Identification 04

Seminar IX :Identification 04
第九研讨班 :认同

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

15.11.61 I 2
Seminar 1: Wednesday 15 November 1961

If we hold onto it for a moment, and try to polish up its sign function, if we try to reanimate its function for our purposes, I would like to remark the following: the fact is that this formula, which I repeat is only found in its concentrated form in Descartes at certain points of the Discours de la Methode, it is not at all in this way in this dense form that it is expressed.

假如我们坚持它一阵子,并且尝试修饰它的符号象征功用,假如我们尝试重新激发它的功用,作为我们的目标,我想要做以下评论:事实上,我重复的这个公式,仅有在笛卡尔的「真理论述方法论」的某些要点,以精炼的形态被找到。它被表达时,根本不是以这种精炼的形态的方式。

This “I think therefore I am”, encounters this objection – and I believe that it has never been made – which is that “I think” is not a thought. Descartes, of course, proposes
these formulae at the end of a long process of thinking, and it is quite certain that the thinking involved is the thinking of a thinker. I would go even further: this characteristic, it is a thinking of a thinker, is not required for us to talk about thought. A thought, in a word, in no way requires that one thinks about the thought.

这个「我思故我在」遭遇这个反对—我相信这个反对从来没有表达过—那就是「我思」并不是一个思想。当然,笛卡尔建议这些公式,是在一段漫长的思维的过程之后。这是千真万确的,被牵涉到的思想,是一位思想家的思想。我甚至更深入探讨:这个特性,它是一位思想家的思想,我们并没有被要求具有这个特性,才来谈论有关思想。总之,思想根本就没有要求:我们思维这个思想。

For us in particular, thinking begins with the unconscious. One cannot but be astonished at the timidity which makes us have recourse to the formula of psychologists when we are trying to say something about thinking, the formula of saying that it is an action at the state of being outlined, at a reduced state, the
small economic model of action.

特别对于我们,思想开始于无意识。我们忍不住地大为惊奇,对于让我们诉诸于心理学家的这种胆小,当我们正在尝试说关于思想的某件东西,我们诉诸于这个公式说:这是一个处于被描绘轮廓状态的行动,处于被化简的状态,行动的小精简规模。

You will tell me that you can find that somewhere in Freud, but of course, one can find(13) everything in Freud: in some paragraph or other he may have made use of this psychological definition of thinking. But after all, it is extremely difficult to eliminate the fact that it is in Freud that we also discover that thinking is a perfectly efficacious mode, and in a way one that is sufficient to itself, of masturbatory satisfaction?

你们将会告诉我,你们能够找到,在弗洛伊德的某个地方,但是当然,我们能够在弗洛伊德找到一切。在某个段落,他可能曾经使用这个心理学对于思想的定义。但是毕竟,这是极端地困难,要减少这个事实:在弗洛伊德,我们也发现,思想是一个非常有效用的模式。在某方面,本身就自给自足的思想,是一种手淫式的满足吗?

This to say that, as regards what is in question concerning the meaning of thinking, we have perhaps a slightly broader span than other workers. This does not exclude that in questioning the formula we are dealing with: “I think therefore I am”, we could say that, as regards the use that is made of it, it cannot but pose us a problem: because we have to question this word “I think”, however large may be the field that we have reserved for thinking, to see the characteristics of thinking being satisfied, to see being satisfied the characteristics of what we can call a thinking.

这就是说,关于受到质疑的东西,关于思想的意义,我们或许比其他的工作者,拥有稍微更宽广的空间。这并没有排除,当我们询问这个公式,我们正在处理:「我思故我在」,我们能够说,关于对这个公式的使用,它忍不住会跟我们提出一个问题:因为我们必须询问「我思」这个字词,无论我们保留给思想的领域是多么的宽广,为了看出思想被满足的这些特性,为了看出我们所谓的思想的特性被满足。

It could be that this word proved itself quite insufficient to sustain in any way, anything whatsoever that we may at the end discover of this presence: “I am”.

很有可能,这个字词证明它本身并不足够以任何方式维持任何东西,为了我们最后会发现「我在」的这个存在。

This is precisely what I am claiming. To clarify my account, would point out the fact that “I think” taken simply in this form, is logically no more sustainable, no more supportable than the “I am lying”, which has already created problems for a
certain number of logicians, this “I am lying” which can only be sustained because of the no doubt empty but sustainable logical vacillation which this apparent meaning unfolds, quite sufficient moreover to find its place in formal logic. “I am lying”, if I
say it, it is true, therefore I am not lying, but nevertheless I am indeed lying because in saying “I am lying” I affirm the contrary.

这确实是我正在宣称的。澄清我的描述,将会指出这个事实:以这种方式接受的「我思」,在逻辑上并不见得会比「我正在说谎」更好维持,更好支持。「我正在说谎」这个陈述曾经引起逻辑专家某些的难题。这个「我正在说谎」仅能够被维持,因为这个无可置疑的空洞,但是这个明显的意义展开的可维持的逻辑的摇摆。而且,它完全足够在正式的逻辑里找到它的位置。「我正在说谎」,假如我说它,它就是真实的,因此我并没有正在说谎。可是我确实是在说谎,因为当我说「我正在说谎时」,我肯定了相反的东西。

(14) It is very easy to dismantle this so-called logical difficulty and to show that the so-called difficulty on which this judgment reposes depends on the following: the judgement that it involves cannot refer to its own enunciation, it is a collapsing: it is on the absence of distinction between two planes, because of the fact that the accent is put on the “I am lying” itself without making a distinction in it, that this pseudo-difficulty comes about; this in order to tell you, that without this distinction, we are not dealing with a real proposition.

