Encore 22

Encore 22
繼續再來
Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

VI
God and Woman’s jouissance
上帝及女人的歡爽

2b

It seems clear to me that the Other – put forward at the time of “The Instance of the Letter” as the locus of speech – was a way, I can’t say of laicizing, but of exorcising the good old God. After all, there are even people10 who complimented me for having been able to posit in one of my last seminars that God doesn’t exist. Obviously, they hear (entendent)11 – they hear, but alas, they understand, and what they understand is a bit precipitate.

對於我而言,這是顯而易見,大他者—在「訊息在無意識的代理」裡被提出的,作為言談的軌跡—那是一種將善良的古老上帝的驅魔,我無法說是開除他的會籍。畢竟,甚至有些人恭維我,因為在我上一次的研討班,曾經提出:上帝並不存在。顯而易見地,他們聽到—他們聽到,但是,唉,他們瞭解,他們所瞭解的是有點倉促。

So today, I am instead going to show you in what sense the good old God exists. The way in which he exists will not necessarily please everyone, especially not the theologians, who are, as I have been saying for a long time, far more capable than I am of doing without his existence. I, unfortunately,
am not entirely in the same position, because I deal with the Other.

所以今天,我並不是要跟你們顯示,這個善良的古老上帝存在有什麼意義。他存在的方式未必讓每個人皆大歡喜,特別是並不討好神學家。如同我長久以來一直在說的,他們比起我,更加能夠免除上帝的存在。不幸地,我跟他們並不處於相同的立場,因為我處理的是大他者。

This Other – assuming there is but one all alone – must have some relationship with what appears of the other sex. On that score, I didn’t stop myself, the year I mentioned last time, that of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, from referring to courtly love. What is courtly love?

大他者—假定僅僅只有一位大他者—跟出現在異性身上的東西,會有某些的關係。因為那個原因,我並沒有停止我自己不去提到騎士之愛,上一次我提到的那一年,「精神分析的倫理學」的那一年,什麼是騎士之愛?

It is a highly refined way of making up for (suppléer à) the absence of the sexual relationship, by feigning that we are the ones who erect an obstacle thereto. It is truly the most amazing thing that has even been attempted. But how can one denounce the fake?

這是一個非常高雅的方式來彌補性關係的欠缺,由於假裝我們額外豎立阻礙的那些人。這確實是曾經被嘗試過的最令人驚奇的事情。但是我們如何能夠抨擊這種虛假?

Rather than dwelling on the paradox of why courtly love appeared during the feudal era, materialists should see therein a magnificent occasion to show, on the contrary, how it is rooted in the discourse of loyalty (féalité), of fidelity to the person. In the final analysis, the “person” always has to do with the master’s discourse. Courtly love is, for man – in relation to whom the lady is entirely, and in the most servile sense of the word, a subject – the only way to elegantly pull off the absence of the sexual relationship.

非但沒有詳述這個矛盾:為什麼騎士之愛出現在封建時期,相反地,唯物論者在那裡應該看到一個重要的場合,顯示它如何根源于忠誠度的論述,忠誠於某個人的論述。追根究底,這個「人」總是必須跟主人論述有關係。騎士之愛,對於男人而言—相關于他們,女人完全是服從於他們,就服從這個字眼的順服意義而言。唯一的方法用來高雅地驅除性關係的欠缺。

It is along this pathway that I shall deal – later though, for today I must break new ground – with the notion of the obstacle, with what in Aristotle’s work – whatever else may be said, I prefer Aristotle to Jaufre Rudel12 – is precisely called the obstacle, evaraat^13

我將沿著這條途徑處理—雖然稍後,因為今天我必須打破我的原則—使用阻礙的觀念,使用亞裡斯多德著作裡確實所謂的阻礙。不管別人怎麼說,我偏愛亞裡斯多德,勝過魯德爾。

My readers – whose book you must, I repeat, all go out and buy later – even found that. They investigate the instance so thoroughly, so carefully – as I said, I have never seen a single one of my students do such work, alas, no one will ever take seriously what I write, except of course those about
whom I said earlier that they hate me in the guise of desupposing my knowledge – that they even discover the evaraai^ the Aristotelian logical obstacle that I had reserved for the end. It is true that they do not see where it fits in.

我的讀者甚至會發現到—我重複一下,你們必須出去購買他的書。他們如此徹底,如此仔細地研究這個例子—如同我說的,我從來沒有看見過我的一位學生,從事這樣的研究。唉!沒有願意認真看待我所書寫的東西,當然,除了那些早先我說過,他們偽裝並非否認我的知識來痛恨我。他們甚至發現亞裡斯多德的邏輯的阻礙,那是我保留作為這個目標。他們確實沒有看出它在哪裡適合。

But they are so used to working, especially when something motivates them – the desire, for example, to obtain their Master’s,14 a truly serendipitous term here – that they even mention that in the footnote on pages 28 and 29.15

但是他們如此習慣於研究,特別是當某件東西引起他們的動機—譬如,想要獲得他們的碩士學位,在此這確實是一個意外的東西—他們甚至提到,第28頁及29頁的注釋。

Consult Aristotle and you will know everything when I at last come to this business of the evaracriç. You can read, one after the other, the passage in the Rhetoric and the two sections of the Topics16 that will allow you to truly know what I mean when I try to integrate my four formulas, 3x<I
and the rest, into Aristotle’s work.

