齐泽克论拉康

齐泽克论拉康

Puppet and the dwarf
木偶与侏儒
Zizek
齐泽克

In Buddhist terms, the Lacanian act is the exact structural obverse of Enlightenment, of attaining nirvana: the very gesture by means of which the Void is disturbed, and Difference (and, with it, false appearance
and suffering) emerges in the world.

A. 对于佛教徒来说,拉康式行为是启蒙和涅磐的反面:通过拉康式行为虚空被搅扰了,而差异(虚幻和痛苦)出现。
B. 从佛教术语而言,拉康所谓的「诉诸行动」,跟「启明开悟」与「达到涅槃开悟」,在结构上是恰恰相反。「诉诸行动」是一种姿态,凭借这种姿态,空无被扰乱,差异出现在世上 。随着差异出现,虚假与痛苦也出现。

The act is thus close to the gesture of Bodhisattva who, having reached nirvana, out of compassion—that is, for the sake of the common Good—goes back to phenomenal reality in order to help all other living beings to achieve nirvana.

A. 这种行为接近于涅磐的菩萨,处于慈悲回到现象界的真相去帮助别人。
B. 「诉诸行动」因此类似佛陀的姿态。佛陀获致涅槃后,由于发大悲心—换句话说,为了众生的利益—佛陀回到色相的现实界,为了帮忙所有其他的众生获致涅槃。

The distance from psychoanalysis resides in the fact that, from the latter’s standpoint, Bodhisattva’s sacrificial gesture is false: in order to arrive at the act proper, one should erase any reference to the Good, and do the act just for the sake of it.

A. 不同于精神分析的是,对于精神分析来说,菩萨的牺牲是虚伪的:为了达到目的,你必须去除一切指向善的东西,而只是为了善而行动
B. 佛陀不同于精神分析的地方在于这个事实:从精神分析的观点而言,佛陀的牺牲的姿态是虚假的:为了到达诉诸行动的本身,我们应该抹除一切指向「至高的善」,然后又为了这个「至高的善」,去诉诸行动。

雄伯说:
佛陀这个「至高的善」the Good,是什么呢?华严经普贤行愿品,这么记载:
诸佛如来以大悲心而为体故。因于众生而起大悲。因与大悲生菩提心。因菩提心成等正觉。是故菩提属于众生。若无众生,一切菩萨终不能成无上正觉。
菩萨随顺众生,于诸病苦为作良医,于失道者示其正路,于闇夜中为作光明,于贫穷者令其伏藏。菩萨如实平等饒益众生。

(This reference to Bodhisattva also enables us to answer the “big question”: if, now, we have to strive to break out of the vicious cycle of craving into the blissful peace of nirvana, how did nirvana “regress” into getting caught in the wheel of craving in the first place?

A. (这也使我们可以回答这个大问题:如果我们打破贪欲的轮回进入喜乐的涅磐,涅磐怎么堕落为贪欲本身?
B. (由于指向佛陀,我们也能够回答这个「大哉问」:假如现在我们必须奋斗,才能突破对于涅槃的安乐净土的渴望的恶性循环,涅槃当初怎么会「堕落」成为沉沦于渴望的轮迴?

The only consistent answer is: Bodhisattva repeats this primordial “evil” gesture. The fall into Evil was accomplished by the “original Bodhisattva”—in short, the ultimate source of Evil is compassion it self.)

A. 唯一合理的答案是:菩萨重复着原始的邪恶(evil)姿态,堕落(regress)为恶是通过菩萨完成的,也就是说:恶的根源是慈悲)。
B. 唯一能够自圆其说的回答是:佛陀「重复」这个原初的「恶道」的姿态。堕入「恶道」,伴随而来的是「原初的佛陀」的拯救—总之,「恶道」的最后来源,就是大悲心的本身。

雄伯说:
齐泽克将原初佛陀的大悲心,跟原初的邪恶姿态,相提并论,有点令人费解。今阅华严经入法界品第三十九至十八,有这样的记载:

复忆往世作诸恶业,即时发意专自防断,复忆往世起诸妄想,即使发意恒正思维。复忆往世所修诸行,但为自身,即使发意令心广大普及含识。复忆往世追求欲境,常自损耗无有滋味,即时发意修行佛法,长养诸根以自安稳。复忆往世起邪思念颠倒相应,即时发意正见心起菩萨愿。复忆往世日夜劬劳作诸恶事,即时发意,起大精进成就佛法。

