精神分析伦理学:善的功用

Ethic 218

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

XVII 第17章

The function of the good
善的功用

SAINT AUGUSTINE AND SADE
圣奥古斯丁与萨德

MEMORY, FACILITATION, RITE
记忆,促进引导,仪式

THE SUBJECT, ELISION OF A SIGNIFIER
主体,能指的省略

THE TEXTILE FAB L E
织物的寓言

UT I L I T Y AND JOUISSANCE
实用与欢爽

We have reached the barrier of desire then, and, as I indicated last time, I
will speak about the good. The good has always had to situate itself on that
barrier. I shall be concerned today with the way in which psychoanalysis
enables one to articulate that situation.

我们因此已经到达欲望的这个阻碍。如同我上次指示的,我将会谈论有关善。善总是曾经必须定位它自己在那个阻碍。今天,我将会关心这个方式,以那个方式,精神分析让我们能够表达那个情况。

I will speak then about the good, and perhaps what I have to say will be
bad in the sense that I don’t have all the goodness required to speak well of
it. I won’t perhaps speak too well of it because I am myself not quite well
enough to speak at that high level the subject requires. But the idea of nature
that I have told you about means that I will not be stopped by such an accidental
contingency. I simply ask you to excuse the presentation if at the end
you are not completely satisfied.

我因此将会谈论到善。或许我必须要说的东西将会是不好的,因为我并没有拥有所有必要的善意,来推崇它。我或许将不会太称赞它,因为我自己并没有的善意来以主体要求的高层次来谈论。但是我曾经告诉你们的自然的观念意味着,我将不会受到一种意外的偶然性阻挡。我仅是要求你们包容这个呈现,假如最后,你们并没有完全满意。

The question of the good is as close as possible to our sphere of action. All
exchanges between men and especially interventions of the type we engage
in are usually placed under the tutelage and authority of the good – the perspective
is a sublime one, indeed a sublimated one. Now sublimation could
be defined from a certain point of view as an opinion in the Platonic sense of
the term, an opinion arranged in such a way as to reach something that might
be the object of science, but that science doesn’t manage to reach where it is
to be found. A sublimation of any kind, even including that universal, the
good itself, may be momentarily in this brief parenthesis considered to be a
phony science.

善的问题尽可能靠近我们的行动的领域。人际之间的所有的交换,特别是我们精神分析从事的这种介入,通常是被放置在善的守护与权威之下。这个观点是崇高的观点,确实是一个被升华的观点。现在,升华能够从某个观点来定义,作为柏拉图的术语的意义的一种意见。这一种意见被以这种方式安排,这样它才能够到达它将能够被发现的地方。任何种类的升华,甚至包括那个普遍性,善待本身可能暂时处于这个简短的括号里,它被认为是一门伪科学。

Everything in your analytical experience suggests that the notion and finality
of the good are problematic for you. Which good are you pursuing precisely
as far as your passion is concerned? That question concerning our
behavior is always on the agenda. At every moment we need to know what
our effective relationship is to the desire to do good, to the desire to cure.

你们精神分析经验的一切暗示着,善的这个观念与最终性,对于你们而已,是颇为棘手。就你们的激情而言,你们正在追寻哪个善?关于我们的行为的那个问题总是处于讨论议程。随时,我们都需要知道,我们跟行善的欲望的实际关系是什么,跟想要治疗别人的欲望是什么。

We have to deal with that as if it were something that is likely to lead us
astray, and in many cases to do so instantly. I will even add that one might
be paradoxical or trenchant and designate our desire as a non-desire to cure.
Such a phrase is meaningful only insofar as it constitutes a warning against
the common approaches to the good that offer themselves with a seeming
naturalness, against the benevolent fraud of wanting-to-do-one’s-best-for-the subject.

我们必须处理那个,好像那是某件可能会引导我们迷失的东西,在许多情况,很可能马上这样做。我将甚至补充说,我们可能是悖论,或是锐利,并且指定我们的欲望,作为是没有欲望想要治疗别人。这样一个词语仅有在形成一个警告时,它才具有意义。它警告不要采有共同的途径来接近善,虽然这些途径提供它们自己,具有表面上的自然。它也警告不要从事善意的欺骗,想要替主体善尽自己最大力量。

But in that case what do you want to cure the subject of? There is no doubt
that this is central to our experience, to our approach, to our inspiration –
wanting to cure him from the illusions that keep him on the path of his
desire. But how far can we go in this direction? Moreover, even if these
illusions are not respectable in themselves, the subject still has to want to
give them up. Is the limit of resistance here simply individual?