假如你們參照亞裡斯多德,你們將會知道,當我最後談論「阻礙」這件事的一切。你們能夠閱讀,一段又一段地,在「修飾學」的這個段落及「信件集」的這兩個部分。它們容許你們真實地知道我是什麼意思,當我嘗試合併我的四個愛情公式ΣχΦχ,及其餘的東西,到亞裡斯多德的著作裡。

Lastly, to finish up on this point, why should materialists, as they are called, be indignant about the fact that I situate – and why shouldn’t I – God as the third party in this business of human love? Even materialists sometimes know a bit about the ménage à trois, don’t they?

最後,為了完成這一點的論述,唯物論者,顧名思義,對於這個事實非常憤怒:我將上帝定位在人類之愛的第三者,(有何不可呢?)唯物論者有時候甚至也稍微知道這個「擁有一妻也妾的齊人之福」,他們知道嗎?

So let us try to push ahead. Let us try to push ahead regarding what results from the following, that nothing indicates that I don’t know what

所以,讓我們嘗試勉為其難前進。讓我們嘗試勉為其難前進,不管隨後的結果會是什麼。沒有一樣東西指示著,我不知道要追求什麼。

I’m saying when I speak to you. What creates a problem right from the beginning of this book, which continues right up until the end, is that it assumes – and with that one can do anything – that I have an ontology, or, what amounts to the same thing, a system.

當我跟你們談論時,我正在言說。從這本書的一開始,造成難題的東西,一直繼續到最後,那就是,它假定我們擁有一個本體論,(本體論能夠發揮任何東西),或者相當等於是說,我們擁有一個系統。

In the circular diagram17 in which is supposedly laid out what I put forward regarding the instance of the letter, the authors are at least honest enough to use dotted lines – for good reason, since they hardly weigh anything – to situate all of my statements enveloping the names of the principal philosophers into whose general ontology I am claimed to insert my supposed system. But it cannot be ambiguous that I oppose to the concept of being – as it is sustained in the philosophical tradition, that is, as rooted in
the very thinking that is supposed to be its correlate – the notion that we are duped (joués)18 by jouissance.

在這個迴圈的圖形裡,在裡面,我所提出關於「信作為無意識的訊息代理」,所被認為被規劃出來的東西,作者們至少還有自知之明,使用一些點點的虛線—理由很充分,因為他們幾乎沒有重視任何東西—他們將我所有的陳述,涵蓋主要哲學家的名字,然後宣稱,我將我假定的系統,套進那些主要哲學家的一般本體論裡。因為我假定的系統在哲學傳統裡獲得支撐,換句話說,我的系統根源於這個被認為是相關的思想:我們被歡爽欺騙的觀念。

Thought is jouissance. What analytic discourse contributes is the following, and it is already hinted at in the philosophy of being: there is jouissance of being.

思想是歡爽。精神分析論述的貢獻如下,它在生命實存的哲學裡已經被暗示:那就是,生命實存的歡爽。

I spoke to you of the Nicomachean Ethics because the trace is there. What Aristode wanted to know, and that paved the way for everything that followed in his wake, is what the jouissance of being is. Saint Thomas had no problem after that coming up with the physical theory of love – as it was
called by the abbot Rousselot, whom I mentioned last time19 – namely, that the first being we have a sense of is clearly our being, and everything that is for the good of our being must, by dint of this very fact, be the Supreme Being’s jouissance, that is, God’s. To put it plainly, by loving God, we love
ourselves, and by first loving ourselves – “well-ordered charity,” as it is put20 – we pay the appropriate homage to God.

我跟你們談論「尼可馬周倫理學」,因為痕跡在那裡。亞裡斯多德所想要知道的東西,以及替在他之後隨之而來的一切舖路的東西,就是生命實存的歡爽是什麼。聖湯瑪士在那之後,並沒有遭遇困難就構想出愛的生理法則—如同修道院長羅沙拉特所稱呼它。我上一次提到這個人,換句話說,我們能夠理解的首要事情是,很清楚就是我們的生命實存。換句話說,上帝的生命實存。明白地說,就是憑藉對於上帝之愛,我們愛我們自己。憑藉首先愛我們自己,我們對上帝表示恰如其分的崇敬,如通俗所說,上帝泛愛他的子民。

Being – if people want me to use this term at all costs – the being that I oppose to that – and to which this little volume is forced to attest right from the very first pages of its reading, which simply involve reading – is the being of signifierness. And I fail to see in what sense I am stooping to the ideals of materialism – I say “to the ideals” because they’re beyond its scope – when I identify the reason for the being of signifierness in jouissance, jouissance of the body.

