Archive for September, 2012

Psychoses 60

September 20, 2012

Psychoses 60
精神病

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

XII 第12章

The hysteric’s question
歇斯底里症的问题

PRECONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS
前意识与无意识

SIGN, TRACE, SIGNIFIER
符号、痕迹、能指

2
People sometimes also say to me – Fortunately you’re not alone in the Societi
de psychanalyse. There’rs also a woman of genius, Frangoise Dolto, who shows us the essential function of the image of the body and throws light on the way the
subject leans on it in his relations with the world. We are delighted to rediscover a
substantial relation here, which the language relation is undoubtedly tacked onto,
but it is infinitely more concrete.

人们有时也对我说:「幸运地,你在精神分析社团并不孤单。也有一位天才女性,弗兰郭兹、窦陀,她跟我们教导身体的意象的基本功用,并且启蒙主体依靠它的方式,在他跟世界的关系。我们很高兴在这里重新发现一种实质的关系,语言的关系无可置疑地被钉住,但是它却是更加具体。

I’m not at all criticizing what Frangoise Dolto teaches. She makes excellent
use of her technique and her extraordinary apprehension of the subject’s
imaginary sensibility. She speaks of all this and she also teaches those who
listen to her to speak of it. But making this remark doesn’t resolve the question.

我丝毫没有批评弗兰郭兹、窦陀的教学内容。她擅长利用技术与她的特别的理解,对于主体的想象的理解性。她谈论所有这一切,她也教导那些倾听她谈论它的那些人。但是发表她的谈论并没有解决问题。

I’m not surprised that something of a misunderstanding remains to be dispelled,
even in people who think they’re following me. Don’t think I’m
expressing any disappointment here. That would be to be in disagreement
with myself, since I teach you that misunderstanding is the very basis of
interhuman discourse.

我并不惊讶,属于误解的某件东西还有待澄清,甚至在那些认为他们正在跟随我动人们。你们不要认为我在此正在表达认为的大失所望。那本来就是跟我自己的意见一致。因为我教导你们:误解是人际之间的辞说的基础。

But that is not the only reason that I’m not surprised that my discourse
may have created a certain margin of misunderstanding. This is because in
addition, if one is to be consistent in practice with one’s own ideas, if all valid
discourse has to be judged precisely according to its own principles, I would
say that it is with a deliberate, if not entirely deliberated, intention that I
pursue this discourse in such a way as to offer you the opportunity to not
quite understand. This margin enables you yourselves to say that you think
you follow me, that is, that you remain in a problematic position, which
always leaves the door open to a progressive rectification.

但是那并不是唯一的理由,我并不惊讶:我的辞说曾经创造误解的某个边缘。这是因为除外,假如我们想要在实践时跟我们自己的理念一致,假如一切有效的辞说必须确实根拒它自己的原则来判断。我将会是,它是一种经过深思熟虑的意图,即使不是完全的深思熟虑。我以这样一种方式追寻这种辞说,结果提供你们这个为了不完全理解的机会。这个边缘让你们自己能够说:你们认为你们跟随我,换句话说,你们保持在一个棘手的立场,那总是摊开大门,容许逐渐的修正。

In other words, if I were to try to make myself very easily understood, so
that you were completely certain that you followed, then according to my
premises concerning interhuman discourse the misunderstanding would be
irremediable. On the contrary, given the way I think that I have to approach
problems, you always have the possibility of what is said being open to revision,
in a way that is made all the easier by the fact that it will fall back upon
me entirely if you haven’t been following sooner – you can hold me responsible.
It is on this basis that today I shall take the liberty of going back over an
essential point.

换句话说,假如我们想要让我自己容易地被了解,这样你们完全确定:你们遵照,依据我的假设,关于人际之间的辞说,这种误解将是无法修正的。相反地,考虑到我认为我必须探究这些问题的方式,你们总是拥有这个可能性:所被说出的内容容许修正。这个方式会变得更加容易,因为这个事实:假如你们没有早一点理解,那原因归咎于我。你们能够要我负起这个责任。根据这个基础,今天我将冒昧地回溯一个要点。

I’m not saying that what is communicated in the analytic relation passes
through the subject’s discourse. I am therefore absolutely not required to
distinguish, in the very phenomenon of analytic communication, between the
domains of verbal and preverbal communication. That this pre- or even
extraverbal communication is always present in analysis is not in doubt, but
it is a question of seeing what it is that constitutes the properly analytic field.

我并不是说,在精神分析的关系,所被沟通的东西都通过主体的辞说。我因此绝对没有被要求在精神分析沟通的这个现象里,区别文辞及前文辞的沟通的领域。这个「先前」或「超」文辞的沟通,总是存在于精神分析里,并没有受到质疑。但是问题是要看出,是什么形成这个适当的精神分析的领域。

What constitutes the analytic field is identical with what constitutes the
analytic phenomenon, namely the symptom – and also a very large number
of other phenomena that are called normal or subnormal, the sense of which
wasn’t elucidated before analysis, and that extend well beyond discourse and
speech, since they involve things that happen to the subject in his daily life,
like slips, memory disturbances, dreams, and the phenomenon of jokes, whose
value to the Freudian discovery is essential because it enables the perfect
coherence in Freud’s work between the analytic phenomenon and language
to be isolated.

组成精神分析领域的东西,认同于组成精神分析现象的东西。换句话说,认同于病征。也认同许多其他所谓正常或异常的现象。对于这些现象的意义,在精神分析之前,并没有被解释。它们充分延伸超越辞说与话语。因为它们牵涉到恰巧是他日常生活的主体的东西,像是口误,记忆困扰,梦,及各种笑话的现象。它们对于弗洛依德的发现的价值是很重要的,因为它让弗洛依的著作的这个完美的一致性能够被孤立出来。这种一致性处于精神分析现象与语言之间。

Let’s start by saying what the analytic phenomenon is not.
Analysis has thrown an immense amount of light on the preverbal. In analytic
doctrine this is linked essentially to the preconscious. It is the sum of
internal and external impressions, of information the subject receives from
the world he lives in, of the natural relations he has with it – assuming that
there are any relations in man that are entirely natural – some are, however
perverted they may be. Everything of the order of this preverbal thus partakes
of what we can call an intraworldly Gestalt, within which the subject is
the infantile doll that he once was, he is an excremental object, a sewer, a
leech. Analysis has called upon us to explore this imaginary world, which
partakes of a sort of barbaric poetry – though it is in no way the first to make
it felt, certain poetic works have been.

让我们从这里开始,先说:什么并非是精神分析的现象的本质。
精神分析曾经大量地启蒙这个先前文辞。在精神分析的信条,这基本上是跟这个前意识息息相关。那是内在与外在的印象的总和,主体从他居住的世界接收的资讯的总和,他跟这个世界拥有各种自然的关系的总和—假定在人身上,有任何完全是自然的关系—有些是,尽管它们是多么的倒错。属于倒错这个先前文辞的秩序的一切,因此参与我们所谓的内在世界的格式塔行为。在这个行为里,主体是他曾经一度是的婴孩娃娃,他说一个排粪的客体,一个水沟,一个吸血者。精神分析曾经召唤我们探索这个想象的世界。这个世界参与一种野蛮的诗—虽然精神分析并非是首先让它被感觉到,某些诗的作品曾经是什么。

Here we’re in the innumerable shimmering of the great affective meaning.
The words to express it come to the subject in great abundance, they are at
his disposal, as accessible and as inexhaustible in their combinations as the
nature to which they are a response. This is the world of the child, in which
you feel at ease, all the more because you are familiar with his fantasies –
high is equivalent to low, the back is equivalent to the front, etc. Universal
equivalence is the law of this world, and it is even this that leaves us sufficiently
uncertain whether any structure in it can be pinned down.

在此,我们处于这个伟大的情意的意义的无数的微光里。表达它的这些字词大量地来到主体这里,它们听由他的使用。在它们的组合,就像跟它们回应的自然一样地可接近及无穷尽。这就是小孩的世界,在这个世界里,你感觉自在,更加自在,因为你对他的幻见耳熟能详:高相等于低,背后相等于前面,等等。普遍性的相等于世界性的法则。甚至是这个,让我们完全地不确定,里面是否有任何结构能够被钉住。

This discourse of affective meaning attains the sources of confabulation
straight away. On the other hand the discourse of passional demands, for
instance, is poor by comparison and is already drivel. This is because of the
impact of reason. The preverbal support of the imaginary relation therefore
quite naturally expresses itself in discourse here. We find ourselves here in a
familiar domain, one that has always been explored by empirical deduction
as much as by a priori categorial deduction. The source and storehouse of
this preconscious of what we call imaginary is not unfamiliar, it has already
been successfully explored-in the philosophical tradition, and it may be said
that Kant’s schema-ideas are situated on the border of this domain – this at
least is where they might find their most brilliant credentials.

情意意义的辞说立刻获得幻见的各种来源。在另外一方面,譬如,激情要求的辞说,比较起来是贫乏的,而且是没有价值的讯息。这是因为理性的冲击。这个想象的关系的前文辞的支持因此相当自然地表达它自己,在这里的辞说。我们在此发现我们处于一个熟悉的领域,这个领域总是曾经被探索,同样根据试验的推理跟一种由果推因的范畴的推理。所谓的想象的这个前意识的来源跟储存库,并非是不熟悉,在哲学的传统,它已经成功地被探索。我们可以说,康德的基模:观念被定位在这个领域的边缘。这至少是他们可能发现它们最璨烂的标志。

The classical theory of the image and the imagination is obviously surprisingly
inadequate. This is ultimately an unfathomable domain. While we’ve
made remarkable progress into its phenomenology, we are a long way from
having mastered it. While analysis has enabled the issue of the image’s formative
value – which tends to be confused with the problem of the origins or
even of the essence of life – to be brought to light, it’s unquestionably from
biologists and ethologists that we must expect any progress. While the analytic
inventory enables certain essential characteristics of the economy of the
imaginary function to be displayed, the question is not thereby exhausted.

这个意象与想象的古典理论,显而易见地是令人惊奇地不足够。最后,这是一个深不可测的领域。虽然我们曾经有杰出的进展,进入它的现象,我们根本就没有掌控它。虽然精神分析曾经让意象的形成的价值的问题被启蒙,因为它倾向于跟生命的起源,甚至生命的本质的问题混淆,无可置疑地,我们必须期望生物学家及人种学家让它们有所进展。虽然精神分析的目录让某些的基本特性能够被展示,想象的功用的经济活力的某些基本特性,这个问题因此还没有被穷尽。

Therefore, I have never said of this preconscious world, which is always
ready to emerge into the daylight of consciousness, and which is at the subject’s
disposal unless there are orders to the contrary, that in itself it has the
structure of language. I’m saying, because it is obvious, that it is recorded
there and that it is recast there. But it retains its own pathways, its characteristic
ways of communication. And this is not the level at which analysis has
made its essential discovery.

因此,我从来没有说到这个前意识的世界,它总是准备出现进入意识的白日光辉,听任主体的使用,除非有相反对秩序。它的本身拥有语言的结构。我正在说,因为这是明显的,它被记录在那里。它在那里被重新铸造。但是它保留它自己的途径。它的特性的沟通的方式。这并不是这个层次,精神分析从事它的基本发现。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Psychoses 59

September 19, 2012

Psychoses 59
精神病

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

XII 第12章

The hysteric’s question
歇斯底里症的问题

ON THE PREVERBAL WORLD
论文辞前的世界

PRECONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS
前意识与无意识

SIGN, TRACE, SIGNIFIER
符号、痕迹、能指

A TRAUMATIC HYSTERIA
一位创伤的歇斯底里症

We’ve got to the point where the analysis of Schreber’s text has led us to
emphasize the importance of language phenomena in the economy of psychosis.
It is in this sense that one may speak of Freudian structures of the
psychoses.

我们已经到达这个点:苏瑞伯的文本的精神分析引导我们强调,精神病的经济活动的语言现象的重要性。以这个意义,我们可以谈论弗洛依德对于精神病的结构。

1
What function do these language phenomena have in the psychoses?
It would be surprising if psychoanalysis didn’t offer us a new way of treating
the economy of language in the psychoses, a way that differs through and
through from the traditional approach, which refers to classical psychological
theories. Our own point of reference is different – it is our schema of analytic
communication.

这些语言现象在精神病具有怎样的功用? 这将是非常令人惊奇的,假如精神分析没有提供我们一个方法,来处理精神病的语言的经济活力。这个方法要彻底地跟传统的方法不同。传统方法提到的是古典的心理学理论。我们自己的指称点是不同的—那是在我们精粉分析的沟通。

Between S and O, the fundamental speech that analysis must uncover, we
have the interference of the imaginary circuit, which resists its passage. The
imaginary poles of the subject, o and o’, coincide with the said specular relation,
that of the mirror stage. The subject, in the corporeity and multiplicity
of his organism, in his natural fragmentation, which is in o’, refers to this
imaginary unity that is the ego, o, where he knows himself and misrecognizes
himself [se connait et se ntfconnait], and which is what he speaks about – he
doesn’t know to whom, since he doesn’t know who speaks in him either.

在主体与大他者之间,精神分析必须揭露的基本言说,我们拥有想象的迴圈地干预。这个想象迴圈抗拒它的经过。主体的想象的两极,o 与 o’,巧合于所谓的自我理想与理想自我的魅影关系,镜像阶段的关系。主体在他的组织的器官化与多重化,在他的自然的片段化。在理想自我o’ 这里,它提到这个想象的一致性,那就是自我o。在那里,他认识他自己与误认他自己。那就是他谈论的东西。他并不知道对他谈论。因为他也不知道在他身上,是谁在谈论。

I used to say schematically, in the archaic period of these seminars, that
the subject begins by talking about himself, he doesn’t talk to you – then, he
talks to you but he doesn’t talk about himself – when he talks about himself,
who will have noticeably changed in the interval, to you, we will have got to
the end of the analysis.

我过去常用基模方式说,在这些研讨班的过去的时期,主体以开始谈论他自己开始,他并没有跟你们谈论—然后,他跟你们谈论,但是他并没有谈论他自己。当他谈论他自己时,在中间过程,是谁将会明显地改变成跟你谈论,我们将会已经到达精神分析的结束。

If one wants to position the analyst within this schema of the subject’s
speech, one can say that he is somewhere in O. At least he should be. If he
enters into the coupling of the resistance, which is just what he is taught not
to do, then he speaks from o’ and he will see himself in the subject. This
occurs in the most natural of ways if he has not been analyzed – which does
happen occasionally, and I’d even say that in a certain way the analyst is
never fully an analyst, for the simple reason that he is a man, and that he,
too, partakes of the imaginary mechanisms that are obstacles to the passage
of speech.

假如我们想要定位精神分析家在主体的言说的基模内,我们能够说,他说在大他者O的某个地方。至少,他应该是在那里。假如他进入这种抗拒的配对,那恰是他被教导不要做的事情。那么,他从理想自我o’ 的这个位置言说,他将会看见他自己在主体那里。这样的事情发生,以最自然的方式,假如他还没有被分析—这样的事有时会发生。我甚至说,以某种的方式,精神分析家从来就不是完整的精神分析家,理由很简单:他是一个人,他也参与阻碍言说的进展的想象的机械结构。

He must not identify with the subject, he must be dead enough
not to be caught up in the imaginary relation, within which he is always
solicited to intervene, and allow the progressive migration of the subject’s
image towards the S, the thing to be revealed, the thing that has no name,
that can only find its name to the extent that the circuit from S to O has been
completed directly. What the subject has to say through his false discourse
will find a passage all the more easily when the economy of the imaginary
relation has been progressively pared down.

