超越现实原则 04

超越现实原则 04
Beyond the Reality Principle

雅克、拉康
Jacques Lacan

Discussion of the Objective Value of the Experience

精神分析经验的客观价值的讨论

Such is the phenomenological description that can be given of what happens
in the series of experiences that form a psychoanalysis. Some might say that
it is the work of an illusionist were the result not precisely to dispel an illusion.
Its therapeutic action, on the contrary, must be essentially defined as a
twofold movement through which the image, which is at first diffuse and broken,
is progressively assimilated with reality, in order to be progressively dissimilated
from reality, that is, restored to its proper reality. This action attests
to the efficacy of this reality.

组成精神分析的这一连串的经验里,能够被给予的现象的的描述是如此强烈。
有人甚至说,那是一位幻术师的工作,假如结果并不是要驱散一个幻术。
相反地,它的治疗的行动,基本上必须被定义为一种双重性运动。
通过这个双重性运动,这个形象,起初是充裕而破碎,现在逐渐被现实吸收。
为了逐渐从现实吸收,换句话说,为了逐渐被恢复到它的适当的现实。
这个行动证实这个现实的有效性。

雄伯说

双重性运动:一、从现实吸收 二、被现实吸收
分析家是幻术师illuionist吗?
分析者叙述的是幻术illusion吗?
现实的有效性efficacy of reality,意味着快乐原则势必屈服于它吗?
分析家的立场,是要引出分析者的快乐原则?还是驱散幻术,引导他回到现实原则?

But if it is not an illusory kind of work, then it must be a simple technique,
some will say, and as an experience it is highly unsuitable for scientific observation
since it is based on conditions that are diametrically opposed to objectivity.
For have I not just described this experience as a constant interaction
between the observer and the object? It is, in effect, in the very movement that
the subject gives it through his intention that the observer is informed of this
intention—I have even stressed the primordial nature of this pathway.
Inversely, through the assimilation that it fosters between himself and the
image, it subverts from the outset the function of this image in the subject.

但是假如它并不是一种幻术的工作,那么它一定是一种简单的技术。
有些人说,作为精神分析经验,它非常不适合于科学的观察。
因为它是以这些条件作为基础。
这些条件跟客观性恰恰对立。
我难道不是曾经描述这个精神分析经验,作为是一种不断地互动,处于观察者与客体之间?
实际上,就在这个主体给予它这个运动,通过这个意图,观察者被告知这个意图。
我甚至强调这个途径的这个原初的特性。
相反地,通过它培养的这个吸收,处于他自己与这个形象之间,它从一开头,就颠覆在主体身上,这个形象的功能。

雄伯

精神分析是幻术?还是技术?它适合于作为科学的观察吗?它具有客观性吗?
拉康描述精神分析经验,作为是处于观察者与客体之间的一种不断地互动。问题是这个客体其实也是主体。
这个意图是分析者作为主体的意图。
也就是分析家的主体跟分析者的主体在不断地互动a constant interaction。而不仅是两个客体,或是主体对客体的互动。
他们的不断互动是四元互动,而不是二元互动。这就是精神分析的原初特性。
什么是主体培养的在他自己跟形象之间的吸收?
是主体被吸收到他培养的形象里,而成为理想的自我ideal ego?
形象在主体身上的功能,原先是主体对自己的认同,被颠覆之后,变成主体对形象的认同?

Of course, he only identifies the image in the very progress of this subversion—
I have not tried to dissimulate the constitutive nature of this process.

The absence of a fixed reference in the system that is observed and the use,
for the purposes of observation, of the very subjective movement that is
eliminated everywhere else as a source of error, are challenges, it seems, to a
sound method.

雄伯译

当然,在这个颠覆的这个进展中,他仅是认同这个形象。

我并没有尝试要将这个过程的构成的特性区别出来。
在被观察到这个系统,固定指称的欠缺。
为了观察的这些目的,主观性的运动的使用,在别的地方被减少,作为是一种错误的来源。
似乎,固定指称的这个欠缺,跟主观性运动的使用,对于一种健全的方法,会成为挑战。

雄伯说

如果精神分析要成为一门科学的技术,它不能太过于使用主体性,其次它需要固定的指称。
这正是精神分析的挑战,用现代流行语来说,就是它的硬伤。

Let me also indicate the challenge to proper usage that can be seen here. In
the very case study [observation] that he provides us, can the observer hide his
personal stake in the game? The intuitions of his finds are elsewhere referred
to as delusions and we find it hard to discern from what experiences the insistence
of his perspicacity proceeds.

雄伯译

让我也指示出这个挑战,对于在此能够被看见的适当的用途。
在他提供给与我们的这个个案研究,观察者能够隐藏他个人对于遊戏的赌注吗?
他的发现物的这些直觉,在别的地方被提到,作为谵妄。
我们发现很难辨识,他的洞察的这个坚持,从什么经验继续而来?

雄伯说
这个遊戏指的是分析家与分析者的不断互动的遊戏。
观察者指的是分析家,还是分析者?他们各自隐藏个人的什么赌注?
观察者的发现物的直觉,为什么会被认为是谵妄?
观察者对于自己的洞察力,为什么那么坚持?从什么经验继续而来?