但是在那个情况,你们想要替主体治疗什么?无可置疑地,这是我们精神分析经验,我们的方法,我们的启发的核心。我们想要治疗他,免除让他在欲望途径踽行的幻觉。但是我们朝这个方向能够前进多远?而且,甚至这些幻觉本身并没有可尊敬之处,主体依旧必须想要放弃它们。抗拒的限制在此仅是个人的吗?

Here the question of different goods’ is raised in their relation to desire.
All kinds of tempting goods offer themselves to the subject; and you know
how imprudent it would be for us to put ourselves in a position of promising
the subject access to them all, to follow “the American way.” It is nevertheless
the possibility of having access to the goods of this world that determines
a certain way of approaching psychoanalysis – what I have called “the American
way.” It also determines a certain way of arriving at the psychoanalyst’s
and making one’s demand.

在此,关于欲望的不同善行的问题被提出。各种诱人的善行呈现它们自己给主体。你们知道这将是多么不谨慎,假如我们将我们自己放置于这个立场:跟主体承诺要接近所有这些诱人善行,要追求「美国人的方式」。可是,这是可能的,接近这个世界的善行:决定某种接近精神分析的方式—我所谓的「美国人的方式」。它也决某种方式:获得精神分析家的善行,并且提出自己的要求。

Before entering into the problem of different goods, I would like to sketch
out the illusions on the path of desire. Breaking these illusions is a question
of specialized knowledge – knowledge of good and evil indeed – that is located
in this central field whose irreducible, ineradicable character in our experience
I have attempted to show you. It is bound up with that prohibition, that
reservation, that we explored specifically last year when I spoke to you about
desire and its interpretation. I pointed to its essential character in the notion
of “he didn’t know,” which is in the imperfect tense in French and which
remains centrally within the field of enunciation, or in other words within
the deepest relationship of the subject to signifying practice. That is to say,
the subject is not the agent but the support, given that he couldn’t even
calculate the consequences. It is through his relationship to signifying practice
that, as a consequence, he emerges as subject.

在探讨不同善行的问题之前,我想要描绘出在欲望途径的这些幻觉。打破这些幻觉需要专门的知识—确实是善与恶的知识—它位于这个核心领域—我曾经企图跟你们显示,在我们精神分析经验,这个核心领域具有无法化减,无法抹除的特性。它跟去年我们明确探究的那个禁忌,那个保留息息相关,当我跟你们谈论关于欲望与其解释。我指向它的基本特性,使用「他不知道」的这个观念。这个观念是法文的未完成式文法,它的中心始终保持在表述的领域里面。或是换句话说,保持在主体跟能指化的实践的最深层关系。也就是说,主体并不是这个代理者,而是这个支持者,假如考虑到他甚至无法估算到这些结果。凭借他跟能指化实践的关系,他结果出现作为主体。

Moreover, to refer to that fantasmic experience that I chose to produce
before you so as to exemplify the central field involved in desire, don’t forget
the moments of fantasmic creation in Sade, moments in which one finds
expressed directly – in diabolically jubilatory terms that make it intolerable
to read – the idea that the greatest cruelty is that the subject’s fate is displayed
before his eyes with his full awareness of it. The plot against the victim is openly hatched in front of him.

而且,我提到我选择在你们面前产生那个幻见的的经验,为了强调欲望牵涉的核心领域。请你们不要忘记,萨德创造幻见的那些时刻。在那些时刻,我们发现这个观念直接地被表达,用恶魔般欢欣的术语,让人不忍卒睹。这个观念是:最大的残酷就是主体的命运被展示在他眼前,让他充分知道。对受害者不利的计谋,在他面前明目张胆地被设计。

The value of this fantasm is that it confronts the subject with the most radical kind of interrogation, with a final “he didn’t know,” insofar as expressed thus in the imperfect tense, the question asked is too much for him. I just ask you to recall the ambiguity revealed by linguistic experience in connection with the French imperfect. When one
says “a moment later and the bomb exploded (iclatait),” that may mean two
contradictory things in French, namely, either the bomb did, in fact, explode
or something happened which caused it not to explode.

这个幻见的价值是,它让主体面对这个最强烈种类的质疑,用一个最后的「他并不知道」,它因此被表达,用未完成式的意涵。被询问的这个问题,太过沉重,他无法承受。我仅是要求你们回忆一下,法文的未完成式,由语言经验显示的这个模糊暧昧。当我们说,「再过一下子,炸弹会爆炸」。这句话在法文意味着两个矛盾的事情:换句话说,要就是炸弹实际上爆炸,要不就是某件事情发生,阻止炸弹没有爆炸。

We have now reached the subject of the good. The subject is in no sense
new, and one has to admit that thinkers from earlier periods, whose concerns
may for one reason or another seem dated to us, nonetheless sometimes formulate
the issues in interesting ways. I have nothing against bringing them
to your attention, however strange they may seem when presented here out
of context in an apparently abstract form that doesn’t seem designed to arouse
our interest. Thus, when Saint Augustine writes the following in Book VII,
Chapter XII, of his Confessions, I think it deserves far more than an indulgent
smile.

