Less than nothing 05

Less than nothing 05
少甚于无

Slavoj Zizek
斯拉夫、齐泽克

CHAPTER 8
第八章

THE “MAGICAL FORCE” OF REVERSAL

倒转的「魔术力量」

The contrast with Hegel is thus striking. If Hegel’s underlying axiom is that “the
result of an untrue mode of knowledge must not be allowed to run away into an empty nothing”41 (note the prohibitive mode: “must not be allowed to …”!)—i.e., that, through the work of “tarrying with the negative,” every outbreak of negativity can be accounted for (rendered intelligible) in a narrative of meaning and thus aufgehoben in an encompassing infinite totality—for Heidegger, it is a formal (a priori) characteristic of Dasein’s finitude that every meaningful engagement will finally “run away into an empty nothing”: all our
meaningful engagements are just so many contingent attempts to postpone the inevitable; heroic acts against the background of the ultimate nullity of all human endeavor. Does this critique of Hegel hold up however?

跟黑格尔的对照因此耐人寻味。假如黑格尔的作为基础的公理是:「知识的非真实的模式的结果,一定不要被容许逃走进入空洞的空无」(请注意这个禁止的模式:「一定不要被容许、、、」!)–譬如,凭借「逗留否定性」的研究,否定的暴发能够被说明,(让人能理解),以意义的描述,因此在涵盖一切的有限性里被「勾销」–对于海德格,这是生命实存的有限性的正式的(由果推因)的特性,每个意义的参与最后「逃走进入空洞的空无」:我们所有的意义的参与仅是如此众多偶然性的企图,要拖延这个无可避免的事情。英勇的行动,对抗所有人类的企图的这个最后的徒劳。可是,对黑格尔的这个批判能自圆其说吗?

On a first approach, it may well appear justified—as Pippin has noted, when, in a famous passage from the Foreword to the Phenomenology, Hegel provides the most outstanding formulation of the reversal of the negative into a higher positivity, of the resurrection of the infinite life after death, he has recourse to a very strange term: “Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. This tarrying with the negative is the magical force [Zauberkraft] that converts it into being.”42

根据最初的途径,它很有可能自圆其说—如同皮宾曾经注意到,在一篇著名的段落,从「精神现象学」前言,黑格尔供应最杰出的说明,对于负面性的倒转成为更高的积极性,在死亡之后,永恒生命的复活,他曾经诉诸于一个非常奇怪的术语:「仅有凭借直视否定性,并逗留在否定性,精神才是这个力量。这个逗留在否定性是这个魔术的力量,将它转变成为生命的实存。」

Effectively, it is “as if Hegel cannot help giving away his dodge and his own
uncertainty with that revealing (most un‐Hegelian) word or Freudian slip,
Zauberkraft”43—an admission that there is something magical, something like the intervention of a deus ex machina, in the dialectical reversal of the negative into the positive. This is why we need to be very precise in circumscribing this reversal. It is a commonplace about Hegel that he criticized the idea of the Crusades for confounding the possession of the spiritual Truth of Christianity with the possession of the physical site of Christ’s tomb, the place of his crucifixion and resurrection. However, here again, the choice is not an immediate one: in order to experience the spiritual Truth of Christianity one has to first occupy the tomb and experience its emptiness—only in this disappointment, through this failure‐in‐triumph, does one reach the insight that, in order to “live in Christ,” it is not necessary to travel to faraway lands and occupy empty tombs, since Christ is already here whenever there is Love between his followers. To recast this experience in the terms of the Rabinovitch joke:

