少于空无:第11章

CHAPTER 11c
第11章

Less Than Nothing
少于空无

Slavoj Zizek
斯拉夫、齐泽克

FORMULAE OF SEXUATION: THE ALL WITH AN EXCEPTION

性别化公式:具有例外的这个「全部」

Lacan elaborated the inconsistencies which structure sexual difference in his
“formulae of sexuation,” where the masculine side is defined by the universal function and its constitutive exception, and the feminine side by the paradox of “non‐All” (pas‐tout) (there is no exception, and for that very reason, the set is non‐All, non‐totalized). Recall the shifting status of the Ineffable in Wittgenstein: the passage from early to late Wittgenstein is the passage from All (the order of the universal All grounded in its constitutive exception) to non‐All (the order without exception and for that reason non‐universal, non‐All).

拉康建构作为性别差异的架构的这些不一贯性,在他的「性别公式」。在那里,男性的一面根据普遍性的功用与结构性的例外来定义。而女性的这边则是根据「并非全部」的悖论来定义。(没有例外,因为那个理由,这个集合是并非全部,并非整体性)。请大家回忆一下,维根斯坦对于无法解释物的转变的地位:从早期维根斯坦到晚期维根斯坦的过程,是从「全部」(全部作为基础的普遍性的秩序,在它的结构性的例外),到「并非全部」(没有例外的秩序,因为那个理由,并非是普遍性,并非全部)。

That is to say, in the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, the world is comprehended as a self‐enclosed, limited, bounded Whole of “facts” which precisely as such presupposes an Exception: the mystical Ineffable which functions as its Limit. In late Wittgenstein, on the contrary, the problematic of the Ineffable disappears, yet for that very reason the universe is no longer comprehended as a Whole regulated by the universal conditions of language: all that remains are lateral connections between partial domains. The notion of language as a system defined by a set of universal features is replaced by the notion of language as a multitude of dispersed practices loosely interconnected by “family resemblances.”22

换句话说,在早期维根斯坦的「逻辑哲学论文Tractatus 」,这个世界被理解作为是各种事实的自我封闭,有限制,有边界的整体。它的本身确实预先假设一种「例外」:神秘的无法解释物充当是它的限制。相反地,在晚期维根斯坦,这个无法解释物的问题消失。可是,正因为那个理由,宇宙不再是可理解,作为一个「整体性」,受到语言的普遍性条件的规范:所有剩余的东西,都是部分领域的边缘联接。语言作为系统的观念,由一套普遍性特征来定义,现在被取代。由语言作为众多的散佈的实践的观念取代。这些散佈的实践则是受到「家庭的类似物」互相联结。

A certain type of ethnic cliché renders perfectly this paradox of the non‐All: the
narratives of Origin in which a nation posits itself as being “more X than X itself,” where X stands for another nation commonly regarded as the paradigmatic case of some property.

某种的少数民族的陈词让这个「并非全部」的悖论表现得最为淋漓尽致。起源的所有叙事,每次都伴随着不同的否定。在起源的叙事里,一个国家提出它自己,作为「比 X 的本身更加是X」。在那里,X代表另外一个国家。那个国家共同被认为是某种财产的典范案例。

The myth of Iceland is that it became inhabited when those who found Norway, the freest land in the world, too oppressive, fled to Iceland; the myth about Slovenes being miserly claims that Scotland (the proverbial land of misers) became populated when Slovenes expelled to Scotland someone who had spent too much money.

冰岛的神话是,它开始有人定居,当有些人发现挪威,世界上最自由的土地,太过于压迫。他们逃到冰岛。关于斯拉夫人是守财奴的神话宣称:苏格兰(守财奴的世俗家园),苏格兰开始有人定居,当斯拉夫人被驱赶到苏格兰时,某个人曾经挥霍太多的钱。

The point is not that Slovenes are the most avaricious or Icelanders the most freedom‐loving—Scots remain the most miserly, but Slovenes are even more so; the people of Norway remain the most freedom‐loving, but Icelanders are even more so. This is the paradox of the “non‐All”: if we totalize all nations, then the Scots are the most miserly, yet if we compare them one by one, as “non‐All,” Slovenes are more miserly. A variation on the same motif occurs in Rossini’s famous statement on the difference between Beethoven and Mozart: when asked, “Who is the greatest composer?” Rossini answered, “Beethoven”; when asked the additional question “What about Mozart?” he added, “Mozart is not the greatest, he is the only composer…”

