Less than nothing 03

Less than nothing 03
少甚于无

Slavoj Zizek
斯拉夫、齐泽克

CHAPTER 8
第八章
THE LACANIAN PROSOPOPOEIA
拉康的人格化

The mode of appearance of this Cunning of Reason is irony, which for Hegel lies at the very core of dialectics: “All dialectics lets hold that which should hold, treats it as if it fully holds [lässt das gelten, was gelten soll, als ob es gelte], and, in this way, it lets it destroy itself—the general irony of the world.”14

理性的狡狯的外表的模式是反讽。对于黑格尔,这种反讽在于辩证法的核心。「所有的辩证法让应该成立的东西成立,对待它好像它充分地成立。以这种方式,它让它毁灭它自己—世界的一般反讽。

With his method of questioning, Socrates merely pushes his opponent‐partner to make his abstract idea more concrete (“what do you mean by justice, by happiness …?”), and, in this way, lets him reveal the inconsistency of his
position and lets this position destroy itself. The method does not impose external standards onto an idea, it measures the idea by its own standards and lets it destroy itself through its own self‐explication. When Hegel writes that womankind is “the everlasting irony of the community,”15 does he thereby not assert the feminine character of irony or dialectics?16 What this means is that the very presence of Socrates, his questioning attitude, transforms the speech of his partner into prosopopoeia:

用他的质疑的方法,苏格拉底逼迫他的对手将他的抽象理念变得更加具体(「你说的正义是什么意思,快乐是什么意思?」)以这种方式,他让他显示他的立场的不一贯性,并且让这个立场毁灭它自己。这个方法并没有赋加外在的标准进入一个观念,它衡量这个观念,凭借它自己的标准,然后让它毁灭它自己,通过它自己的自我表述。当黑格尔写到:「女人是社会的永恒反讽」,他难道不是在主张,反讽或辩证法具有女性的特性吗?这句话的意思是,苏格拉底的存在,他的质疑的态度,转变他的对手的话语成为人格化:

When the participants in a conversation are confronted with Socrates, their words all of a sudden start to sound like quotes and clichés, like borrowed voices; the participants are confronted with the abyss of what authorizes them in their speech, and the moment they try to rely on the usual supports of authorization, authorization fails. It is as if an inaudible echo of irony adds itself to their speech, an echo which hollows out their words and their voice, and their voice appears as borrowed and expropriated.17

当对话中的这些参与者面对苏格拉底,他们的文词突然开始听起来像是引言及陈旧词语,像是借用的声音。参与者面临这个差距,在他们的话语中授权他们差距。当他们尝试依靠权威的通常支持,权威就失灵。好像反讽的隐藏共鸣增添它自己到他们的话语,这一种共鸣掏空他们的话语及他们的声音。他们的声音似乎是借用而且是被盗用。

Recall the proverbial scene of a man making a speech in front of his wife, boasting of his great exploits, evoking high ideals, etc., and his wife silently observing him with a barely concealed mocking smile—her silent presence has the effect of ruining the pathos of his speech, of unmasking him in all his misery. It is in this sense that, for Lacan, the Socratic irony announces the subjective position of the analyst: does not the same hold also for the analytic session?

请回顾一下这个凡俗的场景:某个人在他妻子面前发表言说,侃侃而谈他的伟业,召唤崇高的理想,等等,而他的妻子带着露骨的嘲讽微笑旁观—她的沉默的存在具有这个效果:毁灭他的演说的悲情,揭发他所有的悲惨。就是从这个意义,对于拉康,苏格拉底的反讽宣布精神分析家的主体性立场:对于精神分析的谘商,相同的场景不也适用?

Recall Umberto Eco’s analysis of Casablanca, where he draws attention to
a strange habit of the Resistance hero Victor Laszlo: in every scene, he orders a different drink, a Pernod, a cognac, a whisky. But why? Is this to be read as an indication that, beneath the image of a heroic anti‐fascist fighter, there dwells a refined, decadent hedonist?