实际上,这个「好像黑格尔禁不住地屈从于他的逃避及他自己的不确定性,用那个启示的字词(相当非黑格尔式)或是弗洛依德的口误—这是一种承认:有某件魔术的东西,某件像是天外救星deux ex machine 的介入,从否定性倒转成为肯定性。这就是为什么我们需要非常确实来限定这个倒转。这是关于黑格尔的一个共同的地方,他批评十字军东征的这个观念,因为它混淆了基督教的精神真理的拥有,跟耶稣基督的坟墓的实质地点的拥有,他的被钉上十字架及复活的地点。可是,在此的这个选择并不是一个当下的选择:为了经验基督教的这个精神的真理,我们必须首先佔有这个坟墓,并且经验它的空洞。仅有凭借在胜利中的失败,这个失望,我们才获得这个洞见:为了「生活在基督的圣灵里」,我们并不需要旅行到遥远的土地,并且佔有那些空洞的坟墓。因为每当他的信徒之间存有爱心,基督就已经在那里。为了重新铸造这个经验,用拉宾诺维奇的笑话:

“We are going to Jerusalem to find Christ’s tomb and to dwell in the presence of
divinity.”

「我们将去耶路撒冷找到耶稣基督的坟墓,并且驻居在神圣的存在里。」

“But what you will discover in Jerusalem is that the tomb is empty, that there is
nothing to find, that all you have is yourselves, the community of visiting Christians …”

「但是你们将会在耶路撒冷发现的是,坟墓的空洞,找不到任何东西,你们所拥有的是你们自己,拜访基督徒的社区、、、」

“Well, this community of spirit is the living Christ, and this is what we were really
looking for!”

「呵呵,精神的社区就是活着的耶稣基督,这就是我们确实正在寻找的!」

The same goes for the resurrection itself: “Christ will be resurrected!” “But we, his followers who wait for him, see nothing …” “True, you don’t see—but what you don’t see is that the spirit of this community of yours, the love that bonds you, is the resurrected Christ!” And likewise even more so for the topic of the Second Coming: nothing will “really happen,” no God will miraculously appear; people will just realize that God is already here, in the spirit of their collective.

相同的道路适用于复活的本身:「基督将会复活!」「但是我们,他的信徒等待他,什么都没有看见、、、」「确实地,你们没有看见—但是你们没有看见的东西是,属于你们的这个社区的精神,团结你们的爱,那就是耶稣基督的复活!」同样地,对于「二次再来」的主题,更是如此。没有什么「将会确实发生」,没有上帝将会奇迹般地出现。人们将仅是体会到,上帝已经在这里,在他们的集体的精神里。

Christopher Nolan’s film The Prestige (2006)—a story about the deadly rivalry
between two magicians, the lower‐class Alfred Borden and the upper‐class Robert Angier, in fin de siècle London—can, surprisingly, help us to grasp clearly this “magical” aspect of Hegelian dialectics.

克利陀弗、诺兰的影片「顶尖对决」(2006)—在两位魔术家之间敌意难解的故事,低层的波顿,跟高层安吉尔,在世纪末的伦敦—令人惊奇地,这个故事能够帮助我们清楚地理解黑格尔辩证法的「魔术」的一面。

The film can be read as an allegory of the struggle for Hegel’s legacy between Right and Left Hegelians. The two magicians compete over who can deliver the
best performance of the “Transported Man” trick; Borden, the first to perform it,
disappears into a box, bounces a ball to another box across the stage, and instantly reappears within the second box to catch the ball. Blackmailed into revealing the source of his trick to Angier, Borden gives him one clue, the name of an inventor: “Tesla.” (This, we later learn, is a lie: Borden simply used his twin brother to replace him.) Angier travels to Colorado Springs to meet Nikola Tesla and learn the secret of Borden’s illusion.