他一定不要认同这个主体,他一定是充分麻木,才不会被套陷在这个想象的关系里。在这个想象的关系,他总是被恳请介入,并且让主体的意象的逐渐迁移朝向这个主体S,这个应该被显示的东西,这个没有名字的东西,仅有当这个从主体S到大他者O的迴圈,已经直接地被完成,它才能找到它的名字。主体通过他的虚假的辞说所必需言说的,将会更加容易地找到一个过程,当想象的关系的经济活动逐渐地被配对化。

I’m moving quickly, since I’m not here today to go over the whole theory
of analytic dialogue for you. I simply want to indicate to you that the word –
to be understood with the emphasis that this comprises, the solution to an
enigma, a problematic function – is located in the Other, through the intermediary
of which all full speech is realized, this you are in which the subject
locates himself and recognizes himself.

我快速地进展,因为我今天在这里,要跟你们温习精神分析对话的整个理论。我仅是想要跟你们指示这个「文字」。为了被了解,带着这个强调:一个谜团的解决,一个棘手的功用,被定位置在大他者,通过这个大他者的中介,所有充份言说被实践。在这个「你的生命实存」,主体定位他自己,并且体认他自己。

Well then, through analyzing the structure of Schreber’s delusion at the
time it became stabilized into a system that links the subject’s ego to this
imaginary other, this strange god who understands nothing, who doesn’t reply,
who deceives the subject, we have been able to recognize that in psychosis
the Other, where being is realized through the avowal of speech, is excluded.
The phenomena in question in verbal hallucination exhibit in their very
structure the subject’s relationship of internal echo to his own discourse.

呵呵,通过分析苏瑞伯的谵狂的结构,在它稳定成为一个系统的时刻。这个系统连接主体的自我跟这个想象界的大他者,这个什么都不了解到奇怪的神。他不回答,他欺骗主体,我们始终能够体认出,在精神病,这个大他者被排除,但是在那里,生命实存被实现,通过言辞的宣称。受到质疑的这些现象,在文辞的幻觉里,以它们的结构,展现主体对于他自己的辞说的内部回声的关系。

They ultimately become increasingly meaningless, as Schreber puts it, emptied
of sense, purely verbal, learned by rote, pointless refrains. What, then,
is this special relationship to speech? What does the subject lack for him to
be able to get to the point where it is necessary for him to construct this
entire imaginary world, for him to undergo within himself this automatism
of the function of discourse? Not only does discourse invade him, not only is
it a parasite in him, but he is dependent on its presence.

这些现象变得越来越没有意义,如苏瑞伯所表达,被掏空理解,纯粹的文辞化,死背强记的没有意义的叠句。因此,跟言辞的这个特别的关系?为了让他能够到达这点,主体欠缺什么?在这点,他需要建构这整个想象的世界,为了让他经历自己内部的这个辞说的功用的这个自动机制?这个辞说不但侵犯他,不但寄生在他身上,而且他依靠它的存在。

I’ve shown you in vivo in a case presentation that the subject is only able
in psychosis to reconstitute himself in what I’ve called the imaginary allusion.
This is precisely the point we have come to. The subject’s constitution in
imaginary allusion is the problem on which we need to make progress.
Until now people have been satisfied with this. The imaginary allusion has
seemed to be very significant. People have rediscovered all the material, all
the elements, of the unconscious in it. They seem never to have wondered
what was significant from the economic point of view about the fact that by
itself this allusion has no power to resolve anything. They were aware of this nevertheless, but as a mystery, and over time they strove to efface the radical differences between this structure and the structure of the neuroses.

在一场个案报告,我曾经根据生物的有机体跟你们显示,在精神病的主体,仅能够重新建构他自己,在我所谓的想象的指称。这确是是我们已经来到的这点。在想象的指称里,主体的形成是这个难题,我们需要赖以进展的难题。直到现在,人们对于这个始终是满意的。这个想象界的指称一直似乎是很重要。人们曾经重新发现无意识在里面的所有的材料,所有的要素。他们似乎从来没有想要知道,从经济的观点,什么是重要的,关系这个事实:这个指称的本身没有权力解决任何事情。他们知道这个,但是作为一个神秘,随着时间过去,他们努力要抹除这个强烈的差别,处于这个结构跟神经症的结构之间的差别。

I was asked the same questions in Strasbourg as in Vienna. People who
seemed fairly open to certain views I was putting forward ended up saying to
me – How do you work with psychotics? – as if stressing the ABC of technique
wasn’t enough, with an audience as unprepared as that one was. I replied –
The question is still somewhat in progress. We have to try to locate some reference
points before we can discuss technique, let alone any psychotherapeutic recipes.
They persisted – Nevertheless, one can* t just do nothing for them. – No, certainly
not. Before we discuss this, lets wait until certain things have been made clear.

在史特拉斯堡,跟在维也纳,我被询问这个相同的问题。人们似乎非常愿意接受我提出的某些观点,但是结果却是对我说:「你如何研究精神病?」,好像强调技术的基本原理还不够似的。有一场听众跟那场听众同样没有准备好。我回答说:「这个问题依旧还在进展当中。我们必须尝试定位某些的指称点,这样我们才能讨论技术,更不用说任何的精神病的治疗疗法。他们持续地问:「可是,我们不能个对他们束手无策。」「不,当然不能。但是在我们讨论这个之前,让我们先等到某些的事情被弄清楚。」

To take a further step forward here, we must, as is often the case, take a
step back and return to the fascinating character offered by language phenomena
in psychosis – as it happens, this is liable to reinforce what just now
I called a misunderstanding.

为了在此向前探究,像通常那样,我们必须先退后一步,回到在精神病的语言现象所提供的这个迷人特性。恰巧地,这倾向于强化刚才我所谓的误解。

I hear it said that I hold that everything the subject communicates he
expresses in words and thus that I deny the existence, to which people are
much attached, of the preverbal.

我听过这种说法,我相信,主体沟通的一切事情,他用文辞表达,然后我否认前文辞部分的这个存在,虽然人们对于它们密切相关。

This extreme position doesn’t fail to produce, in those who dwell on this,
fairly lively recantations, which manifest themselves in two attitudes – the
hand on the heart, related to what we shall call the authentic attestation through
a displacement upwards, and the bowing of the head, supposed to be weighed
in the balance, which I reputedly unload too much at the wishes of my interpellator.

这个极端的立场一定会产生非常强烈的否认,在详述这件事情的那些人身上。这些否认用两种态度展现它们自己–「心的手」与「头的弓」。前者跟我们所谓的真诚的见证,通过昇华的替换;后者被认为是被压在平衡杠。对于我的提问者的各种愿望,我被传闻避重就轻。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

The Psychoses 58

September 17, 2012

The Psychoses 58
精神病

Jacques Lacan
亚克、拉康
X
XI
On the rejection of a primordial signifier
原初能指的拒绝

LETTER 52
第52封信

The magic writing pad is made of a sort of bluish-grey substance on which
there sits a strip of transparent paper. You write on the strip of paper and
when you lift it up there is nothing there anymore, it remains blank. On the
other hand, everything you have written down reappears on the surface of
the slightly adhesive substance, which enables what you write to be recorded
by virtue of the fact that the tip of your pencil makes the paper adhere to this
surface which, becoming darkened slightly, becomes momentarily visible.
There you have, as you know, the basic metaphor by which Freud explains
what he understands by the workings of perception in connection with memory.

魔术书写板由一种蓝灰色的物质组成,在这个物质上,有一张透明的纸覆盖。你在这张纸上写字,然后当你掀开它时,再也没有东西在那里,它始终是空白。在另一方面,你曾经写下的每样东西,重新出现在这个稍微粘着的物质上。那让你所写的东西能够被记录,凭借这个事实:你的铅笔的尖端让这张纸粘著这个表面。当它变得稍微暗色时,它变得暂时看得见。那就是你拥有的,众所周知,凭借这个基本的隐喻,弗洛伊德解释他所了解的东西,由于感觉到运作,跟记忆的关系。

What memory? The memory he is interested in. There are two zones in this memory, that of the unconscious and that of the preconscious, and after the preconscious one sees a complete consciousness emerge which cannot but be articulated.

什么记忆,他感到興趣的记忆。在这个记忆,有两个地区,无意识的地区,及前意识到地区。这前意识的地区之后,我们看见一个完整的意识出现,这个意识禁不住地被表达。

The requirements of his own conception of things are manifest in the fact
that between the essentially ephemeral Wahrnehmungen [perceptions], which
disappear as soon as they appear, and the constitution of the system of consciousness and, even at this stage, of the ego – he calls it the official ego, and official in German means the same as officiel in French, in the dictionary it’s not even translated – there are the Niederschriften [registrations], of which
there are three. Here we witness Freud’s development of an initial apprehension of what memory might be in its analytic functioning.

他自己对事情的感觉到要求被展示在这个事实:在这个基本上是短暂的感觉,当它们一出现,它们就消失。意识到系统的组成,甚至在这个阶段,自我的阶段,他称它为官方的自我。在德文,官方official的意思跟法文的officiel 相同,在字典上,它甚至没有被翻译。在此,我们见证到弗洛伊德的发展一个最初的理解,对于在精神分析的功能里,记忆可能的什么。

Freud gives a number of chronological divisions – that there are systems
formed for example between birth and one and a half, then between one and
a half and four years of age, then between four and eight, etc. But despite his
saying this, we aren’t required to believe, any more than we did before, that
these registers are constituted successively.

弗洛伊德给出许多的按时间发展的区分—譬如,有些系统被形成,处于出生跟一岁半之间,然后处于一岁半跟四岁之间,然后处于四岁跟八岁之间,等等。但是尽管他这样说,我们并没有被要求相信,正如我们以前那样,这些铭记连续地被形成。

Why distinguish them from one another and how do they become apparent?
They become apparent in the defense system, which consists in the fact
that things that don’t give us pleasure don’t reappear in any of the registers.
Thus here we are in the official economy, and this is where we don’t recall
what doesn’t give us pleasure.

是什么区别它们彼此不同?它们如何变得透明?它们在防卫系统变得透明。这个防卫系统在于这个事实:并没有给予我们快乐的这些事情,并没有出现在这些铭记。因此,在此我们处于官方的经济学。这是我们回忆不起来,是什么没有给予我们快乐。

This is absolutely normal. Call it defense, but
it isn’t pathological for all that. It’s even what one has to do – if we forget
things that are disagreeable to us we can only come out ahead. A notion of
defense that doesn’t start from this falsifies the entire question. What gives
defense its pathological character is the fact that, around the famous affective
regression, topographical regression takes place. A pathological defense, when produced in an uncontrolled fashion, provokes unjustifiable reverberations, because what goes for one system doesn’t go for another. The disturbance stems from this confusion between mechanisms, and it’s from this point on that we speak of a system of pathological defense.

这是绝对正常的。我们称它为防卫,但是尽管那样,这并不是病态的。这甚至是我们必须做的东西—假如我们忘记一些让我们不愉快的东西,我们能够仅是事先排除。并不是从这里开始的防卫的观念,让整个的问题变成虚假。给予防卫它的病态的特性是这个事实:环绕这个著名的情感的倒退,拓扑图形的倒退发生。一种病态的防卫,当它被产生,以一种无法被控制的方式,激发没有什么道理的反响,因为适用于一个系统的,并不适用于另外一个系统。这种扰乱起源于机械结构之间的这个混淆,从这点开始,我们谈论一种病态的防卫。

To understand it properly we shall begin with the best known phenomenon, from which Freud always started, the one that explains the existence of the system Unbewusstsein.

为了适当地了解它,我们将从这个最著名的现象。弗洛依德总是从那个现象开始,这个现象解释「无意识」这个系统的存在。

The mechanism of topographical regression here is perfectly clear at the
level of finished discourse, which is that of the official ego. Here one finds
agreements and coherences between discourse, signifier, and signified superimposed upon one another, forming the intentions, the plaints, the obscurity, the confusion, in which we live and due to which, whenever we spell something out, we always have this feeling of discordance, of never being completely up to what we want to say.

在此的拓扑图形的倒退的机械结构,在已完成的辞说的层次是非常明显的。那就是官方自我的层次。在此,我们发现处于辞说,能指与所指的互相赋加之就的一致性及一贯性,它们形成我们生活其间的这些意图,编织,模糊,混淆。由于这些,每当我们解释某件事情时,我们总是拥有不协凋的这种感觉,从来没有完整地从事我们想要说的话。

This is the reality of discourse. We are
nevertheless well aware that the signified is sufficiently captured by our discourse for everyday purposes. It’s when we want to do a bit better, to get to
the truth, that we are in total disarray, and rightly so. It is, moreover, why
most of the time we give up the game.

这就是辞说的现实界。可是,我们清楚地知道,这个所指示充分地被我们的辞说捕捉,作为日常的各种用途。当我们想要做得稍微好些,到达这个真理,我们就完全混乱,很有理由混乱。而且,这就是为什么大部分时间,我们放弃这个遊戏。

There is indeed a relationship between meaning and the signifier, it is what
the structure of discourse supplies. Discourse, which is what you hear when
you listen to me, and it does exist – the proof is that sometimes you don’t
understand it – , is a signifying temporal chain. But at the level of neurosis,
which brought about the discovery of the realm of the Freudian unconscious
qua register of memory, our good fellow, instead of using words, uses everything at his disposal – he empties his pockets, he turns his trousers inside
out, he puts his functions, his inhibitions inside, he gets completely inside
himself, with the signifier, it’s he who becomes the signifier. His real, or his
imaginary, enters into the discourse.

的确,有一个处于意义与这个能指之间的关系。那就是辞说的结构所供应。辞说,那是你们所听到,当你们倾听我时。他确实存在。证据是,有时你们并不了解它。它是一个能指化的时间所链。但是在神经症的层次,它导致弗洛依德的无意识的领域的发现,作为记忆的铭记。我们的好人,非但没有使用文字,他使用一切他能使用的东西—他清空掉他的口袋,他将他的裤子由里面向外发展,他记那个他的功能,他的潜抑向里面翻转,他完全退缩进入他自己,用这个能指。他变成这个能指。他的真实界,或是他的想象界,进入他的辞说。

If this isn’t what a neurosis is, if this isn’t what Freud taught, then I give
up.

假如这并不是神经症的本质,假如这并不是弗洛依德的教导,那么我放弃。

In the problematic field of the phenomena of Verneinung, phenomena occur
that must originate in a fall in level, in die passage from one register to another,
and that curiously manifest themselves with the characteristic of the negated
and the disavowed – it’s as if they are not existent. This is a very early property
of language, since the symbol is as such the connotation of presence and
absence.

在「否定」的这些现象的棘手的领域,一定是起源于层次的掉落的各种现象会发生,从一个铭记到另外一个铭记的过程。耐人寻味地,证明它们自己,用这个被否定及不被承认的特性。好像它们并没有存在。这是语言的非常早期的特性,因为这个符号象征的本身是存在与缺席的内涵。

This doesn’t exhaust the question of the function of negation within language.
There is an illusion of privation that stems from the ordinary usage of
negation. Moreover, all languages possess a whole range of negations, each
worthy of separate study – negation in French, negation in Chinese, etc.
What’s important is this. What appears to be a simplification in discourse
harbors dynamics which escape us, are secret. There is an illusion in thinking
that a Verneinung is observable simply in the fact that apropos of a dream the
subject stresses, Ifs not my father. Everyone’s familiar with this, the subject
is noticeably affected by the interpretation and ends up saying that it’s his
father, and as we’re happy with this, we don’t go any further.这并没有穷尽语言之内的否定的功用的问题。有一种被剥夺的幻象起源于「否定」的普通用法。而且,所有的语言都拥有一整个范围的否定,每一个否定都值得各别研究—法文的否定,中文的否定,等等。重要的是这个。看起来似乎是辞说的简化的东西,内涵著我们无法理解的动力结构,它们是奥秘。在思想有一种幻象:「否定」仅有在这个事实,才是可观察:关于主体强调的梦: 「那并不是我的父亲」。每个人对这句话都耳熟能详,主体显而易见受到这种解释的影响,结果都会说:那就是他的父亲。因为我对此感到满意,我们就没有再深入探究。

The subject says to you – / don’t want to tell you something that is unpleasant. Here it’s quite different. He says it nicely, but through dynamics whose immediacy is perceptible, he is in effect engaged in saying something unpleasant. It’s because we experience this that we are alert to the mystery that this illusion of privation can represent. Think of what Kant calls a negative value in its function, not only of privation, but of subtraction, in its true positivity.