请回顾一下艾可的分析「北非谍影」。他提醒大家注意反抗军的英雄维克、拉斯洛的一个奇怪的习惯:在每个场景,他点一杯不同的饮料,波诺酒、白兰地、维士忌。但是为什么?这难道不应该被阅读,作为一种指示:在英雄式的反对法西斯的鬥士的意象底下,潜在著一位高雅、颓废的享乐主义者?

No: it is simply that the scriptwriters did not treat Victor Laszlo as a psychologically consistent personality, but as a composite of multiple clichés.
And it is the same in subjective reality: the mysterious “depth of personality” has to be demystified as the illusory effect of prosopopoeia, of the fact that the subject’s discourse is a bricolage of fragments from different sources.

不:那仅是因为这些剧本作家并没有对待维克、拉斯洛,作为一位心理上具有一贯性的人物,而是作为多重陈词的综合体。在主体性的现实界,情况也是相同:神秘的「人格的深度」必须被解除神秘化,作为是这个事实的人格化的幻觉:主体的辞说是根据不同来源的碎片的併贴。

The status of prosopopoeia in Lacan changes radically with the shift in the status of the analyst from being the stand‐in for the “big Other” (the symbolic order) to being the “small other” (the obstacle which stands for the inconsistency, failure, of the big Other). The analyst who occupies the place of the big Other is himself the medium of prosopopoeia: when he speaks, it is the big Other who speaks (or, rather, keeps silence) through him; in the intersubjective economy of the analytic process, he is not just another subject, he occupies the empty place of death. The patient talks, and the analyst’s silence stands for the absent meaning of the patient’s talk, the meaning supposed to be contained in the big Other. The process ends when the patient can himself assume the meaning of his speech.

在拉康,人格化的地位强烈地跟随精神分析家的地位的改变而变化,从代表这个「大他者」(符号象征的秩序)的立场,改变成为这个「小他者」(这个阻碍代表大他者的这个不一贯性,失败)。精神分析家佔有大他者的位置,他本身是人格化的媒介:当他言说时,那是大他者通过他在言说,(或者,相反地,保持沉默)。在精神分析的过程的互为主体性的活动,他不仅是另外一个主体,他佔有死亡的这个空洞的位置。病人谈话,这个意义应该被包括在大他者里。这个过程结束,当病人自己能够假设他的话语的意义。

The analyst as the “small other,” on the contrary, magically transforms the words of the analysand into prosopopoeia, de‐subjectivizing his words, depriving them of the quality of being an expression of the consistent subject and his intention‐to‐mean. The goal is no longer for the analysand to assume the meaning of his speech, but for him to assume its non‐meaning, its nonsensical inconsistency, which implies, with regard to his own status, his de‐subjectivization, or what Lacan calls “subjective destitution.”

相反地,精神分析家作为「小他者」,魔术般地转移分析者的这些文词成为人格化,除掉他的文词典主体性,剥夺这些文词的这个特质:作为一贯性的主体的表达,及呈现意义的意图。这个目标不再是要分析者担负起他的言谈的意义,而且要他担负起它的无意义,它的无意义的不一贯性。这暗示着,关于他自己的地位,他的除掉主体化,或是拉康所谓的「主体化的贫瘠」。

Prosopopoeia is defined as “a figure of speech in which an absent or imaginary
person is represented as speaking or acting.” The attribution of speech to an entity commonly perceived to be unable to speak (nature, the commodity, truth itself …) is for Lacan the condition of speech as such, not only its secondary complication. Does not Lacan’s distinction between the “subject of the enunciation” and the “subject of the enunciated” point in this direction? When I speak, it is never directly “myself” who speaks—I have to have recourse to a fiction which is my symbolic identity. In this sense, all speech is “indirect”: “I love you” has the structure of: “my identity as lover is telling you that it loves you.”18

人格化被定义为「言谈的人物,一位缺席或想象的人被代表作为言说或行动。」言谈的被归属于一个实体,共同被感觉没有能力言谈的实体,(自然,货物、真理本身、、、)对于拉康,这是这个言谈本身的情况,不仅是它的次级併发症。拉康的区别「表述的主体」跟「被表述的主体」难道不是指向这个方向?当我言谈,那从来就不直接是「我自己」在言谈—我必须诉诸于一种幻想,这个幻想是我的符号象征的认同。从这个意义,所有的言说都是「间接」:「我爱你「拥有这个结构:「我作为情人的认同正在告诉你,它爱你。」

The implication of prosopopoeia is thus a weird split of which Robert
Musil was aware: the “man without properties” (der Mann ohne Eigenschaften) has to be supplemented with properties without man (Eigenschaften ohne Mann), without a subject to whom they are attributed.