这个影片能够被阅读为一个寓言:在右派与左派的黑格尔主义者之间,争夺黑格尔的遗产。这两位魔术家互相競争,谁最能够表现出「人被运输」的魔术。波顿首先表演,消失进入一个箱子,弹出一个球越过戏台,到另外一个箱子,然后瞬间重新消失在第二个箱子里,为了捉住这个球。由于被恐吓要被揭露他的魔术的来源给安吉尔,波顿给他一个线索,发明者的名字:「忒斯拉」(我们后来知道,这是一个谎言:波顿仅是利用他的孪生兄弟来替代他。)安吉尔旅行到科罗拉多温泉区去会见尼古拉、忒斯拉,并且获知波顿幻法魔术的秘密。

Tesla constructs a teleportation machine, but the device fails to work. Angier then learns from Borden’s notebook that he has been sent on a wild‐goose chase. Feeling he has wasted his money, he returns to Tesla’s lab and discovers that the machine can in fact create and teleport a duplicate of any item placed in it. When Tesla is forced to leave Colorado Springs, Angier is left with the machine. In a letter, Tesla warns Angier to destroy it. Angier refuses to do so and returns to London to begin a final set of 100 performances with his new act, “The Real Transported Man,” in which he disappears under huge arcs of electricity and
“teleports” fifty yards from the stage to the balcony in a second.

忒斯拉建造一台运输机器,但是这台机器无法运作。然后,安吉尔从波顿的笔记获知,他已经被派遣去追逐野鹅。由于感觉他浪费金钱,他回到忒斯拉的实验室,并且发现这个机器实际上创造并且传真运输放置里面的任何东西的复制品。当忒斯拉被迫离开科罗拉多温泉区,听任安吉尔处理那台机器。在一封信里,忒斯拉警告安吉尔毁灭它。安吉尔拒绝这样做,并且回到伦敦,开始用他的新的行动表演100个魔术表演的最后一齣。「真实地运输人」。在这齣表演,他消失在巨大的电虹管下,然后瞬间传真运输五十码,从舞台到观众看台。

Borden attends Angier’s performance and is baffled; he slips backstage and finds Angier inside a water tank, with a padlock on the latch that prevents his escape. At the film’s end, the mortally wounded Angier reveals his secret to Borden: each time he disappeared during the illusion, he fell through a trap door into the tank and drowned; the machine created a duplicate who teleported to the balcony and basked in the applause. Angier says he suffered to become great—a philosophy Borden thought Angier had never learned.

波顿出席安吉尔的表演,感到困惑。他悄悄到后台,发现安吉尔在一个水槽里,栓栏有把大锁让他无法逃避。在影片结束时,安吉尔的致命的受伤让波顿知道他的秘密。每次他在幻法魔术消失时,他从一个陷阱的门掉入水槽,然后淹溺。机器创造一个复制人,他被传送到观众看台,然后陶醉于掌声中。安吉尔说,他为了成为伟大而遭受痛苦。这个哲学,波顿认为安吉尔从来没有学到。

The class rivalry between the upper‐class Angier and the lower‐class Borden is
reflected in, among other things, the different ways in which they organize the illusion: Borden uses his twin brother to replace him, while Angier does it with the help of true scientific wizardry (he really is redoubled). There is a celebration of the aristocratic ethic of sacrifice (against cheap lower‐class trickery) at work here: for the sake of his art, Angier undergoes the terrible pain of drowning during each performance.

上流阶层的安吉尔与下层阶层的波顿,有阶级的敌意被反映在许多事情上。他们组织幻象的方式有差异。波顿使用他的双胞兄弟来替代他,而安吉尔则是凭借真是的科学的巫术来完成(他确实是被复制)。在此,庆贺贵族的牺牲的伦理在运作:为了他的艺术的缘故,安吉尔在每次的表演,都经历淹溺的可怕的痛苦。

Therein resides Angier’s revenge: Borden thinks that only he is ready to truly suffer to become great (when he loses some fingers on his hand, his twin brother also cuts off the same fingers to remain indiscernible from him, etc.); however, at the end, he is forced to admit that beneath Angier’s corrupted‐aristocrat attitude there is a much more terrible sacrifice—each performance is paid for with a suicide.