No doubt, the pathways by which truth is discovered are unsoundable, and there have even been mathematicians who have admitted to having seen the truth in dreams or having stumbled upon it
by accident. Nevertheless, propriety requires one to present one *s discovery as having proceeded from a process that conforms more closely to the purity of the idea. Science, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion.

雄伯译

无可置疑,凭借的这些途径,所被发现的真理是奥秘难测。
甚至曾经有数学家曾经承认,在各种梦里看见过这个真理。或是曾经偶然地碰触到这个真理。
可是,是否可信则是要求说者提供他的发现,作为是从一个过程继续而来。
这种过程更加靠近于这个观念的纯净。
科学,就像是凯撒的妻子,是不容质疑的。

雄伯
古代罗马,凯撒跟妻子离异,因为妻子的错误行径若是受到怀疑,凯撒自己本人也难摆脱怀疑。 拉康以此引证,科学的论据必须清楚。

然而,精神分析发现的真理,若是使用主观性及无法提出固定指称,会被认为是奥秘难测。
精神分析发现的真理能否自圆其说,作为一门科学的技术,势必要追究它的来源过程,是否观念纯净。

In any case, the scientist’s good reputation has been assured for quite some
time now. Nature can no longer reveal itself in any sort of human form and every
step forward in science has effaced from nature an anthropomorphic trait.
While I think I can speak ironically about what these objections betray by way
of emotional resistance, I do not think I can dispense with responding to their
ideological import. Without going too far afield on epistemological questions,
I will posit first that physical science, as purified as it may seem in its modern
progress from any intuitive category, nevertheless betrays, indeed all the more
strikingly, the structure of the intelligence that constructed it.

雄伯译

无论如何,科学家的良好名声现在已经被确认有相当一段长时间。
「自然」不再需要显示它自己,以任何种类的人类的形式。
在科学方面,前进的每个步骤已经从「自然」抹除一种人类形态的特征。
虽然我认为我能够反讽地谈论到,关于这些反对透露出什么,凭借情感的抗拒。
我不认为我能够免除不用回应他的们意识形态的意义。
我不想离题讨论认识论的问题。
我首先想要提出生理科学,虽然它似乎很纯净化,在它的现代的进展,避免任何直觉得范畴,可是它透露出建构它的智慧的结构,更加生动地。

雄伯说

拉康认为精神分析学应该是一种人类学,因为它所研究及关怀的是人类。
但是当时研究心理学的科学家,却是将人类的「自然」的天性,当著是生理或物理physical science科学的客体在研究。属于人类形态的特征逐渐被抹除。
拉康对于这些心理学的科学家的各种违背人类自然天性的研究,虽然带有情感的抗拒,及反讽, 但是对于他们在意识形态的意义,认为还是有需要回应。
更远的话,还需要回应认识论对于知识intellect的背离人类的自然天性。
当时的心理学,或物理科学避免不谈论任何直觉的范畴intuition category,可是建构它的智慧的结构却更加生动地透露出,直觉的范畴的重要性。
拉康认为精神分析强调直觉的重要性。

If someone like Meyerson could show that physical science is subjected in all its processes to
the form of intellectual identification (a form that is so constitutive of human knowledge that he finds it anew through reflection in ordinary thought processes), and if the phenomenon of light (to provide here the standard of reference and the atom of action) manifests a relationship to the human sensorium
that is more obscure here, don’t these points—ideal points by which physics is related to man, but which are the poles around which physics revolves—demonstrate the most unsettling homologies to the pivotal roles assigned to human knowledge, as I mentioned earlier, by a tradition of reflection
that does not resort to experimentation?

雄伯译

假如某个人,像迈耶松那样,能够显示,物理科学在它的各种过程,都隶属于知识认同的形式,(这一种形式是如此形成人类的知识,以致他重新发现它,通过在普通的思想的过程的反思),
假如光的现象(在此提供指称的标准及行动的原子),证明一种跟人类感官的关系,这种感官在此是比较模糊。
这些要点难道不是证明最不稳定的类同物,类同于指定给人类知识的枢纽的角色?
根据这些理想要点,物理学跟人类息息相关。
这些理想要点是物理学环绕旋转的枢纽。
如同我早先所提到的,这些枢纽的角色被指定给人类的知识,根据沉思的传统。
这个沉思的传统并不诉诸于试验。

雄伯说

知识性的认同 intellectual identification
普通思想的过程的反思 reflection in ordinary thought processes
人类的感官human sensorium
人类的知识human knowledge
沉思的传统 tradition of reflection
试验 experimentation

拉康说明,物理科学的客观的试验,源自于人类沉思的传统。人类的知识或智识knowledge or intellect,跟人类的感官及思想的反思息息相关。

Be that as it may, the anthropomorphism that has been eliminated by
physics in the notion of force, for example, is an anthropomorphism that is not
noetic but psychological, for it is essentially the projection of human intention.
To require a similar elimination in an anthropology that is in the process of
being born and to impose such an elimination upon its most distant goals, would
be to misrecognize its object and to authentically manifest an anthropocentrism
of another order, that of knowledge.