生命實存—假如人們想要我不計任何代價使用這個術語—我反對這樣的生命實存,反對這本小冊子從它的閱讀的前面幾頁,就不得不證明的生命實存。那種作為能指的生命實存,那僅是他們的閱讀。我實在看不出,我屈從於唯物論的這些理想,有什麼意義。我說我是「屈從那些理想」,因為他們逾越它們的範圍—當我辯認出這個理由:作為能指在歡爽的的生命實存,在身體的歡爽裡。

But, you see, a body hasn’t seemed materialistic enough since Democritus. One has to find atoms and the whole nine yards, not to mention sight, smell, and everything that follows there from. All that goes together.

但是,你們要明白,自從德謨克拉圖士以來,身體從來就不是完全物質化的東西。我們必須找出原子跟整個九個場域,更不用跟視覺,味覺,以及一切從那裡隨之而來的東西。這一切都聚集在一起。

It’s no accident that Aristotle occasionally quotes Democritus, even if he feigns disgust when he does so, for he relies on the latter’s work. In fact, the atom is simply an element of flying signifierness, quite simply a CTTOLX^IOV.21

亞裡斯多德引述德謨克拉圖士,並非是偶然,即使當他這樣做時,他假裝感到厭惡。因為他依靠後者的著作。事實上,原子僅是飛翔的能指點一種元素,僅僅就是一種「訊息的元素」。

Except that it is extremely difficult to make it work out right when one retains only what makes the element an element, namely, the fact that it is unique, whereas one should introduce the other a little bit, namely, difference.

除外,當我們保留僅是讓元素成為元素的東西,我們極端困難讓它運作。換句話說,它是獨特的這個事實。在另一方面,我們應該稍微介紹一下大他者,換句話說,差異性。

Now, if there’s no such thing as a sexual relationship, we must see in what respect the jouissance of the body can serve a purpose here.

現在,假如沒有性的關係這樣的東西,我們必須看出,身體的歡爽在此能夠從哪一方面充當目標。

雄伯注:

有些學者出版的研究拉康的書,引用諸如本體論的生命實存哲學,牽強比附拉康的精神分析論述,讓他火冒三丈。因為生命實存哲學的本體,是以人作為「能指」signifierness,當著主體,而拉康的精神分析論述,則是以人作為「所指」signifiedness,作為主體。前者強調身體的意識the conscious 的生命實存,而後者則是強調實在界的無意識the unconscious的生命實存。

除外,拉康結語時提到,「我們應該稍微介紹一下大他者,換句話說,差異性」One should introduce the other a little bit,namely,difference。讓我想到他在「精神分析的四個基本觀念」結語時所說的「精神分析家的欲望並不是一個純粹的欲望。它是一種想要獲得絕對差異的欲望,當面臨原初的能指時,主體第一次將它自己屈服于原初能指的立場時,分析家介入的欲望。僅有在那裡,無限的愛的意義才會出現,因為僅有處於法則的限制之外,無限的愛才能存活。」The analyst’s desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire to obtain absolute difference, a desire which intervenes when, confronted with the primary signifier, the subject is, for the first time, in a position to subject himself to it. There only may the signification of a limitless love emerge, because it is outside the limits of the law, where alone1 it may live.

再回想到拉康的「主體的顛覆及欲望的辯證法」Subversion of the subject and dialectic of desire。他使用一個大「問號」的拓撲圖形顯示Che uoi 「大他者對我的欲望是什麼?」這三段引文對照來看,我們終於可以明白:大他者對我的欲望就是絕對的差異absolute difference, 也就是介入主體首次屈服原初能指的無限的愛endless love。

每個主體都要捫心自問:為什麼我給不出無限的愛?我的原初的無限的愛,何時消失?為何消失?若是按照拉康的欲望辯證法,沒有無限的愛,就沒有實在界無意識「所指」的生命實存,我們過的一生,難道不就是無意義的空虛的一生?

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

2 Responses to “Encore 22”

  1. 路人周 Says:

    譯者的注解在這裡已經是比附了。拉岡原文所說的唯物論,與意符的存有還有元素作為元素的unique獨特,都是the title of the letter裡面所提及的東西。兩位哲學家認為signifiant(能指/意符)就是一個sigularite獨特性與奇點,所以必須從某種斯多亞學派的語句要素或是話語元素概念加以理解,而這讓拉岡落入斯多亞之後可能有的發展危險。同時也是在這種解讀的意義上,必須引入他者(位置)與原來的能指(或是意符)一同使用與說明,才能免除兩位評論者的危險。至於注中對於欲望辯證的說明,無法說正確還是錯誤,因為那已經完全不是原典的內容了。

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