安吉尔的报复就在那里。波顿认为他为了成为伟大,他就是准备要真实地承受痛苦(当他丧失他的手上的手指头,他的双胞胎兄弟也切掉相同的几隻手指,为了保持跟他没有区别,等等)。可是,最后,他被迫承认,在安吉尔的腐败的贵族的态度,有一种更加可怕的牺牲—每次都表演都用自杀作为代价。

Early in the film, when a magician performs a trick with a small bird which
disappears in a cage on the table, a small boy in the audience starts to cry, claiming that the bird has been killed. The magician approaches him and finishes the trick, gently producing a live bird out of his hand—but the boy is not satisfied, insisting that this must be another bird, the dead one’s brother. After the show, we see the magician in a room behind the stage, bringing in a flattened cage and throwing a squashed bird into a trash bin—the boy was indeed correct. The film describes the three stages of a magic performance: the setup, or the “pledge,” where the magician shows the audience something that appears ordinary
but is probably not, making use of misdirection; the “turn,” where the magician makes the ordinary act extraordinary; and the “prestige,” where the effect of the illusion is produced.

在影片的初始,一位魔术家用一隻鸟表演一个魔术。这隻鸟消失于桌上的笼子,观众中一位男孩开始哭叫,宣称这隻鸟已经被杀死。魔术家走近他,然后结束这个魔术,从他的手里拿出一隻活的鸟—但是这位男孩并不满意,坚持说,那是另外一隻鸟,死去的鸟的兄弟。在这次表演之后,我们看到这位魔术家在舞台幕后的房间,带进一个扁平的鸟笼,然后将一隻被压扁的鸟丢进垃圾桶—那位男孩确实说对了。这部影片描述魔术表演的三个阶段:设计,或是「宣告」,魔术家跟观众显示某件看起来特别的东西,但是可能并不普通,由于使用错误的方向。其次是转折,魔术家让普通的动作看起来特别。最后是威望,幻景的效果被产生。

Is not this triple movement the Hegelian triad at its purest? The thesis (pledge), its catastrophic negation (turn), and the magical resolution of the catastrophe (prestige)? The catch, as Hegel was well aware, is that in order for the miracle of the “prestige” to occur, somewhere there must be a squashed bird—in The Prestige, it is Angier’s drowned body.

这难道不是黑格尔正反合的三个动作,处于最纯净的状态?这个主题(宣告),它的灾难性的否定(转折),然后是灾难的魔术般的解决(威望)?黑格尔知道得很清楚,这个要领是,为了让这个「威望」的奇迹发生,某个地方,必须要有一隻被压扁的鸟—在「威望」那里。那就是安吉尔的被淹溺的身体。

We should thus have no qualms about admitting that there is something of the
“cheap magician” about Hegel, in his trick of synthesis, of Aufhebung. Ultimately, there are only two ways to account for this trick, like the two versions of the vulgar bad news/good news medical joke: (1) the good news is good, but it concerns another subject (“The bad news is that you have a terminal cancer and will die in a month. The good news is: you see that beautiful nurse over there? I’ve been trying to get her into bed for months; finally, yesterday, she said yes and we made love the whole night like crazy …”); (2) the good news is bad news for the subject, but from a different perspective (“The bad news is you have
severe Alzheimer’s. The good news is: you have Alzheimer’s, so you will have forgotten the bad news by the time you get home”).

我们应该没有疑惧,关于承认,关于黑格尔有某位「廉价的魔术家」,在他的综合,勾销的魔术。最后,仅有两个方法来解释这个魔术,就像通俗的好坏消息医疗笑话的两个版本,但是它关系到另外一个主体,。(坏消息是,你罹患末期癌症,一个月内会死掉。好消息是,你看到那边那位美丽的护士吗?好几个月来,我曾经尝试拐诱她上床,最后昨天她答应了。我们一整天疯狂地作爱。第二个版本是,对于主体,好消息就是坏消息,但是从不同的观点,你罹患老年痴呆症,所以你将会忘掉这个坏消息,在你回家之前。)

The true Hegelian “synthesis” is the synthesis of these two options: the good news is the bad news itself—but in order for us to see that, we have to shift to a different agent (from the bird which dies to the one which replaces it; from the cancer‐ridden patient to the happy doctor, from Christ as individual to the community of believers). In other words, the dead bird remains dead, it really dies; likewise in the case of Christ, who is reborn as another subject, as the Holy Ghost.