主体对你说:「我并不想要告诉你们某件令人不愉快的事情」。在此,这是完全不同的。他很清楚地说它,但是通过这种动力结构,它的当下性是可以感觉出来。他事实上从事于说出某件令人不愉快的事情。那是因为我们经验这件事情,我们有所警觉剥夺的这个幻象能够代表的这个神秘。你们不妨回想一下康德所谓的否定的价值,不但在剥夺的它的功用,而且在扣除的它的功用,在它的真实的积极性。

The question of Verneinung remains entirely unresolved. What’s important
is to notice that Freud was only able to understand it by relating it to something
more primitive. He expressly acknowledges in his Letter 52 that the
primordial Verneinung comprises an initial putting into signs, Wahrnehmungszeichen.

「否定」的这个问题始终并没有完整地被解决。重要的是要注意到,弗洛依德仅是能够了解它,凭借将它跟某件更加原始的东西连接。他生动地承认,在他的第52封信:原初的「否定」包括一个最初地将「感觉的指示」放进符号象征里。

He admits the existence of this field I am calling that of the primordial
signifier. Everything he subsequently says in this letter about the dynamics
of the three great neuropsychoses that he applies himself to – hysteria, obsessional neurosis, paranoia – presupposes the existence of this primordial stage, which is the chosen locus of what for you I am calling Verwerfung.

他承认我正在称为原初的能指的这个领域的存在。他随后在这封信里谈论到这些动力结构,他致力研究的三大神经症精神病,癔症,强迫性神经症。妄想症—这个动力结构预先假设这个原初阶段的存在。那就是这个被选择的轨迹,我正在跟你们称为是「除权弃绝」的东西。

In order to understand this, consider something that Freud is constantly
pointing out, namely that one has to assume a prior, and at least partial,
organization of language in order for memory and historicization to work.
The memory phenomena that Freud is interested in are always language phenomena.

为了理解这个,请考虑某件东西,弗洛依德不断地指出的东西。换句话是,我们必须假定语言的一个先前组织,至少是部分的组织,为了让记忆及历史化能够运作。弗洛依德感到興趣的这个记忆的现象,总是语言的现象。

In other words, one already has to have the signifying material to
make anything signify at all. In The Wolf Man the primitive impression of
the famous primordial scene has remained over the years, serving no purpose,
though already signifying, before having its word to say in the subject’s
history. The signifier is thus primitively given, but it remains nothing as long
as the subject doesn’t cause it to enter into his history, which becomes important between the ages of one and a half and four and a half. Sexual desire is effectively what man uses to historicize himself, insofar as it’s at this level that the law is introduced for the first time.

换句话说,我们已经必须拥有这个能指化的材料,为了让任何东西具有能指意涵。在「狼人」,这个著名的原初的场景的原始印象,那些年来始终存在,没有任何的目的,虽然已经是能指化,在它拥有它的字词在主体的历史言说。这个能指因此原始就被给予,但是它始终是空无,只要主体没有引起它进入他的历史。这个历史变的重要,处于一岁半跟四岁半之间。性的欲望有效地是人用来让他自己历史化。因为就是在这个层次,法则第一次被介绍。

You now see the general economy of what Freud gives us with his simple
schema in this little letter. This is confirmed by a hundred other texts. One
of you, whom I have praised for having contradicted what is being developed
here, pointed out to me that the end of the text on “Fetishism” refers quite
directly to what I’m now explaining to you. There Freud makes an essential
revision to the distinction he had drawn between neurosis and psychosis,
saying that in the psychoses reality is reworked, that a part of reality is suppressed, and that reality is never truly scotomized.14 Ultimately, and you will see this from the context, it’s to a deficiency, to a hole in the symbolic, that
he is referring, even if in the German text it’s the term reality that is used.

你们现在知道,弗洛依德用他这封短信给予我们,用他的简单的基模,这个一般的经济结构。这个经济结构受到上百个其它文本肯定。你们其中一位,我曾经赞美,因为反驳在此所被发展的东西。他跟我指出,论「物神化」的文本的结尾,相当直接地提到我正在跟你们解释的东西。在那里,弗洛依德做一个重要的修正,对于他做的这个区别,处于神经症与精神病之间的区别。他说,在精神病,现实界被重新建构,现实界的一部分被压制,现实界从来没有真实地被孤立化。最后,你们将会从这个内容看出,他是提到一种欠缺,提到符号象界的一个空洞,即使在德文的文本,「现实界」这个术语被使用。

Haven’t you seen what the primordial phenomenon is when I present concrete
cases to you of people who have recently plunged into psychosis? I showed you a person who thought he had been receiving advances from a
character who had become his friend and the essential point of attachment in
his existence. This character withdrew, and then there he was in a state of
perplexity linked to a correlate of certainty, which is how the approach to the
prohibited field announces itself, access to which on its own constitutes the
onset of psychosis.

你们难道不曾看见:这个原初现象是什么?当我呈现人们的具体个案给予你们。这些人们最近突然变成精神病?我跟你们显示一个人,他认为他曾经一直收到各种建议,从一位已经成为他的朋友的人物,这位人物在他的生命的实存具有重要的情感。这个人物撤退,然后,在那里,他处于困惑的状态,跟确定性相关的困惑。那就是,接近这个被禁止的领域的方法如何宣佈它自己。接近这个方法的本身,就形成精神病的开始。

How does one enter psychosis? How is the subject led, not into alienating
himself in the little other, but into becoming this something which, from
within the field in which nothing can be said, appeals to all the rest, to the
field of everything that can be said? Isn’t this something that evokes what
you see displayed in the case of President Schreber – namely, these fringe
phenomena at the level of reality which have become significant for the subject?

我们如何进入精神病?主体如何被引导,不是进入异化的他自己,在这个小他者,而是进入成为这个某件东西,从这个领域的内部,在那里,没有东西能够被说,这个某件东西诉诸于其余的东西,诉诸于能够被说的一切的领域?这难道不是某件东西引发你们看见的东西,在苏瑞伯庭长的个案被展示出来。换句话说,这些边缘现象,在现实界的层次,对于主体,它们已经变得很重要。

Psychotics love their delusion like they love themselves.15 Having said this,
Freud, who hadn’t yet written his article on narcissism, added that the entire
mystery lies here. This is true. What is the relationship between the subject
and the signifier that is distinctive of the very phenomena of psychosis? How
come the subject falls entirely into this problematic?

精神病患喜他们的幻象,就像他们喜欢他们自己。当弗洛依德说完这个,那时他还没有写作论自恋的文章,他补充说,整个神秘就在这里。这是真实的。处于主体跟这个能指之间的关系是什么?在精神病的这些现象里,非常清楚的这个能指?主体为什么完全掉落到这个棘手难题里?

These are the issues that we are raising this year and I hope we are able to
make some headway with them before the long vacation.
15 February 1956

这些是今年我们正在提出的这些问题。我希望我们能够在漫长假期之前,朝它们勇往迈进。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

The Psychoses 57

September 15, 2012

The Psychoses 57
精神病

Jacques Lacan
亚克、拉康
X
XI
On the rejection of a primordial signifier
原初能指的拒绝

LETTER 52
第52封信

3
In his Letter 52 to Fliess, Freud returns to the circuit of the psychical apparatus.

在他写过弗利斯的第52封信,弗洛伊德回到心理仪器的迴圈。

You are, I hope, familiar with the Fliess correspondence, which has been
delivered to us by certain testamentary or testimonial hands with a series of
cuts and expurgations that, whatever their justification, the reader cannot fail
to feel is scandalous. Nothing can justify the cutting of a text at the point at
which the remainder, even if it were regarded as outdated and weaker, might
enlighten us on Freud’s thought.

我希望,你们对于弗利斯的通信耳熟能详,这些通信曾经传递给我们,凭借某种的证词或证词的手中,带有一系列的删减与整理。不管他们的理由是什么,读者一定会感觉,那是谣言。没有一样东西能够证明文本的这个删减,在那个时候,这个剩余的东西可能启蒙我们,有关弗洛伊德的思想,即使它被认为是过时而且比较微弱。

The psychical apparatus that preoccupies Freud isn’t the psychical apparatus
as conceived by a professor behind a table and in front of a blackboard,
who modestly gives you a model which, all things considered, looks like it
might work – whether it works well or poorly, it doesn’t much matter, what is important is to have said something that seems in some simple way to resemble what is known as reality.

让弗洛伊德如此专注的这个心理的仪器,并不是一位讲桌后面,黑板前面的教授所构想的心理的仪器。他谦虚地给予你们一个模式。从各方面考量,这个模式看起来是可以运作。无论它运作德顺畅与否,这无关紧要。重要的是要曾经说过某件东西,以某种单纯的方式,似乎是类似众所周知的现实界。

For Freud, it’s a matter of the psychical
apparatus of his patients, not of the ideal individual, and it’s this that introduces
him to this really astounding productiveness that we see here, even
more than anywhere else, in this famous Letter 52. What he is seeking to
explain is not just any old psychical state, but that from which he set out,
because it alone is accessible and proves to be fruitful in the experience of the
treatment – the phenomena of memory. The schema of the psychical apparatus in Freud is invented to explain phenomena of memory, that is, what
isn’t going well.

对于弗洛伊德,这个问题是他的病人的心理的仪器。就是这个心理仪器介绍他到这个确实是令人叹为观止的创造性,我们在此看到的,在这个著名的第32封信,甚至比起任何其他地方。他正在尝试解释的东西,不仅是任何古老的心理的状态,而且是他从那里出发,因为仅有这个心理状态能够被接近,并且证明是有成果的,在精神分析的治疗经验—记忆的这些现象。在弗洛伊德,心理仪器的基模被发明,为了解释记忆的现象。换句话说,进行得并不顺畅的东西。

You must not think that the general theories of memory that have been
proposed are particularly satisfactory. Because you’re psychoanalysts you’re
not excused from reading the works of psychologists, some have done some
sensible things, have discovered some remarkable discrepancies in valuable experiments – you will see their difficulty, the twists and turns they perform, in trying to explain the phenomenon of reminiscence.10 However, Freudian experience shows that the memory which interests psychoanalysis is quite distinct from what psychologists speak of when they display its mechanism to us in an animate being in an experiment.

你们一定不要认为,曾经被提出的记忆的一般理论特别令人满意。因为你们是精神分析家,你们无法免除不去阅读心理学家的著作。有些人曾经做过一些很明理的事情,曾经这宝贵的试验里,发现一些显著的差异—你们将会看出它们的困难。他们执行的各种变化与转变,当他们尝试解释回忆的现象。可是,弗洛伊德的精神分析经验显示:让精神分析感到興趣的记忆,是完全不同于心理学家所谈论的,当他们在试验里,用一种生命实存,跟我们展示它的机械结构。

I shall illustrate what I mean.
The octopus. It’s the most beautiful animal there is. It has played a fundamental role in Mediterranean civilizations. Nowadays it’s very easy to catch.

我将说明我的意思。
章鱼。这是世界上最美丽的动物。他曾经扮演一个基本的角色,在地中海的文明。今天,要捕捉章鱼很容易。

You put it into a little jar, insert electrodes, and watch. The octopus extends
its limbs and, suddenly, it retracts them. And one observes that it’s very soon
wary of our electrodes. So we dissect it and we discover, in what serves as its
head, a large nerve, large not only in size but also in the diameter of the
neurons, visible under the microscope. This is what serves as its memory,
that is, if you sever it in the live octopus, the apprehension of experience
works much less well, a deterioration is produced in the registrations of memory, which is why it’s thought this is the seat of its memory. And nowadays
people tell themselves that perhaps the octopus’s memory functions like a
little machine, in that it’s something that goes round in circles.

你们将它放入一个罐子里,插入电子灯管观看。章鱼延伸它的肢爪,突然地,它退缩它们。我们观察到,它很快就知道我们的电子灯管。所以,我们解剖它,我们发现,是什么充当他的头的功能,一个巨大的神经体,不但体积巨大,而而电子的直径也巨大,在显微镜下可看得出来。这是充当它的记忆的功能。换句话说,假如你在活的章鱼身上分裂它,经验的这个理解运作效果较差,在记忆的铭记会产生恶化。那就是为什么这个神经体被认为是它的记忆的位置。今天,人们告诉他们自己是,或许,章鱼的记忆的功能就像一台机器。因为那是绕着许多圆圈打转的东西。

I’m not in the process here of distinguishing man from the animal, since
what I teach you is that in man, too, memory is something that goes round
in circles. However, it’s made up of messages, it’s a succession of little signs
of plus or minus, which file in one after the other and go round and round
like the little electric lights on the Place de l’Opfra that go on and off.

我在此成处于区别人与动物的过程,因为我教导你们的是:在人身上,记忆也是某件绕着圆圈打转的东西。可是,记忆是由许多过程组成。它是许多加与减的小符号的连续体。这些加与减的小符号接续地排列,迴旋地绕着,就像在歌剧场地这些小小的电灯,闪烁明灭。

This is what human memory is. However, the primary process, the pleasure principle, means that the psychoanalytic memory Freud talks about is,
contrary to that of the octopus, something completely inaccessible to experience.

这就是人类的记忆的样子。可是,这个原初的过程,这个快乐原则,意味着,弗洛伊德谈论的精神分析的记忆,跟章鱼的记忆相反,那是精神分析经验完全无法进入的东西。

What else would it mean to say that desires in the unconscious are never
extinguished, because those that do become extinguished are by definition
never spoken of again? There are some that are never extinguished and continue to circulate in memory. In the name of the pleasure principle, they
cause the human being to recommence the same painful experiences, in cases in which things are connected to one another in memory in such a way as to persist in the unconscious. What I’m saying here is only the simple expression of what you already know in principle, but which of course is what you know as if you didn’t know it. I’m not only trying to make you know it, but also to get you to recognize that you know it.

它还会意味着什么?假如我们说,在无意识的欲望永远没有被消灭,因为那些确实变得被消灭的欲望,定义上永远没有再被谈论。有些欲望永远没有被消灭,并且继续在记忆里流通。以快乐原则的名义,它们引起人类重新开始相同的令人痛苦的经验。在某些情况,事情在记忆里互相关联,以这种方式,它持续待在无意识里。我在此正在说的是,仅有这个单纯的表达,对于原则上你们已经知道的东西。但是当然,这是你们所知道德,好像你们不知道它。我不仅正在尝试让你们知道它,而且让你们体认到,你们知道它。

Freudian memory is not located along a sort of continuum from reaction
to reality considered as a source of excitation. It’s striking that we have to go
to all this trouble whereas this is all Freud ever speaks of – disorder, restriction,
registration – this is not only the vocabulary of this letter, this is the
very thing at issue. What is essentially new in my theory, says Freud, is the
claim that memory is not simple, its registered in various ivqys.11

弗洛伊德所谓的记忆,并不是位于沿着一种从现实界反应的连续体,从这个现实界被认为是引起興奋的来源。引人注意的是,我们必须尽一切的费心,而这是弗洛伊德所谈论的一切:混乱,限制,铭记。这不但是这封信的辞彙,这是受到争议的东西。「是的,在我的理论里,属于基本上是新颖的东西。」弗洛伊德说,「它是这个宣称:记忆并不单纯,它以各种方式被被铭记。」

So what are these different registers? It’s here above all that this letter
brings grist to my mill, which I regret, because you’re going to jump on it
and you’re going to say to yourselves – Yes, it’s like this in this letter, but in the
next one it’s not like this. It’s in all the letters. It’s the very soul of the development of Freud’s thought. Otherwise a mass of things would be inexplicable. He would have become Jungian, for example.

