Less than nothing 04

Less than nothing 04
少甚于无

Slavoj Zizek
斯拉夫、齐泽克

CHAPTER 8
第八章
LACAN, MARX, HEIDEGGER
拉康、马克思、海德格

Such a shift also lies at the very heart of the Hegelian relationship between lies and truth. Winston Churchill was right when he characterized truth not as something we search for, but as something upon which, occasionally, we accidentally stumble: “Men stumble over the truth from time to time, but most pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing happened.”

这样一种转变就在于黑格尔的关系的核心,处于谎言与真理之间。温斯顿、邱吉尔说得没有错,当他表现真理的特性,不是作为某件我们寻找的东西,而是作为某件偶尔我们会邂逅的东西。「人有时邂逅真理,但是大部分人善待一下,然后匆匆离开,好像没有发生什么事。

A psychologically intuitive person may be able to recognize immediately—from
a slight change of tone or of gesture—when somebody has started to lie; but perhaps what one needs much more is someone able to recognize when, in the generalized babble of daily communication, a person stumbles upon truth (or, rather, when the truth starts to talk in or through the babble)—not, of course, factual truth, but subjective truth, which can also (even as a rule does) express itself in the guise of a (factual) lie.

一位具有心理直觉的人可能能够立刻体认出来—从语调或姿态的轻微改变—当某个人已经开始说谎,但是或许我们更加需要的是某个人能够体认出,在日常沟通的一般性的蠢话里,什么时候一个人邂逅真理, (或者,什么时候真理开始用蠢话或通过蠢话谈论)–当然,那并不是事实的真理,而是主观性的真理。这个真理也能够表达它自己,伪装成(实际的)的谎言。

The reason is that, at their most radical, lies are not a simple denial of truth; they serve a much more refined protective function: to render the truth palpable, tolerable. During World War II, Churchill quipped: “In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” And since, in a way, life itself, especially love, is permanent warfare, lying is what keeps the world together. Joseph de Maistre wrote: “if we want to teach an error, we should … always begin with a truth.”24 De Maistre had in mind how even the most cruel sacrificial rituals of pagan religion implicitly harbor a correct insight into the efficacy of sacrifice brought out in its true form by Christianity. However, from a Hegelian standpoint, we should invert this statement: “if we want to teach a truth, we should always begin with an error.”

这个理由是,在它们最激烈时,谎言并不是对于真理的单纯的否定。它们充当一种更加精炼的保护功用:将真理变得具体化,可容忍。在二次大战期间,邱吉尔开玩笑说:「在战时,真理是如此的珍贵,以致于她应该受到一群谎言护卫的伴从。因为在某方面,生命本身,特别是爱,就是永久的战争,谎言就是团结这个世界的东西。约瑟夫、梅思特瑞写到:「假如我们想要教导一个错误,我们应该总是从真理开始。」梅思特瑞心中所想的是,即使是异教徒宗教最残酷的牺牲的仪式都含蓄地怀抱著一个正确的洞见,看到牺牲的有效性,由基督教用它的真实的形式显露出来。可是,从黑格尔的观点,我们应该倒转这个陈述:「假如我们想要教导一个真理,我们应该总是从一个错误开始。」

The basic strategy of Brecht’s celebrated adaptive cunning, exemplified by his
behavior during his interview by the House Un‐American Activities Committee (HUAC), is to “lie with (partial) truth”: while all Brecht’s answers to the Committee were factually true, he tailored the facts to create a false overall impression (in short: that he was not a dedicated communist propagandist, but just an anti‐fascist democrat). The principle underlying Brecht’s strategy is best expressed in his cynical reply to the reproach that he acted like a coward:

布莱特的著名的适应的狡狯的基本策略,可由他的行为作为典范,在非美裔活动委员会的採访过程。那个策略就是「用(部分)真理说谎。虽然布莱特对于委员会的回答,实际上是真实的,他裁剪这些事实来创造虚假的全面性印象(总之:他并不是一位全心全意的共产党的宣导者,而仅是反对法西斯主义的民主党员)。作为布莱特的策略的基础的原则,可由他嘲讽地回答这个谴责:他的行为像个懦夫,表现的最为淋漓尽致。

“My profession is not a hero, but a writer.” The problem here, of course, is that being a hero—that is, having courage—is precisely not a profession, but a
characteristic that can be displayed in any situation where what is at stake is what Badiou calls fidelity to a Truth‐Event. Brecht’s stance should be contrasted to that of Dashiell Hammett, who found himself in a similar predicament at the same time: called to testify before the HUAC, he was asked if he really was a trustee for a fund that the Communist Party of the USA had organized to protect its persecuted members and sympathizers.