真实的黑格尔的「综合」,就是这两个选择的综合:好消息是坏消息的本身—但是为了让我们看出,我们必须转移到一个不同的代理哲(从死掉的鸟到替代它的鸟,从罹患癌症的病人,到快乐的医生,从耶稣基督作为个人,到信徒的社区)。换句话说,死去的鸟始终是死了,它确实死掉。在耶稣基督的情况,凡是重生的人,就是另外一个主体,作为神圣的鬼魂。

We are dealing here with jokes in which we arrive at the final line only through a
dialogic undermining of a preceding position, an undermining which unexpectedly involves our subjective standpoint.44

我们在此正在处理这些笑话。在这些笑话里,我们仅是凭借一种对话的逐渐损坏一个先前的立场,来到达这个最后的底线。这种逐渐损坏出乎意料之外地牵涉到主体的观点。

The basic idea of Hegel’s dialectic is, on the contrary, that this dialogic process is not just subjective but is inscribed in the reality of the “Thing itself”: the tension which is reflected in the dialogue is constitutive of reality—this is how Hegel’s thesis that the path to truth is part of truth itself should be conceived. Even the remark allegedly made by Brecht in Sidney Hook’s apartment, apropos the accused at the Moscow show trials in the 1930s, can be recast in these terms: In 1935 Brecht visited Hook’s house in Manhattan. When Hook raised the question of the recent arrest and imprisonment of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and thousands of others, Brecht is alleged by Hook to have replied calmly in German: “The more innocent they are, the more they deserve to be shot.” As Hook tells it, he then handed Brecht his hat and coat. Brecht left “with a sickly smile.”45

相反地,黑格尔辩证法的基本观念是,这个对话的过程不仅是主体性,而且被铭记着「物自体」的现实界:被反映在对话里的紧张构成现实界。这就是黑格尔的「正题」:通往真理之路是真理本身的部分。这个「正题」应该被构想。甚至1930年代,布莱特在雪梨、胡克的公寓所宣称的这个谈论,关于在莫斯科的样板审判的这位被告,能够用这些术语来重新铸造。在1935年,布莱特拜访胡克在曼哈顿的家。当胡克提出这个问题: 最近,基诺威夫,卡梅尼夫,以及上千的其他人的被逮捕和监禁,据胡克宣称,布莱特镇定地以德语回答:「他们越是无辜,他们越应该被抢毙。」依照胡克的说法,他於是将他的帽子和外套交给布莱特,布莱特带着「病态的微笑」离开。

Brecht’s statement is thoroughly ambiguous—it can be read as a standard assertion of radical Stalinism (your very insistence on your innocence, your refusal to sacrifice yourself for the Cause, bears witness to your guilt, which resides in giving preference to your individual interests over the larger interests of the Party), or it can be read in a radically anti‐Stalinist manner: if they were in a position to plot the assassination of Stalin and his entourage, and were “innocent” (that is, did not grasp the opportunity), then they really deserve to die for having failed to rid us of Stalin.

布莱特的陈述是彻底的模糊暧昧—它能够被阅读作为是激进的史达林的标准的主张(你们坚持你们的无辜,你们拒绝为了理想牺牲你们自己,就见证到你们的罪行。这个罪行在于你们偏爱你们的个人的興趣,胜过于党的更大的興趣)。或是它能够被阅读,以一个激烈的反对史达林的方式: 假如他们的立场是要计划谋杀史达林及他的随从(换句话说,没有捉住机会),并且是无辜的,那么,他们确实应该为了没有替我们铲除史达林而被处死。

The true guilt of the accused is thus that, instead of rejecting the very ideological framework of Stalinism and ruthlessly acting against Stalin, they narcissistically fell in love with their victimization and either protested their innocence or became fascinated by the ultimate sacrifice they could make for the Party by confessing to non‐existent crimes. The properly dialectical way to grasp the
imbrication of these two meanings would be to start with the first reading, followed by the common‐sense moralistic reaction to Brecht: “But how can you say something so ruthless?