重点并不是斯拉夫人是最贪婪的人,或是冰岛是最热爱自由的人。苏格兰人始终是守财奴。而是斯拉夫人甚至是更加守财奴。挪威的人们始终是最热爱自由的人,而是冰岛人甚至是更加热爱自由的人。这个就是「并非全部」的悖论:假如我们将所有的国家整体化,那么苏格兰人是最守财奴的人。可是,假如我们逐一地比较他们,作为「并非全部」,斯拉夫人是更加的守财奴。对于相同主题的一个变种发生在罗西尼的著名的陈述,对于贝多芬与莫扎特之间的差异。当被问到,「谁是最伟大的作曲家?」罗西尼回答,「贝多芬」;当被问到这个额外的问题,「莫扎特怎么样?」他补充说,「莫扎特并不是最伟大,他是仅有的作曲家、、、」

This opposition between Beethoven (“the greatest” of them all, since he struggled with his compositions with titanic effort, overcoming the resistance of the musical material) and Mozart (who freely floated in the musical stuff and composed with spontaneous grace) points towards the well‐known opposition between the two notions of God: God as “the greatest,” above all Creation, the Ruler of the World, and so on, and God who is not the greatest but simply the only reality, who does not relate to finite reality as separate from him, since he is “all there is,” the immanent principle of all reality.23

将贝多芬与莫扎特相提并论,(贝多芬是所有作曲家中最伟大,因为他费尽心力跟他的作曲奋斗,克服音乐材料的阻碍;而莫扎特则是自由地飘浮在音乐道材料里,作曲时自动自发而且悠遊高雅),指向这个著名的对立:上帝的两个观念的对立:一个上帝的观念,作为是「最伟大,尤其是在创造世界方面,世界的统治者,等等;另一个上帝的观念,并不是最伟大,而仅是唯一的现实界。他并没有跟有限的现实界相关,作为是跟他分开,因为他就是「现实界所有存在的一切」,所有现实界的不朽原则。

The famous first paragraph of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti‐Oedipus contains another unexpected example of universality grounded in an exception: it begins with a long list of what the unconscious (“it,” not the substantialized “Id,” of course) does: “It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks.”24 Talking is conspicuously missing from this series: for Deleuze and Guattari, there is no “ça parle,” the unconscious does not talk. The plethora of functions is in place to cover up this absence—as was clear already to Freud, multiplicity (of phalluses in a dream, of the wolves the Wolf‐man sees through the window in his
famous dream) is the very image of castration. Multiplicity signals that the One is
lacking.25

德勒兹与瓜达里的「反伊狄浦斯」的著名的第一段,包括另外一个意料之外的例子:普遍性以例外作为基础。它开始于一长列的无意识的作为(当然,「它」并不是「本我」的实体化」:「它到处运作,有时功能顺畅,有时它适合与开始。它呼吸,它发热,它吃。它拉屎,它性交」。从这一系列当中,谈话显而易见是失落。对于德勒兹与瓜达里,「言说」并不存在,无意识并不言说。丰富的功能各就各位,掩盖这个欠缺—如同对于弗洛依德,这已经是显而易见,多重性(梦中阳具的多重性,狼人通过他著名的梦中的窗户观看的狼的多重性)就是阉割的意象。多重性意指著,这个「一」是欠缺的。

The logic of universality and its constitutive exception should be deployed in three moments: (1) First, there is the exception to universality: every universality contains a particular element which, while formally belonging to the universal dimension, sticks out, does not fit its frame. (2) Then comes the insight that every particular example or element of a universality is an exception: there is no “normal” particularity, every particularity sticks out, is in excess and/or lacking with regard to its universality (as Hegel showed, no existing form of state fits the notion of the State). (3)Then comes the proper dialectical twist: the exception to the exception—still an exception, but the exception as singular universality, an element whose exception is its direct link to universality itself, which stands directly for the universal. (Note here the parallel with the three moments of the value‐form in Marx.)

普遍性的逻辑与其结构的例外应该被运作,在三个时刻:一、首先,普遍性有这个例外;每个普遍性包括一个特别的因素。虽然它正式属于普遍性的维度,它突出,它不适合于框架。二、然后有这个洞察:每个特殊的例子或普遍性的元素是一个例外。没有「正常」的特殊性,每个特殊性都突出,处于过度及欠缺,关于这个普遍性(如同黑格尔显示,没有一个现存的国家的形式适合国家的观念)。三、然后来临的就是适当的辩证法的变形:例外中的例外—依旧是一个例外。但是这个例外作为独特的普遍性,这一个元素的例外就是它跟普遍性本身的直接关系。它直接代表普遍性。(请注意这里的这个并列,跟在马克思的价值形式的三个时刻的并列。)

The starting point for Lacan’s formulae of sexuation is Aristotle—why? Aristotle oscillates between two notions of the relationship between form and matter: either form is conceived as universal, a possibility of particular beings, and matter as the principle or agent of individualization (what makes a table this particular table is the particular matter in which the universal form of Table is actualized), or matter is conceived as neutral‐universal stuff, a possibility of different beings, and form as the principle of individualization, as the agent which transforms neutral matter into a particular entity (the form of a table makes wood—which could have become many other things—a table). For
Hegel, of course, the first notion is that of abstract universality (universality as a neutral form shared by many particular entities), while the second notion already contains the germ of concrete universality: the form (i.e., universal concept) is in itself the principle or agent of its own individualization, of its concrete self‐articulation. It is in order to resolve or obfuscate this deadlock that Aristotle has to have recourse to sexual difference: being (a substantial entity) is the unity of form and hyle, of masculine and feminine, of active and passive.