人格化的这个暗示因此是罗伯特、莫思尔知道的一种古怪的分裂:这位「没有特性的人」必须被补充没有人的特性,没有一个被特性归属地主体。

There are two correlative traps to be avoided here, the rightist and the leftist
deviations. The first, of course, is the pseudo‐Hegelian notion that this gap stands for a “self‐alienation” which I should strive to abolish ideally and then fully assume my speech as directly my own. Against this version, one should insist that there is no I which can, even ideally, assume its speech “directly,” by‐passing the detour of prosopopoeia. Wearing a mask can thus be a strange thing: sometimes, more often than we tend to believe, there is more truth in the mask than in what we assume to be our “real self.”

有两个相关的陷阱在此应该被避免,右派份子跟左派份子的偏离。当然,前者是虚假的黑格尔的观念:这个差距代表一种「自我的异化」,在理想上,我应该努力废除这个「自我异化」,然后充分地担负起我的言说,作为直接是我自己的言说。相对应这种说法,我们应该坚持,并没有「我」在理想上能够「直接地」担负起它的言谈,凭借绕过人格化的迂回。戴着面具因此有时是件奇怪的事情:有时,我们经常倾向于相信,在面具,比起在我们认为是我们「真正的自性」,具有更多的真理。

Think of the proverbial shy and impotent man who, while playing an interactive video game, adopts the screen identity of a sadistic murderer and irresistible seducer—it is all too simple to say that this identity is just an imaginary supplement, a temporary escape from his real‐life impotence. The point is rather that, since he knows that the video game is “just a game,” he can “reveal his true self,” do things he would never do in real‐life interactions—in the guise of a fiction, the truth about himself is articulated.

请想想那位世俗的害羞而性无能的人,当他在玩一个互动的电脑遊戏,採用一位虐待狂及迷人的诱拐者的帘幕身份—这样说是过于简化:这个身份仅是想象的补充,一个暂时的逃避,逃避他在现实生活的无奈。相反地,重点是, 因为他知道这个电脑遊戏「仅是遊戏」,他能够「显露他的真实的自我」,做他永远不会做的事情,在真实生活的互动里—伪装一个幻想,关于他自己的真理被表达。

Therein lies the truth of a charming story like Alexandre Dumas’s The Man in the Iron Mask: what if we invert the topic according to which, in our social interactions, we wear masks to cover our true face? What if, on the contrary, in order for us to interact in public with our true face, we have to have a mask hidden somewhere, a mask which renders our unbearable excess, what is in us more than ourselves, a mask which we can put on only exceptionally, in those carnivalesque moments when the standard rules of interaction are suspended? In short, what if the true function of the mask is not to be worn, but to be kept hidden?19

一个迷人的故事的真理就在这里,就像杜拉斯的「铁假面人」:假如我们倒转这个主体,情况会怎样?依照这个主题,在我们社交的互动里,我们戴着面具来隐藏我们的真实的脸孔?相反地,假如为了让我们在大庭广众跟我们真实的脸孔互动,我们必须戴着隐藏某处的面具,这一个面具让我们自己身上不仅是我们自己的东西,成为无法忍受的过度,这一个面具,我们仅是偶然才戴上,在那些嘉华年会的时刻,当互动的标准规则被悬置?总之,假如面具的真实的功用不能够被戴上,而是被保持隐藏,会发生怎样的事?

The opposite trap is to elevate “that through which I speak” into an authentic site of Truth, so that “something in me deeper than myself, the Truth itself, speaks through me.”

