on the natural co-operation of these two apparently contradictory sides. Their union is es¬sentially an irrational life process that can, at most, be described in individual cases, but can neither be brought about, nor un¬derstood, nor explained rationally.15

要清楚地区分个人心灵跟集体心灵,就是不可能。即使可能,对于我们的目标,那也是完全没有意义,没有价值。我们仅需要知道,人类的心灵既是个人,也是集体,就足够了。它的幸福依靠这两种明显的矛盾的自然的合作。它们的统一基本上是非理性的生命的过程,充其量能够在个人的情况被描述,但是既无法被导致,也无法被理解,更无法理想地被解释。

15 [This paragraph, though included in the earliest draft of the German MS, was omitted from the earlier French and English translations.-EDITORS.]
289

APPENDICES
<le87 If I may be forgiven a humorous illustration of the starting-
point for the solution of our problem, I would cite Buridan’s ass between the two bundles of hay. Obviously his question was wrongly put. The important thing was not whether the bundle on the right or the one on the left was the better, or which one he ought to start eating, but what he wanted in the depths of his being-which did he feel pushed towards? The ass wanted the object to make up his mind for him.

假如我被容许用一个幽默的例子,作为我们的难体的解决的出发点,我将引述布瑞顿的两束乾草之间的驴子。显而易见地,他的问题提出的方式错误。重要的事情并不是在右边,或者在左边的乾草束比较好,或是他应该从哪边吃起,而是他在他生命的深处,他所要的东西,他感觉被迫超著它们前进。驴子想要这个对象来代替他下定决心。

<le88 What is it, at this moment and in this individual, that repre-
sents the natural urge of life? That is the question.

在这个时刻,在这个个人,是什么代表生命的自然渴望?那是个问题。

<le8g That question neither science, nor worldly wisdom, nor reli-
gion, nor the best of advice can resolve for him. The resolution can come solely from absolutely impartial observation of those psychological germs of life which are born of the natural collab¬oration of the conscious and the unconscious on the one hand and of the individual and the collective on the other. Where do we find these germs of life? One man seeks them in the con¬scious, another in the unconscious. But the conscious is only one side, and the unconscious is only its reverse. We should never forget that dreams are the compensators of consciousness. If it were not so, we would have to regard them as a source of knowl¬edge superior to consciousness: we should then be degraded to the mental level of fortune tellers and would be obliged to ac¬cept all the futility of superstition, or else, following vulgar opinion, deny any value at all to dreams.

这个问题既非科学,也非世俗的智慧,更非宗教,即使是金玉良言都无法给他提供解答。解答仅能来自绝对不偏不倚的观察,对于那些生命的心理的微细来源。它们诞生于一方面是意识与无意识的自然合作,另一方面是个人与集体心灵的合作。我们到哪里寻找这些生命的细微来源?有人在意识里寻找,另外有人在无意识里寻找。但是意识仅是一边,而无意识则仅是另外一边。我们永远不应该忘记,梦是意识状态的补偿。假如不是那样,我们将会必须将梦视为是优秀于意识的知识的来源。我们因此应该被贬抑到算命师的精神层次,并且被迫接受迷信,或其他随之而来的粗俗意见的徒劳无用,根本否认掉梦的价值。

490 It is in creative fantasies that we find the unifying function
we seek. All the functions that are active in the psyche converge in fantasy. Fantasy has, it is true, a poor reputation among psy¬chologists, and up to the present psychoanalytic theories have treated it accordingly. For Freud as for Adler it is nothing but a “symbolic” disguise for the basic drives and intentions presup¬posed by these two investigators. As against these opinions it must be emphasized-not on theoretical grounds but essentially for practical reasons-that although fantasy can be causally ex-plained and devalued in this way, it nevertheless remains the creative matrix of everything that has made progress possible for humanity. Fantasy has its own irreducible value, for it is a psy¬chic function that has its roots in the conscious and the uncon¬sciousalike, in the individual as much as in the collective.

在这个创造性的想象,我们找到我们寻找到这个统一的功能。在心灵里所有主动的功能,都在想象里汇集。的确,在心理学界当中,想象拥有的名声并不佳。迄今,心理学的理论曾经也是同样态度对待它。弗洛依德,跟阿德勒一样,认为积极想象仅是基本冲动与意图的象征的伪装,这两位研究员预先这样假设。跟他们的意见背道而驰的,我们必须强调,不是根据理论的理由,而是基本上为了实践的目的。虽然想象能够用因果关系来解释,并且以这种方式贬抑它。它仍然始终是人类进步的成为可能的一切事物的创造的基础。想象拥有它自己的无法还原的价值。因为它是心灵的功能,同样拥有它的根源于意识与无意识,于个人与集体心灵。

290

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