对于拉康的性别公式的起始点是亚里斯多德—为什么?亚里斯多德摇摆于形式与物质之间的关系的两个观念之间:要就是,形式被构想成为普遍性,特殊的存在物的可能性,物质被构想成为个体化的原则与代理物(让桌子成为这个特殊的桌子的原因,是这个特殊的物质,桌子的普遍性形式在那里被实现)。要不然就是,物质被构想成为中立与普遍性的材料,不同存在物的可能性,而形式则是被构想成为个体化的原则,作为代理物,将中立的物质转变成为特殊的实体(桌子的形式使木材成为桌子—虽然木材本来能够成为许多的其他东西)。当然,对于黑格尔,第一个观念上抽象的普遍性的观念(普遍性作为中立的形式,受到许多特殊性的实体的分享)。而第二个观念已经包括具体普遍性的因子:形式(譬如,普遍性的观念)本身就是它自己的个体化的原则与代理物,它自己的具体的自我实现。为了要解决或模糊这个僵局,亚里斯多德必须诉诸于性别差异:存在作为一个实质的实体, 就是形式与物质的一致性,男性与女性的一致性,主动与被动的一致性。

This point is crucial to bear in mind: Lacan’s claim is not the rather obvious one that the Aristotelian couple of form and hyle is “sexualized,” that Aristotelian ontology remains in the lineage of the ancient sexualized cosmologies. It is, on the contrary, that Aristotle has to have recourse to a sexualized couple in order to resolve a strictly conceptual problem—and that this solution does not work, since the paradox of gender is that it disturbs the clear division into genus and species: we cannot say that humanity is a genus (gender) composed of two species, men and women, since a species is a unity which can reproduce itself—no wonder our everyday use of these terms turns this hierarchical
distinction around: we talk about the human species composed of (divided into) two genders.26 What this confusion indicates is that there is indeed “gender trouble,” but not in Judith Butler’s sense: the point is not only that the identity of each sex is not clearly established, neither socially nor symbolically nor biologically—it is not only that sexual identity is a symbolic norm imposed onto a fluid and polymorphous body which never fits the ideal—the “trouble” is rather that this ideal itself is inconsistent, masking a constitutive
incompatibility. Sexual difference is not simply a particular difference subordinated to the universality of the human genus/gender, but has a stronger status inscribed into the very universality of the human species: a difference which is the constitutive feature of the universal species itself, and which, paradoxically, for this reason, precedes (logically/conceptually) the two terms it differentiates between: “perhaps, the difference which keeps apart one [sex] from the other belongs neither to the one nor to the other.”27

这点非常重要,要铭记在心。拉康的宣称并不是这个明显的宣称:亚里斯多德将形式与物质的配对是「性别化」,亚里斯多德的本体论始终是在古代的性别化的宇宙论的脉络里。相反地,亚里斯多德必须诉诸于性别化的配对,为了解决严格是观念的问题。这种解决行不通,因为性别的悖论式,它扰乱这个清楚的区分成为物种与品种。我们无法说,人类是由两种品种组成的物种(性别化),男人与女人。因为品种是一种能够繁殖自己的一致性。难怪我们日常使用这些术语,将这种阶层的区别倒转过来。我们谈论人类的品种是由两种性别组成(区分)。这种混淆所指示的内容是,确实是有「性别的麻烦」。但不是朱蒂丝、巴特勒的意义:这个点不但是每个性别的认同没有清楚地被建立,无论社会上,象征上,或生物上。不但是性别的认同是一种象征的名称,被赋加在流动而多形态的身体上,这个身体永远没有适合这个理想。相反的,这个「麻烦」是,这个理想本身是不一贯,遮蔽一个结构性的不和谐。性别差异不仅是特殊的差异,隶属于人类物种与品种的普遍性,而且拥有一个更加强烈的地位,被铭记到人类品种的普遍性。这一种差异是普遍性的品种本身的构成特征。矛盾地,因为这个理由,它预先存在(逻辑上与观念上)于它区别的这两个术语:「或许,保持一个性别跟另外一个性别不同的差异,既不属于这个性别,也不属于另外一个性别」。

So how do Lacan’s formulae of sexuation relate to Aristotle? Lacan proposes a
reading of the Aristotelian “logical square” different from the predominant one: he introduces a subtle change into each of the four propositions. First, in his reading (here Lacan follows Peirce), the truth of the universal affirmation does not imply existence: it is true that “all x are Fx” even if no x exists. Second, he does not read the particular affirmation (some x are Fx) in the standard “minimal” way (“at least some x—but maybe all x—are Fx”), but in the “maximal” way, that is, as excluding the universal affirmation, as in contradiction with it (“some x are Fx means that all x are not Fx”). Third, he changes the formulation of the universal negative statement into a double negation: instead of the standard “all x are not Fx,” he writes, “there is no x which is not Fx.” Fourth, he changes the
formulation of the negative particular statement, displacing the negation from the function to the quantifier: not “some x are not Fx,” but “not‐all x are Fx.”

