[228] 447 By way of example I would like to recall the case of a
schizophrenic patient of Maeder’s, who used to declare that the world was his picture-book.2 He was a wretched locksmith’s ap¬prentice who fell ill at an early age and had never been blessed with much intelligence. This notion of his, that the world was his picture-book, the leaves of which he was turning over as he looked around him, is exactly the same as Schopenhauer’s “world as will and idea,” but expressed in primitive picture lan¬guage. His vision is just as sublime as Schopenhauer’s, the only difference being that with the patient it remained at an embry¬onic stage, whereas in Schopenhauer the same idea is trans¬formed from a vision into an abstraction and expressed in a lan¬guage that is universally valid.


[229] 448 It would be quite wrong to suppose that the patient’s

vision had a personal character and value, for that would be to endow the patient with the dignity of a philosopher. But, as I have indicated, he alone is a philosopher who can transmute a vision born of nature into an abstract idea, thereby translating it into a universally valid language. Schopenhauer’s philosophical conception represents a personal value, but the vision of the pa¬tient is an impersonal value, a merely natural growth, the pro¬prietary right to which can be acquired only by him who ab¬stracts it into an idea and expresses it in universal terms. It would, however, be wrong to attribute to the philosopher, by exaggerating the value of his achievement, the additional merit of having actually created or invented the vision itself. It is a primordial idea that grows up quite as naturally in the philoso¬pher and is simply a part of the common property of mankind, in which, in principle, everyone has a share. The golden apples drop from the same tree, whether they be gathered by a lock¬smith’s apprentice or by a Schopenhauer.


[218] 449 These primordial ideas, of which I have given a great
many examples in my work on libido,S oblige one to make, in regard to unconscious material, a distinction of quite a different character from that between “preconscious” and “unconscious” or “subconscious” and “unconscious.” The justification for these distinctions need not be discussed here. They have their specific value and are well worth elaborating further as points of view. The fundamental distinction which experience has forced upon me claims to be no more than that. It should be evident from the foregoing that we have to distinguish in the uncon-scious a layer which we may call the personal unconscious. The contents of this layer are of a personal nature in so far as they have the character partly of acquisitions derived from the individual’s life and partly of psychological factors4 which could just as well be conscious.


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