「我的专业并不是英雄,而是作家。」当然,在此的问题是,作为英雄—换句话说,具有勇气—并不是一种专业,而是一种能够在任何情境表达特性。在那里,岌岌可危的是巴迪欧所谓的对于真理事件的忠诚。布莱特的态度应该对照于达西尔、汉梅特的态度,后者发现他自己同时处于类似的困境:被号召在非美裔活动委员会作证,他被询问他是否是美国共产党组织的基金会信托人,这个基金会是为了保护它受到迫害的成员及同情者。

The truth was that he knew nothing about the fund, but he was too proud to answer truthfully, since this would have implied that he recognized the authority of the HUAC and accepted the need to defend himself; so he refused to answer (and was duly sent to prison where, after only two weeks, the guards began to address him as “Sir”—proof of the extraordinary power and dignity of his personality). Both Brecht and Hammett lied, but where Brecht lied with (partial) truth, Hammett lied to save his dignity and truthfulness.25

事实上,他对这个基金会一无所知,但是他太骄傲,以致没有真实地回答。因为这本来会暗示,他承认非美裔活动委员会的权威,并且接受替他自己辩护的需要。所以他拒绝回答(然后按规定被送入监狱,在那里,仅经过两个星期后,警卫开始称呼他为「先生」–证明他具有他的人格的特别权力与权威)。布莱特与汉梅特都说谎,但是布莱特用部分的真理说谎,而汉梅特说谎说为了拯救他的尊严及忠实。

No wonder that Georg Lukács, Brecht’s great Marxist opponent, displayed more ethical courage than Brecht when, after the crushing of the Hungarian rebellion at the end of 1956, he was arrested by the Soviets, who offered him freedom on one condition: they had tapes of his phone conversations with the other members of the Imre Nagy government and they knew that he had expressed his disagreement with some of the government’s anti‐socialist measures—all the Soviets wanted from him was to restate these disagreements publicly. Lukács declined, knowing perfectly well that to state the factual truth under such
conditions would have been to lie.

难怪布莱特的马克思的伟大对手,乔治、鲁凯克,展示比布莱特更具有伦理的勇气,经过1956年结束,匈牙利的反叛被压制后,他被苏联逮捕,然后被释放,其中一个条件是:他们拥有他跟印马、纳吉政府官员的电话谈话的录音带。他们知道他曾表达他并不赞同某些政府的反对社会主义的措施。苏联所要从他那里得到的就是公开重新陈述这些的不赞同。鲁凯克婉拒,因为他清楚地知道,在这些条件下,陈述这个实际的真理,那将会是说谎。

In his first Seminar, Lacan defines error as a habitual embodiment of truth: “as long as the truth will not be revealed in its entirety, that is to say, in all probability till the end of time, it will be in its nature to propagate itself in the guise of error: error is thus a constitutive structure of the revelation of being as such.”26

在他的研讨班,拉康定义错误,作为真理的习惯性化身:「只要真理没有完整地显示,换句话说,很有可能,直到生命结束。真理的特性将会以伪装错误的方式宣导自己:错误因此是生命实存本身的启示的组成结构。」

The reference here, of course, is to the Freudian universe in which truth articulates itself as a rupture of the normal or regular flow of our speech or activity: the truth leaks out in the guise of slips of the tongue, failures to act, etc. Lacan wants to draw a strict distinction between this Freudian procedure and the Hegelian dialectic in which truth also arises out of errors, through the
self‐sublation of the latter: Hegelian truth is the absolute disclosure which can only be formulated at the end of history, when the historical process is fully actualized, while Freudian truth is partial, fragmentary, always just a rupture in the flow of ignorance, never the revealed totality.

当然,在此的指称是提到弗洛依德的宇宙。在那里,真理标达它自己,作为我们话语或活动的正常或规律的流露:真理以伪装成口误,没有採取行动等方式,泄露出来。拉康想要严格地区别,弗洛依德的程序跟黑格尔的辩证法,在后者,真理也是从错误中产生,经由错误的自我钩销:黑格尔的真理就是,绝对的辞说仅能在历史的结束被说明,当历史的过程充分地被实现。而弗洛依的真理是部分,片断,总是一种断裂,在无知中流动,从来就不是被显示的完整性。

The problem here is that since psychoanalysis thus lacks the final
point of total revelation which would enable it to firmly distinguish truth from error, how can it be sure that the other discourse which the psychoanalytic interpretation discerns beneath the discourse of méprise is not just another discourse of misrecognition? Aware of the problem, for a couple of years Lacan effectively insisted on a homology between psychoanalysis and Hegelian Absolute Knowing: the only difference being that the psychoanalyst is more modest, aware that we cannot ever reach the point of accomplished
symbolization/revelation.

在此的这个问题是,因为精神分析因此缺乏完整启示的最后的时刻,这个时刻将会让他能够坚定地区别真理跟错误。这如何能够确定?精神分析的解释,在meprise之下觉察出来的另外一个辞说,并不仅是误认的另外一个辞说?因为知道这个问题,两三年后,拉康实际上坚持一种同质性,处于精神分析与黑格尔绝对知识之间的同质性。唯一的差别是,精神分析家更加谦卑,因为他知道,我们永远无法到达完整的符号象征与启示的那个时刻。

(Later, Lacan resorted to the classic Freudian answer: the proof of the truth of a psychoanalytic interpretation is its own symbolic efficacy, the way it transforms the subject.) However, such a reading of Lacan as a “weak Hegelian,” still faithful to the Hegelian goal and merely postponing indefinitely the final reconciliation, is stricto sensu wrong—that is, wrong with regard to Hegel. In other words, the very notion of Absolute Knowing as accomplished symbolization, the full revelation of Being, etc., totally misses the point of the Hegelian “reconciliation” by turning it into an Ideal to be reached, rather than something that is always already here and should merely be assumed. Hegelian temporality is crucial here: we enact “reconciliation” not by way of a miraculous healing of wounds, and so forth, but by recognizing “the rose in the cross of the present,” by realizing that reconciliation is already accomplished in what we (mis)perceived as alienation.