拉康的性别的公式如何跟亚里斯多德扯上关系?拉康建议一种阅读亚里斯多德的「逻辑方块」的方式,不同于这个盛行的方法。他介绍一种微妙的改变,成为四种命题的每一个。首先,在他的阅读(在此,拉康遵循皮尔斯),普遍性肯定的真理并没有意味着存在:的确,在标准的「最小量」方式,「所有的X是X」(至少,有些的X—但是也许所有的X—都是X)。但是在「最大量」的方式,也就是说,作为排除普遍性的肯定,如同跟它的矛盾(「有些的X是fx,意味着并非所有的X 都是Fx」)。第三,他改变普遍性的否定的陈述的说明,成为双重的否定:非但不是标准的「并非所有的X是FX」,他写道,「没有不是Fx的X」。第四,他改变否定的特殊的陈述的说明,替代这个否定,从功用变成数量词:并不是「有些的X,不是Fx」,而是「并非全部的X是Fx」。

What immediately stands out is how contradiction is displaced. In the classic
Aristotelian logical square, contradiction is vertical, between the left side (“all x are Fx” and “some x are Fx”) and the right side (“all x are not Fx” and “some x are not Fx”): the two universal propositions are contrary (all x are Fx or not Fx), while the two diagonals are contradictory (“some x are nonFx” is in contradiction with “all x are Fx”; and “some x are Fx” is in contradiction with “all x are nonFx”). Furthermore, the relation between each universal and particular proposition is one of implication: “all x are Fx” implies that “some x are Fx,” and “all x are not Fx” implies that “some x are not Fx”; plus the relation between the two particular propositions is one of compatibility (“some x are Fx” and “some x are not
Fx” can both be true). The standard example: “all swans are white” and “all swans are not‐white” is contrary; “all swans are white” and “some swans are non‐white” is contradictory, as well as “all swans are non‐white” and “some swans are white”; “some swans are white” is compatible with “some swans are non‐white.”

立即突显出来的东西,是矛盾如何被替换。在古典的亚里斯多德的逻辑四方块,矛盾是垂直的,处于左边(所有的X都是Fx」与「有些的X是fx」;在右边则是「并非所有的X是Fx,或有些的X,并非Fx」:这两个普遍性的命题是相反的(所有的X都是Fx,或并非是Fx」。虽然这两个斜角线是矛盾 (「有些的X是并非Fx」,处于矛盾状态,跟「所有的X是Fx」。「有些的X是Fx」处于矛盾状态,跟「并非所有的X都是Fx」。这暗示着:「有些的X并非是X」。除外,这两个特殊的命题之间的关系,是和谐的关系(「有些的X是Fx」与「有些的X并非是Fx」,两者俱可是真实)。标准的例子是:「所有的天鹅都是白色」,与「所有的天鹅都是非白色」是相反的;「所有的天鹅是白色」与「有些的天鹅是非白色」;以及「所有的天鹅是非白色」与「有些天鹅是白色」是矛盾。「有些的天鹅是白色」与「有些天鹅是非白色」是和谐的。

In the square as rewritten by Lacan, contradictions are only between the upper and the lower levels (directly and diagonally): “all x are Fx” is in contradiction with “there is at least one x which is nonFx” as well as with “not‐all x are Fx,” and vice versa for “there is no x which is not Fx”; the relationship between the two horizontal couples, the upper and the lower, is, on the contrary, one of equivalence: “all x are Fx” is equivalent to “there is no x which is nonFx,” and “there is at least one x which is nonFx” is equivalent to “not‐all x are Fx.” This lesson is crucial: “there is no sexual relationship” means that there is no direct
relationship between the left (masculine) and the right (feminine) side, not even that of contrariness or contradiction; the two sides, set side by side, are equivalent, which means they just coexist in a non‐relationship of indifference. Contradiction only occurs within each of the sexes, between the universal and the particular of each sexual position (“all x are Fx” is in contradiction with “there is at least one x which is not Fx,” and “there is no x which is not Fx” is in contradiction with “not‐all x are Fx”).