我们现在已经到达这个善行的主体。这个主体并不新颖,我们必须承认,较早期的思想家,因为某种理由,我们可能觉得他们的关怀似乎很新潮。他们用有趣的方式说明这个问题。我并不反对提醒你们注意他们,无论他们看起来是多么奇怪,当我在此呈现他们,用显而易见是摘要形式的文本,因为这种摘要形式似乎并不是被设计要引起我们的兴趣。因此,当圣奥古斯丁在他的「忏悔录」第七册第十二章,书写以下文字,我认为它应该获得的,不仅是让人会心的微笑。

That everything that is, is good, because it is the work of God.

每样存在的东西都是善,因为那是上帝的杰作。

I understood that all corruptible things are good, and that they wouldn’t be corruptible if they were sovereignly good; no corruption would occur if they were not good. For if they were of sovereign good, they would be incorruptible, and if they had no good in them, there would be nothing in them capable of being corrupted, since corruption injures that which it corrupts, and it can only injure it if diminishes good.

我理解,所有会腐败的东西都是善。假如它们是至高的善,它们就不会腐败。假如它们并不是善,没有腐败会发生。因为它们隶属于至高的善,它们就不会腐败。假如它们本质没有善,它们内部就没有东西会被腐败。因为腐败伤害它所腐败的东西,只有当善被减少时,腐败才会伤害它。

And now we come to the core of the argument in the French version of the
Garnier edition.

现在我们来到噶尼尔编辑的法文版争论的核心。

Thus either corruption causes no damage, which cannot be upheld, or all things
that are corrupted lose some good, which is undeniable. That if they had lost everything that was good, they would no longer exist at all. Or in other words, if they continued to live without being susceptible to corruption any longer, they would be in a more perfect state than they were before having lost all that was good about them, since they would remain forever in an incorruptible state.

因此,要就是腐败都不会引起损害。这无法自圆其说,要不就是所有被腐败的东西丧失某些的善,这是无可否认的。假如它们已经丧失一切的善,它们将根本就不再存在。或者,换句话说,假如它们继续存在,而没有再承受腐病,它们将会是处于更加完美的状态,比起它们先前的状态,在已经丧失所有关于它们的善之前,因为它们将会始终处于一种无法腐败的状态。

I assume that you grasp the core and indeed the irony of this argument, and moreover that it is precisely the question that interests us. If it is unbearable to realize that everything that is good is extracted from the heart of all things, what can we say of that which remains, which is, after all, something, something different? The question goes echoing down through the centuries and down through human experience. We find it again in The Story of Juliette, with the difference that it is attached, as it should be, to the question of the Law, and in a no less odd way. I would like to draw your attention to this oddness because it is the oddness of a structure that is at issue. Sade writes as follows:

我认为你们理解这个核心,以及确实就是这个争论的反讽。而且,确实就是这个问题让我们感到興趣。假如这是让人无法忍受,当我们体认到,每件善的东西是从所有事情的核心抽离出来,对于剩馀的东西,那毕竟是某件不同的东西,我们能够说些什么呢?这个问题迴响了好几世纪,贯穿人类的经验。我们再次在「朱莉叶特的故事」里找到它,差别是,如同它所应该的,它跟法律的问题挂钩。以同样古怪的方式,我想要提醒你们注意这个古怪,因为受到争议的结构就是这个古怪。萨德书写如下:

Tyrants are never born out of anarchy. One only ever sees them rise up in the
shadow of laws; they derive their authority from laws. The reign of law is, therefore, evil; it is inferior to anarchy. The greatest proof of this position is the obligation of any government to plunge back into anarchy whenever it wants to remake its constitution. In order to abrogate its ancient laws, it is obliged to establish a revolutionary regime in which there are no laws. Under this regime new laws are eventually born, but the second is less pure than the first since it derives from it, since the first good, anarchy, had to occur, if one wanted to achieve the second good, the State’s constitution.