(后来,拉康诉诸于这个古典的弗洛依式的回答:精神分析解释的真理的证据,是它自己的符号象征的有效性。它改变主体的方式。)可是,如此阅读拉康,作为是「软弱的黑格尔」,依旧是忠实于黑格尔的目标,并且仅是不定期地拖延这个最后的「协和」,这种阅读严格而言是错误的。换句话说,关于黑格尔,这样的阅读是错误的。也就是说,绝对知识的这个观念,作为被完成的符号象征,生命实存的充分实现,等等,完全错认黑格尔「协和」的时刻。因为他将它转变成为一种要被抵达的理念,而不是某件「总是已经在此,而且应该仅是被假定的东西」。黑格尔的时间性在此时重要的:我们拟定「协和」,并不是凭借对于创伤的奇迹般的治疗,等等。而是凭借体认出「目前的这个十字架的这朵玫瑰花」,凭借体会到,协和总是被完成,在我们所感觉或错误感觉作为异化的东西。

Consequently, Hegel does deal with symptoms—in the sense that every universality in its actualization generates an excess which undermines it. The Hegelian totality is by definition “self‐contradictory,” antagonistic, inconsistent: the “Whole” which is the “True” (Hegel: “das Ganze is das Wahre”) is the Whole plus its symptoms, the unintended consequences which betray its untruth. For Marx, the “totality” of capitalism includes crises as its integral moments; for Freud, the “totality” of a human subject includes pathological symptoms as indicators of what is “repressed” in the official image of the subject.

结果,黑格尔处理病征—意思是,在实现它的每个普遍性,产生一种毁灭它的过渡。黑格尔的完整性在定义上是「自我矛盾」,具有敌意,不一贯的:这个「整体性」,就是这个「实在」,就是这个「整体性」加上它的病征,这些意料之外的结果,泄露出它的非真理。对于马克思,资本主义的的这个「完整性」包括危机,作为它的完整的时刻。对于弗洛依德,一位人类主体的「完整性」包括病态的病征,作为主体的正式意象所被潜抑的病征的指标。

The underlying premise is that the Whole is never truly whole: every notion of the Whole leaves something out, and the dialectical effort is precisely the effort to include this excess, to account for it. Symptoms are never just secondary failures or distortions of the basically sound System—they are indicators that there is something “rotten” (antagonistic, inconsistent) in the very heart of the System.

作为基础的假设是,「这个整体性从来就不是真正的整体」。整体性的每个观念漏掉某件东西,而辩证的努力确实就是努力要包括这个过渡,为了解释它。病征从来就不仅是次要的失败或是这个基本健全的系统的扭曲—它们是指标:在系统的中心,有某件「腐烂」的东西(具有敌意而且不一贯)。

This is why the anti‐Hegelian rhetoric which insists on how Hegel’s totality misses the details which stick out and destroy its equilibrium misses the point: the space of the Hegelian totality is the very space of the interaction between the (“abstract”) Whole and the details that elude its grasp, although they are generated by it. So what if Hegel’s thought is not a metaphysics, but a form of
pataphysics in Alfred Jarry’s sense, a thinking of pathological incidents which inevitably disturb the inner logic of a process?

这就是为什么反对黑格尔的措词坚持,黑格尔的整体性错过这些突显出来的细节,并且毁灭它的平衡。这种措词错过这个要点:黑格尔的整体性的空间就是这个互动的空间,处于(抽象的)整体性与无法让它理解的细节之间,虽然它们都被它产生。所以,假如黑格尔的思想并不是形上学,而是阿弗瑞、杰瑞所说的超形上学,那会怎样?后者是病态意外地思想,无可避免地扰乱过程的内在逻辑。

The paradigmatic case of Understanding, of its “abstract” reasoning, is thus not
primarily the isolated analysis of objects and processes, or a blindness to the complex dynamic Whole within which an object is located (even Stalin was well aware of this topic, with his endless variations on the motif of how “everything is connected with everything else”), but rather a blindness to the structural role of symptoms, of excesses and obstacles, a blindness to the productive role of these obstacles. For example, at the level of Understanding, crises appear as obstacles to capitalism’s smooth functioning, obstacles that can and should be avoided by the adoption of intelligent economic policies.

理解,也就是抽象推理的典范的情况,因此并不是原初就是客体与过程的孤立分析,或是对于复杂的动力的整体性视而不见。在这个整体性里面,客体被找出(即使史达林清楚知道这个议题,不断地变化这个主题:每样东西如何跟每样其他东西发生关联。)而是相反地,对于病征,对于过分与阻碍的的结构性角色视而不见,对于这些阻碍的生产性角色视而不见。譬如,在理解的层次,危机出现,作为资本主义的顺畅运作的阻碍。这些阻碍能够而且应该被避免,凭借採用明智的经济政策。

Likewise, for Understanding, the “totalitarian” character of the communist regimes of the twentieth century appears as a regrettable consequence of “neglecting” the central role of democratic decision‐making, not as a necessary feature of the twentieth‐century communist project as such. “Understanding” is thus inherently utopian (in the ideological sense of the term): it dreams of, say, a society based on money, but in which money would not be an instrument of fetishistic alienation and exploitation, but would simply mediate the exchange between free individuals; or of a society based on parliamentary democracy which would fully and effectively represent the people’s will and so on.