这个相反的陷阱就是要提升「通过它我言说的这个人」,成为一个真诚的真理的地点,这样「某件在我身上比我更深度的东西,这个真理的本身,通过我言说。」

This is the Jungian version, involving a distinction between my Ego and the Self, a much broader ground of my subjectivity, with the task being to progress from my Ego to my true Self. Against this version, one should assert that that which speaks through me is fundamentally a lie.20 The temptation here, of course, is to say that it is not the other through whom I speak, but that the Other itself speaks through me: the ultimate prosopopoeia is the one in which I myself am the other, the means used by X to speak.

这就是荣格的说法,牵涉到区别我的「自我」与「自性」,我的主体性更加宽广的场域,拥有这个工作的存在要从我的「自我」进展到我的真实的「自性」。相对应这个说法,我们应该主张,通过我言说的这个人基本上是一个谎言。当然,在此的诱惑是要说:并不是通过这个他者,我言说,而是大他者本身通过我在言说。最后的人格化就是我在大他者里面,我自己就是大他者,被x用来言说的工具。

Does, then, the key dialectical reversal apropos prosopopoeia go from the subject talking through others to the subject itself as the site through which the Other speaks? The shift from me speaking through some figure of the Other to the I itself as prosopopoeia? From “I cannot tell the truth about myself directly; this most intimate truth is so painful that I can only articulate it through another, by adopting the mask, talking through the mask, of another entity,” to “truth itself is talking through me”? This reversal involves the dialectical shift from predicate to subject—from “what I am saying is true” to “truth is talking through me.”

因此,关于人格化,这个关键点辩证法的倒转,难道从通过别人言谈到主体,转变成为主体的本身,作为是通过这个地点,大他者言说?从我通过某个大他者的人物言说,到这个「我」的本身作为人格化?从「我无法直接说出有关我自己的真理,这个最亲密的真理是如此令人痛苦,以致我仅能表达它,通过另外一个实体,以採用这个面具,通过这个面具,言谈另外一个实体」,到「真理本身就通过我言说」?这种倒转牵涉辩证法的转变,从述词到主体—从「我正在言说的是真理」,到「真理正在通过我言说」。

And, furthermore, is not this shift also clearly sexualized? Woman is man’s
prosopopoeia: she is man’s symptom, she has no substance of her own, she is a mask through which man speaks (more precisely, as Otto Weininger demonstrated, a mask through which the fallen nature of man speaks). Woman cannot relate to truth as an inherent value, she cannot tell the truth; however, truth can speak in or through her. The reversal from “I speak the truth” to “I, the truth, speak” occurs with woman’s identification with the truth: men tell the truth, while in woman, truth itself speaks.

而且,这个转变难道不也是清楚地被性化?女人是男人的人格化:女人是男人的病征,她并没有拥有她自己的特质,她是一个面具,通过这个面具,男人言说(更贴切地说,如若奥图、维宁吉证明,通过一个面具,人的这个堕落的天性言说)。女人无法跟真理有关作为一个天生的价值,她无法说出真理。可是,真理能够在女人身上或通过他言说。这个倒转,从「我言说真理」,到「我作为真理言说」,发生在女人对于真理的认同:男人说出真理,而女人是真理本身在言说。

The “primordial prosopopoeia” is effectively that of the symbolic order itself, of the subject (constituting itself through) assuming a symbolic mandate—or, as Lichtenberg put it in one of his aphorisms: “There is a transcendent ventriloquism that makes people believe that something that was said on earth came from heaven.” In one of the Marx brothers’ films, Groucho, caught telling a lie, answers angrily: “Whom do you believe, your eyes or my words?” This apparently absurd logic renders perfectly the functioning of the symbolic order in which the symbolic mask matters more than the direct reality of the
individual who wears it. It involves the by now familiar structure of what Freud called “fetishistic disavowal”: “I know very well that things are the way I see them, that the person in front of me is a corrupt weakling, but I nonetheless treat him respectfully, since he wears the insignia of a judge, so that when he speaks, it is the law itself which speaks through him.”