所以,这些不同的铭记是什么?尤其重要的是在这里,这封信能够被我运用,我很遗憾,因为你们将要一扑而上,你们并没有要跟你们自己说:「是对,就像这封信里的这个,但是在下一封信,它就不像这个。它在所有的信件里。这是弗洛伊德的思想发展的灵魂。否则,一大堆事情将会无法解释。譬如,他本来会成为荣格学派。

So what are these registers? You’re going to see something appear that
you’ve never seen before, because until now there have been for you the
unconscious, the preconscious, and the conscious. It’s been known for a long
time that the phenomenon of consciousness and the phenomenon of memory
exclude one another. Freud stated it not only in this letter, but also in the
system of the psychical apparatus he gives at the end of The Interpretation of
Dreams.u It’s for him a truth that absolutely cannot be called experimental,
it’s a necessity that imposes itself on him from the point of view of handling
the system as a whole, and at the same time one feels that there is here an
initial signifying a priori in his thought.

这些铭记是什么呢?你们将会看出某件东西出现,那是你们以前从来没有看见过的。因为迄今,对于你们而言,无意识,前意识,及意识始终存在。长久以来,大家都知道,意识的现象及记忆的现象互相排除。弗洛伊德陈述它,不但在他信件里,而且在「梦的解析」,他给予的心理的仪器的系统里。对于他,这是一件绝对无法被称为是试验性的真理。这是赋加在他身上的一种需要,从处理这个系统的整体的观点而言。同时,我们感觉到,他的思想这里,有一个最初的能指化的以果推因。

At the beginning of the circuit of psychical apprehension there is perception.
This perception implies consciousness. This must be something like
what he shows us in his famous metaphor of the magic writing pad.1*

在心理理解的迴圈的开始,存在着感觉。这个感觉暗示着意识。这一定是某件像是他显示的东西,在他对于魔术般的写字板的著名的隐喻。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

The Psychoses 56

September 15, 2012

The Psychoses 56
精神病

Jacques Lacan
亚克、拉康
X
XI
On the rejection of a primordial signifier
原初能指的拒绝

VERWERFUNG
弃绝除权

LETTER 52
第52封信

That’s my supposition, and seeing that I speak from the genetic point of
view, I don’t otherwise have to justify it in experience. It’s structurally necessary to admit a primitive stage in which the world of signifiers as such
appears.

那是我的假设。当我看到,我从基因的观点言说,否则我并不需要在精神分析经验证实它的存在。它在结构上是需要的,承认一个原初的阶段。在这个阶段里,能指的世界本身出现。

Since this level leaves you somewhat confused, I will put things to you
dogmatically, which I detest doing – you know my style is dialectical.
Before a child can learn to articulate language, we have to assume that
signifiers, which are already of the symbolic order, have appeared. When I
speak of a primitive appearance of the signifier, this is something that already
implies language. All this does is link up with the emergence of this being
that is nowhere, the day. The day qua day is not a phenomenon, the day qua
day implies symbolic connotation, the fundamental alternation of the vocal
connoting presence and absence, on which Freud hinges his whole notion of
beyond the pleasure principle.

因为这个层次让你们感到相当困惑,我将武断地跟你们陈述—我并不喜欢这样做—你们知道我的风格是辩证法。在小孩能够学习表达语言之前,我们必须假定,能指已经是属于符号象征的秩序,这是某件已经暗示是语言的东西。所有这一切所为,都跟这个不存在于何处的生命实存的某件东西的出现息息相关,那将是白天。白天作为日子并不是一种现象,白天作为日日暗示着符号象征的内涵,以声音内涵在场与缺席的基本的轮换。弗洛伊德将他超越快乐原则的整个的观念,都悬挂在这个在场与缺席。

It’s exactly this field of symbolic articulation that I’m currently aiming at
in my discourse, and it’s here that Verwerfung occurs.

确实就是符号象征的表达的这个领域,我在我的辞说里目前正在朝向的目标。在此,弃绝除权出现。

I’m delighted by the fact that some of you are bothered by this subject of
Verwerfung. After all, Freud doesn’t mention it very often, and I have gone
and dug it out of the two or three crannies where the tip of an ear is showing,
and even sometimes those where nothing at all is showing, but where the
comprehension of the text demands that one assume it is there.

我很高兴这个事实:你们有些人对于「弃绝除权」的这位主体感到困扰。毕竟,弗洛伊德并没有时常提到它,我在他的全集里上穷碧落下黄泉地寻找,但是对于文本的理解要求,我们应该假的,它就在那里。

On the subject of Verwerfung, Freud says that the subject did not want to
know anything about castration, even in the sense of repression.5 As a matter of fact, in the sense of repression one still knows something about the very thing one doesn’t want, in some sense, to know anything about, and the whole of analysis consists in showing us that one knows it very well indeed. If there
are things the patient wants to know nothing about, even in the sense of
repression, another mechanism is implied. And as the word Verwerfung appears in direct connection with this sentence as well as several pages before, I grab it. I set no great store by the term, I set store by what it means, and this is what I believe Freud meant.

对于弃绝除权的主体,弗洛伊德说,主体并不想要知道任何事情,关于阉割,即使那仅是压抑的意义。事实上,在压抑的意义,我们仍旧知道某件东西,关于我们并不想要的东西。在某种意义,知道任何东西,整个的精神分析就在于跟我们显示:我们的确清楚地知道它。假如病人有些东西根本不想要知道,甚至从压抑的意义来说,另外一个机械结构被暗示着。如同「弃绝除权」这个字词出现,跟这个句子以及前面好几页直接相关,我捉住它。我将这个术语储备起来。我储备它的意义。这就是我相信弗洛伊德的意思。

It has been objected to me, most pertinently I must say, that the closer one
gets to the text the less one manages to understand it. This is indeed why a
text has to be brought to life by what follows and by what precedes. It’s
always by means of what follows that a text has to be understood.
Those who make the most objections to me suggest, incidentally, that I
look in some of Freud’s other texts at something that might not be Verwerfimg
but, for instance, Verleugnung – it’s strange to see proliferation of
this Ver in Freud.

有人曾经反对我说,我必须承认,反对得颇为中肯。我们越靠近这个文本,我们越是无法了解它。这确实是为什么一个文本必须后面跟随的及前面进行的东西来展现生命。总是凭借后面跟随的东西,一个文本必须被了解。对我提出最多反对党那些人,偶然地建议,我应该在弗洛伊德的一些其他文本,观看某件可能并非是弃绝除权的东西,而是,譬如,「否认」。这是耐人寻味的,在弗洛伊德那里,看见这个「放弃」的繁殖。

I have never given you any purely semantic lesson on
Freud’s vocabulary, but I assure you that I could serve up a good dozen of
them straightaway. I would begin by talking about the banking connotations
of all these terms, conversion, displacement,6 etc., and this would take us a
long way, right into the major implications of this direct approach Freud had
to the phenomena of neurosis. But we can’t spend forever on these different
approaches. Trust me a bit concerning this work on the sense. I have chosen
Verwerfimg to make myself understood because it’s the fruit of long reflection,
my work leads me to it. At least for a while, take my honey such as I
offer it to you and try to put it to some use.

我从来没有给予你们任何纯粹的语意教学,对于弗洛伊德的字彙。但是我告诉你们,我能够立刻供应足足十几个辞彙。我将开始谈论所有这些术语的储存的内涵,诸如「转变」,「替换」,等等。这将会让我们有很大进展,直接进入这个直接方法的主要暗示,弗洛伊德探索神经症的现象的方法。但是我们无法永远耗时间在这些不同的方法上面。请大家稍微信任我,关于对这个意义的研究。我曾经选择「弃绝除权」,来让我自己被人理解,因为这是常久反思的成果,我的研究引导我到达它。至少有一阵子,请大家接受我提供给予你们的我的成果,并且尝试去测试它。

171
This Verwerfimg is implicated in the text Die Verneinung, which M. Jean
Hyppolite presented here two years ago, and this is why I have chosen to
publish his presentation in the first number of the review La Psychanalyse.7
There you will be able to see, with text in hand, whether or not we were
right, Hyppolite and I, to set off down the path of Verneinung.
Freud’s text, undeniably brilliant, is far from being satisfactory. It mixes
everything up. This has nothing to do with a Verdrdngung.

这个「除权弃绝」被暗含在「否定」的文本里。两年前,海泼来特在此呈现这个「否定」的文本。这是为什么我曾经选择出版他的演讲,在「精神分析」评论第一期。在那里,你们将能够看出,从手中的文本,我们是否正确。海泼来特与我,探究「否定」的这条途径。弗洛伊德的文本无可否认的杰出的,但是根本不令人满意。它混淆一切。这个「否认」丝毫没有关系。

What is at issue when I speak of Verwerfimg? At issue is the rejection of a
primordial signifier into the outer shadows, a signifier that will henceforth be
missing at this level. Here you have the fundamental mechanism that I posit
as being at the basis of paranoia. It’s a matter of a primordial process of
exclusion of an original within, which is not a bodily within but that of an
initial body of signifiers.

当我谈论到「除权弃绝」,受到争议的是什么?受到争议的是一个原初能指的被拒绝进入外面对阴影,一个因此而在这个层次上失落的能指。在你,你们拥有我提出的这个基本的机械结构,作为是妄想症的基础。问题是一个原初的内在被排除的原初的过程。这并不是身体的内部,而是能指们的最初体系的内部。

It’s inside this primordial body that Freud posits the constitution of a world
of reality, which is already punctuated, already structured, in terms of signifiers.

就在这个原初的体系,弗洛伊德提出现实界的世界的形成。这个现实界已经是被贯穿,已经是被架构,用能指的术语。

Freud then describes the entire operation by which representation
and these already constituted objects are brought together. The subject’s initial
apprehension of reality is the judgment of existence, which consists in
saying – This is not my dream or my hallucination or my representation but an
object.

弗洛伊德描述这整个的运作,凭借这个运作,呈现及这些已经被形成的客体被结合在一块。主体对于现实界的最初的理解是生命实存的判断,这个生命实存在于说: 「这并不是我们的梦想,或是我的幻觉,或是我的呈现,而是一种客体。」

It’s a matter of testing the external by the internal – it’s Freud saying this,
not me-, a matter of the constitution of the subject’s reality in a refinding of
the object. The object is refound in a quest, and moreover the object one
refinds is never the same. This constitution of reality, essential to the explanation of all mechanisms of repetition is registered on the basis of an initial bipartition, one that curiously coincides with certain primitive myths that
evoke something primordially crippled that has been introduced into the subject’s access to human reality. Here you have what is presupposed by this
unusual priority that in Die Verneinung Freud attributes to what he explains
analogically as a judgment of attribution, as distinct from a judgment of existence.

问题是凭借内部测试外部。这是弗洛伊德这样说,而不是我。主体的现实界的形成的问题,在重新发现这个客体。这个客体在一种追寻中被重新发现,而且,我们重新发现的这个客体,从来并不是相同的。现实界的这个形成,对于重复的机械结构的解释是非常重要的,它被铭记,根据一个最初的两边分隔的基础。这个现实界的形成,耐人寻味地巧合于某些原初的一些神话。这些神话召唤某件原初被潜抑的东西。这个东西被介绍进入主体跟人类现实界的接近。在此,你们拥有这个不寻常的优先性所预先假定。在「否定」,弗洛伊德归属他用类比所解释的东西,作为属性的一种判断,作为跟生命实存的判断。

There is in Freud’s dialectic an initial division into the good and the
bad that can only be understood if we interpret it as the rejection of a primordial
signifier.

在弗洛伊德的辩证法,有一个最初的分隔进人这个善与恶。只有当我们将它们解释为一种原初能指的被拒绝,我们才能了解这个善与恶。

What does primordial signifier mean? It’s clear that it quite precisely means
nothing.

这个原初的能指的被拒绝意味着什么?显而易见地,它确实什么都没有意味著。

What I’m explaining to you here has all the characteristics of the myth that
I was tempted to mention on that occasion and that M. Marcel Griaule
recounted to you last year – namely, the division into four of the primeval
placenta. The first was the fox who, tearing out his portion of the placenta,
introduced an imbalance from which there stemmed the cycle that would
involve the division of the fields, the bonds of kinship, etc.8

我在此正在跟你们解释的东西,拥有神话的各种的特性。在那个场合,去年格劳乐跟你们描述这个神话时,我忍不住要提到这个神话。换句话说,这个原初的胚胎被区分成为四个。第一个是狐狸,它撕开这个胚胎的它的部分,它介绍一种不平衡,从这个不平衡,产生将会牵涉这些领域的区个的这个循环,亲属的这些关系,等等。

What I’m 172
recounting to you is also a myth, for I in no way believe that there is anywhere
at all a moment, a stage, at which the subject first acquires the primitive
signifier, that subsequently the play of meanings is introduced, and that
after that, signifier and signified having linked arms, we then enter the domain
of discourse.

我正在跟你们描述的也是一个神话,因为我根本就不相信,在任何地方会有一个时刻,一个阶段,在这个阶段,主体首先获得这个原初的能指。随后,意义的扮演被介绍。之后,能指与所指扱手并进,我们因此进入辞说的领域。

All the same, there is a representation here that is so indispensable that I
feel comfortable about giving it to you, so as to satisfy your demands, but
also because Freud himself tends in this direction – we shall have to wait and
see how.

仍然,在此有一种符号再现是如此的无法免除,我感觉很舒服,当我将它给予你们,为了满足你们的要求,但是也因为弗洛伊德他自己倾向于朝这个方向。我们将等着瞧要如何进行。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

The Psychoses 55

September 13, 2012

The Psychoses 55
精神病

Jacques Lacan
亚克、拉康
X
XI
On the rejection of a primordial signifier
原初能指的拒绝

DAY AND NIGHT
日与夜

VERWERFUNG
弃绝除权

LETTER 52
第52封信

2
These premises alone cast doubt on a theory of analytic treatment that with
ever-increasing insistence is reduced to a relation of two. It’s henceforth captivated in the relationship between the subject’s ego and the ideal ego, between the ego and the other, an other whose qualities may no doubt vary, but who will always be – experience proves it – the one unique other of the imaginary relation.

光是这些前提就投下怀疑,对于精神分析治疗的理论。由于越来越增加的坚持,这个治疗理论被还原成为两者的一种关系。它因此著迷于主体的自我与理想的自我之间的关系,处于自我与他者之间的关系。这一个他者的特质无可置疑变化万千,但是谁将总是具有想象关系的这个独特的他者,精神分析经验证明它。

As for the supposed object relation that is to be rehabilitated, the subject
is reduced to a curious experience that could be called the Kleinian substructure of the imaginary, namely, the oral complex. Of course, in a subject who isn’t inclined towards alienation of his own accord this can only persist on the basis of a misunderstanding constituted by a sort of imaginary incorporation or devouring which, given that the analytic relation is a relation of
speech, can only be an incorporation of the analyst’s discourse. On this deviant conception analysis can’t be anything other than the incorporation of the suggested, even supposed, discourse of the analyst – that is, the exact contrary of analysis.