同样地,对于理解,对于二十世纪的共产党政权的「集权」特性,出现作为一个令人遗憾的结果,由于「忽略」民主的决定的中心的角色,不是作为二十世纪的共产党的计划本身的一种必须的特征。「理解」因此在本质上是乌托邦(从这个术语的意识形态来说):譬如,它梦想一个以金钱作为基础的社会,但是在这个社会,金钱将不会是物神化的异化及剥削的工具。或是梦想一个以议会的民主为基础的社会,它会充分而有效地代表人民的意志,等等。

So Hegel “cannot think the symptom” insofar as we understand the Cunning of
Reason in its traditional teleological sense, as a hidden rational order controlling historical contingency, manipulatively exploiting particular moments in order to realize its hidden universal goal. However, the moment we take into account the retroactivity of universal necessity—the fact that each “use” of particular moments for some universal goal, as well as this goal itself, emerge retroactively in order, precisely, to “rationalize” the symptomal excess—we can no longer accept the Hegelian Cunning of Reason in its standard sense.

所以,黑格尔「无法思考这个病征」,因为我们了解理性的狡狯,处于它的传统的目的论的意义,作为隐藏的理性的秩序,控制历史的偶然性,操控地利用特别的时刻,为了体现它的隐藏的普遍性目标。可是,当我们一考虑到普遍性需要的反动—对于某些普遍性的目标,以及这个目标本身的特别时刻的每个使用,会反动地出现,为了,确实是为了理性化这个病征的过度—我们不再能够接受黑格尔的标准意义的理性的狡狯。

In his early, Maoist‐phase Theory of Contradiction, Badiou wrote: “To the
nothing‐new‐under‐the‐sun, the thinking of revolt opposes the ever new insurgent red sun, under the emblem of which the unlimited affirmative hope of rebellious producers engenders ruptures.” This upbeat statement is supplemented by a much more ominous‐sounding one: “There is the radically New only because there are corpses that no trumpet of Judgment will ever reawaken.”27 The shocking brutality of this last statement should not blind us to its truth: if we really want to assert a radical break, we must abandon the Benjaminian notion of retroactive redemption, of a revolutionary act which redeems all past suffering and defeats—as the Christians say, the dead should be left to bury the dead.

在他的早期的毛泽东时期的「悖论的理论」,巴迪欧写到:「对于这个阳光底下无新事,反叛的思想反对这个永远是新被颠覆的红太阳,这它的旗帜下,反叛的生产者的无限的肯定的希望,产生断裂。」这个乐观的陈述被伴随着一个听起来更加是恶兆的陈述:「这个强烈的新太阳存在,仅是因为最后审判的号角将永远唤不醒那些尸体。最后这句陈述的令人震惊的残酷,不应该让我们视而不见它的真理:假如我们确实想要主张一个强烈的突破,我们必须放弃反动的救赎,这个班杰明的观念。这个革命的行动救赎所有过去的痛苦与失败—如同基督教徒所说,应该留下死者来埋葬死者。

No Cunning of Reason can retroactively justify present suffering, as in the Stalinist idea, elaborated by Merleau‐Ponty in Humanism and Terror, that the good life of the communist future will justify the cruelty of the contemporary revolutionary process.

没有理性的狡狯能够反动地证明目前的痛苦是应该,如同在史达林的观念,由梅洛庞帝在「人文主义与恐怖」所建构。共产党的未来的美好生活将会证明,当代的革命过程的残酷是应该的。

Robert Pippin is the only thinker today who heroically defines his goal as the
promotion of “bourgeois philosophy,” that is, the philosophy of legitimizing and analyzing the “bourgeois” way of life centered on the notion of autonomous and responsible individuals leading a safe life within the confines of civil society. The problem, of course, comes back to the skeleton in the closet of every bourgeois society: Pippin as a Hegelian (the US Hegelian) should know that, for Hegel, modern bourgeois society could only have arisen through the mediation of Revolutionary Terror (exemplified by Jacobins); furthermore, Hegel is also aware that, in order to prevent its own death by habituation (immersion in the life of particular interests), every bourgeois society needs to be shattered from time to time by war.