这个「原始的人格化」实际上是符号象征秩序的人格化,是主体担负起符号象征的委任的人格化,(通过这个委任构成它自己)–或是,如同李天伯格所说,在他的其中一个警语:「有一位超验的腹语演员让人们相信,在地球上所被说的东西,来自于天上。」在导演马克兄弟的其中一部影片,格劳宙被揭发正在说谎言,他愤怒地回答:「你们相信谁?你们的眼睛,还是我们的话语?」这种明显的荒谬的逻辑将符号秩序的功用表现得淋漓尽致。在符号象征秩序里,符号象征的面具重要性超过于戴着面具的个人的直接现实性。这牵涉到,现在大家耳熟能详的弗洛依德所谓的「物神化的不承认」的结构,「我清楚知道,事情是我看见它们的样子,在我面前的这个人是一位腐败的懦夫,但是我仍然尊敬地对待他,因为他戴着法官的标志,所以当他言谈时,是法律的本身通过他在言说。」

So, in a way, I really do believe his words, not my eyes. This is where the cynic who believes only hard facts falls short: when a judge speaks, there is in a way more truth in his words (the words of the institution of law) than in the direct reality of the person of judge; if one limits oneself to what one sees, one simply misses the point. This paradox is what Lacan aims at with his les non‐dupes errent (those in the know err): those who refuse to let themselves get caught in the symbolic fiction and believe only what they see with their own eyes are those who err most. What the cynic misses here is the efficiency of the symbolic
fiction, the way it structures our (experience of) reality. A corrupt priest preaching on goodness may be a hypocrite, but if people endow his words with the authority of the Church, they may inspire them to perform good deeds.

所以,在某方面,我确实相信他的话语,而不是我的眼睛。这是仅相信具体事实的讽世者无法理解的部分:当法官言说,在他的话语里,有某种更多的真理(法律的制度的话语),超过法官这个人的直接现实界。假如我们限制我们自己于我们所看见的东西,我们仅是错过这个重点。这个悖论是:拉康用「知道者犯错」所要表达的目的是:那些拒绝让他们自己被套陷于符号象征的幻想的人们,他们仅是相信他们用自己的眼睛所看见的人们,他们犯的错误最严重。讽世者在这里所错过的是,符号象征的幻想的有效性。它作为我们的现实界的经验的架构。一位宣导善行的腐败的僧侣可能是一位伪君子,但是假如人们赋予他的话语,具有教会的权威,这些话语启发人们去实现善的行为。

Here one should take note of a certain paradox: it is precisely when “I speak”—when I perceive myself as the agent of my speech—that, effectively, “the big Other speaks through me,” that I am “spoken,” since my speech acts are totally regulated by the symbolic order in which I dwell. And, conversely, the only way for me to bring my subjective position of enunciation into words is to let myself be surprised by what I say, to experience my own words as a case of “it speaks in/through me.” This is what happens in the case of a symptom: in it, my true subjective position finds a way to articulate itself against my will and intention. The opposition is thus not directly between “I speak” and “the Other speaks through me,” since these are the two sides of the same coin. When “it speaks” through me, it is not the big Other which speaks: the truth that articulates itself is the truth about the failures, gaps, and inconsistencies of the big Other.21

在此,我们应该注意某个悖论:确实是当「我言说」时,当我感觉我自己,作为言说的代理者,实际上,这个大他者通过我言说时,我被言说,因为我的话语的行动完全被规范,被我驻居的符号象征的秩序规范。相反地,唯一的方法让我将我主体性的表达立场带进文字,就是要让我自己受到我所说的内容惊讶,为了经验我自己的文字,作为是「大他者在我身上及通过我言说」的情况。这就是病征状况所发生的事情。我的真实的主观性的立场找到一种方式表达它自己,违背我的意志及意图。这个对立因此并不是直接处于「我言说」与「大他者通过我言说」之间,因为这些是相同钱币的两面。当「它通过我言说」,那并不是大他者言说:表达它自己的真理是关于大他者的失败,差距,不一贯的真理。

The Talmud says: “The one who quotes properly brings redemption to the world.” Is this not literally the formula of Stalinist argumentation? Freud also emphasizes that the unconscious in dreams can only quote—dreams are like a parrot, they are the ultimate prosopopoeia, just repeating speech fragments qua remnants of the day, while also, of course, submitting them to cruel cuts and rearrangements in order to squeeze its message into them. (The underlying premise of quotation: the big Other is always there, everything
is already written, so all that we can say should, if true, be supported by a quotation.)

