齐泽克论拉康

Less than nothing
少甚于无

Slavoj Zizek
斯拉夫、齐泽克

CHAPTER 8 第八章

Lacan as a Reader of Hegel

拉康作为黑格尔的读者

[The] question of the termination of an analysis is that of the moment at which the subject’s satisfaction is achievable in the satisfaction of all—that is, of all those it involves in a human undertaking. Of all the undertakings that have been proposed in this century, the psychoanalyst’s is perhaps the loftiest, because it mediates in our time between the care‐ridden man and the subject of absolute knowledge.1

精神分析的终结的问题,是所有的满足当中,主体的满足被完成的时刻。换句话说,在人类的的追求,它牵涉到所有的满足当中。在这个世纪来,曾经被建议的所有的这些追求,精神分析家的追求或许是最崇高的,因为它在我们的时代,中介于充满焦虑的人与具有绝对知识的主体之间。

This passage from Rapport de Rome contains in nuce Lacan’s program of the early
1950s—a program that every professional philosopher would undoubtedly dismiss as nonsense: namely, to bring together Heidegger (who defines “care” as the fundamental feature of finite Dasein) and Hegel (the philosopher of infinite Absolute Knowledge in which the Universal and the Particular are fully mediated).2

从「罗马的迴响」的这个段落包括拉康在1950年代的计划。这个计划,每个哲学家无可置疑将会排斥为无意义。那就是融合海德格(他定义焦虑为有限的生命实存的基本特征)与黑格尔(无限的绝对知识的哲学家,在绝对知识里,普遍性与特殊性充分地被中介。)

The Lacanian analyst as a figure of Absolute Knowing? Is not this thesis restricted to a specific historical moment (the early 1950s), when Hegel’s influence on Lacan (mediated by Alexandre Kojève and Jean Hyppolite) was at its peak? Did not Lacan soon move from Hegel to Kant, insisting on the
inaccessible (“impossible”) character of the Real that forever resists symbolization, on the subject’s unsurpassable separation from the cause of its desire?

拉康的精神分析家,作为一位绝对知识的人物吗?这个命题难道不会被限制于一个明确的历史的时刻(1950年代早期),当黑格尔对拉康的影响正达到颠峰(由柯杰维与海泼莱特中间导引)?拉康难道不是从黑格尔转向康德,坚持实在界这个无法进入的特性(不可能界)。因为这个实在界永远是在抗拒被符号象征化,对于主体的无法被克服的分离,跟他的欲望的原因。

Is not the best description of Lacan’s central project that of a critique of pure desire, where the term “critique” is to be understood in its precise Kantian sense: maintaining the gap that forever separates every empirical (“pathological”) object of desire from its “impossible” object‐cause whose place has to remain empty?

拉康的中心的计划的最好描述,难道不就是「纯粹欲望的批判」的计划?在那里,「批判」应该被了解,根据它的准确的康德的意义:维持这个差距,这个差距永远分离欲望的每个经验的客体,跟它的「不可能的」的客体的原因,因为这个客体的原因的位置必须是空无?

And is not what Lacan calls “symbolic castration” this very gap which
renders every empirical object unsatisfactory? Indeed, in the following paragraphs of the Rapport de Rome itself, Lacan already outlines the “limits within which it is impossible for our teaching to ignore the structuring moments of Hegel’s phenomenology”:

拉康所谓的「符号象征的阉割」,难道不就是这个使得每个的经验的客体令人不满意的差距?的确,在「罗马的迴响」本身的随后的几个段落,拉康已经概述「这些限制,在这些限制里,我们的教学不可能忽略黑格尔的现象学的这个结构化的运动」。

But if there is still something prophetic in Hegel’s insistence on the fundamental
identity of the particular and the universal, an insistence that reveals the extent of his genius, it is certainly psychoanalysis that provides it with its paradigm by revealing the structure in which this identity is realized as disjunctive of the subject, and without appealing to the future.

但是,假如依旧还有某件东西具有预言性质,在黑格尔坚持基本的认同于特殊性与普遍性。这种坚持显示他的天才的广度。那确实是精神分析供应它的典范给他,凭借显示这个结构。在这个结构,这个认同被实现,作为是主体的中断,而没有诉诸于未来。

Let me simply say that this, in my view, constitutes an objection to any reference to totality in the individual, since the subject introduces division therein, as well as in the collectivity that is the equivalent of the individual. Psychoanalysis is what clearly relegates both the one and the other to the status of mirages.3

让我简单地说,依我之见,这形成一种反对,对于任何提到个人的整体性。因为主体介绍这个分裂在里面,以及在相当于是这个个人的集体性里。精神分析清楚地分配前者与后者到幻影的地位。

We are thereby back in familiar waters: Hegelian self‐consciousness, the subject of absolute notional self‐mediation which supersedes or devours every alterity, versus the Lacanian divided subject of the unconscious, by definition separated from its Cause.

我们因此回答耳熟能详的领域:黑格尔的自我意识,绝对观念化的自性的中介的主体。这个自性的中介取代并且吞没每个它者,相对于拉康的无意识的分裂的主体,在定义上,它跟它的原因被分离。

It is not enough, however, to reduce Hegel to his grand formulae (the Absolute not only as Substance but also as Subject; the actuality of the rational; Absolute Knowing; the self‐canceling force of negativity; etc.) and then to quickly reject him as the most extreme expression of the modern delirium of the total subjective‐notional mediation or appropriation of all reality. One should display, apropos Hegel himself, what the author of one of the best books on Hegel, Gérard Lebrun, called the “patience of the notion” (La patience du concept, the book’s title): to read Hegel’s theoretical practice en détail, in miniature, following all his dialectical cuts and turns.

可是,光是将黑格尔还原成为他的的伟大的公式,并不足够 (这个绝对知识不仅作为物质,而且作为主体,理性的实际表现。这个绝对知识,负面的取消自性的力量,等等),然后很快地拒绝他,作为这个现代的谵妄的最极端的表达,主体在观念上整体性地中介与佔用所有的现实界。关于黑格尔本身,我们应该展示,雷布伦所谓的「观念的耐心」,他是研究黑格尔的论著的其中一位作者。详细地阅读黑格尔的理论的实践,遵照他所有的辩证法的切割与转折。

The wager of such an operation is double: it can ground the (only serious) critique of Hegel, the immanent critique that measures him by his own standards, analyzing how he realizes his own program; but it can also serve as a means to redeem Hegel, to unearth the actual meaning of his great programmatic maxims as opposed to the standard understanding of them.

这样的运作所冒的危险是双倍的:它能够建立对于黑格尔的批判(仅是严重的批判)的基础,这种内在性的批判根据他自己的标准评价他,分析他如何实现他自己的计划。但是它也能够充当是一种工具来拯救黑格尔,挖掘出他的伟大的发展的箴言的实际意义,迴异于对这些箴言的标准的理解。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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