罗伯、皮宾是今天唯一的思想家,英勇地定义他的目标,作为是提升「布尔乔亚哲学」,换句说,合理化并且分析布尔乔亚的生活方式。这种生活方式专注于自主而负责的个人,在文明社会的范围里,过著安全的生活。当然,这个问题会回到每个布尔乔亚的社会,都具有不可告人的恐怖秘密。皮宾作为一位黑格尔学派(美国式的黑格尔学派)应该知道,对于黑格尔,现代的布尔乔亚的社会能够产生,仅是经由革命的恐怖的中介 (由雅克宾的恐怖断头台作为典范)。而且,黑格尔也知道,为了阻止它自己习焉不察的死亡,(耽溺于特别興趣的生活),每个布尔乔亚的社会都需要有时用战争予以粉碎。

A problem such as “can excesses like Auschwitz be justified, economized, as
necessary detours on the road towards a free society, can they be aufgehoben as moments of historical progress?” is, therefore, from a strict Hegelian perspective, badly posed: it presupposes a position of external substantial teleology that is precluded by Hegel.

在朝向自由社会的途中,诸如像奥斯威兹集中营这样的过度能够证明是合理,而且精简为必要的迂回吗?它们会是作为历史的进展的时刻的「钩消」吗?因此,从严格的黑格尔的观点,它被很不恰当地提出:它预先假定一个外在的实质目的论的立场,这是黑格尔所预示的。

There is no substantial historical Spirit weighing up in advance the costs and benefits of a prospective historical catastrophe (e.g., is the massacre of European Jewry a price worth paying for the unprecedented peace and prosperity of postwar Europe?): it is only actual humans, caught up in a historical process, who generate a catastrophe which can then give birth to new ethico‐political awareness, without any claim that this unintended result in any way “justifies” or legitimizes the enormous suffering that led to it.

没有实质的历史的精神预先衡量这些代价及利益,对于一个未来的历史的灾难(譬如,对于欧洲犹太人的屠杀,难道不是一个代价,偿付给战后欧洲史无前例的和平与繁荣?)仅是实际的人类被套陷于历史的过程,这些人类产生的灾难因此能够产生新的伦理-政治的觉醒,而没有宣称:这个意图之外的结果证明合理,或合法化曾经导致它的巨大痛苦。

Measured in this way, no historical progress is “worth the price”: all one can say is that the ultimate outcome of historical catastrophes is sometimes a higher ethical awareness which one should accept with humility and in memory of the blood spilled on the path to realizing it. Such “blessings in disguise” are never guaranteed in advance, which is why, insofar as a symptom is the point of “irrationality” of the existing totality, a point which cannot be subsumed under any figure of totalizing Reason, we should invert Marx’s famous formula of recovering the “rational core” of Hegel’s dialectic and boldly propose to recover its irrational core.

以这种方式来衡量,没有历史的进步是「值得这个代价」:我们所能够说的是,历史灾难的最后的结果,有时是一个更高的伦理的觉醒,那是我们应该谦卑地接受的,来纪念在实现它的途中的浴血成河。诸如的因祸得福从来没有被预先被保证。这就是为什么,当病征是现存整体性的「非理性」的点。这个点无法被包括在整体化的理性的任何数字里。我们应该倒转马克思的著名的公式,恢复黑格尔的辩证法的理性的核心,并且大胆地建议要恢复它的非理性的核心。

But, again, are we not contradicting here Lacan’s explicit critique of the Hegelian
“Cunning of Reason”? Does not Lacan advocate Marx’s “materialist reversal of Hegel”: what Hegel cannot think is the radical sense of a symptom which undermines from within any Cunning of Reason?

但是,除外,我们难道不是在此反驳拉康的明确的批判黑格尔的「理性的狡狯」?拉康难道不是主张马克思的「唯物论对黑格尔的颠覆」:黑格尔无法想到的是,病征的积极意义从内部损坏理性的任何狡狯?

For Marx, the totality of Reason (which asserts its reign through its
“cunning”) is undermined in its symptom (the proletariat as the “unreason within the domain of Reason,” as the non‐sense that no cunning can legitimate and/or rationalize).

对于马克思,理性的整体性(主张它的统治,通过它的狡狯)在它的病征里被损坏 (普罗阶级,作为理性领域内部的非理性,作为没有狡狯能够合法化,以及,或理性化的无意义。)

This dimension of the symptom as “the return of truth as such into the gap of a certain knowledge” is highly differentiated in Marx’s critique, even if it is not made explicit there.

病征的维度,作为「真理本身的回来,进入某种知识的差距」,在马克思的批判里,被高度地被区别,即使它在那里并没有被弄得很明确。

And one can say that a part of the reversal of Hegel that he carries out is constituted by the return (which is a materialist return, precisely insofar as it gives it figure and body) of the question of truth. The latter actually forces itself upon us … not by taking up the thread of the ruse of reason, a subtle form with which Hegel sends it packing, but by upsetting these ruses (read Marx’s political writings) which are merely dressed up with reason.28

我们能够说,马克思能够实现的黑格尔的颠覆,是由这个回转所形成,(这是一种唯物论的回转,确实是因为它给予它形象与身体),对于真理的问题。后者确实强迫它自己在我们身上,不是凭借从事理性的狡计的脉络,一种微妙的形式,黑格尔用来将它渐渐封住,而是凭借颠覆这些狡计(请阅读马克思的政治著作)这些狡计仅是用理性来包装。