塔尔木说:「引述的这个人适当地带来救赎给世界。」实质上,这难道不是史达林主义的论述的公式吗?弗洛依德也强调,在梦中的无意识仅能够引述—梦就像一隻鹦鹉,它们是最后的人格化,仅是重复片断的话语,作为当日电残渣。当然,梦也将这些残渣承受残酷的切割及重新安排,为了将它的讯息压挤进入它们。(引言的作为基础的假设是:大他者总是在那里,每样东西已经被书写,所以,我们能够说,所有应该受到引言支持的一切,假如它们是真实的话。

This—and not the ridiculous notion of some mysterious Spirit secretly pulling the strings to guarantee a happy outcome—is what the Hegelian “Cunning of Reason” amounts to: I hide nothing from you, I renounce all “hermeneutics of suspicion,” I do not impute any dark motives to you, I just leave the field free for you to deploy your potential and thus destroy yourself. There is more than superficial word‐play in the resonance between List der Vernunft (Cunning of Reason) and Lust der Vernunft (Pleasure of Reason): the Cunning of
Reason only works, the subject only allows itself to get caught in the trap of reason, if it is bribed by some surplus‐pleasure, and it is this surplus that is brought out by the analytic stance.

这相当等于是黑格尔的「理性的狡狯」–并不是某个神秘的精灵操控,来保证一个快乐的结果,这种荒谬的观念—我什么都没有跟你们隐藏,我仅是留下这个战场让你们自由运作你们的潜力,因此毁灭你们自己。这不仅是表面的文字遊戏,迴响于「理性的狡狯」与「理性的快乐」之间:理性的狡狯仅能运作,主体仅能让它自己被套陷于理想的陷阱,假如它被某种过剩快乐所贿赂。就是这种过剩,被精神分析的态度揭露出来。

It is easy to discern here the unexpected proximity of the Hegelian master to the
analyst, to which Lacan alludes: the Hegelian Cunning of Reason means that the Idea realizes itself in and through the very failure of its realization. It is worth recalling the sublime reversal found in Charles Dickens’s Great Expectations: when, as a young man, Pip is described as a “fellow of great expectations,” everybody perceives this as a prediction of his future worldly success. At the novel’s end, however, when Pip abandons London and returns to his modest childhood community, we realize that he lived up to the prediction that marked his life only by finding the strength to leave behind the vain thrill of London’s
high society, and thereby authenticate the notion of his being a “man of great expectations.”

我们在此很容易觉察黑格尔的主人,出乎意料地邻近精神分析家。拉康提到精神分析家时说:黑格尔的理性的狡狯意味着,理念实现它自己,在实现它的失败里,并且通过这个失败。值得一提的是,在查理、狄更生的小说「崇高期望」,被找到的翻转:作为年轻人,皮普被描述为一位「被期望很高的人」,每个人都觉得这是一种他的未来世俗成就的预测。可是,在小说结束时,当皮普放弃伦敦,回到他谦卑的童年的社区,我们体会到,他实践标示他一生的这个预测,仅是凭借找到这个力量将伦敦高级社会的虚荣刺激抛置背后,因此让他成为「崇高期望」的人的这个观念真诚地实现。

Furthermore, as befits a Hegelian novel, the ending of Great Expectations is deeply ambiguous in a way which evokes the radical ambiguity of the Hegelian
reconciliation—here is the novel’s last paragraph, describing Pip and Estella meeting again at the ruins of Satis House:

而且。如同跟黑格尔式的小说相符,「崇高期望」的结局在某方面极度暧昧。它召唤黑格尔的统合的极度暧昧。在此时小说的最后一段,描述皮普于艾斯特拉再次会面,在萨提斯莊园的废墟。

“We are friends,” said I, rising and bending over her, as she rose from the bench.
“And will continue friends apart,” said Estella. I took her hand in mine, and we went out of the ruined place; and, as the morning mists had risen long ago when I first left the forge, so the evening mists were rising now, and in all the broad expanse of tranquil light they showed to me, I saw no shadow of another parting from her.