在拉康重新改写的这个四方块,矛可仅存在于上方及下方的层次(直接或是斜角线):「所有的x 是fx」跟「至少有一个x是非fx」,以及跟「并非所有的x是fx,」彼此矛盾。反过来说也是一样,「没有不是fx的x」。在两个水平的配对之间的关系,上方与下方之间的关系,相反地是相等的关系:「所有的x是fx」相等于「并非所有的x 是fx」。这个教训是重要的:「性别关系不存在」意味着,在左边(男性)与右边(女性)之间,没有直接的关系。甚至没有相反或是矛盾的关系,这两边,并列存在,是相等的。这意味着,它们仅是共同存在于一个冷漠的非关系。矛盾仅是发生在每个性别内部,在每个性别位置的普遍性与特殊性之间(「所有的x是fx」,跟「至少有一个并非fx的x」之间,互相矛盾。「没有不是fx的x」与「并非所有的x是fx」互相矛盾。

Sexual difference is thus ultimately not the difference between the sexes, but the difference which cuts across the very heart of the identity of each sex, stigmatizing it with the mark of impossibility. If sexual difference is not the difference between the two sexes, but a difference which cuts from within each sex, how then do the two sexes relate to each other? Lacan’s answer is “indifference”: there is no relationship, il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel—the two sexes are out of sync. Recall that, on very last page of Seminar XI, Lacan defines the desire of the analyst not as a pure desire (a self‐critical remark, clearly—he had himself claimed this in Seminar VII), but as a desire to obtain absolute difference.28 In order for the difference to be “absolute,” it must be a
redoubled, self‐reflected difference, a difference of differences, and this is what the formulae of sexuation offer: the “dynamic” antinomy of All and its exception, and the “mathematic” antinomy of non‐All without exception. In other words, there is no direct way to formulate sexual difference: sexual difference names the Real of an antagonism which can only be circumscribed through two different contradictions.29

性别差异因此最后并不是两性之间的差异,而是横切每个性别的核心的差异,用不可能性的标记污染它。假如性别差异并不是两性之间的差别,而是横切每个性别之间的差异,那么这两个性别如何发生关联?拉康的回答是「冷漠」。性别关系不存在。这两个性别并不是同时性。请回忆一下,在第11研讨班的最后一页,拉康定义精神分析家的欲望,不是作为纯粹的欲望,(显而易见是自我批判的谈论,他自己曾经在第7研讨班宣称过),而是作为获得绝对差异的欲望。为了让这个差异成为「绝对」,这个差异必须双倍,自我反射的差异,差异中的差异。这就是性别公式提供的:「所有」的「动力」的镝及其例外,与没有例外的并非所有的「数学公式」的镝。换句话说,没有直接的方式,说明性别关系:性别关系命名敌意的实在界,它仅能通过两个不同的矛盾来界定。

Let us take a closer look at the first antinomy: Lacan refers here to Peirce’s logical square of universal and particular positive and negative propositions, which implies that the truth of a universal affirmative proposition does not imply the existence of a term to which it refers, in contrast to a particular affirmative proposition (“all unicorns have one horn” is true even if there are no unicorns, but not “some unicorns have one horn”—for the second proposition to be true, at least one unicorn has to exist).30 What are the consequences for psychoanalysis of the purely logical point that the true of a universal affirmation does not imply that a particular element which exemplifies this truth exists? It is true that unicorns have only one horn, but there are nonetheless no unicorns… and if we
go by way of a little wild analysis insisting on the phallic value of the single horn growing out of the forehead, this brings us to the paternal phallic authority, to what Lacan calls the Name‐of‐the‐Father.

让我们更加仔细观看第一个镝:拉康在此提到皮尔斯的逻辑的四方块:普遍性,特殊性,肯定与否定的命题。它暗示着,普遍性肯定的命题的真理,并未暗示着它提到的术语的存在,对照于特殊性的肯定的命题(「所有的独角兽都有一个角」是真实的,即使并没有这样的独角兽存在。但是「有些的独角兽有一个角」则是并不真实。为了让第二个命题成为真实,至少要有一个独角兽必须存在」。对于精神分析,当普遍性的肯定的真实并没有暗示着,作为这个真理的典范的特殊的因素存在,这个纯粹的逻辑的点的结果是什么?虽然独角兽确实仅有一个角,但是并没有独角兽存在。假如我们经由稍微深入的精神分析,继续坚持单一的角从前额长出来的阳具的价值,这带领我们到达父权的阳具的权威,拉康称之为「以父亲之名」。

“All fathers are Fx” is true, but this means that no existing father is“really father,” that—in Hegelese—there is no father at the level of his notion: every father that exists is an exception to the universal notion of father: the order of the function which we introduced here as that of the name‐of‐the‐father is something which has universal value, but, simultaneously, puts on you the charge to control if there is or not a father who fits this function. If there is no such father, it still remains true that the father is God, it is simply that this formula is confirmed only by the empty sector of the square.31