Marx “invents the symptom” when he conceptualizes the position of the proletariat as the material “figure and body” which gives body to the “un‐reason” of the totality of Reason (the modern Rational State) conceptualized and legitimized by Hegelian Knowledge. Marx thus sees through the Hegelian trick of legitimizing exploitation and other horrors as necessary moments of the progress of Reason (Reason using evil human passions as means to actualize itself), denouncing it as the legitimization of a miserable social reality which is merely “dressed up with reason.” As such, the “message” of the symptom is:

马克思「发明这个病征」,当他概念化普罗阶级的立场,作为物质的「形象与身体」,它产生整体性的这个「非理性」(现代的理性国家),用黑格尔的知识予以概念化及合理化。马克思因此看透黑格尔的合理化剥削及其他恐怖的诡计,作为是理性进展的必要的时刻,(理性使用邪恶的人类激情,充当工具,来实践它自己),抨击它,作为悲惨的社会的现实的合理化.这种社会的现实仅是用理性来装扮。作为这样一个社会,病征的讯息是:

“Men, listen, I am telling you the secret. I, truth, speak.”29 In a symptom, “it
speaks,” the subject is surprised by it, taken aback, caught with his pants down; a symptom is thus something that cannot be attributed to any subject or agent. The temptation to be resisted here—the very temptation of the Cunning of Reason—is to surmise another meta‐Subject or Agent who organizes these apparent failures and mistakes, turning them into steps towards the final Truth.

「人啊,请倾听,我正在告诉你们这个秘密,我作为真理,在言说。」在病征里,「它在言说」,主体被它所惊吓,大吃一惊,连裤子都来不及穿上。这样一种病征,因此是某件无法被归属于任何主体或代理者的东西。在此,应该被抗拒的诱惑—理性的狡狯的这个诱惑—它应该想像另外一个形上-主体,或的形上-代理者。他们组织这些表面的失败及错误,将他们转变成为朝向最后的真理的步骤。

The Cunning of Reason is the desperate wager of trusting in history, the belief that the big Other guarantees its final happy outcome—or, as Lacan put it in his acerbic way:

理性的狡狯是在历史中信托这个信仰的赌注:大他者保证它的最后的快乐的结果—或是,如同拉康以它他的辛辣方式表达:

The discourse of error—its articulation in action—could bear witness to the truth against the apparent facts themselves. It was then that one of them tried to get the cunning of reason accepted into the rank of objects deemed worthy of study. Unfortunately, he was a professor … Remain content, then, with your vague sense of history and leave it to clever people to found the world market in lies, the trade in all‐out war, and the new law of self‐criticism on the guarantee of my future firm. If reason is as cunning as Hegel said it was, it will do its job without your help.30

错误的辞说能够见证真理—它在行动里的表达—来对抗这些外表达事实本身。就在那时,其中一个事实让理性的狡狯被接受,进入被认为是值得研究的客体的阵营。不幸地,他是一位教授—请你们满足于你们模糊的历史感觉,并且将它留给精明的人用谎言去创办这个世界市场,这是全面性战争的行业,以及创办自我批判的新的法律,对于我的未来的公司。假如理性像黑格尔所说的那样的狡狯,它将会尽它的职责,而没有你们的帮助。

A symptom is, on the contrary, that which undermines the big Other, that in which the big Other reveals its gaps, inconsistency, failure, impotence. When Lacan writes, “I, truth, speak,” this does not mean that the substantial “big Other” in me speaks, but, on the contrary, that the big Other’s failure breaks through. Error is the partial un‐truth which can be sublated into a subordinate moment of the truth of Totality, while a symptom is a partial break‐through of the repressed truth of the Totality, a truth which belies totality. Lacan here opposes error and mistake (méprise): while, in the Hegelian dialectical process, truth arises through error, in the psychoanalytic process, it arises from a mistake (or, rather,
mis‐apprehension)—truth says: “Whether you flee from me in deceit or think you can catch me in error, I will catch up with you in the mistake from which you cannot hide.”31

相反地,一个病征是损坏大他者的东西。在病征里,这个大他者显示它的差距,不一贯性,失败,无能。当拉康写到,「我,作为真理,在言说」,这并不意味着,我身上的实质上的大他者在言说,而是相反地,这个大他者的失败作为突破。错误是这个能够被钩消的部分的非真理,被钩消成为一个隶属于整体性的真理的时刻。而病征是整体性的被潜抑的真理的部分的突破。这一种真理虚假地代表整体性。拉康在此反对犯错及错误:在黑格尔的辩证法的过程,真理通过错误产生,在精神分析的过程,真理从错误中产生(或者说,从错误的理解中产生)–真理言说:「无论你们是否欺骗地逃避我,或是认为你们能够在错误中捉住我,我将会在错误中迎头赶上你们,你们无所逃避这个错误。

When I am in error, I hold as true something that is not true; in a symptom, on the contrary, truth appears in what I hold as least true, most contingent, unworthy of universality. Again, truth says:

当我犯错时,我认为某件非真实的东西是真实的。相反地,在病征里,真理出现在我认为是最不真实,最偶发性,不值得普遍性的东西里,

I wander about in what you regard as least true by its very nature: in dreams, in the way the most far‐fetched witticisms and the most grotesque nonsense of jokes defy meaning, and in chance—not in its law, but rather in its contingency. And I never more surely proceed to change the face of the world than when I give it the profile of Cleopatra’s nose.32