「我们是朋友」,我说,站起并且俯身向她,当她从长椅起来,「然后,我们将继续当分开的朋友」,艾斯特拉说。我用我的手握着她的手,然后我们走出这个废墟之地,早晨的迷雾现在散开,在它们透露给予我的那广裘的宁静之光辉里,我看不到任何另外一层分开我们的阴影。

How are we to read the last words, “I saw no shadow of another parting from her”? Do they mean that Estella and Pip will never part, that they will stay together forever, or that it is only at this moment that Pip did not (or could not) see the shadow of a future parting?

我们应该如何阅读最后的几个字「我看不到任何另外一层分开我们的迷雾。」它们难道意味着,艾斯特拉跟皮普将永远不会分开吗?他们将永远在一块吗?或是仅是在这个时刻,皮普并没有(或无法)看见分开他们的这个阴影。

Even more interestingly, we now know that this ending was a revised second
version: in the original ending, Estella has remarried and Pip remains single; following the advice of certain friends (Edward Bulwer‐Lytton, Wilkie Collins), Dickens wrote a more upbeat ending, suggesting that Estella and Pip would marry. Many critics not only found this new ending a concession to popular taste; some even proposed their own new ending—here is G. B. Shaw’s version, describing what happens after Estella and Pip run into one another and then part again: “Since that parting, I have been able to think of her without the old unhappiness; but I have never tried to see her again, and I know I never
shall.”

更加耐人寻味的,我们现在知道,这个结局是一种修正过的第二版。在原先的结局,艾斯特拉重新结婚,而皮普始终是单身。听从某些朋友的劝告 (艾德华、薄维尔、莱顿、维基、柯林斯),狄更生描写一个更加乐观的结局,暗示着:艾斯特拉跟皮普将会结婚。许多批评家不但发现这个新的结局迎合大众的口味,有些批评家甚至建议他们自己的新结局—在此,萧伯纳德版本,描述所发生的事情,在艾斯特拉与皮普互相邂逅,然后再次分开:「自从上次分开,我一直能够想到她,而没有往常的不快乐,但是我从来没有尝试再次见到她。我知道我将永远不会见到她。」

There is an ambiguity here again: “I know I never shall”—shall what? See Estella
again or try to see her again (which leaves open the prospect of an unpremeditated encounter)? Another attempt was made by Douglas Brooks‐Davies, who resolved the ambiguity of Dickens’s second ending by opting for the pessimistic version: when Estella and Pip are leaving the garden together, “the evening sunlight of the moment when I left Satis holding Estella’s hand was so bright that it banished all shadows—even the metaphorical shadow of the parting that we were soon (and permanently) to endure.”

在此再次有一种模糊暧昧:「我知道我将永远不会」–将永远不会什么呢?再次见到她,或是尝试再见到她(这展开这个不期而遇的远景)?另外一个企图由道格拉斯、达维斯所从事,他解决狄更生的第二次结局的模糊暧昧。「当我握著艾斯特拉的手离开萨提斯时,当时的黄昏馀晖是如此的灿烂,它驱除了所有的阴影—甚至是分开的隐喻的阴影,我们不久(及永远)要忍受的阴影。

However, this dispelling of the ambiguity does not work because, in a way, it is superfluous, it says too much—in an exact parallel with Hegel’s “Absolute Knowing,” where we also see “no shadow of another parting from it”: it, of course, includes its own historicity; however, to say this explicitly is already to say too much and involves a regression to historicism. The denouement of Great Expectations thus relies on a kind of Hegelian reflexivity: what changes in the course of the hero’s ordeal is not only his character, but also the very ethical
standard by which we measure his character.

