Ethic 131

Ethic 131
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康
χ Marginal comments
第十章 边缘的评论

ART, RELIGION, SCIENCE
艺术、宗教、科学

ON THE SUBJECT OF SPITZ
论史匹兹的主体

ANAMORPHOSIS AND ARCHITECTURE
变形与艺术

THE PRIMACY OF THE ES
Es 的原初性
2
I would like now to make sure that today’s meeting might be of some use to
those who have travelled some distance to get here.

我现在想要确定,今天的演讲可能有些用途,对于那些远道而来的那些人。

Given the point we have reached in my Seminar, it seems likely that some
of you may have questions to ask me or answers to give, so as to suggest the
meaning for them of some element or other in my argument.

假如考虑在我的研讨班,我们已经到达的这个点。这似乎是可能的,你们有些人,可能会有问题要问问,或有些答案要给予。为了建议在我的论点,对于他们,在某些元素的这个意义。

I know that it is never easy to break the silence in a crowd, to ring one’s
little bell, so to speak. I will, therefore, give you the opportunity to ask me a
written question. The only disadvantage there is that I am free to read it as I
see fit.

我知道,要在群众中打破这个沉默并不容易,也就是,要摇响这个小铃。因此,我将给予你们这个机会用文字书写问我。唯一的不方便是,我可以随我方便自由地来阅读。

At the same time we are going to do something unexpected that strikes me
as a good idea. Some of you attended the scientific meeting of our Society
yesterday. I don’t know how it ended because I had to leave after having
responded at some length to the lecturers, people for whom I have the greatest
affection, and after I had expressed my deep interest in their work. They
are here today and I would like to ask Smirnov for some clarification on the
subject of Spitz’s “No and Yes.”1‘

同时,我们正要做某件意料之外的事情。这个事情给我的印象是一个好点子。昨天,你们有些人出现我们社团的科学的会议。我并不知道它如何结束,因为我必须离开,在详细回答一些演讲者之后。我对那些演讲者非常敬爱。在我表达对他们的研究深感興趣之后。他们今天在此,我想要要求史莫诺夫来做一些澄清,对于史匹兹的「不要与是的」

Why did you not tackle the “Yes”? [Mr. Smirnov’s answer.]
你们为什不克服这个「是的」?(史莫诺夫的回答)

Let me explain to those who do not know the text that it is a book belonging
to a series of investigations founded on the direct observation of newborn
babies or more precisely of infants, that is to say, up to the point of the
appearance of articulated language as such. Within this dimension, Spitz claims
to find the “No” as a “pattern,” as a semantic form in a certain number of
gestures and expressions, and primarily in “rooting” – that is to say, in the
oscillating gesture of the head that the infant makes in its approach to the
breast. The word is very difficult to translate into French, but there is a
correlative in the English text in the word “snout,” which clearly indicates
what is involved.

让我解释,对那些不知道这个文本的人,这是一本书属于一系列的研究,以新生的婴儿的直接观察作基础,或是更确实地说,以婴儿的观察。换句话说,一直到被表达的语言本身的出现。在这个维度里,史匹兹宣称发现这个「不要」,作为一个「模式」,作为一个语意的形式,这某些的姿态与表达。最初是在footing。换句话说,在头的摇摆的姿态,婴儿在接近乳房时,低下的头。这个footing很难翻译成为法文,但是在英文文本有一个相关字snout(鼻子探前)。很清楚地指示所牵涉的东西。

I am far from being critical of Spitz. I intend rather to defend him. I don’t
mean he is right, but the work is good and sharply articulated. And I would
fault you with failing to have brought out the fact that the phenomenon is
analogous to what occurs in traumatic neurosis – it is, he says, the last memory
before the emergence of the catastrophic reaction.

我丝毫并不是在批评史匹兹。相反地,我打算替他辩护。我并不说他是正确的,但是这个研究是好的,而且清楚地被表达。我将责怪你们,因为没有揭露这个事实:这个现象跟创伤的神经症所发生的事情类似。他说,那是最后的记忆,在灾难的反应出现之前。

I embarrassed you by asking you to comment on Spitz’s other works, namely,
his fiction on The Primal Cavity or at the very least his references to the
screen of the dream.

我让你们感到尴尬,要求你们评论史匹兹的其他著作。换句话说,他的对「原初的空洞」的想象,或是至少,他提到梦的帘幕。

Spitz doesn’t on the whole elaborate on the fact that a form of reaction
deriving from an earlier stage may be used in a critical situation. That seems
to be a very useful idea, however, something that should always be emphasized.
I think you made the point, unless it was Laplanche.

大体上,史匹兹并没有建构这个事实:从早期阶段获得的反应的形式,可以被使用在批评的情况。可是,那似乎是一个有用的观念,某件应该总是被强调的东西。我认为你们表达这个要点,除非是拉普兰奇。

Spitz is reduced to having a mechanism as passive as that of traumatic
neurosis intervene. He thus implies some preceding frustration of the infant.
He considers the act of “rooting” to be a trace which remains inscribed after
something like the refusal or withdrawal of the breast that immediately precedes
it. It is surprising that he expresses it in an isolated form, on the basis
of a given case, and not in general.