我漫遊在你们认为根据它的特性是最不真实的地方:在梦境里,以最机智灵巧的方式,抗拒意义的笑话的无意义的方式,在无常生活里,不是在它的法则里,而是相反地在它的偶发性里。我从来没有如此确定地前进,为了改变世界的面貌,比起当我给予这个世界,克里奥佩脱拉这位埃及女王的鼻子的美丽轮廓。

The implications of such a radical notion of the symptom are much more
far‐reaching than it may appear: the symptom is not a secondary expression of some substantial content already dwelling deep in the subject—on the contrary, the symptom is “open,” coming from the future, pointing towards a content that will only come to be through the symptom.33 Recall Lacan’s statement that “woman is a symptom of man”—does this mean that, vulgari eloquentia, a woman comes to ex‐sist only when a man selects her as a potential object of libidinal investment? So what is she prior to this investment?

对于病征如此强烈的观念所暗示,比起病征的表面更加深远。病征并不是某种实质的内容的一个次级的表达,这个实质内容深深驻居于主体身上。相反地,病征是「开放性」,来自未来,指向一个仅是经由病征而逐渐成为的内容。请大家回忆一下拉康的陈述:「女人是男人的病征。」–这难道不是意味着,仅有当男人选择女人,作为力比多的投注的一个潜在的客体时,女人才逐渐存在?那么,在这个投注之前,女人是什么?

What if we conceive the idea of a symptom that pre‐exists what it is a symptom of, so that we can consider women as symptoms wandering around in search of
something to attach themselves to as symptoms—or even just being satisfied with their role as empty symptoms?34 One can effectively claim that a woman who withdraws from sexual contact with men is a symptom at its purest, a zero‐level symptom—a nun, for example, who, in rejecting becoming the symptom of a particular man (her sexual partner), posits herself as the symptom of Christ, the man (ecce homo).

假如我们构想预先存在的病征的观念,作为病征形成的东西,那会怎么样?这样,我们能够将女人认为是病征,到处漫遊寻找某件东西来连系她们自己,作为病征?或是甚至满足于她们的角色,作为空洞的病征?我们能够有效地宣称:从跟男人的性接触撤退的女人,是最纯净,零度状态的病征。譬如,修女,当她们拒绝成为某特特别男人的病征,(她的性的伴侣),提出她自己,作为耶稣基督的病征,瞧!这个人!

This notion of the paradoxical pre‐existence of a symptom can also be given a
Benjaminian twist. In the middle of Tchaikovsky’s “Francesca da Rimini” (eleven minutes into it), there is a passage which sounds almost like Bernard Herrmann, a kind of flight into the future; then the standard Romanticism recovers itself. It is really as if Tchaikovsky produced here a symptom in the early Lacanian (or Benjaminian) sense of a message from the future, something that its own time lacked the proper means to hear or understand.

病征的矛盾地先前存在的观念,也能够被给予一个班杰明式的变种。在柴可夫斯基的Francesca da Rimini (有十一分钟),有一个听起来几乎像是伯纳、赫曼的讯息:某种逃避到未来。然后,标准的浪漫主义恢复它自己。这确实是好像柴可夫斯基在此产生一种病征,在早期的拉康式或班杰明式的从未来传递的讯息的意义。某件它自己的时代欠缺适当的工具来倾听或了解的东西。

(This is how modernism works: what were originally fragments of an organic Whole are autonomized—the same goes for Joan Miró’s paintings.) No wonder that this is the music used for the ballet sequence at the end of Torn Curtain—a kind of revenge of Herrmann whose score Hitchcock discarded—a scene in which the “repressed returns.” (Did he choose this piece?)35

这是现代主义运作的方式:原先是有机体的整体的碎片,被赋予自主权。相同的道理可适用于米罗的图画。)无论这是被使用作巴蕾舞系列的音乐,在「被撕破的帘幕」–某种的赫曼的报复,他的乐谱被希区考克抛弃—在那里,被压抑者会回来(他确实选择这首曲子吗?)

There is a nice anecdote about a Latin American poet who modified the political
tenor of his poetry according to whoever was his most recent mistress: when she was a proto‐fascist rightist, he celebrated military discipline and patriotic sacrifice; when he got involved with a pro‐communist woman, he started to celebrate guerrilla warfare; later, he moved on to a hippy mistress and wrote about drugs and transcendental meditation.

关于拉丁美洲的诗人,有一个美好轶事,他修改他的诗的政治的语调,依照他最近的情妇是谁而定:当情妇是支持法西斯的右派,他就赞扬军事的纪律及爱国的牺性。当跟他缠绵的是支持共产党的女人,他开始赞扬游击队的战斗。后来,他转到一位嬉皮的情妇,并且书写毒品及超验的沉思。

This is what “woman as a symptom of man” means, not merely that a man uses a woman to articulate his message—on the contrary, woman is the determining factor: man orients himself towards his symptom, he clings to it to give consistency to his life. And the Hegelian Cunning of Reason works in a similar way: it is not that Reason is a secret force behind the scenes using human agents for its purposes: there are nothing but agents following their particular purposes, and what they do “auto‐poetically” organizes itself into a larger pattern.