至于应该被恢复的这个被假定的客体关系,主体被还原成为一种耐人寻味的经验。这种经验能够被称为克莱恩的想象的次级结构,换句话说,口腔情结。当然,在一个并没有倾向朝向出于他自愿的异化的主体,仅有根据一种误解,这个才能维持,这种误解由一种想象的合并或是吞没所组成。假如考虑到,精神分析的关系是一种言说的关系,这种想象的合并或吞没仅会上精神分析辞说的合并。根据这个偏离的观念,精神分析不会是别的,实实在在就是精神分析家的被建议,甚至是被假设的辞说。换句话说,跟精神分析恰恰相反的东西。

I’m lighting my lantern and I shall therefore tell you my thesis. I’m going
to tell it to you the wrong way round – that is, by situating it on this genetic
level that seems to be so necessary for you to feel at ease. I shall tell you
afterwards that this isn’t it, but still, let’s begin by saying that if this were it
then it would be as I’m about to say it is.

我正在点亮我的灯笼,我因此将告诉您们我的主题。我将要以倒转的方式告诉你们有关它。换句话说,凭借定位它在这个基因的层次,这个层次是如此的需要,这样,你们才会感到自在。随后,我将告诉你们,这并不是它。但是仍然让我们开始说:假如这是它,那么它将会是如同我即将要说它的样子。

It’s a question of a thesis involving the entire psychical economy, which is
important for an understanding of the confused debates still going on over
the Kleinian fantasmatic, for the refutation of certain objections made against it, and also for better situating what it can truly or fruitfully contribute to an
understanding of the precocity of the repressions it implies. As a matter of
fact, contrary to what Freud says, that there is no repression properly so called
before the decline of the Oedipus complex, the Kleinian theory on the
other hand entails the claim that repression exists right from the earliest preoedipal stages.

这是一个主题的问题,牵涉到整个的精神经济学,这是很重要的,对于了解这些正在进行的混乱的争辩,关于克莱恩的幻见,因为某些对它所做的反对意见的反驳,而且为了更加贴切地定位它所能够真实而有成果地贡献,对于它所暗示的各种压抑的先见之明的了解。事实上,跟弗洛伊德所说的相反,在伊底普斯情结的衰退之前,并没有适当所谓的压抑。在另一方面,克莱恩的理论涵盖这个宣称:从最早期的前伊底普斯情结的阶段,压抑就存在。

My thesis may equally throw light on a contradiction concerning autoerotism
that appears insoluble in Freud himself. On the one hand he talks about
the primitive object of the first mother-child relation. On the other he formulates
the notion of primordial autoerotism, that is to say, of a stage, however
short we suppose it to be, in which there is no external world for the
child.3

我的主题可能同样启蒙有关自动性爱的一个悖论。在弗洛伊德本人身上,这个自动性爱并无法解决。在一方面,他谈论关于最初的母亲与小孩的关系的原初的客体。在另一方面,他说明原初的自动性爱的观念。换句话说,某个阶段的原初的性爱,无论我们认为这个阶段是如何短暂。在这个原初性爱里,对于小孩,并没有外在的世界。

The question is that of the human being’s primordial access to his reality
insofar as we assume that there is a reality correlative to him – an assumption
always implied at the outset of this theme, but which we also know that we
shall have in part to abandon, because there would be no question about this
reality were it itself not constantly being called into question. Is there anything
in man that has this both enveloping and coapted character which causes
us to invent the notion of Umwelt for animals?

这个问题是人类的原初接近他的现实界的问题,因为我们认为,有一个跟他相对的现实界—一个假设总是被暗示,在这个主题的开始,但是我们也知道,我们将必须部分放弃这个假设。因为将不可能会有这个现实界,假如它本身不断地受到质疑。在人的身上,有任何东西拥有这个既涵盖又被密合的特性吗?它引起我们杜撰「周遭环境」的这个观念给动物?

I point out to you in passing that we make use of this hypothesis concerning
animals to the extent that an animal is for us an object and that there are
conditions that are in fact strictly indispensable to its existence. We’re happy
to investigate how an animal functions so as always to be in harmony with
these primordial conditions, and this is what we call an instinct, an instinc-
tual cycle or instinctual behavior – if there are things that aren’t in there, one
has to assume that we can’t see them, and since we can’t see them we’re
happy, and in fact why shouldn’t we be?

我顺便跟你们指出,我们使用这个关于动物的假设,甚至对于我们而言,动物是一种客体。有些情况对于它的存在,事实上是不可免除的。我们很乐意研究,动物如何行使功能,这样它才总是能够跟这些原初的情况相和谐。这是我们所谓的本能,一种本能的循环,或本能的行为。假如有些东西不是在那里,我们必须假定,我们无法看见它们。因为我们无法看见它们,我们很高兴,事实上,为什么我们不应该高兴?

It’s very clear that this is inadequate where man is concerned. The open
and proliferating nature of his world prevents us from making it into his
biological correlate. This is where I try, because it seems coherent and useful
for me to do so, to differentiate for you between the three orders of the
symbolic, the imaginary, and the real. It’s abundantly clear that everything
that our analytic experience shows us can be satisfactorily classified into these
three orders of relationships, the question being at what moment each of
these relationships is established.

显而易见地,就人类而言,这是不足够的。他的世界的这个开放而繁殖的特性,阻止他不能将它当著是他的生物的相关物,这就是我尝试的地方,因为它似乎是一贯而有用,让我这样做,让我跟你们区别符号界,想象界与实在界的这三个秩序。这是非常显而易见,我们精神分析经验跟我们显示的每件事情,都能够令人满意地被分类成为这三个关系的秩序。问题是在什么时刻,这些关系的每一个被建立。

My thesis, and perhaps it will give the answer to the enigma that for some
of you my purple passage of last time on the peace of the evening seems to
have consisted in, is as follows – reality is at the outset marked by symbolic
nihilation [neantisalion].

我的主题,或许它将会给于这个回答,关于在个谜团。对于你们某些人而言,上一次,我的渲染的段落,讨论夜晚的宁静,似乎是在于如下:现实界从一开始被被符号象征的虚无主义所标示。

169
Although all of last year’s work prepared us for it, I’m nevertheless going
to iUustrate it once again, even if only so as to come back to this peace of the
evening that got such a mixed reception.

虽然去年我所有的研究都替我们为此做准备,我仍然将要再次说明它。甚至仅是为了回到这个夜晚的宁静,因为有人接受,有人排斥。

This is not a detour that, as Plato says, is discordant or lacking in analytic
tone. I don’t think I’m being at all innovative. If you read Freud’s text on
President Schreber you will see that, as a clinical argument for understanding
the said President, he explores the function that Nietzsche’s saga in his Zarathusira, called Before the dawn, played for another patient of his.4 If you
refer to this moment – it was precisely so as not to read it out to you that I
indulged in this invocation of the peace of the evening – you will see the same
thing represented I wanted to bring to your attention a week ago, which I’m
going to put to you again now in speaking to you about daytime.

这并不是一种迂回,如同柏拉图所说的,这个迂回是不协调或欠缺精神分析的语调。我并不认为我目前是那么地创新。假如你们阅读弗洛伊德论苏瑞伯的文本,你们将会看出,作为一个临床的主张,为了理解所谓的苏瑞伯庭长,他探索这个功用: 尼采在他的「查拉特拉如是说」的「黎明之前」章的描述。这个描述是针对他的另外一位病人。假如你们提到这个时刻,那确实是为了不要公开跟你们朗读,因为我陶醉于夜晚的宁静的这个召唤—你们将会看到相同的东西被代表。一个星期前,我就想要将提醒你们注意这个被代表的东西。我现在将于再次跟你们提出,当我正在跟你们言说,有关白天。

The day is a being distinct from all the objects it contains and manifests,
it’s probably even more weighty and more present than any of them, and it’s
impossible to think of it, even in the most primitive human experience, as
the simple return of an experience.

白天是一种生命实存,迴异于它所包含及展示的所有的客体。比起任何其他一个客体,白天可能甚至更加的沉重,更加的在场。不可能想到白天,甚至在最原初的人类的经验,作为是一种经验的单纯的回来。

It suffices to mention the prevalence of a rhythm of sleep in the first few
months of human life for us to have all sorts of reasons to believe that it isn’t
due to any empirical apprehension that at a given moment – this is how I
illustrate the initial symbolic nihilations – the human being detaches itself
from the day. The human being is not, as everything leads us to think is the
case for the animal, simply immersed in a phenomenon such as that of the
alternation of day and night. The human being poses the day as such, and
the day thereby becomes presence of the day – against a background that is
not a background of concrete nighttime, but of possible absence of daytime,
where the night dwells, and vice versa moreover. Very early on, day and night
are signifying codes, not experiences. They are connotations, and the empirical and concrete day only comes forth as an imaginary correlative, originally, very early on.

我们只要这样提到就足够了。在婴儿刚出生的前几个月,睡眠的节奏是佔大部分。所以,我们拥有各种理由相信:这并不是由于任何经验上的理解,在某个特定时刻—这是我解释这个最初的符号象征的虚无化—人类跟白天是隔离的。人类并不仅仅是陶醉于一种现象,如同一切东西都引导我们认为,对于动物是这种情况,譬如,日夜轮替的这种现象。人类提出白天作为是这个样子,因此白天就成为日子的存在。根据的并不是具体的夜间的背景,作为背景,而是白天的可能的不在作为背景。在那里,夜晚驻居著,而且,反过来的情况也是一样。在早期,日与夜是符号化的符码,而不是经验。它们是各种的内涵,而经验而具体的白天前来,仅是作为一个想象的相对,在原初,最早的时刻。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

The Psychoses 54

September 12, 2012

The Psychoses 54
精神病

Jacques Lacan
亚克、拉康
X
XI
On the rejection of a primordial signifier
原初能指的拒绝

A TWIN THAT IS BIG WITH DELUSION
充满谵狂的双胞胎

DAY AND NIGHT
日与夜

VERWERFUNG
弃绝除权

LETTER 52
第52封信

We’ve been approaching the problem of the psychoses via the question of
Freudian structures. This approach is a modest one, and it isn’t actually
going in the direction in which our investigations are pointing, namely that
of the economy of the psychoses, which we are investigating through an analysis
of the structure.

我们曾经探究精神病的问题,凭借弗洛伊德的结构的问题。这个方法是谦虚的方法,它实际上并没有朝我们研究的这个方向。换句话说,精神病的活动力的方向,我们正在研究这个方向,通过对结构的精神分析。

The structure appears in what can be called the phenomenon, in the strict
sense of the term. It would be surprising if nothing of the structure were to
appear in the way that, for example, the delusion presented itself. But our
confidence in the analysis of the phenomenon is quite distinct from that of
the phenomenological point of view, which strives to discover what it contains
of reality in itself. From the point of view that guides us we don’t have
this a priori confidence in the phenomenon, for the simple reason that our
way of proceeding is scientific and that it’s the starting point of modern science
not to trust the phenomena and to look for something more subsistent
behind them that explains them.

这个结构出现在所谓的现象,用这个术语的意义来说。这将是令人惊奇的,假如这个结构没有一样以这种方式出现,譬如,谵狂呈现它自己的方式。但是我们对于这个现象的精神分析的信心,完全不同于现象学的观点。后者尝试发现它本身包含怎样的现实界。从引导我们的这个观点,我们对于这个现象,并没有拥有这个以果推因的信心。理由很简单,我们进行的方式是科学的,这是现代科学的开始点,那就是不要信任这些现象,并且在它们背后,寻找某件更加支持它们的东西来解释它们。

One must not retreat from this word. If some time ago psychiatry took a
backward step that consisted in distrusting explanation so as to extol understanding,
it was because the explanatory path had led to dead ends. But we
ourselves have evidence of the explanatory efficacity of analytic investigation,
and it’s on the assumption that here, too, an appropriate analysis of the phenomenon
will lead us to the structure and the economy that we shall make
advances in the domain of the psychoses.

我们一定不要从这个字词撤退。假如不久之前,精神病学採取后退的一步,这一步在于不信任解释,为了赞赏了解。那是因为解释的途径已经通往死巷。但是我们自己拥有精神分析研究的解释式的有效性的证据,那是根据这个假设:在此,对于现象的一个适当的精神分析,将会引导我们到达这个结构跟活动力,我们在精神病的领域,将会前进。

It is not for the simple pleasures of the nosographer that we’re grappling
with the distinction between the neuroses and the psychoses. This distinction
is only too evident. It’s by comparing the two that relationships, symmetries,
and contrasts will appear that will enable us to erect an admissible structure
for psychosis.

这并不是单纯是为了分类学的乐趣,我们正在处理神经症与精神病的这个区别。这个区别是非常明显的。凭借比较这两种病症,各种关系,均称,对比都将会出现。它们让我们能够建立起行得通的结构,对于精神病。

Our starting point is this – the unconscious is present but not functioning.
Contrary to what has been thought, the fact that it’s present doesn’t imply a
solution but, on the contrary, a very special inertia. Furthermore, psychoanalysis
doesn’t consist in making thought conscious or in making the ego’s
defenses less paradoxical, so as to obtain what is rashly called its strengthening.
This rejection of the two paths psychoanalysis took, first at its emergence
and then in its present, deviated state, is almost self-evident when one explores
the psychoses.

我们的开始点是这个—无意识的在场,但是没有发挥功能。跟迄今所被认为的相反,无意识出现的这个事实,并没有暗示一种解决,而是相反地,它暗示一种特别的惰性。而且,精神分析并不是在于让思想变成意识,或是让自我的防卫减少矛盾,为了获得轻率地被称为所它的强化。精神分析採取得这两条途径,首先是在无意识出现时,然后,在无意识的在场。这两条途径的被拒绝,几乎是不证自明的,当我们探究精神病。

In the forthcoming journal of our Society, in its first number on language
and speech, you will find this statement in the foreword – If psychoanalysis
inhabits language, in its discourse it cannot misrecognize it with impunity. This is
the whole sense of what I have been teaching you for a number of years, and
this is where we are with respect to the psychoses. The emphasis on, the
importance given to, language phenomena in psychosis is for us the most
fruitful lesson of all.

在我们社团将出版的这期杂志,在它讨论语言与言说的第一篇,你们将会在前言发现这个陈述:「假如精神分析驻居于语言,于它自己的辞说,它无法误认它,而不遭受伤害。」这是许多年来,我一直教导你们的东西的全部的意义。这是我们所在的立场,关于精神病。在精神病,对于语言现象的强调,所给予的重要性,对于我们而言,是最具成果的教训。

1
The question of the ego is obviously primordial in the psychoses since the ego
in its function of relating to the external world is what breaks down. It’s
therefore not free of paradox to want to give it the power to handle the relationship
with reality and transform it for the aims of what is defined as defense.

在精神病,自我的问题显而易见是原初的,因为在它跟外在世界的相关的功用,自我是瓦解的东西。因此,这并没有免除悖论,想要给它这个力量来处理跟现实界的关系,并且转变它,为了所被定义为防卫的各种目的。

Defense, in the cursory form in which it’s currently understood, is said to
be at the origin of paranoia. The ego, which is gaining in strength in the
modern conception of analysis, in effect having the power to bring the external
world into play in various ways, is in the case of psychosis said to cause a
signal, intended as a warning, to appear in the external world in the form of
a hallucination. Here we rediscover this archaic idea that a pressure [poussie]
emerges which is perceived by the ego as dangerous.