「所有的父亲都是fx」是真实的,但是这意味着,没有现有的父亲「确实是父亲」。用黑格尔的话说,没有处于他的观念的父亲:每个现存的父亲都是父亲的普遍性的观念的例外。我们在此介绍的功用的秩序,作为父亲之名的功用的秩序,是某件具有普遍性价值的东西。但是,同时地,它让你们来负责控制,有或是没有适合这个功用的父亲。假如每有这样的父亲,这仍然是真实的,这个父亲是上帝。这仅是因为这个公式被肯定,仅是凭借这个四方块的空洞的部分。

The implications of this paradox for the individual’s psychic economy are crucial: the paternal function is universal, each of us is determined by it, but there is always a gap between the universal paternal function and the individual who occupies this symbolic place: no father is “really a father,” every “real” father is either not‐enough‐father, a deficient father, failing to play the role properly, or too‐much‐father, an overbearing presence which stains the paternal symbolic function with pathological obscenity. The only father who fully exists is the exception to the universal function, the “primordial father” external to the symbolic Law.32 Or, a more problematic example: one curious story about
Hitler reported in the (in)famous record of his “table conversations” is that, one morning in the early 1940s, he awoke terrified and then, with tears running down his cheeks, explained to his doctor the nightmare that had haunted him:

个人心灵的经济活动的这个悖论的暗示是关键性:父权的功用是普遍性,我们每个人都受到它的决定,但是总是有一个差距,处于普遍性的父权的功用,与个人之间。这个个人佔据这个象征的位置:没有父亲是「确实的父亲」;每个「真实」的父亲要不就是不足够充当父亲,一个不足的父亲,没有适当地扮演这个角色。要不然就是,太过强势的父亲,一个跋扈的存在,他污染父权的象征的功用,具有病态的卑下。充分存在的唯一的父亲,是普遍性的功用的例外,外在于象征法则。或是,更加棘手的例子: 一个耐人寻味的故事关于希特勒被报导,在那个著名(或恶名昭彰)的记载有关他的「餐会谈话」:1940年代,有一天早上,他惊骇地醒来,眼泪掉落他的脸颊。他对他的医生解释萦绕他的这个梦魇。

“In my dream, I saw the future overmen—they are so totally ruthless, without any consideration for our pains, that I found it unbearable!” The very idea of Hitler, our main candidate for the most evil person of all time, being horrified at a lack of compassion is, of course, weird—but, philosophically, the idea makes sense. What Hitler was implicitly referring to was the Nietzschean passage from
Lion to Child: it is not yet possible for us, caught as we are in the reflective attitude of nihilism, to enter the “innocence of becoming,” the full life beyond justification; all we can do is engage in a “self‐overcoming of morality through truthfulness.”33 So it is all too easy to dismiss the Nazis as inhuman and bestial—what if the problem was precisely that they remained “human, all too human”? But let us go further and move to the opposite end of the spectrum, to Jesus Christ: is not Jesus also a case of the singular exception (“there is one
God who is an exception to divinity, who is fully human”) which implies the inexistence of the universal God?

「在我的梦里,我看见未来的超人—他们是如此残酷无情,没有体谅到我们的痛苦,我发现它无法令人承受!」希特勒的这个观念,我们主要的候选人,充当自古以来最邪恶的人,他感到惊吓,对于欠缺同情心。当然,他的这个观念是古怪的,但是从哲学来说,这个观念具有意义。希特勒暗示提到的东西,是尼采的「从狮子变成小孩」的那个段落: 虽然我们被陷住于虚无主义的省思的态度,我们还没有可能进入「生成的纯真」,超越是非善恶的充实的生活。我们所能做的事参与「凭借真理,来从事道德的自我克服」。所以,我们轻易地就将纳粹排除为没有人性,而且野蛮—万一这个问题确实就是,他们始终是「人性,太过性」,那怎么说?但是让我们更加深入,并且移动到这个光谱的相反一端,移动到耶稣基督。耶稣基督难道不就是这个独特的例外的情况?(有一个是神性例外的上帝,他完全是人」)这暗示着,普遍性的上帝并不存在吗?