史匹兹被沦落到将一个机制,充当像是创伤的神经症的机制介入一样地被动。他因此暗示婴儿具有某种先前的挫折。他认为rooting(鼻头探触)的这个行动,是一种始终被铭记的痕迹,在某件像是立即在他之前的乳房的拒绝或撤退的东西。令人惊奇的是,婴儿表达它,用一个孤立的形式,以一个特定的情况为基础,而不是一般的情况。

[Statements by Mr. Smirnov and Laplanche; a question from Mr. Audouard:
“Why do you speak to us about the Thing instead of simply speaking about
mediation?”]

(史莫诺夫与拉普兰奇的陈述,由奥道尔德提的问题:「为什么你跟我们谈论这个「物象」,而不仅谈论有关中介?

To answer you briefly right away, I note that you have always been attentive
to the note of what one might call Hegelian reinterpretations of analytical
experience. We are concerned here with the Freudian experience as an ethics,
which is to say, at its most essential level, since it directs us towards a therapeutic
form of action that, whether we like it or not, is included in the register
or in the terms of an ethics. And the more we deny this, the more it is
the case. Experience demonstrates this: a form of analysis that boasts of its
highly scientific distinctiveness gives rise to normative notions that I characterize
by evoking the curse Saint Matthew utters on those who make the
bundles heavier when they are to be carried by others. Strengthening the
categories of affective normativity produces disturbing results.

要立刻简短地回答你的问题,我注意到,你总是专注于所谓的精神分析经验的黑格尔的解释的重要性。我们在此关心弗洛依德的精神分析经验,作为一门伦理学。换句话说,在它的最基本的层次,因为它引导我们朝向一个治疗的行动的形式。无论我们喜欢与否,它被包括在这个铭记,或是伦理学的术语。我们越是否认这个,情况越是如此。精神分析经验证明这点:自夸它具有高度的科学的杰出的精神分析的形式,产生命名观念,我表现它们的特征,凭借召唤圣马修表达的诅咒,对于那些将那些负担变得沉重的人,当它们应该由别人来承载。强调情感命名的范畴,产生令人困扰的结果。

It is clear that we put the accent on the irreducible element in the instinct,
on that which appears at the limit of a mediation and that reification is unable
to encompass. But in encircling that something whose limits we explore, we
are encircling the empty image.

显而易见,我们强调本能的这个无法还原的因素,强调出现在中介的限制的东西,以及物化不能够涵盖的东西。但是当我们环绕我们探索的东西的限制,我们环绕这个空洞的意象。

The deliberate intention to emphasize this notion has never been absent
from what I have said thus far. If you look up the texts I referred you to on
this subject, you will see that there is no ambiguity. That Hegelian radicalism
that was rashly attributed to me somewhere by a contributor to Les Temps
Modemes should in no way be imputed to me. The whole dialectic of desire
that I developed here, and that I was beginning at the very moment the rash
individual was writing that particular sentence, is sharply distinguished from
such Hegelianism. It is even more marked this year. The inevitable character
seems to me to be especially marked in the effect of sublimation.

这个刻意的意图,要强调这个观念,从来没有欠缺,从迄今我曾经说过的东西。假如你们查阅我跟你们推荐有关这个主题的文本。你们将会看出,并没有模糊暧昧。一位投稿给Les Temps Modemes的作者,轻率地将黑格尔的激进主义归属于我。我根本就不应该承受这个归属。我在此发展的欲望的整个的辩证法,我逐渐开始的辩证法,在那个轻率的作者写出那个特别的句子的时刻,明显地不同于黑格尔的辩证法。今年,这个现象更加显著。我觉得这个无可避免的特性,在探讨升华的影响时,特别显著。

Mr. X: The formula for sublimation that you have given us is to raise the
object to the dignity of the Thing. This Thing doesn’t exist to start with,
because sublimation is going to bring us to it. The question I have is, therefore,
isn’t this Thing not really a thing, but on the contrary a Non-Thing,
and isn’t it through sublimation that one comes to see it as being the Thing (. . .)?

X 先生:你曾经给予我们的升华的公式,就是要将客体提升到「物象」的尊严。这个物象并没有一开始就存在,因为升华将会带领我们去它那里。我的问题因此是,这个物象其实并不是一个东西,而是相反地,是一个「非物象」。难道不是通升华,我们逐渐看见它,作为是这个物象?

What you are saying strikes me as on the right track; it’s obvious you follow
my presentation of these questions without difficulty. Something is offered
to us as analysts, if we follow the sum of our experience and if we know how
to evaluate it. You state that the attempt at sublimation tends in the end to
realize the Thing or to save it. It’s true and it’s not true. There’s an illusion
there.

你所正在说的内容,给我的印象是正确的途径。显而易见,你对于我呈现这些问题,接受并无困难。某件东西被提供给于我们,作为精神分析家。假如我们遵照我们精神分析经验的这个总数,假如我们知道如何评估它。你陈述,升华的企图最后倾向于实现这个物象,或是拯救它。这确实并非是真实。在那里,有一个幻象。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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