防卫,根据它目前被了解的不成熟的形式,它被说成是处于妄想症的起源。实际上,它拥有这个力量以各种方式运作这个外在的世界。在精神病的个案,它被说成是引起一种讯号,这个讯号被用来当作一种警告,以幻觉的形式出现在外在的世界。在此,我们重新发现这个过时的观念: 被自我感觉是危险的一种压力出现。

165
I should like to remind you here of the sense of what I say regarding the
ego and to phrase it in another way.

我想要提醒你们我所说的内容的这个意义,关于这个自我,并且以另外一种方式陈述它。

Whatever the appropriate role to attribute to it in psychical economy is,
the ego is never alone. It always implies a strange twin, the ideal ego, which
I spoke of in my seminar two years ago. * The most apparent phenomenology
of psychosis tells us that this ideal ego speaks. It’s a fantasm [fantaisie], but
unlike the fantasm, or fantasy [fantasme], that we highlight in the phenomena
of neurosis it’s a fantasm that speaks, or more exacdy, it’s a spoken fantasm.
This is where this character who echoes the subject’s thoughts, who intervenes,
spies upon him, names his actions in the sequence in which they occur,
and commands them is not adequately explained by the theory of the imaginary
and the specular ego.

在精神经济学,不管归属于自我的角色适当与否,自我从来就不是单独存在。它总是暗示一位外来的双胞胎,这个理想的自我。两年前在我的研讨班,我谈论到它。精神病的最明显的现象告诉我们,这个理想的自我会言说。它是一种幻见,但是不像我们在神经症的现象里强调的这个幻见。这是一种言说的幻见,或跟贴切地说,它是被言说的幻见。这是迴响主体的思想的人物,在思想发生的顺序里,介入,侦查他,命名他的行动的人物,命令他的人物。这个人物并没有适当地被解释,被想象界的理论跟魅影的自我解释。

I tried last time to show you that the ego, whatever we make of its function,
and I shall go no further than to give it the function of a discourse of reality,
always implies as a correlate a discourse that has nothing to do with reality.
With the impertinence that, as everyone knows, is characteristic of me I designated
this the discourse of freedom, essential to modern man insofar as he
is structured by a certain conception of his own autonomy. I pointed out its
fundamentally biased and incomplete [partiel et partial], inexpressible, fragmentary,
differentiated, and profoundly delusional nature. I set out from this
general parallel to point out to you what, in relation to the ego, is apt, in the
subject fallen prey to psychosis, to proliferate into a delusion. I’m not saying
it’s the same thing. I’m saying it’s in the same place.

我上次尝试跟你们显示:自我总是暗示着一种辞说,我们无论如何解释它的功能,我将仅是给予它现实界的辞说的这个功能,作为相关物,这个辞说跟现实界没有丝毫关系。众所周知,用我特有的轻率,我指明这个,自由的辞说,对于现代人是非常重要的,因为他被他自己的自主权的某种观念所架构。我指出它的基本特性是偏见性,不完整,无法表达,片段化,差异性,而且深刻的谵狂。我从这个一般性的对比开始,跟你们指出,跟这个自我的关系,在成为精神病的受害者的主体身上,那些倾向于发展成为谵狂的东西。我并不是说,这是相同的东西。我是说,它处于相同的位置。

There is, then, no ego without this twin that is, let’s say, big with delusion.
Our patient, who provides us with valuable images from time to time, says
at one stage that he is a leprous corpse leading another leprous corpse along behind
him.2 A nice image indeed of the ego, since there is in the ego something that
is fundamentally dead and always lined with this twin discourse. The question
we are asking ourselves is this – how does it happen that this double,
which only ever makes the ego half of the subject, becomes a speaking double?
Who is speaking?

因此,每个自我,都有这位充满谵狂的双胞胎,容我们这样是。我们的病人在某个阶段说,他提供我们,有时用有价值的各种意象:「他是一位痲疯病的尸体,正引导另一位痲疯病的尸跟随他后面。」这确实是自我的一个良好意象,因为在这个自我,某件基本上是死的东西,总是跟这个双胞胎的辞说相一致。我们正在询问我们自己的这个问题是: 这是如何发生的? 这位双重人仅是让自我成为主体的一半,他是如何成为一个言说的双重人?是谁在言说?

Is it the other whose function of reflection in the dialectic of narcissism I
have expounded, the other of the imaginary part of the master-slave dialectic
which we have sought in the transitivism of children, in the games of prestige
in which the integration of the socius is put into effect, the other whom the
captivating action of the total image in the counterpart encapsulates so well?
Is it really this reflected other, this imaginary other, this other that for us is
every counterpart in so far as he gives us our own image, captivates us by an
appearance, and provides the projection of our totality – is it he who is speaking?
The question is worth raising. One implicitly resolves it each time one
mentions the mechanism of projection.

这难道是这个他者,在自恋的辩证法,我曾经诠释过他者的反思的功能?这个主人与奴隶的辩证法的想象部分的他者。在儿童的转移行为,我们曾经尝试这种主人与奴隶的辩证法,在这个威望的遊戏,跟伴侣的融合产生效用,这个他者,在伴侣那里的完整的意象的迷人的行动,将他者如此紧密封闭。这难道确实就是这个被反映的他者,这个想象中的他者,对于我们而言,这个他者是完整的伴侣,因为他给予我们属于我们自己的意象,他凭借一种外表迷住我们,并且提供我们整体性的投射。难道是他在言说?这个问题值得提出。我们暗含地解决它,每次我们提到投射的机械结构。

Projection doesn’t always have the same sense, but for our part we restrict
it to this imaginary transitivism by means of which when a child hits his
counterpart he can say without lying -He hit me, because for him it’s exactly
the same thing. This defines an imaginary order of relations that is constantly
found in all sorts of mechanisms. In this sense there is a type of jealousy by
projection, one that projects onto the other the subject’s unfaithful tendencies,
or the accusations of unfaithfulness that he himself has to bear.

投射未必总是有相同的意义,但是就我们而言,我们限制它到这个想象的转移行为。凭借这个转移行为,当一个小孩打到他的同伴,他会并没有说谎地说:「他打我」。因为对他而言,这确实是相同的事情。这定义关系的一种想象的秩序,这种秩序不断地被找到,在各种的机械结构。从这个意义,有一种忌妒,作为投射,这种投射将主体的不忠实的倾向投射到他者,或是他自己必须忍受的不忠实的各种指控。

It’s a rudimentary observation that delusional projection has nothing in
common with this. One may well say that it, too, is a mechanism of projection
in the sense that something whose source is within the subject appears
without, but it’s certainly not the same as the one I have just presented to
you as the transitivism of evil intentions, which is much closer to so-called
common or normal jealousy. One need only examine the phenomena to see
this, and the distinction is fully drawn in Freud’s own writings on jealousy.
The mechanisms at work in psychosis are not limited to the imaginary register.

这是基本的观察,谵狂的投射跟这个根本没有相同之处。我们很有理由说,它也是投射的一种机械结构。它的意义是,来源在主体内部的某件东西,出现在外面。但是它确实并不是相同的东西,跟我刚刚呈现给与你们,作为邪恶意图的转移行为。它更加靠近所谓的共同或正常的忌妒。我们仅需要检查这些现象,我们就会看出这个。这个区别在弗洛伊德「论忌妒」的著作,充分地被描绘。在精神病,运作中的这些机械结构,并没有被限制于想象的铭记。

Where shall we look for them, given that they escape libidinal investment?
Is it sufficient to appeal to libidinal reinvestment of the body? This mechanism,
commonly held to be that of narcissism, is explicitly invoked by Freud
himself to explain the phenomenon of psychosis. Briefly put, in order to
mobilize the delusional relationship, it’s supposed to be a matter of nothing
other than enabling him, as one so quickly says, to become an object again.

考虑到它们逃避力比多的投注,我们将到哪里寻找它们?诉诸于身体的力比多投注,难道是足够的吗?共同被认为是自恋的这个机械结构,明确地被弗洛伊德本人召唤,来解释精神病的现象。简明地说,为了动员谵狂的关系,它应该是一件实实在在就是让他能够再次成为一个客体,我们不妨明快地说。

From one angle this coincides with a number of the phenomena involved,
but it doesn’t exhaust the problem. Each and every one of us knows, provided
he’s a psychiatrist, that in a fully developed paranoiac there is no question
of mobilizing this investment, while in schizophrenics the properly
psychotic disturbance is as a rule much more extensive than in the paranoiac.

从一个角度,这巧合于许多牵涉到的现象,但是它并没有穷尽这个问题。我们每个人都知道,只要他是精神病医生。在一个完整发展的妄想症,不可能动员这个投注,而在精神分裂症,这个适当来说是精神疾病,通常比在妄想症更加地广泛。

Wouldn’t this be because in the imaginary order there is no way of giving
a precise meaning to the term narcissism? Alienation is constitutive of the
imaginary order. Alienation is the imaginary as such. Nothing is to be expected
from the way psychosis is explored at the level of the imaginary, since the
imaginary mechanism is what gives psychotic alienation its form but not its
dynamics.

这难道不是因为在想象的秩序,没有办法给出一个确实的意义,给「自恋」这个术语?异化组成想象的秩序。异化是想象界的本身。没有一样东西应该被期待,从精神病被探究的方式,在想象界的层次。因为想象的机械结构就是给予精神病的异化它的形式,但是并不是给予它的动力。

This is the point we always get to together, and if we don’t get there unarmed,
if we don’t give in, it’s precisely because in our exploration of analytic technique,
and then of beyond the pleasure principle with the structural definition
of the ego that it implies, we have the idea that beyond the little other of
the imaginary we have to admit the existence of another Other.
It’s not only because we give it a capital letter that we are satisfied with it,
but because we locate it as the necessary correlate of speech.

这就是我们一起到达的这个点。假如我们不是要到达那里时,卸下武装,假如我们没有屈服,那确实是因为在我们对精神分析技术的探索,因此在超越快乐原则及自我的结构性定义的探索,它暗示着: 我们理解到,超越想象界的这个小他者,我们必须承认另外一个大他者的存在。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

The Psychoses 53

September 12, 2012

The Psychoses 53
精神病

Jacques Lacan
亚克、拉康
X
On the signifier in the real and
the bellowing-miracle

实在界的能指与呐喊的奇迹

SUBJECTIVE TOPOLOGY
主体的拓扑图形

3
I said last time that the continuity of this perpetual discourse is not only felt
by the subject as a test of his capacities for discourse, but also as a challenge
and a requirement in the absence of which he suddenly feels he is at the
mercy of a rupture with the sole presence in the world that still exists at the
time of his delusion, that of this absolute Other, this interlocutor who has
emptied the universe of any authentic presence. Where does the ineffable
voluptuousness – a fundamental feature of the subject’s life – which is attached
to this discourse, stem from?

我上次说,这个永久的辞说的连续性,不但被主体感觉到,作为他对辞说能力的一种测验,而且作为一种挑战及一种要求。欠缺这个要求时,他突然感觉他是受到一个断裂的支配,具有在世界中的唯一的存在。这个世界依旧存在于他的谵狂的时代,这位绝对大他者的时代,这位对话者曾经掏空这个宇宙的任何真实的存在。这个难以表达的淫荡—主体生命的一个基本特征—它本这个辞说息息相关,它从何来?

In this particularly true-to-life observation, and with an infrangible attachment
to the truth, Schreber notes what happens when this discourse upon
which he is painfully dependent ceases. Different phenomena from those of
the continuous internal discourse arise – things slow down, there are interruptions,
discontinuities, which the subject is forced to complement. The withdrawal of the ambiguous and double god in question, who habitually presents himself in his so-called lower form, is accompanied by sensations that are very painful for the subject, but above all by four connotations of a linguistic order.4

在这个特别忠实于生命的观察里,跟真理具有一种不可违背的连繫,苏瑞伯注意到发生什么事,当他痛苦依赖的这个辞说停止时。从这个连续的内部的辞说的那些现在,产生不同的现象—事情缓慢下来,会有主体被迫要补充的中断及不连续。这位受到质疑的模糊暧昧与双重的神的撤退,他习贯性地呈现他自己,以他所谓的较低的形式,伴随着对于主体的各种令人痛苦的感觉,但是尤其是,伴随着语言秩序的内涵。

In the first place, there is what he calls the bellowing-miracle. He is unable
to contain a prolonged shout, which grips him so brutally that, as he himself
notes, if at that instant he had had anything in his mouth it would have forced
him to spit it out. He has to restrain himself if this is not to occur in public,
and he is a long way from always being able to do so – quite a striking
phenomenon if we see in this shouting the mouth’s motor participation in
speech reduced to its most extreme aspect. If there is anything by means of
which speech comes to be combined with an absolutely a-signifying vocal
function, and which nevertheless contains all possible signifiers, it must surely
be what it is that makes us shiver in a dog’s baying at the moon.

首先,有他所谓的咆哮的奇迹。他不能够控制一个如此残酷掌握它的延长的喊叫。因为他自己注意到,假如在那个瞬间,他曾经有任何东西在他的嘴巴,它本来会强迫他将它呕吐出来。他必须约束他自己,假如不要让这件事在公开场合发生。他根本就不能够这样做—这是一个非常引人注意的现象,假如我们在这个喊叫里看到嘴巴的参与言说,被还原成为它最极端的一面。假如有任何的东西,凭借这个东西,言说渐渐被连接,跟一个绝对是非能指化的声音的功能。可是,它包含所一切可能的能指,它必定是这个本质,让我们不寒而栗,关于狗哀吠月亮。

Secondly, there is the call for help, supposedly heard coming from the
divine nerves that have become separated from God but that trail a sort of
comet’s tail behind them. In the first period, at the time of the tying-to celestial-
bodies, Schreber could not enter into effusive communion with the
divine rays without having one or more tested souls leap into his mouth. But
following a certain stabilization of his imaginary world, this no longer occurred.
In contrast, anxiety-making phenomena recur when some of these animated
entities that he is living in the midst of are, on God’s withdrawal, left trailing
and call out for help.

其次,有假定会被听见求教呼喊,来自神性的神经。这些神性神经已经跟上帝分离,但是它们背后带着彗星的尾巴痕迹。在第一个时期,在跟天庭的星体紧连的时期,苏瑞伯每当进入跟神性的光辉充分沟通,他的嘴巴就会跃入两三个受到考验的灵魂。但是跟随着他的想象世界的某种的稳定,这不再发生。对比起来,形成焦虑的各种现象重复发生,当他生活其中的这些被激发的实体,在上帝撤退之时,有些会尾随而来,呼叫救命。

This phenomenon of the call for help is different from the bellowing. The
bellowing is a pure signifier only, whereas the call for aid has a meaning,
however elementary.

这个呼喊救命的现象,不同于这个呐喊。呐喊仅是纯粹的能指,而呼唤救命是一种意义,无论是多么初级的意义。

This isn’t all. Thirdly, there are all sorts of noises from without, whatever
they might be – something that happens in the corridor of the mental home,
or a noise outside, a bark or a neigh which, he says, has been miracled, done
expressly for him. It’s always something that has a human meaning.

这并非全部。第三,从外面进来各种的噪音,不管是什么噪音。某件东西发生在精神病院的走廊,或是外面的一种噪音,狗吠叫,或是据他说的,奇迹似的马嘶,生动地为他而发出。这总是某件具有人类意义的东西。

159
Between the vanishing meaning of the bellowing and the emission obtained
from the call for help – which is not even his according to him, since it
surprises him from without – we can observe a whole range of phenomena
that are characterized by the outbreak of meaning. Schreber is well aware
that these are real noises that he is accustomed to hearing in his surroundings,
nevertheless he is convinced that they do not occur by chance just at that
moment, but for his sake, on their return to abandonment in the external
world, and in a way that corresponds to the intermediate periods of absorption
in the delusional world.