This affirmation of existence as an exception to (its) universal notion cannot but
appear anti‐Hegelian, Kierkegaardian even: is not Hegel’s point precisely that every existence can be subsumed under a universal essence through notional mediation? But what if we conceive it as the elementary figure of what Hegel called “concrete universality”? Concrete universality is not the organic articulation of a universality into its species or parts or organs; we approach concrete universality only when the universality in question encounters, among its species or moments, itself in its oppositional determination, in an exceptional moment which denies the universal dimension and is as such its direct embodiment. Within a hierarchical society, the exceptional element are
those at the bottom, like the “untouchables” in India. In contrast to Gandhi, Dr. Ambedkar “underlined the futility of merely abolishing Untouchability: this evil being the product of a social hierarchy of a particular kind, it was the entire caste system that had to be eradicated: ‘There will be out castes [Untouchables] as long as there are castes.’ … Gandhi responded that, on the contrary, here it was a question of the foundation of Hinduism, a civilization which, in its original form, in fact ignored hierarchy.”34

存在的这个肯定,作为普遍性的例外的这个观念,让人不禁想到反对-黑格尔,甚是齐克果。黑格尔的重点难道不确实就是:通过观念的中介,每个存在能够被包括在普遍性的本质之下?但是万一我们构想它,作为是这个基本的人物,黑格尔所谓的「具体的普遍性」,那会怎么样?具体的普遍性并不是普遍性被器官表达,进入它的品种或是部分器官;我们接近具体的普遍性,仅有当这个受到质疑的普遍性遭遇到它的本身,在它的品种或时刻当中,处于它的相对的决定,处于例外的时刻。这个时刻否认普遍性的维度,并且它的本身就是它直接的具体代表。在一个阶层的社会,例外的因素是底端的那些因素,就像印度的「贱民」。跟甘地相照起来,安贝卡尔「强调仅是废除贱民的徒劳无功:这种邪恶是社会特别种类的阶层的产物,而是整个种性阶级制度必须被废除:「只要有种性阶级存在,就会有被放逐的贱民种性。」甘地回应说:相反地,在此的问题是印度教的基础,这一种文明在原先的形式,事实上是忽视阶级制度。」

Although Gandhi and Ambedkar respected each other and often collaborated in the struggle to defend the dignity of the Untouchables, their difference here is insurmountable: it is the difference between the “organic” solution (solving the problem by returning to the purity of the original uncorrupted system) and the truly radical solution (identifying the problem as the “symptom” of the entire system, a symptom which can only be resolved by abolishing the entire system). Ambedkar saw clearly how the four‐caste structure does not unite four elements which belong to the same order: while the first three castes (priests,
warrior‐kings, merchants‐producers) form a consistent All, an organic triad, the
Untouchables are, like Marx’s “Asiatic mode of production,” the “part of no‐part,” the inconsistent element which, within the system, occupies the place of what the system as such excludes—and, as such, the Untouchables stand for universality.

虽然甘地与安贝卡尔互相尊敬,并且时常合作为了奋斗捍卫贱民的尊严,他们在此的差异无法克服的。这个「器官」的解决与彻底的激进解决之间的差异。前者解决这个问题,凭借回到原初的没有腐败的制度的纯净。而后者则是将这个问题辨明为整个制度的「病征」,仅有凭借废除整个制度,这一种病征才能够被解决。安贝卡尔清楚地看出,这四个种性阶级结构并没有统合归属于相同秩序的四个因素。虽然前三个种性阶级(僧侣,战士与国王,商人作为制造者),形成一贯性的「整体」,一个有机体的三角模式。贱民,就像马克思的「亚洲的生产模式」,「没有参与的部分」,这个不一贯的因素,在这个制度之内,佔据这个位置,制度本身排除的东西的位置。就本身而言,贱民代表普遍性。

Effectively, there are no castes without outcasts—as long as there are castes, there will be an excessive, excremental zero‐value element which, while formally part of the system, has no proper place within it. Gandhi obfuscates this paradox, clinging to the (im)possibility of a harmonious structure that would fully integrate all its elements. The paradox of the Untouchables is that they are doubly marked by the excremental logic: not only do they deal with impure excrement, their own formal status within the social body is that of
excrement. Hence the properly dialectical paradox: to break out of the caste system, it is not enough to reverse the Untouchable’s status, elevating them into the “children of God.” The first step should rather be exactly the opposite one: to universalize their excremental status to the whole of humanity.

有效地,有种性阶级的地方,就有放逐者。只要有种性阶级存在,就会有过分,排泄出来的零度价值的因素。虽然正式来说,它们是制度的部分,它们在制度里面并没有适当的地位。甘地抹除这个悖论,坚持这个和谐结构的不可能性。这个结构充分地合并所有它的因素。贱民的悖论式,他们双重地受到排泄的逻辑的标记:不但他们处理不纯净的排泄,而且在这个社会的团体里面,他们自己的正式的地位,是排泄的地位。因此,适当的辨证法的悖论是:为了打破这个种性阶级制度,仅是倒转贱民的地位,将他们提升奥「上帝的子民」,是不足够的。代替地,第一步应该确实就是相反的一步:将排泄的地位普遍化到整个人类。

But is there an inconsistency here?—First, the claim was that every particular entity is an exception, unfit as an example of its universality; then we posited the exception as the singular Master‐Signifier which holds, within a structure, the place of its lack. The solution lies in the redoubled exception: every particular entity is in the position of an exception with regard to its universality; with regard to the series of “normal” exceptions, the Master‐Signifier which represents the subject is the exception to the exception, the only place of direct universality. In other words, in the Master‐Signifier, the logic of exception is
taken to its reflexive extreme: the Master‐Signifier is totally excluded from the universal order (as its “part of no‐part,” with no proper place in it), and, as such, it immediately stands for universality as opposed to its particular content. (It is in this sense that Hegel characterizes Christ as an “example of example” and, as such, as the “absolute example.”)