这就是所谓的「女人作为男人的病征」。意思并不是,男人使用女人来表达他的讯息。相反地,女人就是决定的因素。男人定向他自己,朝向他的病征。他坚持这个病征,为了给予他的生命一贯性。黑格尔的理性的狡狯以类似的方式运作。并不是理性是幕后的秘密力量,使用人的代理者充当它的目的,而是它们仅是代理者,追寻它们的特别的目的。它们的作为,「自动诗意化」,组织它自己成为一个更大的模式。

But did not Heidegger propose a much more radical critique of the Hegelian Cunning of Reason, in a way which differs radically from Marx’s critique (and which enables us to recognize in Marx himself the presence of the Hegelian notion of history as the story of dialectical redemption36)?

但是海德难道不是建议一个更加激进的批判,对于黑格尔的理性的狡狯。用的方式跟马克思的批判强烈差异。(后者让我们能够体认出,在马克思身上,存在着黑格尔的历史的观念,作为是辩证法的救赎的故事。

For the Cunning of Reason to be operative, there is no need to resuscitate any transcendent rational agency; particular contingent finite facts must be
accounted for not in terms of any such higher power, but in terms of their own
intelligibility, which is the true “infinite” immanent to the finite itself. The contrast with Heidegger’s own full assertion of finitude could not be clearer. Heidegger deploys all the consequences of such a radical assertion of finitude, up to and including a series of self‐referential paradoxes.

为了让理性的狡狯运作,并没有需要苏醒任何的超验的理性的代理。特别是偶然性的有限的事实必须被解释,不是用任何更改的权力的术语,而是用它们的理解性。这个理解性是有限本身的内在具有的真实的「永恒」。这跟海德格自己对有限性的充分主张对照起来,是再清楚不过了。海德格运作对于有限性的强烈主张的所有的结果,一直到包括一系列的自我指涉的悖论。

His claim is that the ultimate failure, the breakdown of the entire structure of meaning, the withdrawal from engagement and care—in other words the possibility that the totality of Dasein’s involvements “collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance”37—is the innermost possibility of Dasein, that Dasein can succeed in its engagement only against the background of a possible failure: “the interrelational structure of the world of Care can fail in such a catastrophic way that Dasein will appear not as the world‐embedded, open‐to‐meaning, engaged agent in a shared world that it is, but, all at once as it were, the null basis of a nullity.”38 Here Heidegger is not just making the decisionist‐existentialist point about how “being a subject means being able to fail to be one,” how the choice is ours and utterly contingent, with no guarantee of success.39

他的宣称是,最后的失败,意义的整个结构的崩溃,从参与跟操虑撤退—换句话说,很有可能,生命实存的牵涉的整体性崩溃到它自己里面。这世界拥有完全缺乏意义的这个特性—这是生命实存的最内在的可能性。生命实存能够成功地参与它,仅是对抗可能失败的背景:「操虑的世界的相互关系的结构,以如此灾难的方式失败,以致于生命实存本身将会出现,不是作为被镶嵌的世界,开放给意义,参与的代理者,在一个分享的世界。那是空无存在的空无的基础,但是看起来是突然发生。在此,海德格并不仅是发表决定主义与存在主义的观点,关于「成为主体如何就是失败于成为主体」,选择如何属于我们,并且完全是偶然性,并么没有成功的保证。

His point is rather that the historical totality‐of‐meaning into which we are
thrown is always already, “constitutively,” thwarted from within by the possibility of its utmost impossibility. Death, the collapse of the structure of meaning and care, is not an external limit which, as such, would enable Dasein to “totalize” its meaningful engagement; it is not the final quilting point that “dots the i” of one’s life span, enabling us to totalize a life story into a consistent, meaningful narrative.

相反地,他的观点是,我们被抛掷进入的意义的历史的整体性,总是已经是「结构性」从内部被阻碍,由于它的最大的不可能性的可能性。死亡就是意义与操虑的崩溃,死亡并不是一个外在的限制,它本身会让生命实存整体化它的意义的参与。死亡并不是最后的缝合点,替我们的生命期限增添细节,让我们将一生的故事整体化成为一个一贯性的意义的描述。

Death is precisely that which cannot be included in any meaningful totality, its meaningless facticity is a permanent threat to meaning, its prospect a reminder that there is no final way out.40 The consequence of this is that the choice is not a direct choice between success and failure, between authentic and
inauthentic modes of existence: since the very notion that one can successfully totalize one’s life within an all‐encompassing structure‐of‐meaning is the ultimate inauthentic betrayal, the only true “success” Dasein can have is to heroically confront and accept its ultimate failure.

死亡确实是无法被包括在任何的意义的整体性里。死亡的没有意义的现实性,。对意义是一个永久的威胁,死亡的远景是一种残馀物,没有最后的出口。这样的结果是,选择并不是一个直接的选择,处于成功与失败之间的选择,处于生命存在的真诚与不真诚模式之间的选项。因为我们能够成功地整体化我们的生命,在意义的全面涵盖结构里,这个观念上最后不真诚的背叛,生命实存能够拥有的这个唯一真诚的成功。那就是要英勇地面对并且接受它的最后的失败。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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