我们很容易拆解这个所谓的逻辑的困难,并且显示所谓的困难,这个判断本质上具有的所谓的困难依靠著以下:它牵涉到的判断,无法提到它自己的表述,这个判断是一种崩塌:就是在这两个层次之间的区别的欠缺,因为这个事实:「我正在说谎」本身的这个强调点,并没有在里面做一种区别。这个虚假的困难发生,这是为了告诉你们,假如没有这个区别,我们并不是在处理一个真正的命题。

These little paradoxes, of which the logicians make a great deal, in order moreover to reduce them immediately to their proper measure, may seem to be simple amusements: they have all the same their interest: they should be retained in order to pinpoint in short the true position of all formal logic, up to and including this famous logical-positivism of which I spoke earlier.

这些小矛盾,逻辑专家非常重视,为了将它们立刻化简成为它们适当的程度。这两个小矛盾看起来仅是有趣。它们仍然拥有它们的興趣。他们应该被保留,总之为了强调所有正式逻辑的这个真实的立场。一直到包括我早先谈论到的这个著名的逻辑实证论。

By that I mean that in my opinion not enough use precisely has been made of the famous aporia of Epimenides – which is only a more developed form of what I have just presented to you in connection with the “I am lying” – that “All Cretans are liars”.

我说这句话的意思是,依我之见,对于阿披敏尼地思的这个著名的谜团,确实并没有受到充分地利用。这个谜团仅是我刚刚呈现给予你们关于「我正在说谎」的更加复杂的形态。那就是:「所有的科瑞滕人都是说谎者。」

Thus speaks Epimenides the Cretan, and you immediately see the little whirligig that is engendered. Not enough use has been made of it to demonstrate the vanity of what is called the famous universal affirmative proposition A.

阿披敏尼地思如此谈论这个科瑞滕人。你们立刻会看出这个小小的旋转玩物被产生。我们并没有充分地利用它来证明这个白费力气,对于所谓的著名的普遍性的肯定命题A

Because in effect, one notices it in this connection, it is indeed here, as we will see, the most interesting form for resolving the difficulty.

因为事实上,我们在这方面注意到它,它确实在这里,如我们所看见,用来解决这个困难的最有趣的形态。

Because, observe carefully what happens, if one poses the following which is possible, which has been posed in the criticism of the famous universal affirmative A of which some people have claimed, not without foundation, that its substance has never been other than that of a universal negative proposition “there is no Cretan who (15) is not capable of lying”, from then on there is no longer any problem.

因为,当你仔细地观察所发生的事情,假如我们提出以下可能的问题,这个问题曾经被提出,在这个著名的普遍性的肯定A的批评。有些人曾经宣称,并不是完全没有根据,它的材料道道地地就是一个普遍性的否定的命题:「没有一位科瑞滕人不具有说谎的能力。」从那时开始,问题就不再存在。

Epimenides can say it, for the reason that expressed in this way he does not say at all that there is someone, even a Cretan who is able to lie in a continuous stream, especially when one notices that tenaciously lying implies a sustained memory which ensures that it ends up by orienting the discourse in the sense of being the equivalent of an admission, so that, even if “all Cretans are liars” means that there is no Cretan who does not wish to lie in a continuous stream, the truth indeed will finish up by escaping him and, in the precise measure of the rigour of this will; the most plausible meaning of the avowal by the Cretan Epimenides that all Cretans are liars, this meaning can only be the following, which is that:

阿披敏尼地思能够说这句话,因为以这种方式被表达的理由。他根本没有说:有某个人,甚至一位能干说谎话的科瑞滕人,以连续的方式,特别是当我们注意到,顽强地说谎话,暗示着一个随之而来的持久的记忆,以致它结果会定位这个论述,以承认作为相等语的意义。所以,即使「所有的科瑞滕人都是说谎话者」,意味着,没有一位科瑞滕人不希望以连续的方式说谎话。这个真理确实将会以不适用于他而告结束,从这个意愿的严谨的意义来说。这位科瑞滕人阿披敏尼地思所宣称的最合理的意义是:所有的科瑞滕人都是说谎话者,这个意义仅是以下的推理:

1) he glories in it
2) he wants by that to unsettle you by really warning you about his method; but this has no other intention, this has the same success as this other procedure which consists in announcing that one is oneself a plain blunt man, that one is absolutely
frank. This is the type who suggests to you that you should endorse all his bluffing.

1. 他以这句话沾沾自喜。
2. 他想要凭借这句话让你不安,作为真正的警告你关于他的方法。但是这句话并没有其他意图。这句话获得相同的成功,如同这个其它的程序在于宣称:我们自己是一个坦诚的人,我们绝对地坦白。这种人跟你建议:你应该替他所有的吹牛背书。

What I mean, is that every universal affirmative, in the formal sense of the category, has the same oblique goals, and it is very interesting to see these goals manifesting themselves in the classical examples.

我的意思是,每一个普遍性的肯定,在范畴的正式意义而言,都拥有相同的扭曲的目标。这是耐人寻味的,看到这些目标在这些古典的例子里,证明它们自己。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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