在呐喊的逐渐消失的意义,与从呼喊求救所获得的发出之间,我们观察现象的整个幅度。依据他的说法,呼喊求救甚至并不是他的呼喊求救,因为它从外面惊吓到他。整个现象的特征是意义的爆发。苏瑞伯清楚知道,这些是他习惯于听到的真实的噪音,在他的周遭环境。可是,他相信,这些噪音并不是偶然发生,就在那个时刻,以某种方式,对应于在谵狂的世界的融入到中间的时期。

The other miracles, for which he constructs an entire theory of divine creation,
consist in the call of a number of living beings which in general are
singing birds – as distinct from the speaking birds that form part of the
divine entourage – that he sees in the garden. There are also known species
of insects – the subject had an entomologist great grandfather – created quite
intentionally for him by the omnipotence of divine speech. Thus between
these two poles, the bellowing-miracle and the call for help, a transition occurs
in which can be seen traces of the passage of the subject absorbed in an
undeniably erotized link. The connotations are there – this is a male-female
relationship.

其他的奇迹,他替这些奇迹建构神性创造的整个理论。这些奇迹在于许多生物的呼喊,一般来说,这些生物是他在花园看到的唱歌的鸟—不同于言说的鸟是组成神祗随从的部分。也有众所周知的昆虫刻意地为他创造–主体的祖父是一位昆虫学专家—凭借神性言说的无所不能。因此,处于这两个极端之间,这个呼喊的奇迹跟呼喊求救,一种转移发生。在这个转移,专注于无可否认的性爱化的连接的主体,他的经历过程的痕迹,能够被看见。这些内涵在那里—这是一个男性与女性的关系。

The fundamental phenomenon of Schreber’s delusion stabilized into an
Unsinnig, nonsensical, field of erotized meanings. With time the subject managed
to neutralize to its utmost the task he set himself, which consisted in
completing the interrupted sentences. Any other way of responding, by questioning
them or by insulting them, would not have been playing the game. It
is necessary, he says, for me to be linked to the activity of God himself who
speaks to me in his fundamental language, however absurd or humiliating
the character of his questioning. Well then, whenever the subject leaves this
enigmatic field, whenever a state occurs whose arrival one would think he
must be wishing for as a respite, an illumination occurs on the fringe of the
external world and goes through him with all the component elements of
language in a dissociated form.

苏瑞伯的谵狂的基本的现象稳定成为性爱化的意义的无意义的领域。随着时间过去,主体成功地将他指定给他自己的工作彻底中立。这个工作在于完成这些被中断的句子。假如是任何其他方式的回应,凭借质疑它们,或是凭借侮辱它们,本来都不会形成的扮演这个遊戏。他说,这是需要的,让我跟上帝本身的活动息息相关。上帝跟我言说,用他基本的语言,无论他的质疑的特性是多么的荒谬或令人羞辱。呵呵,每当主体离开这个谜团一般的领域,每当一个状况发生,这个状况的到达,我们将会认为是他的期望,作为是一种休息,一种启蒙发生在外在世界的边缘,并且穿过他,用语言的组成元素,疑分离的形式。

On the one hand there is vocal activity in its
most elementary form, even accompanied by a sort of feeling of disarray
linked in the subject to a certain sense of shame. On the other hand there is
a meaning that has the connotation of being a call for help, correlated at that
moment with his abandonment and, subsequently, with this something which
on our analysis ultimately appears much more hallucinatory than these language
phenomena that on the whole remain entirely mysterious. Furthermore,
he never calls them anything but internal speech.

在一方面,有声音的活动,以它的最基本的形式,甚至伴随着一种散乱的感觉,在主体身上,跟某种的羞愧感觉息息相关。在另一方面,有某种的意义拥有成为一位呼喊求救者的内涵,在那个时刻,跟他的放弃息息相关。随后,跟这个某件东西息息相关。当我们给予精神分析时,这个东西最后看起来比这些语言现象还更加是幻觉。大体来说,这些语言现象始终完全是神秘的。而且,他从来没有称它们是别的,实在就是内部的言说。

Schreber describes the peculiar trajectory of the rays that precede the
induction of the divine words – transformed into threads of which he has a
certain visual, or at least spatial, apprehension, they come towards him from
the horizon, spin around inside his head, and finally stab into him from behind.

苏瑞伯描述这些光线的特别的投射,在神祗的话语诱导之前。它们被转变成为他看得见的这些线索,或是至少是空间的理解。它们从地平线朝向他而来,在他的脑袋内部盘旋,最后从后面刺入他。

All this leads us to think that this phenomenon, which is a prelude to the
coming into play of the divine discourse as such, unfolds in what could be
called a trans-space linked to the structure of the signifier and of meaning, a
spatialization prior to any possible dualization of the phenomenon of language.

所有这一切引导我们认为,这个现象是神祗辞说本身的运作的序曲,它展开于所谓的跟能指与意义的结构相关的跨越空间。这一种空间化,早先于语言现象的任何可能的双重化。

What happens when this phenomenon ceases is different. Reality becomes
the support of other phenomena, those that are classically reduced to belief.
If the term hallucination must be attributed to a transformation of reality, this
is the only level at which we have the right to maintain it, if we are to preserve
any coherence for our language.

当这个现象停止时,所发生的事情就不相同。现实界变成其他现象的支持,古典上被还原成为信仰的那些现象。假如「幻觉」这个术语必须被归属于现实界的转变,这是唯一的层次,我们拥有权利去维持它,假如我们想要保持我们的语言的任何一贯性。

What indicates a hallucination is this unusual
sense the subject has at the border between the sense of reality and the sense
of unreality, a sense of proximate birth, of novelty – and not just of any
novelty but of novelty over its use breaking through into the external world.

所指示幻觉的东西是主体拥有的这个不寻常的意义,在现实界的意义跟非现实界的意义之间。靠近诞生的一种意义—不仅是任何的新奇,而是在突破进入外在世界的它的用途之上的新奇。

This is not of the same order as what appears with respect to meaning or
meaningfulness. It is a created reality, one that manifests itself well and truly
within reality as something new. Hallucination, as the invention of reality,
here constitutes the support for what the subject is experiencing.

这并不属于相同的秩序,跟出现的东西,关于意义或是具有意义。这是一种被创造的现实界,这个现实界清楚地证明它自己,在现实界之内,作为某件新的东西。幻觉,作为现实界的发明,在此组成主体所经验的东西的支持。

I think today I’ve got you to grasp the schema I have tried to present, with
all the problems it comprises.

今天,我认为我已经让你们理解我曾经尝试呈现的这个基模,用它所包含的所有的问题。

We are inquiring into the sense to give the term hallucination. In order to
be able to classify hallucinations in the appropriate way, it’s best to observe
them in the reciprocal contrasts, the complementary oppositions, that the
subject himself points out. As a matter of fact, these oppositions form part
of the one same subjective organization and, having been given by the subject,
they have greater value than if they were provided by the observer.
Moreover, one has to follow their progress over time.

我们正在探究这个意义,为了给予「幻觉」这个意义。我们最好观察它们,用主体自己所指出的彼此互惠的对比,互补的对立。事实上,这些对立形成这个相同的主体的组织的部分。因为那是由主体所给予,它们拥有更大的价值,比假如它们是由观察者所供应。而且,我们必须遵照它们随着时间过去的进展。

I have tried to give you an idea of how in Schreber there is something that
is always liable to surprise him, that never unveils itself, but is located in the
order of his relations with language, of these language phenomena that the
subject remains attached to by a very special compulsion and that constitute
the center in which the resolution of his delusion finally results.

我曾经尝试让你们理解在苏瑞伯,如何会有某件东西总是倾向于惊吓他。这个东西从来没有揭露它自己,但是位在跟他语言的关系的秩序,这些语言现象的秩序。主体始终被一个非常特别的推动力所连繫,这些语言现象组成这个中心,谵狂的解决最后会造成这个中心。

There is a subjective topology here based entirely upon the fact, given to
us by analysis, that there may be an unconscious signifier. We need to know
how this unconscious signifier is situated in psychosis. It appears to be external
to the subject, but it’s another exteriority than the one that is evoked
when hallucination and delusion are presented to us as a disturbance of reality,
since the subject remains attached to it through an erotic fixation. Here
we have to conceive of space speaking as such, so that the subject can’t do
without it without a dramatic transition in which hallucinatory phenomena
appear, that is, in which reality itself is presented as affected and also as
signifying.

在此,有一主体的拓扑图形,完全是以这个事实为依据,由精神分析给予我们。可能会有一个无意识的能指。我们需要知道无意识的能指如何被定位在精神病里。它似乎是外在于主体,但是这是另外一个外在性,除了被召唤的外在性,当幻觉与谵狂被呈现给予我们,作为现实界的一种扰乱,因为主体始终通过一种性爱的固著,跟它相连。在此,我们必须构想言说本身的空间,这样,每当主体免除不用它,就会发生一种戏剧性的转变。在这个转变里,幻觉的现象会出现。换句话说,在这里,现实界本身被呈现,作为是受到影响而且作为能指化。

This topographical notion tends in the same direction as the question already
raised about the difference between Verwerfung and Verdrdngung as to their
subjective localization. What I’ve tried to get you to understand today constitutes
a first approach to this opposition.
8 February 1956

这个拓扑图形的观念倾向于朝向相同的方向,因为这个问题已经被提出,关弃绝除权与潜抑之间的差别,关于它们的主体的位置。今天,我曾经尝试让你们了解的东西,形成一个最初的方法来探究这个对了。
1956年 2月8日

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

The Psychoses 52

September 11, 2012

The Psychoses 52
精神病

Jacques Lacan
亚克、拉康
X
On the signifier in the real and
the bellowing-miracle

实在界的能指与呐喊的奇迹

THE PEACE OF THE EVENING
夜晚的宁静

SUBJECTIVE TOPOLOGY
主体的拓扑图形

Let me sum this up. The sense is always moving towards something, towards
another meaning, towards the closure of meaning. It always refers to something
that is out ahead or that turns back upon itself, but there is a direction.
Does this mean that we have no endpoint? I’m sure that this point still remains
uncertain in your mind given the insistence with which I state that meaning
always refers to meaning. You are wondering whether the aim of discourse,
which is not simply to cover over or even conceal the world of things, but to
find a foothold there from time to time, would not in the end be an irremediable
failure.

让我总结一下。这个意义总朝向某件东西移动,朝向另外一个意义,朝向意义的封闭。它总是提到某将超前或回向它自己的东西。但是有一个方向。这难道意味着,我们没有终点?我确定,这个终点在你的心里依旧始终未确定,假如考虑到这个坚持。我坚持陈述,意义总是提到意义。你们会想要知道,辞说的这个目标,它不仅是要涵盖或是隐藏事情的世界,而且是要有时找到一个立足之地。它最后将不会是一个无可救药的的失败。

Now, in no way can we consider that the fundamental endpoint is to point
to a thing. There is an absolute non-equivalence between discourse and
pointing. Whatever you take the ultimate element of discourse to be reduced
to, you will never be able to replace it with your index finger – recall the
quite correct remark by Saint Augustine.

现在,我们根本无法认为,基本的终点是要指向一件东西。在辞说与指向之间,有一个绝对的不相等。无论你将辞说的最后的元素能够被还原成为什么,你将永远无法用你的食指指向替代它。请你们回忆一下圣奥古斯丁的正确谈论。

If I designate something by pointing
to it, no one will ever know whether my finger is designating the object’s
color or its matter, or whether it’s designating a stain or a crack, etc. You
need words, discourse, to discern this. Discourse has an original property in
comparison with pointing. But that’s not where we shall find the fundamental
reference of discourse. Are we looking for where it stops? Well then, it’s
always at the level of this problematical term called being.

假如我指明某件东西,凭借指向它,没有人将会知道,它是指明一个污点或是一个罅隙,等等。你们需要文字,辞说,来辨别这个。辞说拥一个原创的特性,跟指向比较起来。但是那并不是我们将会找到这个辞说的基本指称。我们正在寻找它停顿的地方吗?呵呵,那总是在所谓的生命实存的这个问题的术语的层次。

I don’t want to give an overly philosophical discourse here but want to
show you for example what I mean when I tell you that discourse is essentially
directed at something for which we have no other term than being.
I ask you, then, to think about this for a moment. You are at the close of
a stormy and tiring day, you regard the darkness that is beginning to fall
upon your surroundings, and something comes to mind, embodied in the
expression, the peace of the evening.

我在此并不想要给予一个过分的哲学的辞说,而是想要跟你们显示,譬如,我是什么意思,当我告诉你们那个辞说基本上是引导朝向某件东西,我们没有别的术语,除了就是生命实存。我因此要求你们思考一下关于这个。你们经历暴风雨而且令人疲倦的一天,你们认为正在开始降临在哪吗四周的黑暗,你们想到某件东西,具体被表达为:夜晚的宁静。

I don’t think anybody who has a normal affective life is unaware that this
is something that exists and has a completely different value from the phenomenal
apprehension of the close of the clamor of the day, of an attenuation
of contours and passions. There is in the peace of the evening both a presence
and a choice from everything that surrounds you.

我不认为任何有过正常的情感的生活的人,会不知道,这是某件存在的东西,它具由完全不同的价值,跟对于这天的喧哗的结束,及对于轮廓与激情的减弱的巨大焦虑。在这「夜晚的宁静」里,有一种存在及选择,从环绕你们的一切东西。

What link is there between the expression the peace of the evening and what
you experience? It’s not absurd to ask oneself whether beings who didn’t give
this peace of the evening a distinct existence, who didn’t formulate it verbally,
could distinguish it from any of the other registers under which temporal
reality may be apprehended.

在「宁静的夜晚」这个表达,跟你所经验的东西之间,这个关联是什么?这并非是荒谬,询问你们自己,没有给予夜晚的宁静一个清楚的存在的人们,是否能够区别它,跟任何其它的铭记?因为他们并没有以文辞来说明它,而在这些铭记里,时间的现实性可能会被理解。

This might be a panic feeling, for example, over the presence of the world, an agitation that you observe at that moment in the behavior of your cat which appears to be searching left and right for the presence of a ghost, or this anxiety which, although unknown to us, we attribute to primitive peoples over the setting of the sun, when we think they are perhaps afraid that the sun will not return – which, moreover, isn’t
unthinkable. In short, a feeling of disquiet, of a quest.

譬如,可能会有惊慌的感觉,对于世界的这个存在,一种你们在当时观察到的骚动,在你们猫的行为上。虽然我们并不知道它,我们归属于原始的民族,对于太阳的掉落,当我们认为他们或许害怕,太阳将不会回来。而且,这并非是不可思议的。总之,一直不安的感觉,一种追寻的感觉。

There’s something
here – isn’t there? – that leaves intact the question of what the relationship
is between this order of being, which has its existence equivalent to all sorts
of other existences in our lived experience, and which is called the peace of
the evening, and its verbal expression.

在此,有某件东西,不是吗?这个东西让这个关系是什么的问题,保持完整。在生命实存的这个秩序,与它的文辞的表达之间的关系。生命实存拥有它的存在,相等于是各种的其他的存在,在我们生活过的经验里,并且被称为是「夜晚的宁静」。

We can now observe that something quite different happens according to
whether we, who have called up this peace of the evening ourselves, have
formulated this expression before uttering it, or whether it takes us by surprise
or interrupts us, calming the movement of agitation that dwelled within
us.