这些被告的真实的罪行因此是,他们没有拒绝史达林的意识形态的架构,并且残酷地採取行动反对他,他们自恋地爱上他们成为受害者。他们要就抗议他们的无辜,要不就是著迷于他们能够为了党成为最后的牺牲,去坦承并不存在的罪行。这种恰到好处的辩证法,来理解这两个意义的层层掩盖,将是从第一重阅读开始,后面跟随着对布莱特的普通常识的道德的反应:「你们如何能够说出如此残酷的事情?

Surely such a logic, demanding a blind self‐sacrifice to satisfy the accusatory whims of the Leader, can only function within a terrifying and criminal totalitarian system—it is surely the duty of every ethical subject to fight such a system with all means possible, including the physical removal, murder if necessary, of the totalitarian leadership?” “Yes, so you can see how, if the accused were innocent, they deserve all the more to be shot—they effectively were in a position to rid us of Stalin and his henchmen, and missed this unique
opportunity to spare humanity from his terrible crimes!”46

的确,如此的逻辑,要求盲目的自我牺牲,来满足领袖的控诉的妄想。这仅是在一个可怕而犯罪的集权的制度里,它才能够运作。这确实每位伦理的主体的责任,要尽其一切工具,来跟这样一个制度战斗,包括实质上移除集权当领导,若有必要的话,就谋杀吗?」「是的,所以你们能够看出,假如被告是无辜的,他们更加应该被枪毙—他们实际上处于这个立场,要替我们除掉史达林及他的党羽,而他们没有掌握这个机会,来替人道主义避免他的可怕的罪行!」

The same ambiguity can be discerned in the infamous statement attributed to
various Nazi leaders: “When I hear the word ‘culture,’ I reach for my pistol.” The Nazi’s intended meaning was probably that he was ready to defend high German culture with arms, if necessary, against the Jews and other barbarians; the true meaning, however, is that he is himself a barbarian who explodes with violence when confronted with true works of culture.47

相同的模糊暧昧能够被觉察,在被归属于各种的纳粹的领导者,这个恶名昭彰的陈述:「当我听到文化这个字词,我伸手去拿我的手枪。」纳粹的意图的用意很可能是,他准备用武器来捍卫德国文化,来对抗犹太人及其他野蛮民族,,假如必要的话。可是,这个真实的意义是,他自己是一种充满暴力的野蛮人,当他面临文化的真实的作品。

Hegel’s version of “infinite judgment” is thus different from Kant’s—there is a
negation of negation (of the Rabinovitch type) at work in its most famous example, “the Spirit is a bone”: (1) the Spirit is a bone; (2) this is nonsense, there is an absolute contradiction between these two terms; (3) well, the Spirit is this contradiction. One can see the opposition between this procedure and the paradox of identity as identified by Hegel, where the very occurrence of an identical term causes surprise: A rose is … (we expect a predicate, but get) a rose. The Hegelian move is to treat this surprise/paradox as constitutive of identity: there is surprise (and a temporal logic) in both cases, but of a different kind.48

黑格尔对于「永恒审判」的说法,因此跟康德的说法大异其趣。有一种否定的否定之运作 (属于拉宾诺维奇的方式),在它最著名的例子,「精神即骨头」:1、精神是骨头; 2、这是无意义,在这两个术语之间,有一个绝对的悖论; 3、嗯,精神就是这个悖论。我们能够看出这个对立,处于程序跟黑格尔辨认出来的认同的悖论之间的对立。在那里,一个认同术语的发生会引起惊奇。玫瑰花、、、(我们期望述词,但是获得)是玫瑰花。黑格尔的动作是要对待这个惊奇与悖论,作为是认同的形成:在两个情况,都有一个惊奇(和一个时间段逻辑),但是种类不同。