可是,模糊暧昧的驱散并没有行得通,因为以某种方式,这是多馀的,它说得太多,确实地对比于黑格尔的「绝对知识」。在那里,我们也看到「没有另外一场跟它分开的阴影」。当然,它包括它自己的历史。可是,明确地说这个,总是已经说得太多,并且牵涉到倒退回历史。「崇高期望」的结局因此依靠某种黑格尔的反射作用:在主角受到考验的过程,所改变的不仅是他的性格,而且是伦理的标准,根据这个标准,我们衡量他的性格。

In his review of Badiou’s Ethics, Terry Eagleton wrote:
There is a paradox in the idea of transformation. If a transformation is deep‐seated enough, it might also transform the very criteria by which we could identify it, thus making it unintelligible to us. But if it is intelligible, it might be because the transformation was not radical enough. If we can talk about the change then it is not full‐blooded enough; but if it is full‐blooded enough, it threatens to fall outside our comprehension. Change must presuppose continuity—a subject to whom the alteration occurs—if we are not to be left
merely with two incommensurable states; but how can such continuity be compatible with revolutionary upheaval?22

评论巴迪欧的「伦理学」时,特瑞、依格列敦写到:
在转变的这个观念,有一个悖论。假如转变足够根深蒂固,它也转变我们用来衡量它们的这些标准,因此让我们无法理解它。但是它可以被理解,那可能是因为转变并没有足够强烈。假如我们能够谈论关于这个改变,那并没有充分热血奔腾。但是假如是充分热血奔腾,它威胁会崩塌到我们无法理解。改变必须假设连续性—发生到主体身上的改变—假如我们不想要仅是处于两个无法衡量的状态。但是如此的连续性如何能够跟革命性的颠覆互相和谐?

The properly Hegelian solution to this dilemma is that a truly radical change is self‐relating: it changes the very coordinates by means of which we measure change. In other words, a true change sets its own standards: it can only be measured by criteria that result from it. This is what the “negation of negation” is: a shift of perspective which turns failure into true success.

对于这个两难困境的合宜的黑格尔式解决是,一个确实强烈的改变是关系到自己:它改变这些座标,凭借它们,我们衡量改变。换句话说,一个真实的改变竖立它自己的标准。它仅能凭借造成它的这些标准来衡量。这就是「否定的否定」的意义:观点的改变将失败转变成为成功。

And does the same not go for the Freudian Fehlleistung (acte manqué)—an act which succeeds in its very failure? Robert Pippin is right to emphasize that “the realization that only in such ‘failure’ is there success (success at being Geist) is an achievement like no other” in the history of philosophy.23

相同的道理难道不适用于弗洛依德的口误—这一种行动在它的失败,成功地表达?罗伯特、皮品正确地强调:「成功仅是存在于失败」的这个体会(精神成功),在哲学上是一种无与伦比成就。

This is where the standard reproach to Hegel (that he fails to fully confront negativity, failure, collapse, etc., since there is always a mechanism of redemption built into the dialectical process which guarantees that the utter failure will magically be converted into its opposite) falls short: the story of the Hegelian dialectical reversal is not the story of failure as a blessing in disguise, as a (painful but necessary) step or detour towards the final triumph that retroactively redeems it, but, on the contrary, the story of the necessary failure of every success (of every direct project or act), the story of how the only “success” the subject can gain is the reflexive shift of perspective which recognizes success in failure itself.

这就是对于黑格尔的标准谴责,并没有一针见血的地方,(他没有充分地面对负面性,失败,崩溃,等等,因为总是有一个救赎的机械结构被镶嵌进入辩证法的过程。这个过程保证,表达的失败将会魔术般地被转移成为成功):黑格尔的辩证法的倒转并不是失败的故事,作为因祸得福,作为一个痛苦但是必须的步骤,或是朝向胜利的迂回,这个胜利反动地救赎它。而是,相反地,这时每个直接目标或行动的成功,必然会失败的故事,主体能够获得的唯一的「成功」,就是观点的反射的转变,它在失败的本身体会出成功。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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