Bodhisattva’s compassion is strictly correlative to the notion that the “pleasure principle” regulates our activity when we are caught in the wheel of Illusion—that is to say, that we all strive toward the Good, and the ultimate problem is epistemological (we misperceive the true nature of the Good)—to quote the Dalai Lama himself, the beginning of wisdom is “to realize that all living beings are equal in not wanting unhappiness and suffering and equal in the right to rid themselves of suffering.”12

A. 当我们处于幻想轮回中,菩萨的慈悲和快乐原则这个概念息息相关,也就是说,我们都追寻着善,而最终的问题是认识论的(我们误解了善的本质)。用Dalai拉嘛的话说就是:“智慧的开始是所有生灵都不愿承受不快乐,所有都有权摆脱痛苦”。
B. 佛陀的大悲心,跟我们处于幻见轮迴里,操控我们的活动的「快乐原则」的观念息息相关。换句话说,我们都奋斗朝向这个「至高的善」。而且,最终的问题是认识论,(我们错误地感觉至高的善的特质)–引述Dalai拉嘛他自己的说法:智慧的开始,就是体悟到,当不想要不快乐及痛苦这一点,一切众生是平等的,都有权利替自己摆脱痛苦。

The Freudian drive, however, designates precisely the paradox of “wanting unhappiness,” of finding excessive pleasure in suffering itself—the title of a Paul Watzlawik book (The Pursuit of Unhappiness) expresses this fundamental self-blockade of human behavior perfectly.

A. 而弗洛伊德则明确指出了“向往不快乐”的悖论,即在痛苦中发现剩余的快感。
B. 可是,弗洛伊德所谓的「驱力」,确实指明「想要不快乐」「想要痛苦的本身找到过度的快乐」的这个矛盾。保罗,瓦兹拉维克的这本书名「不快乐的寻求」,完美地表达了人类行为这个基本的阻碍。

The Buddhist ethical horizon is therefore still that of the Good—that is to say, Buddhism is a kind of negative of the ethics of the Good: aware that every positive Good is a lure, it fully assumes the Void as the only true Good.

A. 佛教伦理即是善的反面(negative):认识到所有正面的善都是假象,它必须假设虚空是唯一的善,
B. 佛教的伦理的领域因此依旧是「至高的善」的领域—换句话说,佛教是「至高的善」的伦理学的一种否定。因为它知道,每个正面的「至高的善」是一种陷阱,它充分地假定这个「空无」,作为唯一的「至高的善」。

What it cannot do is to pass “beyond nothing,” into what Hegel called “tarrying with the negative”: to return to a phenomenal reality which is “beyond nothing,” to a Something which gives body to the Nothing.

A. 只是不能超越这个虚空进入黑格尔所说的与否定共存。
B. 它所不能够做的就是将「超越空无」,变成为黑格尔所谓的「停留在否定」:就是回到现象的现实界,那就是「超越空无」,回到给予「空无」实体的色界。

雄伯说
黑格尔所谓的「停留在否定」tarrying with the negative,是指「正、反、合」positive-negative-synthesis的辩证法过程,一直停留在「否定」阶段,不进入「合」,然后再从「正」开始的阶段。这从他自己的历史观来说,似乎是不太可能。

大乘佛教的教义反对一直停留在「空界」的幻灭空,而是上迴向「会色归空」之后,不舍众生地无缘大悲故,「真空幻有」地回归现象的「色界」,因为「菩提属于众生。若无众生,一切菩萨终不能成无上正觉。」

齐泽克则是将黑格尔的「正、反、合」的辩证法,「停留在否定」,跟佛陀的「色、空、色」回转成为菩萨的「真空幻有」的翻转,相提并论,难免让人有比喻不伦的感觉,试想想看:「反」跟「空」的本质,相距有多大啊。

The Buddhist endeavor to get rid of the illusion (of craving, of phenomenal reality) is, in effect, the endeavor to get rid of the Real of/in this illusion, the kernel of the Real that accounts for our “stubborn attachment” to the illusion.

A. 佛教徒想要脱离幻像(渴望现象的存在)。
B. 佛教徒想要摆脱欲望与现象的色界的企图,实际上就是想要摆脱在这个幻见里的「实在界」,「实在结的这个核心,它说明了我们对于「幻见」的「顽固的依恋」。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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