This in turn means that Heidegger’s notion of death as the ultimate point of
impossibility that cannot be dialectically “sublated” or included in a higher totality is no argument against Hegel: the Hegelian response is just to shift the perspective in order to recognize this negativity itself in its positive aspect, as a condition of possibility: what appears as the ultimate obstacle is in itself a positive condition of possibility, for the universe of meaning can only arise against the background of its annihilation. Furthermore, the properly dialectical reversal is not only the reversal of negative into positive, of the condition of impossibility into the condition of possibility, of obstacle into enabling agency,
but, simultaneously, the reversal of transcendence into immanence, and the inclusion of the subject of enunciation in the enunciated content.

这反过来意味着,海德格对于死亡的观念,作为不可能的最后的点,无法用辩证法「勾消」,或是被包括在一个更高的整体性里。这并不是要反对黑格尔的论点。黑格尔的回应,仅是转移这个观点,为了体认出这个否定性的本身,在它的肯定的一面,作为是可能的情况:出现作为这个最后的阻碍,本身是可能的一个肯定的情况。因为意义的宇宙仅能够产生,对抗它自己被毁灭的背景。而且,这个合宜的辩证法的倒转,不但是否定被倒转成为肯定,不可能的情况被倒转成为可能的情况,阻碍被倒转成为促进的代理,而且,同时地,超验被倒转成为内在性,表述的主体被包括在被表述的内容里。

This reversal‐into‐itself—the shift in the status of what‐is‐at‐stake from sign to
Thing, from predicate to subject—is crucial for the dialectical process: what first appears as a mere sign (property, reflection, distortion) of the Thing turns out to be the Thing itself. If the Idea cannot adequately represent itself, if its representation is distorted or deficient, then this simultaneously signals a limitation or deficiency of the Idea itself. Furthermore, not only does the universal Idea always appear in a distorted or displaced way; this Idea is nothing but the distortion or displacement, the self‐inadequacy, of the particular with regard to itself.

这个倒转成为它自身—岌岌可危的地位,从符号转变成为「物象」,从述词转变成为主词—这对辩证法过程是很重要的;首先出现作为仅是「物象」的符号(属性,反思,扭曲),结果成为「物象」的本身。假如这个「理念」无法适当地代表它自己,假如它的再现被扭曲或是欠缺,那么这同时表示一种限制或是「理念」本身的欠缺。而且,这个普遍性的「理念」不但总是出现,以一个扭曲或被替换的方式,而且这个「理念」仅仅就是扭曲或是替换,这个自性的不足,关于它自己的这个特殊性。

This brings us to the most radical dimension of the (in)famous “identity of
opposites”: insofar as “contradiction” is the Hegelian name for the Real, this means that the Real is simultaneously the Thing to which direct access is impossible and the obstacle which prevents this direct access; the Thing which eludes our grasp and the distorting screen which makes us miss the Thing. Is this not how trauma works? On the one hand, trauma is the X that the subject is unable to approach directly, that can only be perceived in a distorted way, through some kind of protective lens, that can only be alluded to in a
roundabout way, never confronted head on, etc.

这引导我们来到这个最激进的维度:这个著名的「对立的认同」,因为这个「悖论」就是黑格尔对实在界的名字,这意味着,实在界同时就是「物象」,不可能直接进入的物象,阻止这个直接进入的这个阻碍,让我们捉摸不定的这个「物象」及这个扭曲的帘幕,让我们错过这个「物象」。这难道不是创伤如何运作吗?在一方面,创伤就是这个未知数X,主体无法直接靠近的未知数X,它仅能用扭曲的方式来感觉,通过某种的保护的透镜。它仅能被提到,以一个迂回的方式,永远不是正面面对,等等。

On the other hand, however, for a subject who has experienced a traumatic shock, the trauma also functions as the very opposite of the inaccessible Thing‐in‐itself which eludes its grasp: it functions as something here, in me, that distorts and disturbs my perspective on reality, twisting it in a particular way. A woman who has been brutally raped and humiliated not only cannot directly recall the rape scene; the repressed memory of the rape also distorts her approach to reality, making her oversensitive to some of its aspects, ignoring others and so on.