暴君从来就不是从无法无天中诞生。我们永远仅是看见他们在法律的阴影里崛起。他们从法律获得权威,因此,法律的统治是邪恶,法律的统治比无法无天还要糟糕。这个立场的最大证据是:每当政府想要重新铸造它的基本结构,它就有义务回归到无法无天。为了废除它的古代法律,它有义务建立一个革命的无法无天的政权。在这个政权下,新的法律最后被诞生,但是第二个法律不像第一个法律那么纯净,因为它从后者演变过来,因为第一个善,无法无天,必须发生,假如我们想要完成第二个善,国家的基本大法。

I give you this as a fundamental example. The same kind of argument,
formulated by minds that were certainly very remote from one another in
their concerns, clearly shows that some form of necessity must exist there
that gives rise to this sort of logical stumbling along a certain path.

我给予你们这个,作为是一个基本的例子。这个相同种类的争论,说明它们的两位人物,彼此的关注焦点确实风马牛不相及,却清楚地显示:某种必要的形式必须存在,才会产生这种沿着某种途径踉跄而行的逻辑。

As far as we are concerned, the question of the good is articulated first of
all in its relationship to the Law. On the other hand, nothing is more tempting
than to evade the question of the good behind the implication of some
natural law, of some harmony to be found on the way to the elucidation of
desire. Yet our daily experience proves to us that beneath what we call the
subject’s defenses, the paths leading to the pursuit of the good only reveal
themselves to us constantly, and I would add, in their original form, in the
guise of some alibi on the part of the subject. The whole analytical experience
is no more than an invitation to the revelation of his desire; and it changes
the primitiveness of the relationship of the subject to the good compared to
everything which up to that point had been articulated by the philosophers.
One has undoubtedly to look closely, for it seems at first that nothing is
changed, and that with Freud the compass still points toward the register of
pleasure.

就我们而言,善的问题首先被表达,在它跟法律的关系。在另一方面,最诱人入胜的,莫过于逃避善的这个问题:这个善隐藏在某个自然法则的暗示背后,朝向诠释欲望的途中,某种和谐能够被找到,它所给予的暗示背后。可是,我们的日常经验,跟我们证明,在我们所谓的主体的各种防卫底下,通往善的追求的这些途径,不断地跟我们显露它们。我将补充说,在它们原先的形式,在主体这方面,是某种藉口的伪装。整个的精神分析经验仅仅就是邀请来启示他的欲望。跟直到当时曾经被哲学家表达的一切比较起来,它改变了主体跟善的关系的原始性。我们无可置疑地必须仔细观看,因为它起初看起来,没有事情被改变。随着弗洛依德,这个罗盘依旧指向快乐的这个铭记。

I have emphasized this since the beginning of the year: from the origin of
moral philosophy, from the moment when the term ethics acquired the meaning
of man’s reflection on his condition and calculation of the proper paths to
follow, all meditation on man’s good has taken place as a function of the
index of pleasure. And I mean all, since Plato, certainly since Aristotle, and
down through the Stoics, the Epicureans, and even through Christian thought
itself in Saint Thomas Aquinas.

自从年初以来,我曾经强调这个:从道德哲学的起源,从伦理学这个术语获得人对意义的反思的时刻开始,反思人的情境,并估算所要追寻的合宜的途径,所有对于人的善行的沉思都发生,作为是快乐的指数的功用。我的意思是所有的哲学,自从柏拉图以降,确实来说,是自从亚里斯多德以降,一直斯多亚学派,伊壁鸠鲁学派,甚至是表现在圣汤玛士、阿奎那诞基督教思想本身。

As far as the determination of different goods
is concerned, things have clearly developed along the paths of an essentially
hedonist problematic. It is only too evident that all that has involved the
greatest of difficulties, and that these difficulties are those of experience. And
in order to resolve them, all the philosophers have been led to discern not
true pleasures from false, for such a distinction is impossible to make, but
the true and false goods that pleasure points to.

就不同的善的决定而言,事情曾经清楚地发展,沿着基本上是棘手的享乐主义的途径。这是显而易见的,所有都曾经牵涉到最大困难,这些困难都是经验的困难。为了解决它们,所有的哲学家曾经被引导要去觉察,觉察不真实的快乐跟虚假的快乐,为了让这样的区别不可能划分,而是快乐所指向的真实与虚假的善行。

Doesn’t Freud’s articulation of the pleasure principle give us an advantage,
a reward in terms of knowledge and clarity?

弗洛依德的表达这个快乐原则,难道不是给予我们一个利益?用知识与清晰的术语而言,给予我们一个酬劳?

Isn’t it in a definitive way profoundly different from the meaning previously
given to pleasure by anyone else?

这难道不是用一个明确的方式,这个方式跟先前别人给予快乐的意义,大相迳庭?

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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