雄伯译

但是尽管如此,在物理力学的观念,人类形态的拟人说已经被减少。
譬如,这种人类形态的拟人说并不是noitic 精神的,而是心理的psychological。
因为这种人类形态的拟人说基本上是人类意图的投射。
假如我们要求类似地减少,在正在被诞生的过程的人类学,假如我们将这样的减少赋加在它最遥远的目标,我们将会误为它的客体,并且会真诚地展示属于另外一个秩序,知识的秩序的人类中心论。

雄伯说

人类形态的拟人说是精神的noetic,跟是心理的psychological,有什么差别?
若是心理的拟人说,基本上是人类意图的的投射,那精神的拟人说是什么?
假如精神分析作为人类学,也像物理力学那样,减少人类形态的拟人说,纯粹客体化,那会形成另一种秩序的人类中心论。
为什么?
以人为万物之衡量的中心,而没有探究到人类的知识的本身的来源。

就像周处除三害,却没有考虑到,其中有一害是自己。牧童骑在牛背上数牛,往往少数自己骑的这一隻。

Indeed, man has relations with nature that are specified, on the one hand,
by the properties of identificatory thought, and on the other hand, by the use
of instruments or artificial tools. His relations with his semblable proceed along
pathways that are far more direct: I am not designating language here, or the
elementary social institutions that are marked with artificiality in their structure,
regardless of their genesis.

雄伯译

的确,一方面,人类跟自然有许多明确的关系,由于思想具有认同的各种特性。
另一方面,由于各种工具,或人造的的各种工具的使用。

人类跟他的类似物的关系,沿着更加直接的途径前进。

我在此并不是正在指明是语言,或是初级的社会机构,它们在它们的结构上被标明为人造的,尽管它们的起源。

雄伯说

人类跟自然的关系。思想具有认同的各identificatory种特性。
人类跟他的类似物的关系。语言,或是初级的社会结构,已经是人造的,并非是自然。
那人类的类似物semblable 是什么呢?

I am thinking, rather, of emotional communication, which is essential to social groups and manifests itself immediately enough in the fact that man exploits his semblable, recognizes himself in this
semblable, and is attached to this semblable by the indelible psychical link that
perpetuates the truly specific vital misery of his first years of life.

代替的,我正在想到情感的沟通。这个情感的沟通对于社会的各种团体是很重要的,而且足够迅速地展示它自己,根据这个事实:人类利用他的类似物,在这个类似物体认出他自己,并且跟这个类似物连接一块,根据这个无法抹除的心理连接。这种无法抹除的心理连接,延续他的生命的最初几年的这个确实是生命力的悲惨。

雄伯说

拉康认为情感沟通才是人类的类似物。
这种类似物使人类情感更加直接地进展,而且这个类似物,还不是语言,或是初级的社会结构。
人类从这个类似物,也就是情感沟通,体认出他自己,并且跟这个类似物连接成一块。
生命的最初几年,应该是指婴儿及幼儿阶段,这一阶段会有确实明确的生命力的悲惨the truly specific vital misery。
为什么?
这个确实明确的生命力的悲惨会造成无法抹除的心理连接。
这种心理连接,就是情感沟通的类似物。人从这个类似物体认出recognize他自己。

These relations can be contrasted with the relations that constitute knowledge,
in the narrow sense of the term, as relations of connaturality: I mean to
evoke with this term their homology to more immediate, global, and adapted
forms that characterize, on the whole, animals’ psychical relations with their
natural environment and by which such psychical relations are distinguished
from psychical relations in man. I shall return to the value of the teachings of
animal psychology. In any case, man’s idea of a world that is united to him
through a harmonious relationship allows us to divine its basis in the anthropomorphism
of the myth of nature. As the effort is achieved that animates this
idea, the reality of this basis is revealed in the ever vaster subversion of nature
implied by the hominiiation of the planet: the “nature” of man is its relationship
to man.

雄伯译

这些关系能够跟构成知识的关系作对照,根据「天然性关系」这个术语的狭义定义。
我打算用这个术语,召唤出它们的同质性,跟更加当下,地球化,被适应的形式。
这些形式大体上表现动物跟它们的自然环境的心理关系。
凭借这些形式,这些心理的关系被区别出来,跟人身上的心理关系区别出来。
我将回头谈论动物心理学的那些教导的价值。
无论如何,人对于世界的观念跟他结合在一块,凭借着一种和谐的关系。
人的这个世界的观念让我们能够猜测这个世界的基础,在于神话对于自然的拟人化。
当激发这种观念的这个努力被完成时,这个基础的现实界被显示出来,由于自然越来越广大的颠覆,由于地球这个行星的人为化:人的「自然」就是地球行星跟人的关系。

雄伯说
情感沟通的这些关系,跟构成知识的关系,作个对照。
前者被称为是天然性的关系relations of connaturality。
动物跟它们的自然环境的心理关系,跟人身上的心理关系不同。
前者较为当下,后者则是将地球行星拟人化。

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