可是,在另一方面,一个曾经经历创伤惊吓动主体,这个创伤也发挥功用,作为是它无法掌握的不可接近的物象本身的对立物。它在此发挥功用,作为某件东西,在我身上,扭曲而且扰乱我对现实界的观点,扭曲它,以一个特别的方式。一个曾经遭到残酷强暴及羞辱的女人,不但无法直接回忆起这个强暴场景,而且被强暴的被压抑记忆也扭曲她的对于现实界的接近,让她对于现实界的某些方面过分敏感,忽略其他,等等。

And is not this shift structurally homologous to that of the Rabinovitch joke quoted above? The very problem (obstacle) retroactively appears as its own solution, since what prevents us from directly accessing the Thing is the Thing itself. The only change here lies in the shift of perspective. In exactly the same way, the final twist in Kafka’s parable “Before the Law” relies on a mere shift of perspective: the man from the country, confronted with the door of the Law that prevents his access to the terrifying Thing (the Law), is told that from the very beginning the door was there only for him, in other words that he was from the beginning included in the Law—the Law was not just the Thing which fascinated his gaze, it always already returned his gaze. And, to go a step further, the gap that separates me from God is the gap that separates God from himself: the distance is not abolished (I do not miraculously rejoin God), it is merely displaced into God himself.

这个转变难道不是在结构上,跟以上引述的拉宾诺维奇的笑话的转变是同质性?这个问题(阻碍)反动地出现,作为它自己的解决,因为阻止我们无法直接接近这个「物象」的东西,就是「物象」的本身。在此,这个唯一的改变在于观点的这个改变,方式确实相同,在卡夫卡的寓言「法律之前」,这个最后的变形,仅是依靠观点的改变; 从乡下来的这个人,面对法律之门,这道门阻止他无法进入这个可怕的「物象」(法律)。他被告诉,从一开始,这道门在那里,就是等待他。换句话说,他从一开始就被「包括」在法律里。法律不仅是吸引他的凝视的这个「物象」,它总是已经回报他的凝视。为了更进一步,分开我跟上帝的这个差距,就是分开上帝跟他自己的这个差距。这个距离并没有被废除 (我并没有奇迹般地跟他融合),它仅是被替换成为上帝本身。

Yet another way to articulate this key moment is in the more traditional terms of the dialectical tension between the epistemological and the ontological dimensions: the gap that separates the knowing subject from the known object is inherent to the object itself, my knowing a thing is part of a process internal to the thing, which is why the standard epistemological problem should be turned around: not “How is my knowledge of the thing possible?” but “How is it that knowledge appears within the thing as a mode of the thing’s relating to itself?” With regard to God, the problem is not “How can I know God?” but “How
and why does God generate in humans knowledge about himself?” that is, how does my knowledge (and ignorance) of God function within God himself? Our alienation from God is God’s self‐alienation. When we lose God, it is not only that God abandons us, God abandons
himself.

可是,另外一种方法来表达这个关键点时刻,用辩证法的紧张的更加传统的术语,这个紧张处于认识论与本体论的维度之间。分开知道的主体跟这个被知道的主体的这个差距,是客体本身的内在本质。我知道一件东西,是这个东西的内部的过程。这就是为什么标准的认识论的问题,应该被倒转过来。不是「我对这个东西的知识如何成为可能?」,而是「知识如何出现在这个东西里面,作为这个东西跟它自己的关系?关于上帝,这个问题并不是「我如何能够认识上帝?」,而是「上帝如何以及为何在人类有关他自己的知识里产生?」换句话说,我对上帝的知识(及我的无知)如何在上帝本身里面发挥功用?我们跟上帝的异化,就是上帝的自我异化。当我们丧失上帝,那不但是上帝放弃我们,而且是上帝放弃他自己。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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