但是在此会有不一贯存在吗?首先,这个宣称是,每个特殊的实体是一个例外,不适合充当它的普遍性的例子。然后,我们提出这个例外,作为独特的主人能指,它在一个结构里,拥有它的欠缺的这个位置。这种解决在于这个双重的例外:每个特殊性的实体处于例外的立场,关于普遍性。关于这一系列的「正常的」的例外,代表主体的主人能指,是例外中的例外。直接普遍性的逻辑。换句话说,在主人能指,例外的逻辑被发挥到它反身的极端。主人能指完全从普遍性的秩序被排除(作为它的「部分的部分」,在它里面,没有适当的位位)。就它的本身而言,它立即代表普遍性,作为跟它的特殊性的内容的对立。(就是这个意义,黑格尔表现耶稣基督的特征,作为是「典范中的典范」,它的本身,作为「绝对的典范。」)

Such “oppositional determination” subjectivizes a structure—how? To grasp this logic of subjectivization, one has to introduce the difference between the enunciated (content) and its process of enunciation, that is, Lacan’s difference between the subject of the enunciated and the subject of enunciation: the exception with regard to the universal order is the subject itself, its position of enunciation. To put it in somewhat simplistic terms, insofar as universality is in front of me, the object of my thought or speech, I occupy by definition a place of minimal externality with regard to it—no matter how much I locate myself as a res cogitans, as a determinate object within the reality I am grasping, that tiny
spot in my world is not me as the point of “self‐consciousness,” the point from which I speak or think. Of course, all my positive properties or determinations can be “objectivized,” but not “myself” as the singular self‐reflexive point of enunciation.

如此「对立的决定」将结构主体化。用怎样的方式?为了理解主体化的这个逻辑,我们必须介绍这个差异,处于被表述的内容与它的表述的过程。换句话是,拉康的差异,处于被表述的主体与表述的主体之间的差异;「关于普遍性秩序的例外,就是主体自己」,它的表述的立场。简单扼要地说,因为普遍性是在我的前面,我的思想或言说的客体,我凭借定义佔据关于它的最小量的外在性的位置。无论我发现我自己的位置是多么作为「思想的人」,作为一个决定的客体,在我理解的现实界里面,在我的世界的那个小小的斑点,并不是我,作为「自我-意识的点」。从那个点,我言说或思想。当然,我所有的决定论的正面属性,能够被客体化,但是「我自己」作为表述的独特的反身的点,并无法被客体化。

In this simple but strict sense, the subject is more universal than universality itself: it may be a tiny part of reality, a tiny speck in the “great chain of being,” but it is simultaneously the singular (stand)point encompassing reality as something that appears within its horizon.

从这个简单但是严谨的意义来说,主体比普遍性的本身更加普遍性。它可能是现实界的一小部分。在「生命实存的伟大锁链」里,是一个小的斑点。但是它同时是这个独特的立足点,涵盖现实界,作是是某件出现在它的领域里面。

We experience this exception in a pointed way apropos statements which concern our mortality: “every human is mortal” implicitly excludes me as mortal, excepts me from the universality of mortals, although I know very well that (as a human animal) I am also mortal. One should take a step further here: not only is the subject a crack in universality, an X which cannot be located in a substantial totality—there is universality (universality “for itself,” as Hegel would have put it) only for the subject: only from the minimally exempted subjective standpoint can an All, a universality (as different from its particular instantiations), appear as such, never to someone or something fully embedded in it as its particular moment. In this sense exception literally grounds universality.

我们经验到这种例外,以一个尖锐的方式,关于跟我们的有限生命息息相关的陈述:「每个人都是有限生命」。这个陈述暗含地排除「我」作为有限生命,将我从有限生命的普遍性排除,虽然我清楚知道,(人作为动物),我也是有限生命。在此,我们应该採取更深入一步:主体在普遍性里不但是一个裂缝,一个未知数X,无法被找出位置,在实质的整体里—仅有对于主体,才会有普遍性存在(普遍性的「物自体」),如同黑格尔本来会这样表达。仅有从最小量的被免除的主体的观点,一个「全部」,一个普遍性的本身(作为跟它的特殊性的当下不同)才能够出现,它永远不是属于某个完全镶嵌于它的特殊时刻的人或某件东西。从这个意义来说,例外实质上是作为普遍性的基础。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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