我们现在能够观察,某件完全不同的东西发生,依照我们是否已经说明这个表达,在表达它之前,因为我们自己曾经召唤这个夜晚的宁静,或是它是否会让我们大吃一惊或是中断我们,停驻于我们内部的骚动平静下来。

It’s precisely when we are not listening for it, when it’s outside our field
and suddenly hits us from behind, that it assumes its full value, surprised as
we are by this more or less endophasic, more or less inspired, expression that
comes to us like a murmur from without, a manifestation of discourse insofar
as it barely belongs to us, which comes as an echo of what it is that is all of a
sudden significant for us in this presence, an utterance such that we don’t
know whether it comes from without or from within – the peace of the evening.

这确实是当我们并没有在倾听它时,当它在我们的领域之外,突然地,它从背后袭击我们,它具有它的全部价值,因为我们被这个内部成长,受到启发的的表达所惊吓。这个表达来到我们身上,就像是从外面而来的喃喃细语,辞说的一种展示,因为它勉强地属于我们。它前来,作为对我们而言,在这个存在里,它突然地变得重要的一种迴响。「夜晚的宁静」,这样一种表达,我们不知道它来自外在,还是来自内在。

Without going to the heart of the issue of the relationship between the
signifier, qua signifier of language, and something that without it would never
be named, it’s noticeable that the less we express it, the less we speak, the
more it speaks to us.

这并没有到达这个关系的问题的核心,处于这个能指,作为语言的能指,与某件东西之间的关系。假如没有这个能指,这个东西将不会被命名。应该受到注意的是:我们越是表达它,我们言说得越少,它跟我们言说得越多。

The more foreign we are to what is at issue in this being, the more it has a tendency to present itself to us, accompanied by this pacifying expression that presents itself as indeterminate, lying on the border between the field of our motor autonomy and this something that is said to us from outside, this something through which the world borders on speaking to us.

我们对于这个生命实存受到争议的东西越是陌生,它越是有这个倾向呈现它自己给我们,伴随着这个令人平静的表达。这个表达呈现它自己,作为是不确定,位于这个边界,处于我们动力的自主权的领域,与这个某件东西之间的边界。这个东西从外面跟我们言说,通过这个东西,这个世界濒临跟我们言说。

What does this being, or not, of language, this the peace of the evening,
mean? To the extent that we’re not expecting it, or wishing for it, or haven’t
even thought about it for a long time, it’ s essentially as a signifier that it
presents itself to us. No experimentalist construction can justify its existence,
there is a datum here, a certain way to take this time of the evening as a
signifier, and we can be open to it or closed to it.

语言的这个生命实存,夜晚的这个宁静,是什么意思?我们甚至没有正在期望它,或希望获得它,或甚至长久都没有思想到它。它基本上是作为一个能指,它呈现它自己在我们面前。再多的试验性建构,都无法证明它存在的理由。在此,有一个资料,某种方式来接纳夜晚的这个时间,作为一个能指。我们能够对它开放,或是对它封闭。

And it’s precisely insofar as
we have been closed to it that we receive it through this peculiar echo phenomenon,
or at least the start of it, which consists in the appearance, at the
limit of the phenomenon’s grip on us of what will most commonly be expressed
for us by these words, the peace of the evening. We have now come to the limit
at which discourse* if it opens onto anything beyond meaning, opens onto
the signifier in the real. We shall never know, in the perfect ambiguity in
which it dwells, what it owes to this marriage with discourse.

确实是因为我们对它曾经是封闭,我们接受它,是通过这个特别的迴响的现象。或是至少是它的这个开始,它在于这个现象对于我们的掌握的限制,对于我们而言,「夜晚的宁静」这些字词共同表达的东西。我们现在来的这个限制,在这个限制,辞说展开进入实在界的这个能指,假如它展开进入任何超越意义的东西。我们将永远不会知道,在它驻居的这个完美的模糊暧昧里,它所归功于跟辞说结合的东西。

You can see how the more this signifier takes us by surprise, that is, in
principle escapes us, the more it’s already presented to us with a more or less
appropriate fringe of discourse phenomena. Well then, the issue for us – this
is the working hypothesis I propose – is to look for what there is at the center
of President Schreber’s experience, what he senses without knowing it at the
edge of the field of his experience, at the fringe, carried away as he is in the
froth created by this signifier he fails to perceive as one but which, at its
limit, organizes all these phenomena.

你们能够看出,这个能指越是惊吓我们,换句话说,原则上,我们越是无法理解,它越是已经被呈现给我们,带着辞说现象的合宜的边际。这是怎么一回事?呵呵,对于我们而言,这个问题是—这是我建议的行得通的假设—这个问题是要在苏瑞伯庭长的经验的中心,寻找具有的本质,在这个边际,当他陶醉于这个能指所创造的幻影。他无法感觉这个能指,作为是一个,但是这一个能指组织所有的这些现象,在它的限制。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

The Psychoses 51

September 11, 2012

The Psychoses 51
精神病

Jacques Lacan
亚克、拉康
X
On the signifier in the real and
the bellowing-miracle

实在界的能指与呐喊的奇迹

THE PEACE OF THE EVENING
夜晚的宁静

SUBJECTIVE TOPOLOGY
主体的拓扑图形

2
Schreber’s discourse has a different structure, to be sure. Schreber notes at
the beginning of one of his chapters, very amusingly – They say I’m paranoid.
As it happens, people at that time were still sufficienlly bound to Kraepelin’s
first classification to describe him as paranoid, whereas his symptoms went
much further than this. But in calling him paraphrenic Freud went further
still, since paraphrenia was the name he suggested for dementia praecox, Bleuer’s
schizophrenia.2

苏瑞伯的辞说有一个不同的结构。的确,在他的其中一个章节的开始,苏瑞伯注意到,耐人寻味地:「他们说,我是妄想症。」偶然地,当时的人们的观念仍然脱离不了科拉培林的最早分类,将他描述为妄想症,而他的病症则是比妄想症更加深入。但是当弗洛伊德称他为妄想分裂症则是比较深入。因为妄想分裂症是他建议的名字,作为精神分裂症,布鲁尔的精神分裂症。

Coming back to Schreber, They say,I’m paranoid, and they say that paranoiacs
are people who refer everything to themselves. In this case they’re mistaken,
it‘s not I who refer everything to myself, it’s he who refers everything to me, It’s
this God who speaks nonstop inside me, through his various agents and extensions.
It’s he who has the unfortunate habit, whatever I experience, of immediately pointing
out to me that something is meant for me, or even that something comes from
me. I can’t play an aria from The Magic Flute – Schreber is a musician –
without having him who speaks immediately attribute the corresponding feelings to
me, but I don’t have them myself.3 You can also see President Schreber become
highly indignant at the fact that the voice should intervene to tell him that
what he is in the process of saying concerns him.

回到苏瑞伯。「他们说,我是妄想症。他们说妄想症患者是什么都提到他们自己的人们。在这个情况,他们是错误的,并不是我,每件事情都提到我自己,而是他,每件事情都提到我,而是这位上帝不断地在我的内部谈话,通过他的各种代理者及延伸物。上帝他拥有这个不幸的习惯,不管我经验到什么,他习惯于马上跟我指出,某件事情都是为了我而设,或甚至某件事情都来自于我。我每次根据莫扎特的「魔笛」,演奏一段独唱,(苏瑞伯是一位音乐家),我就让言说的上帝立刻归属这些对应的感觉给我,但是我自己没有拥有它们。你们也能够看见,苏瑞伯庭长变得非常生气,针对这个事实:声音应该介入告诉他,在言说的过程的他的本质,跟他息息相关。

Of course, we are in a play
of mirages, but this is no ordinary mirage, this Other considered as radically
foreign, as errant, who intervenes so as to cause a convergence to the second
degree upon the subject, an intentionalization of the external world, which
the subject himself, insofar as he asserts himself as / , vigorously repels. Freud mentions Schreber’s paraphrenic traits, but retains the diagnosis of paranoia.

当然,我们处于各种幻想的演示,但是这并不是普通的幻想。这个大他者被认为是完全是外来的,作为迷失者,他介入是为了在主体身上引起一种汇集到第二层次,对于外在世界的一种刻意内化。主体本身,因为他主张他自己作为「我」,强烈地排斥这个外在世界。

We talk about hallucinations. Do we absolutely have the right to do so?
They are not presented to us as such when we hear them recounted. According
to the commonly received notion, which treats them as a false perception,
we’re dealing with something that emerges in the external world and forces
itself on one as a perception, a disorder, a rupture in the text of the real. In
other words, the hallucination is located in the real. The prior question is
whether a verbal hallucination doesn’t require a certain preliminary analysis
that questions the very legitimacy of this definition.

我们谈论到各种幻觉。我们绝对拥有权利这样做吗?他们并没有被呈现给予我们这个样子,当我们听到它们被描述。依照这个共同被接受的观念,这个观念对待他们当著是一种虚假的观念。我们正在处理某件出现在外在世界的东西,并且强迫它自己在一个人身上,作为一种感觉,一种疾病,实在界的文本的一种断裂。换句话说,幻觉的位置是在实在界。这个首要的问题是,文辞的幻觉是否并不要求某种初级的分析,这个初级的分析质疑这个定义的合理性。

Here I have to take the same path I’ve already somewhat bored you with,
by reminding you of the very foundations of the order of discourse and by
rejecting its status as superstructure, its relationship of pure and simple reference
to reality, its having the character of signs, and the equivalence that
is supposed to exist between naming and the world of objects. Let’s try to reexamine
the question from an angle that is a bit closer to experience.

在此,我必须採取我已经让你们不胜其烦的相同的途径,凭借提醒你们辞说的秩序的这个基础,并且凭借拒绝它的地位,作为超级结构,它跟纯粹而单纯的提到现实界的关系,它拥有符号的特性,被认为是存在于命名与各种客体之间的相等。让我们尝试重新检查这个问题,从稍微靠近精神分析经验的角度。

Nothing is as ambiguous as verbal hallucination. The classical analyses
already give us some indication, at least for a portion of the cases, of the
subject’s role in their creation. This is what has been called the psychomotor
verbal hallucination, and the observed adumbrations of utterances have been
gleefully recorded because they offer the hope of a satisfactory rational explanation
of the phenomenon of hallucination. If this problem warrants investigation,
the starting point is the relationship between the mouth and the ear.

没有一样东西像文辞的幻觉那样模糊暧昧。古典的精神分析已经给于我们某个指示,至少对于这些个案的一部分,主体在创造它们时的指示。这就是一直被称为是心理动力的文辞的幻觉,各种表达被观察到的朦胧描绘曾经被愉快地被记录,因为它们提供令人满意的理性解释的希望,对于幻觉的这个现象。假如这个难题保证调查,开始点上嘴巴跟耳朵之间的关系。

This doesn’t only exist between subjects, but also exists for each subject himself,
who when he speaks hears himself. Having got this far, one thinks that
one has already taken a step forward and gained insight into a whole lot of
things. In fact, though, the remarkable sterility of the analysis of the problem
of verbal hallucination is due to the inadequacy of this observation. That the
subject hears what he says is precisely the point at which it’s appropriate not
to stop but to return to the experience of what is going on when he hears
someone else.

这不仅是存在于主体之间,而且存在为了每位主体本身,当他言说时,他听到他自己。当我们已经探究到这里,我们认为我们已经採取向前的一步,然后获得洞见,看到整个事情。虽然事实上,文辞幻觉的难题的精神分析的显著的贫瘠,是由于这个观察到不够充分。主体听到他所说的这个事实,确实就是这个点,我们最好不要停下,而要回到当他听到某个其他的人,所发生的事情的经验。

What happens if you pay attention solely to the saying of what you hear,
to the accent, or even to the regional expressions, to whatever is literal, in
registering your interlocutor’s discourse? You have to bring a little imagination
to this, since it can perhaps never be carried out entirely, but it’s very
clear when a foreign language is involved – what you understand in a discourse
is different from what is registered acoustically.

假如你仅是注意你所听到的这种说法,这种强调,或甚至这个局部的表达,任何实质的东西,当你铭记你的对话者的辞说,这会发生什么事情?你必须带给这个稍微的想象,因为它或许永远没有办法完整地被实践。但是这是显而易见,当一种外来语言被介绍,你在辞说所了解的东西,会迴异于语音所被铭记的东西。

It’s even simpler if
we think of deaf-mutes, who are able to receive a discourse through visual
signs given by means of the fingers, according to the deaf-mute alphabet. If
a deaf-mute is fascinated by the pretty hands of his interlocutor, he will fail
to register the discourse the hands convey. I would add this – can it be said
that properly speaking he sees what he registers, namely the sequence of
signs, their opposition without which there is no sequence?

假如我们想到聋子跟哑巴,那甚至更加单纯。他们能够通过凭借手指给于视觉符号,接收一种辞说,依照聋哑患专用的字母。假如一位聋哑患者被他的对话者的漂亮的手著迷,他将没有办法铭记双手传递的辞说。我再补充一下—适当来说,我们能够说,他看到他所铭记的东西吗?换句话说,符号的顺序,它们的对立,假如每有这些,顺序就不存在?

Even so, we can’t stop there. As it happens, a deaf-mute, even as he reg On the signifier in the real and the bellowing-miracle 137
isters the sequence put to him, may well understand nothing if addressed in
a language he doesn’t know. Like someone who hears a discourse in a foreign
language, he will have seen the said sentence perfectly well, but it will be a
dead sentence. The sentence becomes alive only when it conveys a meaning.

即使是这样,我们无法停止在那里。偶然地,一位聋哑患者,甚至当他体认出他被传递的这个顺序,他很有可能什么都不了解,假如针对他而讲的是一种他不知道的语言。就像某个人听到一种外国语言的辞说,他将已经相当清楚地看到这个被说的句子,但是那是一个没有意义的句子。只有当这个句子传递意义时,它才具有意义。

What does this mean? Even if we are quite convinced that the meaning
always relates to something, that it has value only to the extent that it refers
to another meaning, it’s clear that the life of a sentence is very deeply bound
up with the fact that the subject is listening in, that he intends this meaning
for himself. What makes the sentence as understood different from the sentence
as not understood, which doesn’t prevent it from being heard, is precisely
what the phenomenology of delusion highlights so well, namely the
anticipation of meaning.

这是什么意思? 即使我们深信:这个意义总是跟某件事情有关系。它仅有提到另外一个意义时,它才具有价值。显而易见地,一个句子的生命,跟这个事实息息相关:主体正在倾听,他说这个句子是为了他自己。让这个句子能够被了解的东西,不同于没有被了解的这个句子。这并没有阻碍它没有被听见。这确实是谵狂的现象学如此强调的东西,换句话说,对于意义的预期。

It’s of the nature of meaning, insofar as it takes shape, continually to tend
to close itself off for the listener. In other words the contribution of the listener
of the discourse to the listener who is uttering it is constant and there
is a link between listening and speaking which isn’t external, in the sense in
which one hears oneself speak, but which is located at the level of the language
phenomenon itself. It’s at the level at which the signifier conveys
meaning, and not at the sensory level of the phenomenon, that listening and
speaking are like front and back. To listen to words, to give them one’s.
hearing, is already more or less to obey them. To obey is nothing else, it’s to
be on the look-out, in listening.

这是属于意义的特性,因为它成形,继续倾向于封闭它自己,对于听话者。换句话说,辞说的听话者对于表达它者的贡献,是不断的。在倾听与言说之间,存在着一种并非是外在的关联。它的意义是,我们听到自己在言说,但是这个意义位置在语言现象本身的层次。就在这个层次,这个能指传递意义,而不是这个现象的感官层次。倾听与言说就像是一体两面。倾听文字,给予它们为民的倾听,那已经是相当服从它们。服从并不是别的,那就是在倾听时,专注注意。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com